Pandemic prevention
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Pandemic prevention is the organization and management of preventive measures against pandemics. Those include measures to reduce causes of new infectious diseases and measures to prevent outbreaks and epidemics from becoming pandemics.
It is not to be mistaken for pandemic preparedness or mitigation (e.g. against COVID-19) which largely seek to mitigate the magnitude of negative effects of pandemics, although the topics may overlap with pandemic prevention in some respects.
Some biosafety and public health researchers contend that certain pandemic prevention efforts themselves carry risk of triggering pandemics (e.g. wildlife virus sampling), though not engaging in any form of sampling also carries the risk of being unprepared for future spillover events and being unaware of future pandemic pathogens.
History
2002–2004 SARS outbreak
During the
MERS-CoV/NeoCoV alert
In January 2022, Chinese scientists at the
Monkeypox
On 21 May 2022, the
Measures
Infrastructure and international development
Robust, collaborating public health systems that have the capacity for active surveillance for early detection of cases and to mobilize their health care coordination capacity may be required to be able stop contagion promptly.[16][17][18] After an outbreak there is a certain window of time during which a pandemic can still be stopped by the competent authorities isolating the first infected and/or fighting the pathogen. A good global infrastructure, consequent information exchange, minimal delays due to bureaucracy and effective, targeted treatment measures can be prepared.[19] In 2012 it has been proposed to consider pandemic prevention as an aspect of international development in terms of health-care infrastructure and changes to the pathogen-related dynamics between humans and their environment including animals.[20] Often local authority carers or doctors in Africa, Asia or Latin America register uncommon accumulations (or clusterings) of symptoms but lack options for more detailed investigations.[21] Scientists state that "research relevant to countries with weaker surveillance, lab facilities and health systems should be prioritized" and that "in those regions, vaccine supply routes should not rely on refrigeration, and diagnostics should be available at the point of care".[22] Two researchers have suggested that public health systems "in each country" need to be capable of detecting contagion early, diagnosing it accurately, implementing effective disease control measures, and fully collaborating with the relevant international authorities at each stage .[23] U.S. officials have proposed a range of reforms to international health regulations and global institutions for global health security.[24] The "entire architecture of the response to epidemics" may need to get adapted, evolving "from crisis response during discrete outbreaks to an integrated cycle of preparation, response and recovery" .[25]
Technology-centric measures
Biosafety technologies and biotechnology regulation
Potential policies that support global biosafety could make use of various technologies, including but not limited to laboratory containment technologies – for example, tools could promote compliance with existing and novel biosecurity norms and standards.[26] Proposals to increase biosafety in terms of laboratories, scientific field work and research and development-related activities include:
- limiting research on highly contagious biological agents to only trained researchers in well-protected environments and advanced biological safety systems and disposal of biohazards.[27]
- improving physical security and educating scientists about the misuse potentials[28]
- review processes that ensure risks are justified and minimized, such as preventing certain gain-of-function studies[29][30] (the exact definition of "gain-of-function" is contested and there also the term "enhanced potential pandemic pathogens").[31] Arguments for gain-of-function-type research may include "that vaccines and therapeutics can be pre-emptively researched and developed" this way.[32]
- monitoring and strengthening laboratory protocols around the world[33]
- Work on coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology was carried out at
- According to a study of Indian BSL-2 and BSL-3 facilities, "there are no national guidelines or reference standards available in India on certification and validation of biosafety laboratories"[39]
- In a 2018 study it was suggested that there is a need "to update international laboratory biosafety guidance" "to globalize biosafety"[40]
- In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic there was a "global surge in labs that handle dangerous pathogens" and as of 2022 some researchers "are concerned about [these]".[41]
- monitoring and strengthening field work protocols around the world (such as viral sampling)[42]
- The so far closest known relative virus (with a 96.8% similarity) to SARS-CoV-2 was found in samples from wild horseshoe bats in/at caves in northern Laos.[43][44] No SARS-CoV-2 related viruses could be found in any samples collected in China, including from the only two domestic caves where RaTG13 and RmYN02 were detected, indicating such viruses may currently not circulate in bats in the country.[43][45] A study of wild animals sampled in and around Wuhan at the beginning of COVID-19 emergence did not find SARS-CoV-2 or its progenitor virus in these samples.[46] However, a virologist noted that their "sample sizes are not large enough" – 334 bats instead of "tens of thousands of bats".[47] While another study claims to have used "more than 17,000 bats" without finding SARS-CoV-2 relatives,[48][45] a conservation biologist – who worked on a study[49] that "found four viruses related to SARS-CoV-2" in 342 bat samples of a Yunnan garden – does not believe the study as does one of his coauthors, an evolutionary biologist.[48]
- A small survey reported that many biosafety professionals conducting field collection of potentially infectious specimens have not been formally trained on the topic.[50]
- There are multiple known examples of field-associated infections.[51]
- making deadly viruses harder to engineer[52]
- global efforts to end research into developing dangerous new diseases[52]
- measures that don't rely on relevant technological equipment and biotechnology products (as well as data and knowledge) only being available to registered scientists and all of these scientists to act responsibly may also be possible[citation needed]
- According to one expert, the "international bioweapons community" should work towards having supply chain choke points identified and help implement robust monitoring of them, such as, for example, key input material[32]
- One international team plans to make DNA synthesis screening available for free to countries worldwide and could establish a level of safety if regulations require that DNA synthesis companies send sequences for screening against a certified database[52]
- Only "approximately 80 percent of DNA providers are members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, which screens customers and DNA order sequences to prevent the building blocks of dangerous pathogens from falling into the hands of malicious actors". Screening is "costly, time-consuming, and requires human expertise", e.g. making non-participation economically beneficial.[26]
- Reducing risks from methods that "may enable the creation of (or expand access to) particularly dangerous engineered pathogens" may involve careful regulation.[53]
- Several technological local production capabilities create additional challenges[26]
- Some companies that manufacture DNA started collaboration to limit access to dangerous genes so that only authorized laboratories can obtain DNA of "about 60" lethal germs and toxins[54]
Risks of pandemic prevention
Efforts of pandemic prevention and related endeavors reportedly risk triggering pandemics themselves as of 2021. These risk include, but are not limited to, unwitting laboratory escape and accidents such as spillovers during field interventions/experiments like field collection,[42][27] and misuse of its results due to e.g. insecure commercial sales of required equipment and/or materials and/or data.[citation needed]
One approach to mitigate risks from pandemic prevention is to "maintain a database with hashes of deadly and dangerous sequences" which don't contain data with a potential for danger (depending on various factors) and also "can't be reverse-engineered to learn the dangerous original sequence if you don't already know it". This would theoretically enable checking sequences against a database of recorded pathogens without maintaining a database of deadly sequences.[52] Another approach is not building such databases or not collecting dangerous sequences in the first place. A 2014 study proposed safer "alternatives to experiments with novel potential pandemic pathogens" than some of the current methods.[55]
Pathogen detection and prediction
In a 2012 study it is claimed that "new mathematical modelling, diagnostic, communications, and informatics technologies can identify and report hitherto unknown microbes in other species, and thus new risk assessment approaches are needed to identify microbes most likely to cause human disease". The study investigates challenges in moving the global pandemic strategy from response to pre-emption.
Pathogen detection mechanisms may allow the construction of an early warning system which could make use of artificial intelligence surveillance and outbreak investigation.
An artificial "global immune system"-like technological system that includes pathogen detection may be able to substantially reduce the time required to take on a biothreat agent.[67] A system of that sort would also include a network of well-trained epidemiologists who could be rapidly deployed to investigate and contain an outbreak.[18]
Funding for the United States'
In 2022, researchers reported the development of an ultra-high-throughput
Despite recent advances in pandemic modeling, experts using mostly experience and intuition are still more accurate in predicting the spread of disease than strictly mathematical models.[72]
CRISPR-based immune subsystems
In March 2020 scientists of
Scientists report to be able to identify the genomic pathogen signature of all 29 different SARS-CoV-2 RNA sequences available to them using machine learning and a dataset of 5000 unique viral genomic sequences. They suggest that their approach can be used as a reliable real-time option for taxonomic classification of novel pathogens.[80][81]
Testing and containment
Timely use and development of quick testing systems for novel virus in combination with other measures might (possibly) make it possible to end transmission lines of outbreaks before they become pandemics.[82][83][84][85][additional citation(s) needed] After an outbreak there may be a certain window of time during which a pandemic can still be prevented.[19] A key difficulty with early detection and containment is that in the globalized and urbanized world, pathogens can spread rapidly to several regions worldwide via travel,[86][87] before it may be possible to notice them and e.g. initiate contact-tracing and containment measures. Rapid communication of data for health systems to implement any public intervention measures may be important.[88] A "'One Health' global network for proactive surveillance, rapid detection, and prevention of MERS-CoV and other epidemic infectious diseases threats" has been proposed in 2016.[89]
Moreover, there are several issues with tests. For example, a high discovery-rate is important. For instance, this is the reason why no
Some argue that the best forms of prevention for natural nonsynthetic viruses would be stopping the viruses from spilling into humans in the first place, rather than trying to contain outbreaks.[92]
The German program InfectControl 2020 seeks to develop strategies for prevention, early recognition and control of infectious diseases.
Incentives for countries to report new viruses may be important for sufficiently fast detection and for avoiding cover-ups. A global treaty proposed by the E.U. could address this issue.[96] Rapid regional, possibly also national, capacities in terms of e.g. means, mobile laboratories or diagnostics,[97][98] personnel, technologies, financial insurances and coordination[99] may also be important.[citation needed]
In cases where vaccines already exist a major method for early containment is 'ring vaccination' – vaccinating close contacts of positive cases (and/or geographical areas) via existing vaccines as well as pre-exposure vaccination of people at higher risk.[12][14][15] There are also precautionary vaccine stockpiles.[100] Production capacities may also be important.[101][additional citation(s) needed] See also: vaccine-to-variant adjustment for SARS-CoV-2 Omicron
Researchers have developed a portable virus capture device, coupled with label-free Raman spectroscopy for identification of newly emerging or circulating viruses as a major first step toward managing the public health response to potential outbreaks. It could rapidly obtain the Raman signature of a virus and use machine learning to recognize the virus based on its weighted combination Raman spectrum fingerprint, being able to distinguish between influenza virus type A versus type B.[85]
Surveillance and mapping
Viral hotspots and zoonotic genomics
Monitoring people who are exposed to animals in viral hotspots – including via virus monitoring stations – can register viruses at the moment they enter human populations - this might enable prevention of pandemics.
Improving "frontline healthcare provision and testing capacity for deprived communities around the world" could enable detecting, identifying and controlling outbreaks without delays [109]
.Syndromic surveillance and border control
Expert on infectious diseases at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Amesh Adalja states that the most immediate way to predict a pandemic is with deeper surveillance of symptoms that fit the virus' profile.[60] The scientific and technological ways of quickly detecting a spillover could be improved so that an outbreak can be isolated before it becomes an epidemic or pandemic.[110] David Quammen states that he heard about the idea to develop technology to screen people at airport security points for whether or not they carry an infectious disease ten years ago and thought it was going to be done by now.[110] Thermometers whose measurement data is directly shared via the Internet and medical guidance apps have been used to plot and map unusual fever levels to detect anomalous outbreaks.[111] Various forms of data-sharing could be added to health care institutions such as hospitals so that e.g. anonymized data about symptoms and incidences found to be unusual or characteristic of a pandemic threat could enable high-resolution "syndromic surveillance" as an early warning system. In 1947, the World Health Organization established such a global network of some hospitals.[112][113] Such sharing and off-site evaluation of symptoms and possibly related medical data may have complementary benefits such as improving livelihoods of workers who work with livestock[114] and improving the accuracy, timeliness and costs of disease prognoses.[citation needed] The WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence is an early-warning center that attempts to aggregate data and quickly analyze it to predict, prevent, detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks and was set up Berlin in September 2021. It uses machine learning and may analyze data about animal health, unusual symptoms in humans, migration and other related developments that may contain detectable patterns.[115][116]
Mutation surveillance
In December 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, national and international officials reported mutated variants of SARS-CoV-2, including some with higher transmissibility and worldwide spread. While mutations are common for viruses and the spread of some of the virus' mutations have been tracked earlier, mutations that make it more transmittable or severe can be problematic. Resources for disease surveillance have improved during the pandemic so that medical systems around the world are starting to be equipped to detect such mutations with genomic surveillance in a manner relevant to pandemic mitigation and the prevention of sub-pandemics of specific variants or types of variants. As of December 2020, contemporary measures such as COVID-19 vaccines and medications seem to be effective in the treatment of infections with the tracked mutated variants compared to earlier forms that are closer to the original virus/es.[117][118][119][120] Tools used in the pandemized outbreak of COVID-19 included PANGOLIN[121] and Nextstrain.[122][relevant?] In July 2021, scientists reported the detection of anomalous unnamed unknown-host SARS-CoV-2 lineages via wastewater surveillance.[123][124]
Genomic surveillance refers to monitoring pathogens and analyzing their genetic similarities and differences, which may enable (early) alerts and tailoring interventions, countermeasures and recommendations for the public, like vaccines.[125][126] In terms of pandemic prevention, it may be especially useful for vaccine-preventable diseases.[126] A problem with the surveillance for mutated variants during the COVID-19 pandemic was that entities don't have sufficient incentives (and/or requirements) to report such variants. A global treaty proposed by the E.U. includes such incentives.[96] A further issue was that vaccines did not provide a high enduring protection against the variants. One approach to solve this problem are pan-virus vaccines that protect against many strains (in this case a pan-SARS-CoV-2-like/variant-coronavirus vaccine), possibly including variants that do not yet exist.[127]
Policy and economics
A 2014 analysis asserts that "the
Environmental policy and economics
Some experts link pandemic prevention with environmental policy and caution that environmental destruction as well as climate change drives wildlife to live close to people.[104][133]
Climate change
The WHO projects that
Another way climate change may affect pandemic risks, is by pathogens in thawing permafrost (e.g. in the Arctic) that may have infected now-extinct ancestral humans in such regions.[137] However, a scientist concluded that probably permafrost per se shouldn't host more pathogens than any other environment.[138] Nevertheless, the risk from permafrost pathogens is unknown and viruses from the very first humans to populate the Arctic could emerge.[139] Moreover, researchers have suggested more work on microbes soon to be released from melting glaciers across the world to identify and understand potential threats in advance.[140][141]
Ecosystem degradation and consumption
Studies have shown that
Stanford biological anthropologist James Holland Jones notes that humanity has "engineer[ed] a world where emerging infectious diseases are both more likely and more likely to be consequential", referring to the modern world's prevalent highly mobile lifestyles, increasingly dense cities, various kinds of human interactions with wildlife and alterations of the natural world.
Dennis Caroll of the Global Virome Project stated that the "
In the 2000s, a WHO spokesperson summarized the animal-related aspects of pandemics, stating "the whole relationship between the animal kingdom and the human kingdom is coming under stress".[157]
The integrated, unifying approach of One Health addresses health of people, animals and the environment at once. It could "boost risk identification, reduction, and surveillance in animals and at the human-animal-environment interface".[33]
Data on current causes of emerging diseases
A study which was published in April 2020 and is part of the PREDICT program found that "virus transmission risk has been highest from animal species that have increased in abundance and even expanded their range by adapting to human-dominated landscapes", identifying domesticated species, primates and bats as having more zoonotic viruses than other species and "provide further evidence that exploitation, as well as anthropogenic activities that have caused losses in wildlife habitat quality, have increased opportunities for animal–human interactions and facilitated zoonotic disease transmission".[158]
An UN Environment report presents the causes of the emerging diseases with a large share being environmental:[159]
Cause | Part of emerging diseases caused by it (%) |
---|---|
Land-use change |
31% |
Agricultural industry changes |
15% |
International travel and commerce |
13% |
Medical industry changes |
11% |
War and Famine | 7% |
Climate and Weather | 6% |
Human demography and behavior | 4% |
Breakdown of public health | 3% |
Bushmeat | 3% |
Food industry change | 2% |
Other | 4% |
The report also lists some of the latest emerging diseases and their environmental causes:[159]
Disease | Environmental cause |
---|---|
Rabies | Forest activities in South America |
Bat associated viruses | Deforestation and Agricultural expansion |
Lyme disease | Forest fragmentation in North America
|
Nipah virus infection | Pig farming and intensification of fruit production in Malaysia |
Japanese encephalitis virus |
irrigated rice production and pig farming in Southeast Asia |
Ebola virus disease |
Forest losses |
Avian influenza | Intensive Poultry farming |
SARS virus |
contact with civet cats either in the wild or in live animal markets |
According to a 2001 study and its criteria a total of 1415 species of infectious agents in 472 different genera have been reported to date to cause disease in humans. Out of these reviewed emerging pathogen species 75% are zoonotic. A total of 175 species of infectious agents from 96 different genera are associated with emerging diseases according its criteria. Some of these pathogens can be transmitted by more than one route. Data on 19 categories of the 26 categories which contained more than 10 species includes:[105][relevant?]
Transmission route | Zoonotic status | Taxonomic division | Total number of species | Number of emerging species | Proportion of species emerging |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
indirect contact | zoonotic | viruses | 37 | 17 | 0.459 |
indirect contact | zoonotic | protozoa | 14 | 6 | 0.429 |
direct contact | zoonotic | viruses | 63 | 26 | 0.413 |
direct contact | non-zoonotic | protozoa | 15 | 6 | 0.400 |
indirect contact | non-zoonotic | viruses | 13 | 4 | 0.308 |
direct contact | non-zoonotic | viruses | 47 | 14 | 0.298 |
vector borne | zoonotic | viruses | 99 | 29 | 0.293 |
vector borne | zoonotic | bacteria | 40 | 9 | 0.225 |
indirect contact | zoonotic | bacteria | 143 | 31 | 0.217 |
vector borne | zoonotic | protozoa | 26 | 5 | 0.192 |
direct contact | zoonotic | bacteria | 130 | 20 | 0.154 |
indirect contact | zoonotic | fungi | 85 | 11 | 0.129 |
direct contact | zoonotic | fungi | 105 | 13 | 0.124 |
vector borne | zoonotic | helminths | 23 | 2 | 0.087 |
direct contact | non-zoonotic | bacteria | 125 | 7 | 0.056 |
indirect contact | non-zoonotic | bacteria | 63 | 3 | 0.048 |
indirect contact | non-zoonotic | fungi | 120 | 3 | 0.025 |
direct contact | non-zoonotic | fungi | 123 | 3 | 0.024 |
indirect contact | zoonotic | helminths | 250 | 6 | 0.024 |
Bioresearch and development regulation
In a paywalled article, American scientists proposed policy-based measures to reduce large risks from life sciences research – including pandemics through accident or misapplication. Risk management measures may include novel international guidelines and standards of conduct, effective oversight, improvement of US policies to influence policies globally, and identification of gaps in biosecurity policies along with potential approaches to address them.[160][161]
Concerning systematic comprehensive identification of challenges, the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) convened policy-makers and academics to identify challenges for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2017. A key issue identified was that the rapid rate of progress in relevant sciences and technologies has made it very difficult for governance bodies including the BWC to keep pace.[162] Luke Kemp, a member of CSER, notes that "just a few key countries [are] blocking regulation of catastrophic hazards" and that "[f]or biological weapons it was the US who was the primary culprit in preventing the adoption of a global verification scheme under the Biological Weapons Convention" and suggests that "attempts at regulation are often delayed, distorted or destroyed".[163]
A 2021 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) report concluded that "[t]he international system for governing dual-use biological research is neither prepared to meet today’s security requirements, nor is it ready for significantly expanded challenges in the future".[26] Toby Ord, author of the book The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity which addresses the issue, puts into question whether current public health and international conventions, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and scientists are adequate.[164][165] As of 2017, there is "no concerted international approach to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons and best practices in strengthening the organizational culture of life sciences research laboratories worldwide" in terms of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct, albeit a number of international treaties and partnerships do exist.[166] Around 2022, the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) was set up by the NTI to improve biosecurity and biosafety, calling i.a. for tighter controls on custom-order DNA companies.[167][168][169]
The WHO has published the "Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research" in 2022.[170]
In the context of the 2019–2020 coronavirus pandemic
While biotechnology policies [52]
can substantially reduce the risk of a serious catastrophe, it may be important that relevant steps are initiated immediately and on a global basis.Dual-use knowledge and research
Martin Rees, author of the book Our Final Hour which also addresses this issue, states that while better understanding of viruses may allow for an improved capability to develop vaccines it may also lead to an increase in "the spread of 'dangerous knowledge' that would enable mavericks to make viruses more virulent and transmissible than they naturally are".[185] Different accelerations and priorizations of research may however be critical to pandemic prevention. A multitude of factors shape which knowledge about viruses with different use-cases, including vaccine-development, can be used by whom.[citation needed] Rees also states that "the global village will have its village idiots, and they will have global range".[186]
Experts have clarified that, for example, the definition of "dual use" is not well known and that the international community should better engage with the DIY bio community or biohacker students and in a way that does not stifle "localised innovation for peaceful purposes or people wanting to learn about biology".[32] As of 2022, only very few sophisticated centers could recreate SARS-CoV-2[54] However, for example the progress in genetic engineering enabled all the tools needed to create a virus to be "cheap, simple, and readily available".[187]
94% of countries have no national-level oversight measures for dual-use research.[52]
A biodefense expert cautions that overly strict rules "could prompt researchers to move their experiments to nations with less stringent oversight", suggesting there to be a need for international policies.[188]
Food markets and wild animal trade
In January 2020 during the SARS-CoV 2 outbreak experts in and outside China warned that wild animal markets, where the virus originated from, should be banned worldwide.[104][189] Some scientists point out that banning informal wet markets worldwide isn't the appropriate solution as fridges aren't available in many places and because much of the food for Africa and Asia is provided through such traditional markets. Some also caution that simple bans may force traders underground, where they may pay less attention to hygiene and some state that it's wild animals rather than farmed animals that are the natural hosts of many viruses.[60][61][133] National Geographic's Jonathan Kolby cautions about the risks and vulnerabilities present in the massive legal wildlife trade.[190] Helping ensure people are provided with viable and profitable alternatives to the wildlife trade is also important.[191]
Some
UN biodiversity chief, bipartisan lawmakers, experts and scientists have called for a global ban of wetmarkets and wildlife trade.[193][194][195][196] On January 26 China banned the trade of wild animals until the end of the coronavirus epidemic at the time.[197] On February 24 China announced a permanent ban on wildlife trade and consumption with some exceptions.[198] In early 2022 it was reported that the E.U. "is pushing for a global deal aimed at preventing new pandemics that could include a ban [a gradual shutdown] on wildlife markets".[96]
International coordination
The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) a network of countries, international organizations, NGOs and companies that aim to improve the world's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. Sixty-seven countries have signed onto the GHSA framework.[199][200] Funding for the GHSA has been reduced since the launch in 2014, both in the US and globally.[130] The 194 WHO member states agreed in December 2021 to begin negotiations on the International Treaty on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response.[201][202][203] On the 2021 Global Health Summit, the G20 communicated to commit to promote a set of principles in the Rome Declaration.[204] The new financial intermediary fund (FIF) for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPR) was officially established by in September 2022, hosted by the World Bank with technical leadership from WHO.[205]
In a 2018 lecture in Boston Bill Gates called for a global effort to build a comprehensive pandemic preparedness and response system.[206][207] During the COVID-19 pandemic he called upon world leaders to "take what has been learned from this tragedy and invest in systems to prevent future outbreaks".[67] In a 2015 TED Talk he warned that "if anything kills over 10 million people in the next few decades, it's most likely to be a highly infectious virus rather than a war".[208] Numerous prominent, authoritative, expert or otherwise influential figures have similarly warned about elevated, underprepared or contemporary risks of pandemics and the need for efforts on an "international scale" long before 2015 and since at least 1988.[2][209] Later warnings include a 2015 study which concluded that "a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence from viruses currently circulating in bat populations".[210] Unlike for climate change, which is by now "widely agreed to be among the world's most important problems", there are no large social movements dedicated to solving pandemic prevention.[211]
Some have provided suggestions for organizational or coordinative preparedness for pandemic prevention including a mechanism by which many major economic powers pay into a global insurance fund which "could compensate a nation for economic losses if it acts quickly to close areas to trade and travel in order to stop a dangerous outbreak at its source"[212][additional citation(s) needed] or, similarly, sovereign or regional-level epidemic-insurance policies.[213] International collaboration including cooperative research and information-sharing has also been considered vital.[67]
As an example of domestic coordination, U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein called for the creation of a new interagency government entity, the Center for Combating Infectious Disease which would combine analytical and operational functions "to oversee all aspects of preventing, detecting, monitoring, and responding to major outbreaks such as coronavirus" and get provided with data and expertise by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.[61][214] The U.S. has also set up a "Global Zoonotic Disease Task Force" who would help "ensure an integrated approach to preventing, detecting, preparing for, and responding to zoonotic spillover".[215] However, "global preparedness is greater than the sum of national preparedness" and lacks concerted, collective and coordinated action.[216]
John Davenport advises to abandon widespread
A study found there to be a need "for a renewed framework for global collective action that ensures conformity with international regulations and promotes effective prevention and response to pandemic infectious diseases" and recommended "greater authority for a global governing body, an improved ability to respond to pandemics, an objective evaluation system for national core public health capacities, more effective enforcement mechanisms, independent and sustainable funding, representativeness, and investment from multiple sectors, among others".[99] Researchers found "a leader-level global council" to be required "to identify gaps in preparedness and response, mobilize finances, hold public and private stakeholders accountable, and provide leadership at the first hint of a threat", including "faster detection and reporting of outbreaks and threats" by a more independent and better financed World Health Organization.[218]
Proposed novel organizations also include an entity or entities tasked with "reducing the risk of catastrophic events due to accidents or deliberate abuse of bioscience and biotechnology".[161][26]
Artificial induction of immunity and/or biocides
Outbreaks could be contained or delayed – to enable other containment-measures – or prevented by artificial induction of immunity and/or biocides in combination with other measures that include prediction or early detection of infectious human diseases.[citation needed]
Broad-spectrum antimicrobials, rapid antibody or drug development, development platforms, and quick drug repurposing and medication provisioning may also be potential ways to prevent outbreak from becoming pandemics.[53][additional citation(s) needed] In FY2016, DARPA initiated the Pandemic Prevention Platform (P3) program aimed at the "rapid discovery, testing, and manufacture of antibody treatments to fight any emerging disease threat".[219][220] The SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant escaped the majority of existing SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies, including of sera from vaccinated and convalescent individuals.[221][222][223][224]
Vaccination
Development and provision of new vaccines usually takes years.
Food system- and livestock-specific measures
A review suggests that feeding the future human population would require increases in crop and animal production, albeit it is unclear which diets (e.g. future levels of meat production) they project. This would increase contact rates between humans and both wild and domestic animals and the use of antibiotics and thereby increase pandemic risks.[228] It also suggests that "since 1940, agricultural drivers were associated with >25% of all — and >50% of zoonotic — infectious diseases that emerged in humans".[228]
Moreover, selection for specific genes has made the animals genetically highly similar which could enable pathogens to spread more intensely among the livestock.[238]
A report by the
Measures could include
Culling
Experts warned that depleting the numbers of species by culling to forestall human infections reduces genetic diversity and thereby puts future generations of the animals as well as people at risk while others contend that it's still the best, practical way to contain a virus of livestock.[242] There are also other problems with culling and there are alternatives to it, such as animal vaccination.[243][244][additional citation(s) needed] There are also problems with the forms of culling-implementation such as livestock producers and subsistence farmers who are unable to access compensation being motivated to conceal diseased animals rather than report them.[244]
Prevention versus mitigation
Pandemic prevention seeks to prevent pandemics while mitigation of pandemics seeks to reduce their severity and negative impacts. Some have called for a shift from a treatment-oriented society to a prevention-oriented one.[245] Authors of a 2010 study write that contemporary "global disease control focuses almost exclusively on responding to pandemics after they have already spread globally" and argue that the "wait-and-respond approach is not sufficient and that the development of systems to prevent novel pandemics before they are established should be considered imperative to human health".[246] Peter Daszak comments on the COVID-19 pandemic, saying "[t]he problem isn't that prevention was impossible, [i]t was very possible. But we didn't do it. Governments thought it was too expensive. Pharmaceutical companies operate for profit". The WHO reportedly had mostly neither the funding nor the power to enforce the large-scale global collaboration necessary to combat it.[247] Nathan Wolfe criticizes that "our current global public health strategies are reminiscent of cardiology in the 1950s when doctors focused solely on responding to heart attacks and ignored the whole idea of prevention".[102] Nevertheless, measures that improve pandemic mitigation capabilities and preparedness for mitigation are important – for example the development of novel far-ultraviolet light could make sterilization "easy, routine and effective".[248][211]
See also
- Antimicrobial resistance#Prevention
- Border control
- Travel during the COVID-19 pandemic – Restrictions by countries intended to stop spread of disease
- Globalization and disease – Overview of globalization and disease transmission
- Disease X – Placeholder infectious disease name from the WHO (World Health Organization)
- Global catastrophic risk – Potentially harmful worldwide events
- Global health
- Hazards of synthetic biology
- Health policy#Global health policy
- Infection control
- Molecular nanotechnology#Risks
- Pandemic treaty
- Priority-setting in global health
- Global Health Security Initiative
- Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
- WHO Global Preparedness Monitoring Board
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