Russian conquest of Central Asia
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Russian conquest of Central Asia | |||||||||
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Part of the territorial evolution of Russia | |||||||||
Map of Russian conquest of Turkestan | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Tsardom of Russia (1713–1721)
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Konstantin von Kaufman Mikhail Chernyayev Ivan Lazarev Nikolai Lomakin Alexei Rytov † Khorunzhiy Rybin † Mikhail Skobelev Dmitry Romanovsky Nikolai Rukin † Ormon Khan |
Muhammad Rahim Bahadur II Muhammad Mallya Beg Khan Muhammad Sultan Khan Alimqul † Muhammad Khudayar Khan Berdi Murad Khan † Kara Bateer † Makhdum Kuli Khan Kurmanjan Datka Abdur Rahman Khan | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
In 1714–1716: 2,940 troops In 1717: 4,000 troops In 1715–1725: 2,000 troops 5 guns 12 pounds of gunpowder 300 cores 200 shot and buckshot charges In 1773–1775: 35,000 troops In 1832–1833: 1,050 troops In 1835: 3,347 troops In 1837: 3,080 troops In 1838: 2,620 troops In 1839-1840: 6,651 troops and 10,000 camels (Khiva) 2,600 troops (Kazakh Khanate) In 1843: 30,000+ troops (Summer) 3,100 troops (Autumn) In 1844: 3,000 troops In 1853: 2,000+ troops In 1864: 2,500 troops In 1873: 13,000 troops In 1879: 3,500 troops In 1881: 7,100 troops In 1883–1885: 1,500 troops |
Kazakh Khanate: ~10,000 troops (1717) ~500 troops (1720) ~300 troops (1721) ~3,000-6,000 troops (1773–1775) ~About 2,000 troops (1838) ~3,500 troops (1843) ~20,000 troops[1] (1844–1845) In 1853: ~12,000 troops In 1865: ~36,000 troops | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
In 1716: 2,300 killed 1,300 captured In 1717: About 4,000 killed (Khiva) 3,000 captured (Kazakh Khanate) In 1722: 5,000 captured In 1774–1776: 2,500 killed In 1839: 2,500 killed or died of diseases In 1866: 500 killed and wounded In 1879: 200+ killed ~250 wounded In 1881: 59–268 killed 254–669 wounded 645 died of diseases In 1885: 11 killed or wounded |
In 1853: 230+ killed In 1875: thousands killed In 1866: 12 000 killed In 1868: 3 500+ killed Turkmen tribes: In 1879: 2,000+ killed 2,000+ wounded In 1881: ~8,000 killed (incl. civilians) In 1885: ~900 killed or wounded |
The conquest of Central Asia by the Russian Empire took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. The land that became Russian Turkestan and later Soviet Central Asia is now divided between Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan across the center, Kyrgyzstan in the east, Tajikistan in the southeast, and Turkmenistan in the southwest. The area was called Turkestan because most of its inhabitants spoke Turkic languages with the exception of Tajikistan, which speaks an Iranian language.
Outline
In the nineteenth century, the
Geography
The area was bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the north by the Siberian forests and on the east by the mountains along the former Sino-Soviet border. The southern border was political rather than natural. It was about 2,100 km (1,300 mi) from north to south, 2,400 km (1,500 mi) wide in the north and 1,400 km (900 mi) wide in the south. Because the southeast corner (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) is mountainous the flat desert-steppe country is only about 1,100 km (700 mi) wide in the south. Using modern borders, the area was 4,003,400 km2 (1,545,730 sq mi), about half the size of the United States without Alaska. On the east side two mountain ranges project into the desert. Between them is the well-populated Fergana Valley which is approximately the "notch" on the west side of Kyrgyzstan. North of this projection the mountain-steppe boundary extends along the north border of Kyrgyzstan about 640 km (400 mi) before the mountains turn north again.
Rainfall decreases from north to south. Dense population, and therefore cities and organized states, requires irrigation. Streams coming down from the eastern mountains support a fairly dense population, especially in the Ferghana Valley. There is a line of oases along the Persian border. The interior is watered by three great rivers. The Oxus or
The deserts in the south have enough grass to support a thin nomadic population. The Kyzylkum Desert is between the Oxus and Jaxartes. The Karakum Desert is southwest of the Oxus in Turkmenistan. Between the Aral and Caspian Seas is the thinly-populated Ustyurt Plateau.
When the Russians arrived the organized states were the Khanate of Khiva in the Oxus delta south of the Aral Sea, the Khanate of Bukhara along the Oxus and Zarafshan and the Khanate of Kokand based in the Ferghana Valley. Bokhara had borders with the other two and all three were surrounded by nomads which the Khanates tried to control and tax.
Early contacts
Siberia: Russians first came into contact with Central Asia when, in 1582–1639, Cossack adventurers made themselves masters of the Siberian forests. They did not expand south because they were seeking furs. The Siberian Cossacks were skilled in forest travel and knew little of the steppe and since the forest tribes were few and weak while the steppe nomads were numerous and warlike. See Siberian River Routes and linked articles.
Up the Irtysh River: The
The Kazakh steppe: Since the Kazakhs were nomads they could not be conquered in the normal sense. Instead Russian power slowly increased. See History of Kazakhstan.
Around the southern Urals: In 1556 Russia conquered the
At the time of Peter the Great there was a major push southeast. In addition to the Irtysh expeditions above there was the disastrous 1717 attempt to conquer Khiva. Following the Russo-Persian War (1722–1723) Russia briefly occupied the west side of the Caspian Sea.
About 1734 another move was planned, which provoked the Bashkir War (1735–1740). Once Bashkiria was pacified, Russia's southeastern frontier was the Orenburg line roughly between the Urals and the Caspian Sea.
The area remained quiet for about a hundred years. In 1819 Nikolai Muraviev traveled from the Caspian Sea and contacted the
The Siberian line: By the late eighteenth century Russia held a line of forts roughly along the current Kazakhstan border, which is approximately the boundary between forest and steppe. For reference these forts (and foundation dates) were:
Uralsk was an old settlement of free
1713–1716, 1719: Unsuccessful expeditions to the Dzungar Khanate
Expedition of 1713-1716
On
On October 1, 1715, the detachment arrived at the Yamyshevsky salt lake. Here Buchholz started the construction of the Yamyshev fortress.
On December 15, 1715, the lieutenant colonel did not dare to go further and wrote to Peter I that it was dangerous to meet the
Dissatisfied with the appearance of Russian troops, the Dzungar Khuntaiji Tsewang-Rabtan sent Buchholz a demand to leave, and when the latter did not obey, on the night of February 10, 1716, he attacked the Yamyshev fortress with his 10,000-strong army and recaptured a herd of horses. The winter blockade of the fortress began, in which a detachment of Russians lost 2,300 people from hunger and disease. The detachments and provisions sent to help were intercepted by the Jungars, and Buchholz did not try to repel them, showing passivity. So a caravan of 700 people with a food convoy and 20,000 rubles of money for salaries, as well as 600 merchants from Tobolsk, Tara and Tomsk, was completely captured.
April 28, 1716 Buchholz was forced to leave the Yamyshev fortress. The fortifications were razed to the ground, houses and barracks were destroyed, military supplies were loaded onto 18 planks. There were no more than 700 officers and privates left, most of whom were sick. The Dzungars after the flight of Buchholz released the prisoners: the priest and the commissar who was at the execution.[5]
Expedition of 1719
In 1719, another expedition was organized led by I. M. Likharev, which reached Lake Zaisan, but, having been attacked by the Dzungars, was forced to return to Tobolsk.[6]
1717: Failed conquest on Khiva
Bekovich-Cherkassky received these orders in
Back in Astrakhan by February 1717, Bekovich raised another army and started towards Khiva, together with some engineers and land surveyors. It was many months later that several
What exactly happened with Bekovich-Cherkassky remains a matter of some controversy. According to a few surviving members of his contingent, they advanced to within 120 km from Khiva, when the khan attacked them with a 24,000-strong army. After three days of bloody fighting, the Khivans were routed.
Seeing that the enemy was very numerous, Bekovich-Cherkassky understood that diplomacy had a better chance of success. The Russian officer, accompanied only by 500 of his men, rode into the enemy's camp to propose terms. The khan pretended to surrender to him, welcomed him warmly, persuading him to divide the Russian army to dwell in five separate towns in order to facilitate foraging. The Khivans then attacked the five towns one by one, slaughtering most Russians, selling the others as slaves, and executing all Russian officers including Prince Cherkassky.
Peter the Great did nothing to avenge the defeat since he was still occupied by the war with Sweden, and also by the hostility of the Ottoman Empire. It was more than a century later that the Russian Empire resumed its military expeditions into Central Asia.
1731–1873: Gaining control of the Kazakh Steppe
Initial contacts
Abul Khair Khan's Russian clashes
1843–1844: Failed attacks on Kazakh Khanate
On June 27, Nicholas I allowed a trip to the Kazakh Steppe, with the attribution of expenses for the head of Kenesary to the account of the wagon collection. The detachment of the military foreman Lebedev, consisting of 1,500[7] people, was supposed to become an advanced force, later the number of his detachment reached 1,900 people.[8]
In
On September 1 and 7, 1843, fierce battles broke out with the advance detachments of the Russians, who left from Orenburg. As a result of the fighting, there were many casualties on both sides. Both sides ceased hostilities and withdrew. The rest of the Russian detachments failed to give battle to Kenesary. Often maneuvering in the steppe expanses, he misled them. He exhausted the forces of the Russian detachments and partially exterminated their manpower. Exhausted soldiers, due to the early onset of a cold rainy autumn, stopped hostilities, and left the Steppe in September. It was decided to resume hostilities against Kenesary in the following year, 1844.[9]
Second campaign
During this period, Kenesary became dangerous adversary. The Governor-General of Western Siberia was forced to appeal to the Kazakh population with the following appeal: “You know, Kenesary Kasymov has been causing disorder in the steppe for a number of years and increasing robberies, murders and other unrest. Having aroused the crazy Kazakhs, he continues to carry them along. The great sovereign decided to suppress the rebellion of Kenesary by force. Taking advantage of the wide opportunity presented to you, leave Kenesary. Otherwise, remember, you will be subjected to merciless torture.
The Tsarist government decided to send three detachments to suppress the Kenesary uprising: from the side of the Orsk fortress, the Ulytau mountains and from the Tobol River.
In May 1844, a detachment led by Jantorin, Sultan Baimagambetov and Military foreman Lebedev headed south, towards the Karakums.
The task of the Russian detachments was to take the detachments of Kenesary from both sides "in pincers", and cut off the retreat from the Turgai to the Karakum. However, the Russian troops failed to carry out their plan. Giving separate battles, Kenesary safely retreated to the Karakum. He managed to send Lebedev's detachment along a false route and, along the way, mistakenly defeat the villages of Biy Baikadamov, subject to Russia. Lebedev was recalled to Orenburg and soon put on trial for stealing and ruining the auls of Biys devoted to Russia. Lebedev's place was taken by Colonel Dunikovsky.
By this time, Siberian detachments under the command of General Zhemchuzhnikov were sent to suppress the Kenesary uprising. Having sent out his scouts behind enemy lines in advance, Kenesary received from them information about the Siberian detachment heading to join the Orenburg detachment of Dunikovsky. The task of Kenesary was to prevent these detachments from connecting and getting out of the encirclement. Kenesary decided to send a small detachment to meet him and thus create a false impression among the enemy, suggesting to him that the Kenesary detachment was completely retreating towards Ulytau. The Siberian detachment was really deceived: having changed direction, it set off in pursuit of a small detachment of Kenesary. Meanwhile, Kenesary, with his main forces, appeared on the New Line on June 23 and attacked the Konstantinovsk. The speed and maneuverability of his troops stunned the Russian troops.[10]
Kenesary and now decided to send only a small detachment against the Russians as a barrier, and prepare the main forces for a decisive blow behind enemy lines.
On July 17, 1844, some of his detachments began to impose a battle on the Russian troops, who were under the command of Sultan Zhantorin and Colonel Dunikovsky. Avoiding a decisive clash with the Russian troops, they had to wear down the enemy forces. On the night of July 20-21, 1844, the main forces of Kenesary hit the rear of the enemy, surrounding the Jantorin detachment. During fierce battles, this detachment was completely defeated:[11] “-Kenesary's warriors! - from all shouted Boranbai and shot at one sarbaz, who was running headlong. He clutched his wounded arm and howled in pain. Hearing a shot and screams, the Cossacks began firing into the darkness. At that moment, there was a roar - a cannon shell exploded nearby. A moment later there was a second explosion. Sarbaz and Cossacks, throwing down their weapons, hurried to their horses. They jumped into the saddle and immediately fell to the ground. The straps that fastened the girths and the bridles were cut. The panic began. And at that moment, the rebels broke into the camp, surrounding it from two sides. Friendly fire from rifles mowed down opponents. The horsemen overtook the fleeing and dealt with it on the spot. 44 sultans were killed in the battle. The detachment of Dunikovsky, despite the proximity of the battle, did not dare to help the sultans, fearing encirclement and death. The death of 44 sultans greatly embittered the Orenburg and West Siberian governors-general. On Dunikovsky's report, filed in the name of the Orenburg military governor, Obruchev imposed the following resolution: "Shame, unpleasant news, it is very doubtful, it is hard to believe that such a thing could have happened".[12]
During the summer of 1844, the advance of Kenesary continued at an unrelenting pace. On August 14, detachments led by the batyrs Nauryzbay and Agybay laid siege to the Ekaterininsky fortress, where about 100 soldiers and a huge number of trophies were taken prisoner, including 1847 pounds of bread:[13] “At a distance of four kilometers from the Catherine Stanitsa, about two thousand Sarbazes of Kenesary gathered. The attack began at five o'clock in the morning. The sentry Cossacks did not have time to detect and signal the movement of the Khan's troops towards the settlement. In the predawn hour, the most dexterous Kazakhs, having penetrated into the stanitsa, quickly removed all guards and gave a prearranged signal. Kenesary's cavalry burst into its streets with a battle cry. Sleepy Cossacks jumped out of their houses and fell under the blows of the blades of the rebels. Few managed to leave the stanitsa”.[14]
Fearing the further growth of the uprising, the Orenburg and Siberian governorships decided, in addition to the detachments of Dunikovsky, Zhemchuzhnikov and Jantorins, to send another detachment of Colonel Kovalevsky. By this time, Kenesary, having fortified with his army in the
Fall of the Kazakh Khanate (1847)
Following the rule of Abu'l-Mansur Khan's death in 1781, the Middle jüz was nominally ruled by his son Vali, but Vali never achieved control of the entire jüz. In an attempt to establish some order in 1798, Russia created a tribunal at
By 1837, tensions were rising in the Kazakh steppe once again. This time, the tensions were started by Kazakh co-rulers Ğubaidullah Khan, Sher Ghazi Khan, and Kenesary Khan, all of whom were sons of Qasim Sultan and grandsons of Abu'l-Mansur Khan. They launched a rebellion against Russia. The three co-rulers wanted to restore the relative independence that was present under previous Kazakh rulers such as Abu'l-Mansur, and they sought to resist taxation by the Russians.
In 1841, the three khans obtained the help of their younger cousin Aziz id-Din Bahadur, the son of Kazakh commander Nasrullah Nauryzbai Bahadur, and gathered a large troop of well-trained Kazakhs to resist the Russian army. The Kazakhs captured a number of Kokand fortresses in Kazakhstan, including their former capital of Hazrat-e-Turkistan. They decided to hide in the mountainous region near Lake Balkhash, but were taken by surprise when a Kyrgyz khan named Ormon Khan disclosed their whereabouts to Russian troops. Gubaidullah, Sher Ghazi, and Kenesary were all captured and executed by Kyrgyz defectors who had been helping the Russians. By the end of 1847, the Russian army had captured the Kazakh capitals of Hazrat-e-Turkistan and Syghanaq, abolishing the Kazakh Khanate as a whole.
1819: Expedition to Khiva
In 1819, a young 24 year old officer Nikolai Muraviev (not to be confused with
He crossed the Karakum desert with little problems with the tribesmen, the Turcomans who inhabited the region. Muraviev soon befriended these tribesmen along the way, moving along the Karakum for several days, for he was to arrive later in the Khanate. He arrived in Khiva, but the intentions of Muraviev were well documented by the Khivans, thus he was sent to a fortress, being told supposedly that he was going to have to wait in the fortress before meeting the Khan tomorrow. After a few days in the fortress, Muraviev realized he was trapped. After some time the guards realized he was taking notes, so they relayed this information to the Khan. The Khan and his officials had ensuing debates on what to do with the Russian, with a final decision to be made to have him to visit the Khans Palace.
The following day he arrived in the Palace, and he started a discussion with the Khan, telling him that the Tsar wishes a commercial agreement. After some debating, the Khan agreed to Muravievs deal, and he was to arrive home safely. Muraviev argued the Russians should invade Khiva to free the slaves, who during Muravievs visit showed respect to the man. However, this would never go full with the Tsar, before round 3 of the Khivan expeditions, the 1839 failed winter expedition to Khiva.[17]
1839: Failed attack on Khiva
In 1839, Russia attempted to conquer Khiva. The Russians under Vasily Perovsky marched around 5,000 men south from Orenburg. The winter was unusually cold and most of his camels died, forcing him to turn back. See Khivan campaign of 1839.
1847–1853: The Syr Darya line
Southward from the Siberian Line the obvious next step was a line of forts along the
Given Perovsky's failure in 1839 Russia decided on a slow but sure approach. In 1847 Captain Schultz built Raimsk in the Syr delta. It was soon moved upriver to
In 1852 a surveying party went upriver and was turned back before reaching Ak-Mechet. That summer Colonel Blaramberg and about 400 men were sent to raze Ak-Mechet on the pretext that Russia owned the north side of the river. The Kokandis responded by breaking the dykes and flooding the surrounding area. Having brought no scaling ladders or heavy artillery, Blaramberg saw that he could not take the citadel with its 25-foot-high walls. He therefore captured the outworks, burnt everything in the area and retired to Fort Aralsk. The later-famous Yakub Beg had commanded the fort at one time, but it is not clear if he was in command during this first battle. Next summer the Russians assembled a force of over 2000 men, over 2000 each of horses, camels and oxen, 777 wagons, bridging timber, pontoons and the steamer Perovsky. To guarantee that there would be enough fodder to move this much from Orenburg to Fort Aralsk, the Kazakhs were forbidden to graze the lands north of the fort. Command was given to the same Perovsky who earlier had failed to reach Khiva. He left Aralsk in June and reached Ak-Mechet on July 2. The Kokandis had strengthened the fort and increased the garrison. A regular siege was begun. When the trenches neared the citadel, a mine was dug under the walls. At 3AM on 9 August 1853 the mine was exploded, creating a large breach. The breach was taken on the third try and by 4:30AM it was all over. 230 Kokandi bodies were counted out of the original 300-man garrison. The place was renamed Fort Perovsky.
During the siege Padurov went 160 km (100 mi) upriver to Julek and found that its defenders had fled. He wrecked the fort as well as he could and returned with its abandoned guns. In September a large force from Kokand reoccupied Julek and advanced toward Fort Perovsky. The column sent to meet them had a hard day's fight, called for reinforcements but next morning found that the Kokandis had retreated. In December a Kokandi force (said to be 12000 men) surrounded Fort Perovsky. A 500-man sortie was soon surrounded and in trouble. Major Shkupa, seeing the enemy camp weakly defended, broke out and burned the camp. Two more sorties drove the Kokandis off in disorder.
Russia now held a 320 km (200 mi) line of forts along the west-flowing part of the Syr Darya. The area between the Aral and Caspian Seas was too thinly-populated to matter. The next question was whether Russia would extend the line east to the mountains (Fort Vernoye was founded in 1854) or continue southeast up the river to Kokand and the Ferghana Valley.
1847–1864: Down the eastern side
In 1847–1864 the Russians crossed the eastern Kazakh steppe and built a line of forts in the irrigated area along the northern Kyrgyz border. In 1864–68 they moved south, conquered Tashkent and Samarkand, confined the Khanate of Kokand to the Ferghana valley and made Bokhara a protectorate. This was the main event of the conquest. Our sources do not say why an eastern approach was chosen, but an obvious guess is that irrigation made it possible to move armies without crossing steppe or desert. This was important when transport required grass-fed horses and camels. We are not told how Russia supplied an army this far east, or if this was a problem. It is not clear why a forward policy was now adopted. It seems that different officials had different opinions and much was decided by local commanders and the luck of the battlefield. All sources report Russian victories over greatly superior forces with kill ratios approaching ten to one. Even if enemy numbers are exaggerated it seems clear that Russian weapons and tactics were now superior to the traditional Asian armies that they faced. All sources mention breechloading rifles without further explanation.
Advance from the northeast (1847–1864): The eastern end of the Kazakh steppe was called
In 1847
In 1851 Russia and China signed the Treaty of Kulja to regulate trade along what was becoming a new border. In 1864 they signed the Treaty of Tarbagatai which approximately established the current Chinese-Kazakh border. The Chinese thereby renounced any claims to the Kazakh steppe, to the extent that they had any.
Up the Syr Darya (1859–1864): Meanwhile, Russia was advancing southeast up the Syr Darya from Ak-Mechet. In 1859, Julek[a] was taken from Kokand. In 1861 a Russian fort was built at Julek and Yani Kurgan (Zhanakorgan) 80 km (50 mi) upriver was taken. In 1862 Chernyaev reconnoitered the river as far as Hazrat-i-Turkestan and captured the small oasis of Suzak about 105 km (65 mi) east of the river. In June 1864 Veryovkin took Hazrat-i-Turkestan from Kokand. He hastened surrender by bombarding the famous mausoleum. Two Russian columns met in the 240 km (150 mi) gap between Hazrat and Aulie-Ata, thereby completing the Syr-Darya Line.
1864–1868: Kokand and Bukhara subdued
Tashkent (1865): About 80 km (50 mi) south of the new line was Chimkent (Shymkent) which belonged to Kokand. Chernayev easily took it on 3 October 1864. On 15 October he suddenly appeared before Tashkent, failed to take it by sudden assault and retreated to Chimkent. Kokand then tried and failed to re-take Hazrat-i-Turkestan. In April 1865 Chernayev made a second attack on Tashkent. Unable to take such a large place (it was said to have a garrison of 30,000) he occupied the town's water supply at Niazbek. The Kokand Regent Alim Kuli arrived with 6,000 more troops and almost defeated the Russians, but was killed in the fight. The inhabitants now offered to submit to the Emir of Bokhara in return for assistance. About 21 June a party of Bokharans entered the town and more Bokharan troops were on the move. In this critical position Chernayev determined to risk a storm. At 3 a.m. on 27 June, Captain Abramov scaled the wall and opened the Kamelan Gate, advanced along the wall and opened a second gate while another party took the Kokand gate. That day and the next there was constant street fighting, but on the morning of the 29th a deputation of elders offered surrender.
Campaign of 1866: The Bokhara was now involved in the war. In February 1866 Chernayev crossed the
Samarkand (1868): In July 1867 a new Province of Turkestan was created and placed under
1875–1876: Liquidation of the Kokand Khanate
In 1875 the Kokand Khanate rebelled against Russian rule. Kokand commanders Abdurakhman and Pulat bey seized power in the khanate and began military operations against the Russians. By July 1875 most of the Khan's army and much of his family had deserted to the rebels, so he fled to the Russians at Kojent along with a million British pounds of treasure. Kaufmann invaded the Khanate on September 1, fought several battles and entered the capital on September 10, 1875. In October he transferred command to Mikhail Skobelev. Russian troops under the command of Skobelev and Kaufmann defeated the rebels at the Battle of Makhram. In 1876, the Russians freely entered Kokand, the leaders of the rebels were executed, and the khanate was abolished. Fergana Oblast was created in its place.
The Caspian side
Russia now held an approximately triangular area bounded by the eastern mountains and the vassal Khanate of Bokhara along most of the Oxus. The southern point was about 1,600 km (1,000 mi) south of Siberia, 1,600 km (1,000 mi) southeast of Orenburg and 1,900 km (1,200 mi) southeast of the supply bases on the Volga. The next step was to turn this triangle into a rectangle by moving east across the Caspian Sea from the Caucasus. The Caucasus held many troops left over from the Russian conquest of the Caucasus but the Viceroy of the Caucasus had so far not been active in Turkestan. The Caucasus has a fairly dense population but the east side of the Caspian is desert with significant population only in the oases of Khiva and along the Kopet Dag and at Merv in the south. The main events were the defeat of Khiva in 1873, the conquest of the Turkomans in 1881, the annexation of Merv in 1884 and the Panjdeh area in 1885.
For reference, these were the Russian bases on the north and east side of the Caspian:
- Volga Riverwith connections to the rest of Russia
- Ural River
- Novo-Aleksandrovsky (1834–1846): a shallow port, overlooking Dead Kultuk Bay,[24] that was soon abandoned as the local climate was too inhospitable
- Alexandrovsk (1846–): important at this time but not later
- Kenderli (?1873): a temporary base
- Krasnovodsk (1869–) the best port and later headquarters of the Transcaspian Oblast and start of the Trans-Caspian railway
- Chikishlyar (1871–?): a beach rather than a port
- Ashuradeh (1837–?) a fort and naval station on land claimed by Persia.
1873: The conquest of Khiva
The decision to attack Khiva was made in December 1872. Khiva was an oasis surrounded by several hundred kilometres of desert. The Russians could easily defeat the Khivan army if they could move enough troops across the desert. The place was attacked from five directions. Kaufmann marched west from Tashkent and was joined by another army coming south from Aralsk. They met in the desert, ran short of water, abandoned part of their supplies and reached the Oxus in late May. Veryovkin left from Orenburg, had little difficulty moving along the west side of the Aral Sea and reached the northwest corner of the delta in mid-May. He was joined by Lomakin who had a hard time crossing the desert from the Caspian. Markozov started from Chikishlyar, ran short of water and was forced to turn back. Kaufmann crossed the Oxus, fought a few easy battles and on June 4 the Khan sued for peace. Meanwhile, Veryovkin, who was out of contact with Kaufmann, crossed the delta and attacked the city walls of Khiva until he was called off by Kaufmann. The Khanate of Khiva became a Russian protectorate and remained so until the Russian Revolution.
1879–1885: Turkmenistan: Geok Tepe, Merv and Panjdeh
The Turkoman country remained unconquered. The area corresponded to the Karakum Desert and was inhabited by the Turkoman desert nomads. Irrigation supported a settled population along the Amu Darya in the northeast and along the north slope of the Kopet Dag mountains in the southwest. East of the Kopet Dag two rivers, the Murghab and Tejen, flow north from Afghanistan, supporting the oases of Tejen and Merv. The semi-sedentary population would drive their flocks out into the desert in spring and fall. The Turkomans had no organized state. Some served as mercenaries for Khiva. They habitually raided Persia and sold the resulting slaves in the Khiva slave market. They also bred desert-adapted horses that could usually outrun anything the Cossacks had. Unlike the rather antiquated armies of the Khanates, the Turkomans were good raiders and horsemen, but they could do little against the Russians' modern weapons and explosive artillery. As usual, the main problem was moving men and supplies across the desert.
1879: Lomakin's defeat at Geok Tepe: Lazarev landed a large force at Chikishlyar and began moving men and supplies up the
1881: Skobelev's bloody victory at Geok Tepe: Skobelev was put in command in March 1880. He spent most of the summer and fall moving men and supplies from Chikishlyar to the north side of the Kopet Dag. In December he marched southwest, besieged Geok Tepe for a month and took it by detonating a mine to breach the wall. At least 14,000 Tekes were killed. A week later he occupied Ashgabat 40 km (25 mi) southeast, but could go no farther. In May 1881 the occupied area was annexed as the Transcaspian Oblast. The eastern boundary of the oblast was undefined.
1884: The annexation of Merv: The
The irrigated area along the Kopet Dag ends east of Ashkebat. Farther east there is desert, then the small oasis of Tejent, more desert, and the much larger oasis of Merv. Merv had the great fortress of Kaushut Khan and was inhabited by Merv Tekes, who had also fought at Geok Tepe. As soon as the Russians were established in Askhabad, traders, and also spies, began moving between the Kopet Dag and Merv. Some elders from Merv went north to Petroalexandrovsk and offered a degree of submission to the Russians there. The Russians at Askhabad had to explain that both groups were part of the same empire. In February 1882 Alikhanov visited Merv and approached Makhdum Kuli Khan, who had been in command at Geok Tepe. In September Alikhanov persuaded Makhdum Kuli Khan to swear allegiance to the White Czar.
Skobelev had been replaced by Rohrberg in the spring of 1881, who was followed General Komarov in the spring of 1883. Near the end of 1883, General Komarov led 1500 men to occupy the Tejen oasis. After Komarov's occupation of Tejen, Alikhanov and Makhdum Kuli Khan went to Merv and called a meeting of elders, one threatening and the other persuading. Having no wish to repeat the slaughter at Geok Tepe, 28 elders went to Askhabad and on February 12 swore allegiance in the presence of General Komarov. A faction in Merv tried to resist but was too weak to accomplish anything. On March 16, 1884, Komarov occupied Merv. The subject Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara were now surrounded by Russian territory.
1885: Expansion stopped at Panjdeh: Between Merv and the current Afghan border lies about 230 km (140 mi) of semi-desert. South of that is the important border fort of Herat. In the summer of 1884 Britain and Russia agreed to demarcate the northwest Afghan border. The Russians did what they could to push the border south before it became frozen. When they captured the Afghan fort of Panjdeh, Britain came close to threatening war. Both sides backed down and the border was delineated between 1885 and 1886.
Cost: Russian military expense records indicate that between 1869 and 1879 the Transcaspian campaign cost 4.8 million rubles, the 1879–1880 expedition 5.525 million rubles, and the 1880–1881 expedition 11 million rubles. Railroad construction to that point cost 4,429,991 rubles, and construction materials another 3.518 million rubles. Total expenses from 1869 to 1881 amounted to 29,274,991 rubles.[26]
1872–1895: The Eastern Mountains
The natural eastern boundary of Russian Turkestan was the eastern mountains, but the exact line had to be settled. There were four main problems.
1867–1877: Yakub Beg: East of the Feghana Valley and southeast of Fort Vernoye on the other side of the mountains is the oval
1871–1883: temporary occupation of Kulja: The Tien Shan mountains run along the northern border of Kyrgyzstan. They continue east and separate
1893: Pamirs occupied:
The Great Game
The Great Game[28] refers to British attempts to block Russian expansion toward British India. Although there was much talk of possible Russian invasion of India and a number of British agents penetrating Central Asia, the British did nothing serious to prevent the Russian conquest of Turkestan, with one exception. Whenever Russian agents approached Afghanistan, the British reacted strongly, seeing Afghanistan as a necessary buffer state for the defense of India.
A Russian invasion of India seems improbable, but a number of British writers considered how it might be done. While not much was known about the geography, it was thought that they could reach Khiva and sail up the Oxus to Afghanistan. More realistically they might gain Persian support and cross northern Persia. Once in Afghanistan, they would swell their armies with offers of loot and invade India. Alternatively, they might invade India and provoke a native rebellion. The goal would probably not be the conquest of India, but to apply pressure on the British while Russia shifted focus on more important tasks, like taking Constantinople.
In 1801, there was some loose talk of a joint Franco-Russian invasion of India. During the
The period from 1837 to 1842 was especially active. In 1839, at the time of Perovsky's failed attack on Khiva,
The British took Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1849, thereby gaining the Indus River and a border with Afghanistan. The Crimean War occurred in 1853–56. A second Persian attack on Herat led to the Anglo-Persian War of 1856–57. The Indian Mutiny occurred in 1857–58. This was about the time Russian was building forts east from the Aral Sea (1847–53). The Russian capture of Tashkent (1865) and Samarkand(1868) produced no British response.
In 1875, following the conquest of Khiva,
On the Chinese side of the mountains a line of passes corresponding the Karakoram Highway provided a trade and pilgrim route from the Tarim Basin to India. It was not clear whether this could be used by an army. At the time of Yakub Beg both Russian and British agents were active at his court. A number of Indians in the British service mapped the area around the Pamirs. Russian expansion in the Pamirs provoked the British to move northward and gain control of places like Hunza and Chitral.
The Great Game came to an end with the demarcation of the northern Afghan border
Notes
- ^ The location is uncertain, possibly the modern Zhilek.
- ^ Apparently Istaravshan about 32 km (20 mi) south of the middle 160 km (100 mi) the line between Jizzakh and Kozhent.
- ^ Shahrisabz, Katti-Kurgan, Hussein Bek of Urgut, Omar Bek of Chilek, Jura Bek, Baba Bek and others.
Citations
- ^ Бекмаханов Е.Б., Восстание хана Кенесары (1837-1847), с. 27
- ^ Mancall. Note: The dates for the first Bukhholts expedition on pages 211–212 are unfortunately self-contradictory.
- ^ Мартынов Л. Крепость на Оми: [Исторический очерк]. — Омск: Омскоблиздат, 1939.
- ^ Энциклопедический лексикон. — Т. 7: Бра — Бял. — СПб.: Тип. А. Плюшара. 1836. — С. 622.
- ^ Чулков М. Историческое описание Российской коммерции при всех портах и границах от древних времён до ныне настоящего и всех преимущественных узаконений по оной государя императора Петра Великого и ныне благополучно царствующей государыни императрицы Екатерины Великой. — Том 3. — Книга 1. — М.: Универ. тип., 1785. — Ст. 447.
- ^ РОССИЙСКО-КАЗАХСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ В XVI–XIX ВВ.
- ^ Оренбургские казаки в борьбе с национально-освободительным движением казахского народа
- ^ Revolt of the 1837—1847 under the leadership of Khan Kenesary
- ^ Бекмаханов Е.Б., Восстание хана Кенесары (1837-1847), с. 25–26
- ^ Бекмаханов Е.Б., Восстание хана Кенесары (1837-1847), с. 28
- ^ Бекмаханов Е.Б., Восстание хана Кенесары (1837-1847), с. 29
- ^ Ж. Касымбаев «Кенесары Касымов», с. 52–54
- ^ Бекмаханов Е.Б., Восстание хана Кенесары (1837-1847), с. 30
- ^ Ж. Касымбаев «Кенесары Касымов», с. 54
- ^ Olcott, Martha (1995). "The Russian Conquest". The Kazakhs. Hoover Institution Press. p. 44.
- ^ Olcott, Martha (1995). "The Russian Conquest". The Kazakhs. Hoover Institution Press. p. 60.
- ^ Hopkirk, Peter (1990). The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (1st ed.). United Kingdom: Kodansha International.
- ^ Bregel.
- ^ "An Indian Officer". Note: The author puts this as two years before the foundation of Vernoye which he misdates to 1855, so 1852 is probably correct.
- ^ MacKenzie.
- ^ Bregel, p. 64.
- ISBN 5-7117-0058-8, 5-7117-0059-6. — 100 000 экз.
- ^ Malikov, pp. 180–198.
- ^ New Alexander Fort: A Russian Empire Strategic Stronghold in Mangystau
- ^ Бекмаханова, Наиля E. (2015). Присоединение Центральной Азии к Российской империи в XVIII–XIX вв [Unification of Central Asia to the Russian Empire in the XVIII–XIX Centuries]. Historia Russica (in Russian). «ЦГИ Принт». p. 88.
- ^ Бекмаханова, Наиля E. (2015). Присоединение Центральной Азии к Российской империи в XVIII–XIX вв [Unification of Central Asia to the Russian Empire in the XVIII–XIX Centuries]. Historia Russica (in Russian). «ЦГИ Принт». p. 89.
- ^ Middleton.
- ^ Hopkirk.
References and further reading
- Bregel, Yuri. An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, 2003.
- Brower, Daniel. Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London) 2003
- Curzon, G.N. Russia in Central Asia (London) 1889 online free
- Ewans, Martin. Securing the Indian frontier in Central Asia: Confrontation and negotiation, 1865–1895 (Routledge, 2010).
- Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, John Murray, 1990.
- An Indian Officer (1894). "Russia's March Towards India: Volume 1". Google Books. Sampson Low, Marston & Company. Retrieved 11 April 2019.
- Johnson, Robert. Spying for empire: the great game in Central and South Asia, 1757–1947 (Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2006).
- Malikov, A.M. The Russian conquest of the Bukharan emirate: military and diplomatic aspects in Central Asian Survey, volume 33, issue 2, 2014.
- Mancall, Mark. Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, Harvard University press, 1971.
- McKenzie, David. The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev, University of Georgia Press, 1974.
- Middleton, Robert and Huw Thomas. Tajikistan and the High Pamirs, Odyssey Books, 2008.
- Morris, Peter. "The Russians in Central Asia, 1870–1887." Slavonic and East European Review 53.133 (1975): 521–538 online.
- Morrison, Alexander. "Introduction: Killing the Cotton Canard and getting rid of the Great Game: rewriting the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 1814–1895." (2014): 131–142. online
- Morrison, Alexander. Russian rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A comparison with British India (Oxford UP, 2008).
- Peyrouse, Sébastien. "Nationhood and the minority question in Central Asia. The Russians in Kazakhstan." Europe–Asia Studies 59.3 (2007): 481–501.
- Pierce, Richard A. Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: a study in colonial rule (1960) online free to borrow
- Quested, Rosemary. The expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857–1860 (University of Malaya Press, 1968).
- Saray, Mehmet. "The Russian conquest of central Asia." Central Asian Survey 1.2-3 (1982): 1–30.
- Schuyler, Eugene. Turkistan (London) 1876 2 Vols. online free
- Skrine, Francis Henry, The Heart of Asia, circa 1900.
- Spring, Derek W. "Russian imperialism in Asia in 1914." Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique (1979): 305–322 online
- Sunderland, Willard. "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: the colonial office that never was but might have been." Slavic Review (2010): 120–150 online.
- Valikhanov, Chokan Chingisovich, Mikhail Ivanovich Venyukov, and Other Travelers. The Russians in Central Asia: Their Occupation of the Kirghiz Steppe and the line of the Syr-Daria: Their Political Relations with Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan: Also Descriptions of Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria, Edward Stanford, 1865.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey. The Russians in Central Asia History Today. March 1956, 6#3 pp 172–180.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey. The modern history of Soviet Central Asia (1964). online free to borrow
- Williams, Beryl. "Approach to the Second Afghan War: Central Asia during the Great Eastern Crisis, 1875–1878." 'International History Review 2.2 (1980): 216–238.
- Yapp, M. E. Strategies of British India. Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980)