Croatian Spring
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The Croatian Spring (Croatian: Hrvatsko proljeće), or Maspok,[a] was a political conflict that took place from 1967 to 1971 in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, at the time part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As one of six republics comprising Yugoslavia at the time, Croatia was ruled by the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH), nominally independent from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), led by President Josip Broz Tito. The 1960s in Yugoslavia were marked by a series of reforms aimed at improving the economic situation in the country and increasingly politicised efforts by the leadership of the republics to protect the economic interests of their respective republics. As part of this, political conflict occurred in Croatia when reformers within the SKH, generally aligned with the Croatian cultural society Matica hrvatska, came into conflict with conservatives.
In the late 1960s, a variety of grievances were aired through Matica hrvatska, which were adopted in the early 1970s by a reformist faction of the SKH led by
The Croatian Spring increased the popularity of figures from Croatia's past, such as the 19th century Croat politician and senior Austrian military officer,
While other republics, the SKJ, and Tito himself were not initially involved in the internal Croatian struggle, the increasing prominence of Croatian nationalism led Tito and the SKJ to intervene. Similar to reformers in other Yugoslav republics, the SKH leadership was compelled to resign. Nevertheless, their reforms were left intact and most demands of the ousted leadership were later adopted, ushering in a form of federalism that contributed to the subsequent breakup of Yugoslavia.
Background
Economic crisis
In the early 1960s, the
Politicisation of reforms
Further economic reforms were adopted in 1964 and 1965, transferring considerable powers from the federation to the republics and individual companies. Some of the reform measures exacerbated conflict between the banks, insurers, and foreign trade organisations owned by the Yugoslav government versus those owned by the constituent republics, a conflict that became increasingly political and nationalist.[1] Competing alliances were established. Ranković gained the support of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, in addition to Serbia. Slovenia was supported by Croatia, based on the belief of Vladimir Bakarić—the Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH)—that decentralisation would benefit others in Yugoslavia. Bakarić persuaded Krste Crvenkovski, the head of the League of Communists of Macedonia (SKM), to support the Slovene–Croatian reformist bloc, which managed to enact substantial legislation curbing federal powers in favour of the republics. The conflict was framed as a contest between Serbia's interests against those of Slovenia and Croatia.[5]
In Croatia, positions adopted by Ranković's allies in the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) and the League of Communists of Montenegro (SKCG) were interpreted as hegemonistic, which in turn increased the appeal of Croatian nationalism.[6] By the mid-1960s, the United States consul in Zagreb, Helene Batjer, estimated that about half of SKH members and 80 percent of the population of Croatia held nationalist views.[7]
Peak of the reformist forces
By early 1966, it was clear that the reforms had not produced the desired results. The SKJ blamed the Serbian leadership for resistance to the reforms.
In 1967 and 1968, the Yugoslav constitution was amended once again, further reducing federal authority in favour of the constituent republics.[13] The peak of the reformist coalition occurred at the 9th congress of the SKJ in March 1969, during which decentralisation of all aspects of the country was proposed. A World Bank loan for the construction of motorways caused a major rift in the reformist coalition after the federal government decided to shelve plans to develop a highway section in Slovenia and build one highway section in Croatia and one in Macedonia instead. For the first time, a constituent republic (Slovenia) protested a decision of the federal government, but Slovene demands were rejected. The situation became heated, prompting the Slovene authorities to publicly state that they had no plan to secede. In the aftermath of the affair, the Slovenian authorities withdrew their support for the reformist coalition. Regardless, the SKH and the SKM pressured the SKJ to adopt the principle of unanimity in decision-making, obtaining veto power for the republican branches of the SKJ in April 1970.[14]
National revival
Grievances
By the end of the 1960s, the economic reforms had not resulted in discernible improvement within Croatia. Belgrade-based federal banks still dominated the Yugoslav loan market and foreign trade. Croatia-based banks were pushed out from Dalmatia, a popular tourist region, and hotels there were gradually taken over by large companies based in Belgrade. Croatian media reported that favourable purchase agreements for Serbian companies were the result of political pressure and bribery, and the situation was framed as an ethnic rather than economic conflict.[21]
Furthermore, the situation was worsened by a perception among Croatian nationalists of cultural and demographic threats to Croatia from the following policies: use of school textbooks to suppress Croatian national sentiment, a campaign to standardise the
Language question
In 1967, the first two volumes of the Dictionary of Serbo-Croatian Literary and Vernacular Language based on the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement were published, sparking controversy about whether Croatian was a separate language. Both volumes excluded common Croatian expressions or treated them as local dialect while Serbian variants were often presented as the standard. The unrelated 1966 Serbo-Croatian dictionary published by Miloš Moskovljević further inflamed the situation by omitting the term "Croat" from the vocabulary.[25]
The
Matica hrvatska withdrew from the Novi Sad Agreement on 22 November 1970 because
While multiple newspapers and magazines supported Matica hrvatska, the organisation also introduced its own organ, Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian Weekly), which enthusiastically promoted Croatian nationalism.[24] Edited by Vlado Gotovac,[30] it quickly surpassed the number of subscribers of all other newspapers including Vjesnik, the newspaper of record in Croatia.[24]
SKH factions
Initially, the SKH was internally divided over support for Matica hrvatska, and its leadership remained mostly silent on the matter.
Throughout, the SKH's central economic demand was that Croatia be permitted to retain more of its foreign currency earnings.[35] To this end, the SKH maintained good relations with counterparts from Slovenia and Macedonia, and also attempted to secure the support of the League of Communists of Kosovo. Due to its rejection of the SKH's economic agenda, the SKS was dismissed as "unionist" by the SKH despite Nikezić's support for other reforms.[36] The SKH also opposed the under-representation of Croats in the police, security forces, and the military, as well as in political and economic institutions in Croatia as well as across Yugoslavia. The predominance of Serbs in these positions led to widespread calls for their replacement by Croats.[37] At the federal level, Serbs represented about 39 percent of the Yugoslav population, while Croats accounted for about 19 percent. Serbs were over-represented and Croats under-represented in the civil service by a factor of two, accounting for 67 percent and nine percent of civil servants, respectively.[38] Similarly, Serbs made up between 60–70 percent of the officer corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).[39] In Croatia alone, Serbs represented about 15 percent of the population,[40] but accounted for nearly one-quarter of the SKH's members and more than one-half of the police force.[41]
SKH involvement until mid-1971
In December 1970, the SKH candidate lost the election of student
Within days of the student-body elections, Tito requested that Dabčević-Kučar order the arrests of Šegedin, Marko Veselica, Budiša, Čičak and Đodan, but she declined.
Another set of amendments to the Yugoslav constitution was adopted further restricting federal powers in June 1971. The only powers retained by the federal government were
The SKS leadership did not criticise the SKH; on the contrary, Nikezić and Perović defended Croatia's reformist leadership to Tito in 1971.[48] Serbian and Croatian newspapers traded accusations of mutual hostility, nationalism, and unitarism, leading Tito to admit that the SKJ had lost control of the media.[49] In a meeting with the SKH leaders in July 1971, Tito expressed concern with the political situation and offered Tripalo the post of Prime Minister of Yugoslavia to move him away from the SKH, but Tripalo declined.[50] Later that month, the conservative faction managed to gain sufficient support to expel Đodan and Marko Veselica from the SKH as "nationalist ringleaders".[17]
On 2 August, the SKH announced an Action Programme, criticising nationalism which was referred to in the programme as "national movement", and denouncing unnamed individuals associated with Matica hrvatska for conspiring against the SKH and the SKJ. The SKH leaders determined that the Action Programme would be formally adopted or rejected by its next plenary session in November.[51] The SKH arranged another meeting with Tito on 14 September, insisting he had been misinformed about the situation. After the meeting, Tito said he was convinced that the stories about chauvinism reigning in Croatia were absurd.[50] He also implied that he favoured the SKH's proposal to reform Yugoslavia's foreign currency policy. After the meeting, Tripalo suggested that the Action Programme would no longer be considered.[52]
Looking for role models from the past
The Croatian Spring spurred increased interest in Croatian historical figures. A
Traditional Croatian patriotic songs—some of them banned—experienced a resurgence in popularity. The most popular and controversial singer of such songs at the time was Vice Vukov.[53] Lijepa naša domovino returned to formal use as a patriotic song when a plaque was placed in the Zagreb Cathedral commemorating the noblemen involved in the 17th-century Magnate conspiracy. The opera Nikola Šubić Zrinski, retelling the 16th-century Siege of Szigetvár, was regularly sold out whenever it played at the Croatian National Theatre in Zagreb. Paintings by Oton Iveković (1869–1939) depicting events from Croatian history became very popular.[55][56] Croatia's historical chequy coat of arms became a famous symbol sewn by youths on jackets and berets or applied on stickers to car windshields. In 1969, it was incorporated into the football club crest Dinamo Zagreb. While the Yugoslav flag was still flown, it was always paired with the Croatian one. The latter was also used on its own, and in overall use in Croatia, it outnumbered the Yugoslav flag by ten to one.[56]
The SKH pointed out the significance of the
The SKH maintained that its current policy was rooted in the
Demands for autonomy and a new constitution
At the time of the Croatian Spring, civic relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia were increasingly framed by diverging narratives of
Among Croatian Serbs, Serbian nationalism flared in response to the Croatian national resurgence. By 1969, the cultural society
Finally, Prosvjeta's Rade Bulat demanded the establishment of an autonomous province for the Croatian Serbs, and there were calls to grant autonomy for Dalmatia as well.[67] The SKH Central Committee declared that no region of Croatia could make any legitimate claim to autonomy of any kind and labelled calls for regional Dalmatian autonomy as treason to the Croatian nation.[23] Such responses aligned with the SKH's objective of national homogenisation. To that end, the SKH blocked the option of declaring one's ethnic identity as regional in the 1971 census.[65] The campaign led by Matica hrvatska to emphasise the distinction between Croatian and Serbian was reflected in the prevailing speech of Croatian Serbs, which changed from predominantly Ijekavian, or an Ekavian-Ijekavian blend, to predominantly Ekavian.[40]
The Serbian philosopher Mihailo Đurić argued that Croatia's constitution should be amended to describe the republic as the national state of Croats and Serbs. This remark sparked another series of public debates in March 1971 in the context of the constitutional reform of Yugoslavia. The SKJ responded by bringing charges against Đurić and imprisoning him. Matica hrvatska proposed an amendment to the constitution, further emphasising the national character of Croatia. The SKH dismissed the proposal and drafted its own wording, arguing it was a compromise. Ultimately passed, the SKH's amendment mentioned the Croatian Serbs specifically but defined Croatia as a "national state" of the Croats, avoiding use of the exact same phrase for the Croatian Serbs.[b] The meaning of this difference in formulations was not explained in the text of the constitution.[68] By mid-September 1971, ethnic tensions had worsened to the point that in northern Dalmatia, some Serb and Croat villagers took up arms in fear of each other.[51]
Outside Croatia
In February 1971, the Croatian nationalist émigré magazine Hrvatska država, printed by
Even though the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina was cautious in its response to the SKH's January 1970 shift towards Matica hrvatska's positions,[72] relations became much tenser, primarily reflected through texts published by Matica hrvatska journals and Oslobođenje, the newspaper of record in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[73] The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina initially distinguished between the positions of the SKH and those held by Matica hrvatska, but this distinction eroded over time.[74] In September, Matica hrvatska expanded its work to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina, claiming Croats were underrepresented in government institutions there due to policies implemented during Ranković's tenure. By November 1971, Croatian nationalists advocated annexing a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia to rectify the situation. In response, Serbian nationalists claimed other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Serbia.[75] Officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina responded by prohibiting the establishment of Matica hrvatska branches within the republic.[73]
Foreign policy considerations
During a meeting of the SKJ leadership at the
Aiming to improve the United States' position in the
Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia from 22 to 25 September 1971 amid continuing tension between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev offered a friendship agreement, but Tito declined to sign it to avoid appearing to move closer to the Eastern Bloc.[80] Yugoslav officials notified Nixon through Secretary of State William P. Rogers that the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well. An official visit of Tito to the United States was arranged to reassure Tito of the United States' political, economic, and military support for Yugoslavia. Nixon and Tito met on 30 October in Washington, D.C.[81]
Suppression and purges
November plenum and student protest
At the 5 November plenary session of the SKH, Dabčević-Kučar said that the national movement was evidence of the unity of the nation and the SKH, which she said should not be sacrificed to achieve revolutionary purity. After she rejected several of Bakarić's proposals to modify the SKH's policies, the conservative faction—most vocally Bilić and Dragosavac—demanded the enforcement of the August Action Programme. The issue was not resolved by the plenum but, in the aftermath of the session, Bakarić decided to support Bilić and Dragosavac and to ask Tito to intervene.[82] On 12–15 November, Tito visited Bugojno in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was hosted by the republic's leadership (Branko Mikulić, Hamdija Pozderac, and Dragutin Kosovac). On 13 November, they were joined by the Yugoslav prime minister, Džemal Bijedić, who criticised the SKH's demands for changing the distribution of foreign currency earnings. Dragosavac met with Tito on 14 and 15 November to discuss the Croatian Spring.[83] On 15 November, Tito was joined by the heads of the JNA to view recordings of political rallies in Croatia where nationalists and SKH members spoke and where anti-Tito shouts could be heard.[82]
The extended SKH Central Committee secretly met from 17 to 23 November, but the two opposing factions could not agree.[82] On 22 November, about 3,000 Zagreb University students voted to begin a strike the next morning. Initially, they protested federal regulations on hard currency, banking and commerce. At Paradžik's urging,[84] a series of proposed constitutional amendments was added to the demands: defining Croatia as a sovereign and national state of Croats, making Croatian the official language, guaranteeing that residents of Croatia would complete their compulsory military service in Croatia, and formally establishing Zagreb as Croatia's capital and Lijepa naša domovino as the anthem of Croatia.[85] The protesters singled out Bakarić for sabotaging Tripalo's currency reform.[86] The Croatian Student Federation expanded the strike over Croatia. Within days, 30,000 students were on strike demanding the expulsion of Bilić, Dragosavac, Baltić, Ema Derossi-Bjelajac and Čedo Grbić from the SKH as unitarists.[87] On 25 November, Tripalo met with the students, urging them to stop the strike, and Dabčević-Kučar made the same request four days later.[86]
Karađorđevo meeting and the purges
Tito contacted the United States to inform them of his plan to remove the reformist leadership of Croatia, and the United States did not object. Tito considered deploying the JNA but opted for a political campaign instead. On 1 December, Tito convened a joint meeting of the SKJ and the SKH leaders at the
After the broadcast, the student strike was called off and the SKH leadership announced their agreement with Tito. On 6 December, Bakarić criticised the SKH leadership for not taking any practical steps to comply with Tito's speech of two days earlier, especially for not taking action against Matica hrvatska. Bakarić accused Tripalo of attempting to split the SKH by exaggerating the popular support for the reformists. Two days later, the SKJ leadership met again and concluded that the SKH was not implementing the decisions adopted in Karađorđevo. Student strike leaders were arrested on 11 December,[89] and Dabčević-Kučar and Pirker were forced to resign by Tito the next day. At that point, Tripalo, Marko Koprtla and Janko Bobetko immediately also resigned. In the following days, more resignations were tendered, including the head of the government, Haramija. Milka Planinc became the head of the SKH. Five hundred students protested in Zagreb against the resignations and were suppressed by riot police.[90]
Subsequently, tens of thousands were expelled from the SKH, including 741 high-ranking officials such as Dabčević-Kučar, Tripalo, and Pirker. Another 280 SKH members were compelled to resign their posts and 131 were demoted. SKH conservatives demanded a major show trial with Tuđman as the main defendant, but Tito blocked this proposal.[91] Instead, Tuđman was convicted of trying to overthrow the "democratic self-managing socialism".[92] Overall, 200–300 people were convicted of political crimes, but thousands more were imprisoned without formal charges for two to three months.[91] Matica hrvatska and Prosvjeta were banned, including the former's fourteen publications.[91][92] Purges targeting media professionals, writers, filmmakers, and university staff continued until late 1972.[93] Even though the purges took place only in the period after the 1 December 1971 Karađorđevo meeting, this date is usually thought of as the end of the Croatian Spring in commemorations of the events.[94] Authorities seized and destroyed 40,000 copies of the Moguš, Finka & Babić orthography manual as chauvinist.[95] The remaining 600 copies were bound without any foreword or index and marked "for internal use only". This version was reprinted by London-based Croatian émigré magazine Nova Hrvatska (New Croatia) in 1972 and 1984. The book was published again in Croatia in 1990.[96]
Aftermath
Maintenance of reforms
Under the new SKH leadership,
After the downfall of the reformist SKH leadership, anti-communist émigrés wrote about the Croatian Spring as a movement presaging democratisation and praised Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo as people of "unusual political virtues".[99] Some émigrés believed that the political situation in Yugoslavia, especially among Croats, was conducive to an uprising. Consequently, nineteen members of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood terrorist organisation launched an armed incursion into Yugoslavia in mid-1972, hoping to incite a rebellion that would lead to the re-establishment of the NDH. After a month of deadly skirmishes with the authorities, the incursion ended in failure.[100]
Pirker died in August 1972, and his funeral drew 100,000 supporters. The size of the crowd attending the funeral confirmed continued broad support for Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo, irrespective of their recent purge.[35]
To reduce the popular support for the Croatian nationalists, Tito granted many of the demands of the ousted SKH leaders. For example, export companies were allowed to retain 20 per cent of foreign exchange earnings instead of 7–12 percent while tourism companies increased their retention of foreign currency earnings from 12 per cent to 45 per cent. Devaluation of the Yugoslav dinar by 18.7 per cent, increased the value of the retained foreign currency income on the domestic market.[93]
The new SKH leadership was unwilling to undo the changes implemented by their predecessors and subsequently lost support from the Croatian Serbs.[101] Some Serbs called for the constitution of Croatia to be amended to redefine Croatia as a national state of both Croats and Serbs and create a Serb committee in the Sabor. Those ideas were defeated by Grbić, who held the position of deputy speaker of the Croatian Parliament; as a result, Serbian nationalists denounced Grbić as a traitor to their cause.[102]
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution preserved the 1971 reforms almost entirely, expanded the economic powers of the constituent republics, and granted reformist demands related to banking, commerce, and foreign currency.[103]
Legacy in the final decades of Yugoslavia
In the aftermath of the 1971 purge, the authorities began to
The end of the Croatian Spring ushered in a period known as the Croatian Silence (Hrvatska šutnja),[c] which lasted until the late 1980s, during which the public kept its distance from the unpopular imposed authorities.[108][109] Discussion about the position of the Croatian Serbs was avoided by the new Croatian leadership, and Grbić and others became concerned that the question would be left to the Serbian Orthodox Church and nationalists from Serbia to pose solutions without any counterargument.[102]
The Croatian Spring was a significant event for all of Yugoslavia. Reformist factions in the SKS, SKM and the League of Communists of Slovenia were also suppressed by the end of 1972,[110] replaced by mediocre and obedient politicians. During this period, pressure for the complete breakup of Yugoslavia intensified, religious leaders gained influence, and the Partisan legacy that legitimised the state was weakened.[111] The purges of the 1970s in Croatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia drove many reformist communists and supporters of social democracy away from politics in the country's final decades.[103]
From 1989, several people previously involved with the SKH or Matica hrvatska during the Croatian Spring returned to Croatian politics. Budiša and Gotovac had leading roles in the
Notes
- ^ See notes on naming in #Legacy in the final decades of Yugoslavia
- ^ The amendment defined the Socialist Republic of Croatia as "the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and state of the nationalities inhabiting it."[68]
- ^ Also referred to as the "silent Croatia" in English sources.[107]
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- Rusinow, Dennison (2007). "Reopening of the "National Question" in the 1960s". In Cohen, Lenard J.; Dragović-Soso, Jasna (eds.). State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration. West Lafayette: ISBN 978-1-55753-460-6.
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- Swain, Geoffrey (2011). Tito: A Biography. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. ISBN 978-1-84511-727-6.
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- Veselinović, Velimir (2016). "Franjo Tuđman i pravaši" [Franjo Tuđman and Croatian Parties of Right]. Politička misao: Časopis za politologiju (in Croatian). 53 (1). Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science: 71–102. ISSN 0032-3241.
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Further reading
- Burg, Steven L. (1983). "The 'Yugoslav Crisis': National, Economic, and Ideological Conflict and the Breakdown of Elite Cooperation, 1969–1972". Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966. Princeton: ISBN 978-1-4008-5337-3.
- ISSN 0590-9597.
- Petričušić, Antonija; Žagar, Mitja (2007). "Ethnic Mobilization in Croatia" (PDF). Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano. Retrieved 23 January 2017.
- Rusinow, Dennison I. (1972). "Crisis in Croatia Part I: Post-mortems after Karadjordjevo" (PDF). Southeast Europe Series. XIX (4). New York: American Universities Field Staff: 1–20. OCLC 1789965.
- Spehnjak, Katarina; Cipek, Tihomir (2007). "Disidenti, opozicija i otpor – Hrvatska i Jugoslavija 1945.–1990" [Dissidents, Opposition and Resistance – Croatia and Yugoslavia, 1945–1990]. Journal of Contemporary History (in Croatian). 39 (2). Zagreb: Croatian Institute of History: 255–297. ISSN 0590-9597.
- ISBN 978-86-343-0599-9.
- Veselinović, Velimir (2015). "Politička djelatnost Ante Paradžika" [The Political Activities of Ante Paradžik]. Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva (in Croatian). 12 (1). Zagreb: Croatian Political Science Association: 133–155. ISSN 1845-6707.