Iraqi invasion of Iran
Iraqi invasion of Iran | |||||||||
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Part of the Iran–Iraq War | |||||||||
Iranian soldiers fighting in the First Battle of Khorramshahr (September–November 1980) | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Iran | Iraq | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Joint chief of military staff) Commander)Qasem-Ali Zahirnejad (Joint chief of military staff) Mohsen Rezaee (Revolutionary Guards |
(Republican Guard Commander) | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
| National Defense Battalions | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
At the onset of the war:[5] 110,000–150,000 soldiers, 1,700–2,100 tanks,[6] (500 operable)[7] 1,000 armoured vehicles, 300 operable artillery pieces,[8] 485 fighter-bombers (205 fully operational),[9] 750 helicopters |
At the onset of the war:[10] 200,000 soldiers, 2,800 tanks, 4,000 APCs, 1,400 artillery pieces, 380 fighter-bombers, 350 helicopters | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
4,500 killed[11] 12,000 wounded |
4,000 killed[11] 10,000 wounded |
The Iraqi invasion of Iran began on 22 September 1980, sparking the Iran–Iraq War, and lasted until 5 December 1980. Iraq attacked under the impression that Iran would not be able to respond effectively due to internal socio-political turmoil caused by the country's Islamic Revolution one year earlier. However, Iraqi troops became increasingly bogged down in the face of fierce Iranian resistance, which greatly stalled their advance into western Iran. In just over two months, the invasion was brought to a halt, but not before Iraq had managed to occupy more than 25,900 square kilometres (10,000 sq mi) of Iranian territory.[4]
On 10 September 1980, Iraq, hoping to take advantage of a weakened Iran's consolidation of the Islamic Revolution, forcibly reclaimed territories in Zain al-Qaws and Saïf Saad; these had been promised to Iraq under the terms of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, but were never actually transferred. Both Iran and Iraq later declared the treaty as null and void, doing so on 14 September and 17 September, respectively. As a result, the only outstanding dispute along the Iran–Iraq border at the time of the Iraqi invasion on 22 September was the question of whether Iranian ships would fly Iraqi flags and pay navigation fees to Iraq while sailing through a stretch of the Shatt al-Arab[e] spanning several kilometres.[12][13] On 22 September, Iraqi aircraft pre-emptively bombarded ten Iranian airfields in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to gain aerial superiority on the battlefield. On the next day, Iraqi troops crossed the international border in strength and advanced into Iran in three simultaneous thrusts along a front of approximately 644 kilometres (400 mi). Of Iraq's six divisions that were invading by land, four were sent to Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan in order to cut off Iranian access to the Shatt al-Arab and establish a territorial security zone.[14]
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein presented the invasion as a strategically defensive measure to blunt the edge of Iranian politician Ruhollah Khomeini, who had risen to power as Iran's "Supreme Leader" and was attempting to export the Islamic Revolution to the Arab world. Saddam, as a secularist and an Arab nationalist, perceived Iran's Shia Islamism and Persian identity as an immediate and existential threat to his Ba'ath Party and thereby to Iraqi society as a whole.[15] The Iraqi government sought to take control of the entire Shatt al-Arab in a rapid and decisive military campaign, believing that Iraq's victory in the broader conflict would humiliate Iran and lead to Khomeini's downfall, or, at the very least, thwart the new Iranian government's attempts to spread Khomeinism throughout the Muslim world.[16][17][18][19] Saddam had also aspired to annex Khuzestan and saw the Islamic Revolution as an opportunity to do so, seeking to increase his country's prestige and power in the Arab world.[19][20] To this end, his administration hoped that Iraq, as an Arab-majority country, could successfully exploit Arab separatism in Khuzestan to undermine Iran from within. In practice, these objectives failed to materialize and the majority of Iranian Arabs were indifferent to the pan-Arabism espoused by Iraq's Ba'athists.[16]
Background
Territorial disputes
Saddam's primary interest in war may have stemmed from his desire to right the supposed "wrong" of the Algiers Agreement, in addition to finally achieving his desire of annexing Khuzestan and becoming the regional superpower.[21] Saddam's goal was to replace Egypt as the "leader of the Arab world" and to achieve hegemony over the Persian Gulf.[22] He saw Iran's increased weakness due to revolution, sanctions, and international isolation.[23] Saddam had invested heavily in Iraq's military since his defeat against Iran in 1975, buying large amounts of weaponry from the Soviet Union and France. Between 1973 and 1980 alone, Iraq purchased an estimated 1,600 tanks and APCs and over 200 Soviet-made aircraft.[24] By 1980, Iraq possessed 242,000 soldiers (second only to Egypt in the Arab world),[25] 2,350 tanks[26] and 340 combat aircraft.[27] Watching the powerful Iranian army that frustrated him in 1974–1975 disintegrate, he saw an opportunity to attack, using the threat of Islamic Revolution as a pretext.[28]
Oil and Iran's Islamic Revolution
A successful invasion of Iran would enlarge Iraq's petroleum reserves and make Iraq the region's dominant power. With Iran engulfed in chaos, an opportunity for Iraq to annex the oil-rich Khuzestan Province materialized.
Prelude
Ideological sabre-rattling
In 1979–1980, Iraq was the beneficiary of an oil boom that saw it take in US$33 billion, which allowed the government to invest heavily in both civilian and military projects.[16] On several occasions, Saddam alluded to the Muslim conquest of Persia while promoting his country's position against Iran in the context of a looming war.[32][33] On 2 April 1980, during a visit to al-Mustansiriya University in the city of Baghdad, he drew parallels to the 7th-century Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, in which the Rashidun Caliphate secured a decisive victory over the Sasanian Empire:
In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere, we tell those Persian cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts.[34][35][36]
Revolts by Iraq's Shia Muslims
In 1979–1980, anti-Ba'ath riots arose in the Iraq's Shia areas by groups who were working toward an Islamic revolution in their country.
In April 1980, in response to the Ba'ath Party declaring membership in the Islamic Dawa Party a capital offense at the end of March,[38] Shia militants assassinated 20 Ba'ath officials, and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was almost assassinated on 1 April;[16] Aziz survived, but 11 students were killed in the attack.[21] Three days later, the funeral procession being held to bury the students was bombed.[15] Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nusseif al-Jasim also barely survived assassination by Shia militants.[16] In April 1980, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina al-Sadr were executed as part of a crackdown to restore Saddam's control. The execution of Iraq's most senior Ayatollah, and "reports that Saddam's secret police had raped al-Sadr's sister in al-Sadr's presence, had set his beard alight, and then dispatched him with a nail gun"[39] caused outrage throughout the Islamic world, especially among Iraqi Shias.[16] The Shias' repeated calls for the overthrow of the Ba'ath party and the support they allegedly received from Iran's new government led Saddam to increasingly perceive Iran as a threat that, if ignored, might one day overthrow him;[16] he thus used the attacks as pretext for attacking Iran that September,[15] though skirmishes along the Iran–Iraq border had already become a daily event by May that year.[16] Despite Iran's bellicose rhetoric, Iraqi military intelligence reported in July 1980 that "it is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend on a large scale."[40][41] Days before the Iraqi invasion and in the midst of rapidly escalating cross-border skirmishes, Iraqi military intelligence again reiterated on 14 September that "the enemy deployment organization does not indicate hostile intentions and appears to be taking on a more defensive mode."[42]
Iraq soon after expropriated the properties of 70,000 civilians believed to be of Iranian origin and expelled them from its territory.[43] Many, if not most, of those expelled were in fact Arabic-speaking Iraqi Shias who had little to no family ties with Iran.[44] This caused tensions between the two nations to increase further.[43]
Iraq also helped to instigate riots among Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan province, supporting them in their labor disputes, and turning uprisings into
According to former Iraqi general
Cross-border skirmishes
By September,
With the conclusion of the "liberating operations", on 17 September, in a statement addressed to Iraq's parliament, Saddam stated:
The frequent and blatant Iranian violations of Iraqi sovereignty...have rendered the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void... This river [Shatt al-Arab]...must have its Iraqi-Arab identity restored as it was throughout history in name and in reality with all the disposal rights emanating from full sovereignty over the river...We in no way wish to launch war against Iran.[21]
Despite Saddam's claim that Iraq did not want war with Iran, the next day his forces proceeded to attack Iranian border posts in preparation for the planned invasion.
Iraqi operations
Pre-emptive airstrikes
Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. The
Ground invasion
The next day, Iraq launched a ground invasion along a front measuring 644 km (400 mi) in three simultaneous attacks.[16]
Of Iraq's six divisions that were invading by ground, four were sent to Khuzestan, which was located near the border's southern end, to cut off the Shatt al-Arab from the rest of Iran and to establish a territorial security zone.[16]: 22 The other two divisions invaded across the northern and central part of the border to prevent an Iranian counter-attack.[16]
Northern front
On the northern front, the Iraqis attempted to establish a strong defensive position opposite Sulaymaniyah to protect the Iraqi Kirkuk oil complex.[16]: 23
Central front
On the central front, the Iraqis occupied
Southern front
Two of the four Iraqi divisions which invaded Khuzestan, one
Iraqi hopes of an uprising by the ethnic
Battle of Khorramshahr
On 22 September, a prolonged battle began in the city of Khorramshahr, eventually leaving 7,000 dead on each side.[16] Reflecting the bloody nature of the struggle, Iranians came to call Khorramshahr "City of Blood" (خونین شهر, Khunin shahr).[16]
The battle began with Iraqi air raids against key points and mechanised divisions advancing on the city in a crescent-like formation. They were slowed by Iranian air attacks and Revolutionary Guard troops with
Iranian operations
Retaliatory airstrikes in Iraq
Though the Iraqi air invasion surprised the Iranians, the Iranian air force retaliated with an attack against Iraqi military bases and infrastructure in
The Iranian force of
Destruction of Iraqi oil and nuclear facilities
The Iranian regular military, police forces, volunteer Basij, and Revolutionary Guards all conducted their operations separately; thus, the Iraqi invading forces did not face coordinated resistance.
On 30 September, Iran's air force launched
By 1 October, Baghdad had been subjected to eight air attacks.[16]: 29 In response, Iraq launched aerial strikes against Iranian targets.[16][57]
Aftermath
Iraqi strategic failure
The people of Iran, rather than turning against their still-weak Islamic Republic, rallied around their country. An estimated 200,000 fresh troops had arrived at the front by November, many of them ideologically committed volunteers.[52]
Though Khorramshahr was finally captured, the battle had delayed the Iraqis enough to allow the large-scale deployment of the Iranian military.[16] In November, Saddam ordered his forces to advance towards Dezful and Ahvaz, and lay siege to both cities. However, the Iraqi offensive had been badly damaged by Iranian militias and air power. Iran's air force had destroyed Iraq's army supply depots and fuel supplies, and was strangling the country through an aerial siege.[57] On the other hand, Iran's supplies had not been exhausted, despite sanctions, and the military often cannibalised spare parts from other equipment and began searching for parts on the black market. On 28 November, Iran launched Operation Morvarid (Pearl), a combined air and sea attack that destroyed 80% of Iraq's navy and all of its radar sites in the southern portion of the country. When Iraq laid siege to Abadan and dug its troops in around the city, it was unable to blockade the port, which allowed Iran to resupply Abadan by sea.[60]
Iranian counteroffensive
Iraq's strategic reserves had been depleted, and by now it lacked the power to go on any major offensives until nearly the end of the war.[16] On 7 December, Hussein announced that Iraq was going on the defensive.[16] By the end of 1980, Iraq had destroyed about 500 Western-built Iranian tanks and captured 100 others.[61][62]
See also
Gallery
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Ali Khamenei (right), who would become the second Supreme Leader of Iran in August 1989, in a spider hole with another Iranian soldier during the Iran–Iraq War
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An Iranian Northrop F-5 squadron
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Explosion at Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran after an Iraqi airstrike
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A destroyed Iranian Douglas C-47 Skytrain
Notes
References
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- ^ "روایت تنها بازمانده "دژ" خرمشهر از سقوط تا آزادی". Farda News. 23 May 2016. Archived from the original on 26 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
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- ^ ISBN 978-0-19-005022-1.
- ^ Pollack, p, 186
- ^ Farrokh, Kaveh, 305 (2011)
- ^ Pollack, p. 187
- ^ Farrokh, Kaveh, 304 (2011)
- ^ "The state of the air combat readiness of Iran ... • corporal_historian_23". Archived from the original on 2 October 2018. Retrieved 18 November 2018.
- ^ Pollack, p. 186
- ^ ISBN 978-0674915718.
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On 7 September 1980, Iraq accused Iran of shelling Iraqi villages in the territories of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad on 4 September 1980. Iraq demanded that the Iranian forces in those territories evacuate and return the villages to Iraq. Tehran gave no reply. Iraqi forces then moved to 'liberate' the villages, and on 10 September announced that its forces had done so in a short, sharp military engagement. ... On 14 September 1980, Iran announced it would no longer abide by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Given the scene that was set, it was no surprise that on 17 September, five days before the invasion, Iraq declared the accords null and void. ... On 22 September, Iraqi units crossed the frontier.
- ISBN 9780520921245.
There remains the issue of sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab. ... Granted that this might have been a genuine motive for abrogating the 1975 treaty, and reclaiming title to the whole Shatt, what was the point of the invasion on September 22? Iraq had taken back by unilateral action on September 10 the only strips of territory it still claimed under the treaty. There was no longer any 'territory' as such on the other side to conquer. The Ba'th had already followed the Shah's example of 1971 when he unilaterally took over the three islands in the Gulf.
- ISBN 978-1841763712.
- ^ a b c d Cruze, Gregory S. (Spring 1988). "Iran and Iraq: Perspectives in Conflict". Military Reports. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
- ^ ISBN 978-1841763712.
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Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.
- ^ "Britannica Online Encyclopedia: Saddam Hussein". Archived from the original on 3 May 2015. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
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While the evidence now available suggests the skirmishes were more a convenient excuse for war, questions still remain.
- ^ ISBN 0-7475-0260-9.
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One of the ironies lay in the fact that the Iranian exile community in 1980 was as badly out of touch with the home country as the Iraqi exile community was to prove out of touch with Iraq in 2003.
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- ISBN 978-0-933782-03-7.
- ISBN 978-0-525-94005-0.
- ^ Speech made by Saddam Hussein. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses in Arabic, 2 April 1980. FBIS-MEA-80-066. 3 April 1980, E2-3. E3
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- ^ "National Intelligence Daily" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 10 March 1980. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 November 2010.
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- ^ a b "Viewpoints of the Iranian political and military elites". Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
- ^ Westcott, Kathryn (27 February 2003). "Iraq's rich mosaic of people". BBC News. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
- ^ Noi, Aylin. "The Arab Spring, Its Effects on the Kurds". Archived from the original on 17 September 2012. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
- ^ "Kurdistan, Iraq Global Security". Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
- ^ Coughlin, Con. "Lets Deport the Iran Embassy Siege survivor to Iraq". Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
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- ^ Woods, Kevin. "Saddam's Generals: A Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 April 2013.
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- ^ a b Pike, John (ed.). "Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)". Archived from the original on 28 February 2011. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
- ^ Malvany, Wars of Modern Babylon, 2017, 104-7.
- ^ Malovany, 2017, 106.
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- ^ a b c d Wilson, Ben (July–August 2007). "The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War: When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference" (PDF). The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran-Iraq War. U.S. Army: Foreign Military Studies Office. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 October 2013.
- ^ a b c d Cooper, Thomas; Bishop, Farzad (9 September 2003). "Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980". Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database. Air Combat Information Group. Archived from the original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
- ^ Modern Warfare: Iran-Iraq War (film documentary).
- ^ Wilson, Ben. "The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting during the Iran-Iraq War" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 October 2013.
- ^ Aboul-Enein, Youssef; Bertrand, Andrew; Corley, Dorothy (12 April 2012). "Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War". Small Wars Journal. Ghazalah's Phased Analysis of Combat Operations. Small Wars Foundation. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 30 December 2015.
- ^ Tucker, A. R. (1988). Armored warfare in the Gulf. Armed Forces, May, pp.226.
- ^ "Irano-Irakskii konflikt. Istoricheskii ocherk." Niyazmatov. J.A. — M.: Nauka, 1989.