Radiation hardening

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Radiation hardening is the process of making

nuclear accidents or nuclear warfare
.

Most semiconductor electronic components are susceptible to radiation damage, and radiation-hardened (rad-hard) components are based on their non-hardened equivalents, with some design and manufacturing variations that reduce the susceptibility to radiation damage. Due to the extensive development and testing required to produce a radiation-tolerant design of a microelectronic chip, the technology of radiation-hardened chips tends to lag behind the most recent developments.

Radiation-hardened products are typically tested to one or more resultant-effects tests, including total ionizing dose (TID), enhanced low dose rate effects (ELDRS), neutron and proton displacement damage, and single event effects (SEEs).

Problems caused by radiation

Environments with high levels of ionizing radiation create special design challenges. A single

quantum computers,[2][3][4] military aircraft, nuclear power stations, and nuclear weapons. In order to ensure the proper operation of such systems, manufacturers of integrated circuits and sensors intended for the military or aerospace
markets employ various methods of radiation hardening. The resulting systems are said to be rad(iation)-hardened, rad-hard, or (within context) hardened.

Major radiation damage sources

Typical sources of exposure of electronics to ionizing radiation are the

cosmic radiation for spacecraft and high-altitude aircraft, and nuclear explosions
for potentially all military and civilian electronics.

Radiation effects on electronics

Fundamental mechanisms

Two fundamental damage mechanisms take place:

Lattice displacement

Lattice displacement is caused by

recombination cause loss of the transistor gain (see neutron effects
). Components certified as ELDRS (Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitive) free, do not show damage with fluxes below 0.01 rad(Si)/s = 36 rad(Si)/h.

Ionization effects

Ionization effects are caused by charged particles, including the ones with energy too low to cause lattice effects. The ionization effects are usually transient, creating

latchup). Photocurrent caused by ultraviolet and X-ray radiation may belong to this category as well. Gradual accumulation of holes in the oxide layer in MOSFET transistors leads to worsening of their performance, up to device failure when the dose is high enough (see total ionizing dose effects
).

The effects can vary wildly depending on all the parameters – type of radiation, total dose and radiation flux, combination of types of radiation, and even the kind of device load (operating frequency, operating voltage, actual state of the transistor during the instant it is struck by the particle) – which makes thorough testing difficult, time-consuming, and requiring many test samples.

Resultant effects

The "end-user" effects can be characterized in several groups,

A neutron interacting with the semiconductor lattice will displace its atoms. This leads to an increase in the count of recombination centers and

optocouplers, are very sensitive to neutrons. The lattice damage influences the frequency of crystal oscillators
. Kinetic energy effects (namely lattice displacement) of charged particles belong here too.

Total ionizing dose effects

The cumulative damage of the semiconductor lattice (lattice displacement damage) caused by ionizing radiation over the exposition time. It is measured in

crystals are especially sensitive. Radiation performance curves for TID testing may be generated for all resultant effects testing procedures. These curves show performance trends throughout the TID test process and are included in the radiation test report.

Transient dose effects

The short-time high-intensity pulse of radiation, typically occurring during a nuclear explosion. The high radiation flux creates photocurrents in the entire body of the semiconductor, causing transistors to randomly open, changing logical states of

memory cells. Permanent damage may occur if the duration of the pulse is too long, or if the pulse causes junction damage or a latchup. Latchups are commonly caused by the X-rays and gamma radiation flash of a nuclear explosion. Crystal oscillators may stop oscillating for the duration of the flash due to prompt photoconductivity
induced in quartz.

Systems-generated EMP effects

SGEMP are caused by the radiation flash traveling through the equipment and causing local

and cases.

Digital damage: SEE

Single-event effects (SEE) have been studied extensively since the 1970s.[8] When a high-energy particle travels through a semiconductor, it leaves an ionized track behind. This ionization may cause a highly localized effect similar to the transient dose one - a benign glitch in output, a less benign bit flip in memory or a register or, especially in high-power transistors, a destructive latchup and burnout. Single event effects have importance for electronics in satellites, aircraft, and other civilian and military aerospace applications. Sometimes, in circuits not involving latches, it is helpful to introduce RC time constant circuits that slow down the circuit's reaction time beyond the duration of an SEE.

Single-event transient

SET happens when the charge collected from an ionization event discharges in the form of a spurious signal traveling through the circuit. This is de facto the effect of an electrostatic discharge. Soft error, reversible.

Single-event upset

state machines, placing the device into an undefined state, a test mode, or a halt, which would then need a reset or a power cycle
to recover.

Single-event latchup

SEL can occur in any chip with a parasitic PNPN structure. A heavy ion or a high-energy proton passing through one of the two inner-transistor junctions can turn on the thyristor-like structure, which then stays "shorted" (an effect known as latch-up) until the device is power-cycled. As the effect can happen between the power source and substrate, destructively high current can be involved and the part may fail. Hard error, irreversible. Bulk CMOS devices are most susceptible.

Single-event snapback

Single-event snapback is similar to SEL but not requiring the PNPN structure, can be induced in N-channel MOS transistors switching large currents, when an ion hits near the drain junction and causes avalanche multiplication of the charge carriers. The transistor then opens and stays opened, a hard error, which is irreversible.

Single-event induced burnout

SEB may occur in power MOSFETs when the substrate right under the source region gets forward-biased and the drain-source voltage is higher than the breakdown voltage of the parasitic structures. The resulting high current and local overheating then may destroy the device. Hard error, irreversible.

Single-event gate rupture

SEGR was observed in power MOSFETs when a heavy ion hits the gate region while a high voltage is applied to the gate. A local breakdown then happens in the insulating layer of silicon dioxide, causing local overheat and destruction (looking like a microscopic explosion) of the gate region. It can occur even in EEPROM cells during write or erase, when the cells are subjected to a comparatively high voltage. Hard error, irreversible.

SEE testing

While proton beams are widely used for SEE testing due to availability, at lower energies proton irradiation can often underestimate SEE susceptibility. Furthermore, proton beams expose devices to risk of total ionizing dose (TID) failure which can cloud proton testing results or result in pre-mature device failure. White neutron beams—ostensibly the most representative SEE test method—are usually derived from solid target-based sources, resulting in flux non-uniformity and small beam areas. White neutron beams also have some measure of uncertainty in their energy spectrum, often with high thermal neutron content.

The disadvantages of both proton and spallation neutron sources can be avoided by using mono-energetic 14 MeV neutrons for SEE testing. A potential concern is that mono-energetic neutron-induced single event effects will not accurately represent the real-world effects of broad-spectrum atmospheric neutrons. However, recent studies have indicated that, to the contrary, mono-energetic neutrons—particularly 14 MeV neutrons—can be used to quite accurately understand SEE cross-sections in modern microelectronics.[9]

Radiation-hardening techniques

Radiation hardened die of the 1886VE10 microcontroller prior to metalization etching
Radiation hardened die of the 1886VE10 microcontroller after a metalization etching process has been used

Physical

Hardened chips are often manufactured on

4000 series chips were available in radiation-hardened versions (RadHard).[12] While SOI eliminates latchup events, TID and SEE hardness are not guaranteed to be improved.[13]

Bipolar integrated circuits generally have higher radiation tolerance than CMOS circuits. The low-power Schottky (LS)

5400 series can withstand 1000 krad, and many ECL devices can withstand 10 000 krad.[12]

Magnetoresistive RAM, or MRAM, is considered a likely candidate to provide radiation hardened, rewritable, non-volatile conductor memory. Physical principles and early tests suggest that MRAM is not susceptible to ionization-induced data loss.[14]

SRAM
.

Choice of substrate with wide band gap, which gives it higher tolerance to deep-level defects; e.g. silicon carbide or gallium nitride.[citation needed]

radioactivity, to reduce exposure of the bare device.[15]

Shielding the chips themselves (from neutrons) by use of depleted boron (consisting only of isotope boron-11) in the borophosphosilicate glass passivation layer protecting the chips, as naturally prevalent boron-10 readily captures neutrons and undergoes alpha decay (see soft error).

Use of a special

process node to provide increased radiation resistance.[16] Due to the high development costs of new radiation hardened processes, the smallest "true" rad-hard (RHBP, Rad-Hard By Process) process is 150 nm as of 2016, however, rad-hard 65 nm FPGAs were available that used some of the techniques used in "true" rad-hard processes (RHBD, Rad-Hard By Design).[17] As of 2019 110 nm rad-hard processes are available.[18]

Use of SRAM cells with more transistors per cell than usual (which is 4T or 6T), which makes the cells more tolerant to SEUs at the cost of higher power consumption and size per cell.[19][17]

Use of Edge-less CMOS transistors, which have an unconventional physical construction, together with an unconventional physical layout.[20]

Logical

Error correcting code memory (ECC memory) uses redundant bits to check for and possibly correct corrupted data. Since radiation's effects damage the memory content even when the system is not accessing the RAM, a "scrubber" circuit must continuously sweep the RAM; reading out the data, checking the redundant bits for data errors, then writing back any corrections to the RAM.

Redundant elements can be used at the system level. Three separate microprocessor boards may independently compute an answer to a calculation and compare their answers. Any system that produces a minority result will recalculate. Logic may be added such that if repeated errors occur from the same system, that board is shut down.

Redundant elements may be used at the circuit level.

voting logic" for each bit to continuously determine its result (triple modular redundancy). This increases area of a chip design by a factor of 5, so must be reserved for smaller designs. But it has the secondary advantage of also being "fail-safe" in real time. In the event of a single-bit failure (which may be unrelated to radiation), the voting logic will continue to produce the correct result without resorting to a watchdog timer
. System level voting between three separate processor systems will generally need to use some circuit-level voting logic to perform the votes between the three processor systems.

Hardened latches may be used.[22]

A watchdog timer will perform a hard reset of a system unless some sequence is performed that generally indicates the system is alive, such as a write operation from an onboard processor. During normal operation, software schedules a write to the watchdog timer at regular intervals to prevent the timer from running out. If radiation causes the processor to operate incorrectly, it is unlikely the software will work correctly enough to clear the watchdog timer. The watchdog eventually times out and forces a hard reset to the system. This is considered a last resort to other methods of radiation hardening.

Military and space industry applications

Radiation-hardened and radiation tolerant components are often used in military and aerospace applications, including point-of-load (POL) applications, satellite system power supplies, step down

FPGA
power sources, and high efficiency, low voltage subsystem power supplies.

However, not all military-grade components are radiation hardened. For example, the US MIL-STD-883 features many radiation-related tests, but has no specification for single event latchup frequency. The Fobos-Grunt space probe may have failed due to a similar assumption.[13]

The market size for radiation hardened electronics used in space applications was estimated to be $2.35 billion in 2021. A new study has estimated that this will reach approximately $4.76 billion by the year 2032.[24][25]

Nuclear hardness for telecommunication

In

telecommunication
, the term nuclear hardness has the following meanings: 1) an expression of the extent to which the performance of a
nuclear radiation
and electromagnetic pulses (EMP).

Notes

  1. Nuclear hardness may be expressed in terms of either susceptibility or vulnerability.
  2. The extent of expected performance degradation (e.g., outage time, data lost, and equipment damage) must be defined or specified. The environment (e.g., radiation levels, overpressure, peak velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress) must be defined or specified.
  3. The physical attributes of a system or component that will allow a defined degree of survivability in a given environment created by a nuclear weapon.
  4. Nuclear hardness is determined for specified or actual quantified environmental conditions and physical parameters, such as peak radiation levels, overpressure, velocities, energy absorbed, and electrical stress. It is achieved through design specifications and it is verified by test and analysis techniques.

Examples of rad-hard computers

See also

References

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  8. .
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  10. ^ Microsemi Corporation (March 2012), RTSX-SU Radiation-Tolerant FPGAs (UMC) (PDF) (Datasheet), retrieved May 30, 2021
  11. ^ Atmel Corporation (2008), Rad Hard 16 MegaBit 3.3V SRAM MultiChip Module AT68166H (PDF) (Datasheet), retrieved May 30, 2021
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  14. ^ Wang, B.; Wang, Z.; Hu, C.; Zhao, Y.; Zhang, Y.; Zhao, W. (2018). "Radiation Hardening Techniques for SOT-MRAM Peripheral Circuitry". 2018 IEEE International Magnetics Conference (INTERMAG). 2018 IEEE International Magnetics Conference (INTERMAG). pp. 1–2. .
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  16. ^ "The other Atmel: Radiation Hardened Sparc CPU's | the CPU Shack Museum". 27 July 2009.
  17. ^ a b "Avnet: Quality Electronic Components & Services" (PDF).
  18. ^ "Aerospace & Defense Solutions" (PDF). Onsemi.
  19. ^ Tiehu Li; Yintang Yang; Junan Zhang; Jia Liu. "A novel SEU hardened SRAM bit-cell design". IEICE Electronics Express. 14 (12): 1–8.
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  21. ^ Platteter, Dale G. (October 1980). Protection of LSI Microprocessors using Triple Modular Redundancy. International IEEE Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing.
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  23. ^ Mil & Aero Staff (2016-06-03). "FPGA development devices for radiation-hardened space applications introduced by Microsemi". Military & Aerospace Electronics. Retrieved 2018-11-02.
  24. ^ Diagle, Lisa (2022-06-17). "Rad-hard electronics for space to reach $4.76 billion by 2032, study says". Military Embedded Systems. Retrieved 2022-06-18.
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  35. ^ "NASA Awards Next-Generation Spaceflight Computing Processor Contract". nasa. 2022-08-15.

Books and Reports

External links