Presidency of Millard Fillmore
Zachary Taylor → | |
|
The presidency of Millard Fillmore began on July 9, 1850, when
Upon taking office, Fillmore dismissed Taylor's cabinet and pursued a new policy with regards to the territory acquired in the
Fillmore somewhat reluctantly sought his party's nomination for a full term, but the split between supporters of Fillmore and Secretary of State Daniel Webster led to the nomination of General Winfield Scott at the 1852 Whig National Convention. Pierce defeated Scott by a wide margin in the general election. Though some analysts praise various aspects of his presidency, Fillmore is generally ranked as an inadequate president in polls of historians and political scientists.
Accession
The 1848 Whig National Convention selected Zachary Taylor, a top American general during the Mexican–American War, as the Whig presidential nominee. For Taylor's running mate, John A. Collier convinced his fellow Whigs to nominate Fillmore, a loyal supporter of defeated presidential candidate Henry Clay.[1] During the 1848 presidential election, Fillmore campaigned for the Whig ticket, and he helped put an end to a brief anti-Taylor movement among Northern Whigs that had emerged after Taylor accepted the nomination of a small, breakaway group of pro-slavery Democrats. With the Democrats divided by the Free Soil candidacy of former President Martin Van Buren, the Whigs won the 1848 presidential election.[2]
Despite the Whig presidential victory, Democrats maintained control of both the
Fillmore received the formal notification of Zachary Taylor's death, signed by the cabinet, on the evening of July 9, 1850 in his residence at the
Taylor's widow, Margaret Taylor, left Washington soon after her husband's death, and Fillmore's family took up residence in the White House shortly thereafter. Because Fillmore's wife, Abigail, was often in poor health, his daughter, Mary Abigail Fillmore, frequently served as the White House hostess.[9]
Administration
The Fillmore cabinet | ||
---|---|---|
Office | Name | Term |
President | Millard Fillmore | 1850–1853 |
Vice President | none | 1850–1853 |
Secretary of State | John M. Clayton | 1850 |
Daniel Webster | 1850–1852 | |
Edward Everett | 1852–1853 | |
Secretary of the Treasury | William M. Meredith | 1850 |
Thomas Corwin | 1850–1853 | |
Secretary of War | George W. Crawford | 1850 |
Charles Magill Conrad | 1850–1853 | |
Attorney General | Reverdy Johnson | 1850 |
John J. Crittenden | 1850–1853 | |
Postmaster General | Jacob Collamer | 1850 |
Nathan K. Hall | 1850–1852 | |
Samuel Dickinson Hubbard | 1852–1853 | |
Secretary of the Navy | William Ballard Preston | 1850 |
William Alexander Graham | 1850–1852 | |
John P. Kennedy | 1852–1853 | |
Secretary of the Interior | Thomas Ewing | 1850 |
Thomas McKennan | 1850 | |
Alexander Stuart | 1850–1853 |
Taylor's cabinet appointees submitted their resignation on July 10, and Fillmore accepted the resignations the following day. Fillmore is the only president who succeeded by death or resignation not to retain, at least initially, his predecessor's cabinet.[10] The biggest challenge facing Taylor had been the issue of slavery in the territories, and this issue immediately confronted the Fillmore administration as well.[11] Taylor had opposed a plan, formulated by Henry Clay, which was designed to appeal to both anti-slavery northerners and pro-slavery southerners, but which received the most support from Southerners. During his vice presidency, Fillmore had indicated that he might vote to support the compromise, but he had not publicly committed himself on the issue when he assumed the presidency.[12]
Fillmore hoped to use the process of selecting the cabinet to re-unify the Whig Party, and he sought to balance the cabinet among North and South, pro-compromise and anti-compromise, and pro-Taylor and anti-Taylor. Fillmore offered the position of Secretary of State to
Judicial appointments
Fillmore appointed one Supreme Court justice, though two Supreme Court vacancies arose during his presidency. The first vacancy arose due to the death of Associate Justice Levi Woodbury in 1851. Determined to nominate a Whig from New England, Fillmore settled on Benjamin Robbins Curtis. The 41-year-old Curtis had earned notoriety as a leading practitioner of commercial law, and he won the full backing of Secretary of State Webster. Despite some opposition from anti-slavery senators, Curtis ultimately won Senate approval. After the death of Associate Justice John McKinley in mid-1852, Fillmore successively nominated Edward A. Bradford, George Edmund Badger, and William C. Micou. By refusing to act on any of the nominations, Senate Democrats ensured that the vacancy would be filled by Franklin Pierce after Fillmore left office. Curtis would serve on the Supreme Court until 1857, when he resigned in protest of the holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford.[17] Fillmore also made four appointments to United States district courts, including that of his Postmaster General, Nathan Hall, to the federal district court in Buffalo.[18]
Domestic affairs
Compromise of 1850
Background
Before and during Taylor's presidency, a crisis had developed over the land acquired after the Mexican–American War in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.[19] The key issue was the status of slavery in the territories, which, for many leaders, represented a debate over not just slavery but also morality, property rights, and personal honor. Southern extremists like John C. Calhoun viewed any limit on slavery as an attack on the Southern way of life, while many Northerners opposed any further expansion of slavery.[20] Further complicating the issue was the fact that much of the newly acquired Western lands seemed unsuitable to slavery due to climate and geography.[21] In 1820, Congress had agreed to the Missouri Compromise, which had banned slavery in all lands of the Louisiana Purchase north of the 36° 30' parallel, and many Southerners sought to extend this line to the Pacific Ocean.[22] During the Mexican–American War, a Northern member of Congress had put forth the Wilmot Proviso, a legislative proposal that would have banned slavery in all territories acquired in the Mexican–American War. Though not adopted by Congress, the debate over the Wilmot Proviso had contributed to an increasingly tense national debate regarding slavery.[23]
The territorial issues centered on the territories of California and
Congress also faced the issue of Utah, which like California and New Mexico, had been ceded by Mexico. Utah was inhabited largely by Mormons, whose practice of polygamy was unpopular in the United States.[30] Aside from the disposition of the territories, other issues had risen to prominence during the Taylor years.[31] The Washington, D.C. slave trade angered many in the North, who viewed the presence of slavery in the capital as a blemish on the nation. Disputes around fugitive slaves had grown since 1830 in part due to improving means of transportation, as escaped slaves used roads, railroads, and ships to escape. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 had granted jurisdiction to all state and federal judges over cases regarding fugitive slaves, but several Northern states, dissatisfied by the lack of due process in these cases, had passed personal liberty laws that made it more difficult to return alleged fugitive slaves to the South.[19] Another issue that would affect the compromise was Texas's debt; it had approximately $10 million in debt left over from its time as an independent nation, and that debt would become a factor in the debates over the territories.[32]
Taylor presidency
On January 29, 1850, Senator Henry Clay introduced a plan which combined the major subjects under discussion. His legislative package included the admission of California as a free state, the
Though Clay had originally favored voting on each of his proposals separately, Senator Henry S. Foote of Mississippi convinced him to combine the proposals regarding California's admission and the disposition of Texas's borders into one bill.[38] Clay hoped that this combination of measures would convince congressmen from both North and South to support the overall package of laws even if they objected to specific provisions.[39] Clay's proposal attracted the support of some Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs, but it lacked the backing necessary to win passage, and debate over the bill continued.[39] Foote and other Southern leaders attempted to condition California's statehood either on granting Texas the full extent of its boundary claims on New Mexico, or on the requirement that slavery be allowed in the disputed region if it was not awarded to Texas.[40] Foote also sought to split California into two states, with the division at the 35th parallel north.[41] Taylor opposed the bill, since he favored granting California statehood immediately and denied the legitimacy of Texas's claims over New Mexico.[42] While Congress continued to debate Clay's proposals, Texas Governor Peter Hansborough Bell loudly protested the organization of New Mexico's constitutional convention, which had been proceeded with the approval of Taylor and the military government of New Mexico instigated by General Stephen W. Kearny during the Mexican–American War.[43] Following the New Mexico constitutional convention, Taylor urged that Congress immediately grant statehood to both California and New Mexico, and he prepared for a clash with Texas.[39] When Taylor died in July 1850, none of the major domestic issues facing his presidency had been settled.[44]
Compromise
The debate over slavery in the territories continued despite Taylor's death. Though Fillmore favored the broad outlines of Clay's compromise,[12] he did not believe that it could pass via a single bill. With Fillmore's support, Senator James Pearce of Maryland helped defeat Clay's compromise bill by proposing to remove a provision related to the Texas-New Mexico boundary. In the ensuing debate, all provisions of the bill were removed except for the organization of Utah Territory. With the apparent collapse of the bill, Clay took a temporary leave from the Senate, and Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois took the lead in advocating for a compromise based largely on Clay's proposals. Rather than passing the proposals as one bill, Douglas would seek to pass each proposal one-by-one.[45]
Upon taking office, Fillmore reinforced federal troops in the disputed New Mexico region, and warned Texas Governor Bell to keep the peace.[46] In an August 6, 1850 message to Congress, Fillmore disclosed a belligerent letter from Governor Bell and his own reply to Bell. In that reply, Fillmore denied Texas's claims to New Mexico, asserting that United States had promised to protect the territorial integrity of New Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In his message to Congress, Fillmore also urged Congress to settle the boundary dispute as quickly as possible, and indicated support for providing monetary compensation to Texas in return for the establishment of New Mexico Territory, which would include all of the land it had controlled prior to the Mexican–American War.[47] Fillmore's forceful response helped convince Texas's U.S. Senators, Sam Houston and Thomas Jefferson Rusk, to support Stephen Douglas's compromise. With their support, a senate bill providing for a final settlement of Texas's borders won passage days after Fillmore delivered his message. Under the terms of the bill, the U.S. would assume Texas's debts, while Texas's northern border was set at the 36° 30' parallel north (the Missouri Compromise line) and much of its western border followed the 103rd meridian. The bill attracted the support of a bipartisan coalition of Whigs and Democrats from both sections, though most opposition to the bill came from the South.[48] The Senate quickly moved onto the other major issues, passing bills that provided for the admission of California, the organization of New Mexico Territory, and the establishment of a new fugitive slave law.[49]
The debate then moved to the House of Representatives, where Fillmore, Webster, Douglas, Congressman Linn Boyd, and Speaker of the House Howell Cobb took the lead in convincing members to support the compromise bills that had been passed in the Senate.[50] The Senate's proposed settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary faced intense opposition from many Southerners, as well as from some Northerners who believed that the Texas did not deserve monetary compensation. After a series of close votes that nearly delayed consideration of the issue, the House voted to approve a Texas bill similar to that which had been passed by the Senate.[51] Following that vote, the House and the Senate quickly agreed on each of the major issues, including the banning of the slave trade in Washington.[52] The president quickly signed each bill into law save for the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; he ultimately signed that law as well after Attorney General Crittenden assured him that the law was constitutional.[53] Though some in Texas still favored sending a military expedition into New Mexico, in November 1850 the state legislature voted to accept the compromise.[54]
Passage of the Compromise of 1850, as it became known, caused celebration in Washington and elsewhere, with crowds shouting, "the Union is saved!" Fillmore himself described the Compromise of 1850 as a "final settlement" of sectional issues, though the future of slavery in New Mexico and Utah remained unclear.[55] The admission of new states, or the organization of territories in the remaining unorganized portion of the Louisiana Purchase, could also potentially reopen the polarizing debate over slavery.[56][57] Not all accepted the Compromise of 1850; a South Carolina newspaper wrote, "the Rubicon is passed ... and the Southern States are now vassals in this Confederacy."[58] Many Northerners, meanwhile, were displeased by the fugitive slave law.[59]
Fugitive Slave Act
Fillmore hoped that slavery would one day cease to exist in the United States, but he believed that it was his duty to zealously enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.[60] After 1850, Fillmore's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act became the central issue of his administration. The Fugitive Slave Act created the first national system of law enforcement by appointing federal commissioner in every county to hear fugitive slave cases and enforce the fugitive slave law. As there were few federal courts operating throughout the country, the appointment of commissioners allowed for the enforcement of a federal law without relying on state courts, many of which were unsympathetic to slave masters or unwilling to even take on fugitive slave cases. The law also penalized commissioners and federal marshals who allowed slaves to escape from their custody, and levied fines against anyone who aided a fugitive slave or interfered with the return of slaves. Fugitive slave proceedings lacked many due process protections such as the right to a jury trial, and defendants were not allowed to testify at their own hearing. Many in the North felt that the Fugitive Slave Act effectively brought slavery into their home states, and while the abolitionist movement remained weak, many Northerners increasingly came to detest slavery.[61]
Though the law was highly offensive to many Northerners, Southerners complained bitterly about perceived slackness in enforcement. Many of the administration's prosecutions or attempts to return slaves ended badly for the government, as in the case of Shadrach Minkins. A major controversy erupted over the fate of Ellen and William Craft, two escaped slaves living in Boston. Fillmore threatened to send federal soldiers into the city in order to compel the return of the Crafts to the South, but the Crafts' escape to England put an end to the controversy. Disputes over fugitive slaves were widely publicized North and South, inflaming passions and undermining the good feeling that had followed the Compromise.[62] Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin in response to the Fugitive Slave Act, and its publication in 1852 further raised sectional tensions.[63]
Stirrings of disunion
The Compromise of 1850 shook up partisan alignments in South, with elections being contested by
Other issues
A longtime supporter of
To deescalate the Mormon issue, Fillmore appointed
In August 1850, the social reformer Dorothea Dix wrote to Fillmore, urging support for her proposal in Congress for land grants to finance asylums for the impoverished mentally ill. Though her proposal did not pass, they became friends and continued to correspond well after Fillmore's presidency.[71]
On September 21, 1850, Fillmore signed the
Noting that many miners involved in the California Gold Rush were forced to sell their gold at a discount, Fillmore asked Congress to create a federal mint in California, resulting in the establishment of the San Francisco Mint.[73]
Foreign affairs
Fillmore oversaw two highly competent Secretaries of State, Webster, and after the New Englander's 1852 death,
As part of a broader strategy of establishing U.S. influence in the Pacific, Fillmore and Webster also sought increased influence in Hawaii, which U.S. policymakers saw as an important link between the U.S. and Asia. In 1842, President John Tyler had announced the "Tyler doctrine," which proclaimed that the U.S. would not accept annexation of Hawaii by a European power.[77] France under Napoleon III sought to annex Hawaii, but backed down after Fillmore issued a strongly worded message warning that "the United States would not stand for any such action."[78] The U.S. also signed a secret treaty with King Kamehameha III of Hawaii which stipulated that the U.S. would gain sovereignty over Hawaii in case of war.[77] Although many in Hawaii and the U.S. desired the annexation of Hawaii as U.S. state, the U.S. was unwilling to grant full citizenship to Hawaii's non-white population.[79]
Many Southerners hoped to see Cuba, a Spanish slave-holding colony, annexed to the United States.[78] Venezuelan adventurer Narciso López recruited Americans for three filibustering expeditions to Cuba, in the hope of overthrowing Spanish rule there. After the second attempt in 1850, López and some of his followers were indicted for breach of the Neutrality Act, but were quickly acquitted by friendly Southern juries.[78] Fillmore ordered federal authorities to attempt to prevent López from launching a third expedition, and proclaimed that his administration would not protect anyone captured by Spain. López's third expedition ended in total failure, as the Cuban populace once again refused to rally to their would-be liberator. López and several Americans, including the nephew of Attorney General Crittenden, were executed by the Spanish, while another 160 Americans were forced to work in Spanish mines. Fillmore, Webster and the Spanish government worked out a series of face-saving measures, including the release of the American prisoners, that settled a brewing crisis between the two countries. Following the crisis, Britain and France offered a three-party treaty in which all signatories would agree to uphold Spanish control of Cuba, but Fillmore rejected the offer. Many Southerners, including Whigs, had supported the filibusters, and Fillmore's consistent opposition to the filibusters further divided his party as the 1852 election approached.[80]
A much-publicized event of Fillmore's presidency was the arrival in late 1851 of Lajos Kossuth, the exiled leader of a failed Hungarian revolution against Austria. Kossuth wanted the U.S. to recognize Hungary's independence. Many Americans were sympathetic to the Hungarian rebels, especially recent German immigrants, who were now coming to the U.S. in large numbers and had become a major political force. Kossuth was feted by Congress, and Fillmore allowed a White House meeting after receiving word that Kossuth would not try to politicize it. In spite of his promise, Kossuth made a speech promoting his cause. The American enthusiasm for Kossuth petered out, and he departed for Europe; Fillmore refused to change American policy, remaining neutral.[81]
1852 election and completion of term
As the election of 1852 approached, Fillmore remained undecided whether to run for a full term as president. Fillmore's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act had made him unpopular among many in the North, but he retained considerable support from the South, where he was seen as the only candidate capable of uniting the party. Secretary Webster had long coveted the presidency and, though in poor health, planned a final attempt to gain the White House.[82] Webster hoped that his pro-Compromise stance would help him garner support throughout the country, but his reputation as the spokesman for New England limited his appeal outside of his home region, especially in the South.[83] Fillmore was sympathetic to the ambitions of his longtime friend, but was reluctant to rule out accepting the party's 1852 nomination, as he feared doing so would allow Seward to gain control of the party.[82] Yet he also believed that the Whig nominee was likely to lose in 1852, and feared that a loss would bring an end to his political career. Ultimately, he refused to pull out of the race, and allowed his supporters to run his campaign for the Whig nomination.[84] A third candidate emerged in the form of General Winfield Scott, who, like previously successful Whig presidential nominees William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor, had earned fame for his martial accomplishments. Though Thurlow Weed advised Seward to accept whoever the Whigs nominated, Seward threw his backing behind Scott. Scott had supported the Compromise of 1850, but his association with Seward made him unacceptable to Southern Whigs. Thus, approaching the June 1852 Whig National Convention in Baltimore, the major candidates were Fillmore, Webster, and General Scott.[82] Supporters of the Compromise of 1850 were split between Fillmore and Webster, while Northern opponents of the Compromise backed Scott.[85]
Stephen Douglas's role in the Compromise of 1850, along with his aggressive rhetoric in foreign policy, had made him a front-runner for the 1852 Democratic nomination. But by the time of the May 1852 Democratic National Convention, former Secretary of State James Buchanan of Pennsylvania had eclipsed Douglas, who had made several enemies in the party and faced rumors about his drinking. The convention deadlocked between 1848 nominee Lewis Cass of Michigan and Buchanan, each of whom led on different ballots. On the 49th ballot, the party nominated former New Hampshire senator Franklin Pierce, who had been out of national politics for nearly a decade before 1852. The nomination of Pierce, a Northerner sympathetic to the Southern view on slavery, united the Democrats and gave the party a decided advantage in the 1852 campaign.[86]
The 1852 Whig National Convention convened on June 16. Two days later, at the urging of Southern delegates, the Whig National Convention passed a party platform endorsing the Compromise as a final settlement of the slavery question.[87] On the convention's first presidential ballot, Fillmore received 133 of the necessary 147 votes, while Scott won 131 and Webster won 29. After the 46th ballot still failed to produce a presidential nominee, the delegates voted to adjourn until the following Monday. Fillmore supporters offered a deal to the delegates backing Webster: if Webster could win 40 votes on one of the next two ballots, then the Fillmore delegates would switch to Webster. If not, then the Webster delegates would back Fillmore. When informed of the proposed arrangement, Fillmore quickly agreed, but Webster refused to consent to the deal until Monday morning.[87] Scott's supporters were also active over the weekend, and they won the commitment of some delegates who preferred Scott as their second choice.[88] On the 48th ballot, Webster delegates began to defect to Scott, and the general gained the nomination on the 53rd ballot. Webster was far more unhappy at the outcome than was Fillmore, and Fillmore rejected Webster's offer to resign as Secretary of State.[87] Many Southern Whigs, including Alexander H. Stephens and Robert Toombs, refused to support Scott.[89]
Scott proved to be a poor candidate who lacked popular appeal, and he suffered the worst defeat in Whig history. Whigs also lost several congressional and state elections.
Historical reputation
According to his biographer, Robert Scarry: "No president of the United States ... has suffered as much ridicule as Millard Fillmore".[95] He ascribed much of the abuse to a tendency to denigrate the presidents who served in the years just prior to the Civil War as lacking in leadership. For example, president Harry S. Truman "characterized Fillmore as a weak, trivial thumb-twaddler who would do nothing to offend anyone", responsible in part for the Civil War.[96] Professional historians are no more kind. Paul Finkelman commented, "on the central issues of the age his vision was myopic and his legacy is worse ... in the end, Fillmore was always on the wrong side of the great moral and political issues".[97] Finkelman argues that the central accomplishment of Fillmore's tenure, the Compromise of 1850, should instead be called the "Appeasement of 1850" due to its abandoning of the Wilmot Proviso, thereby opening up all of the territories of the Mexican Cession to slavery.[98]
On a more favorable note, historian
Polls of historians and political scientists have generally ranked Fillmore in the bottom quartile of presidents. A 2018 poll of the American Political Science Association’s Presidents and Executive Politics section ranked Fillmore as the sixth-worst president.[105] A 2017 C-SPAN poll of historians ranked Fillmore as the seventh-worst president.[106]
In his profile of Fillmore for the Miller Center of Public Affairs, historian Michael Holt writes:
From the modern perspective, Fillmore seems almost an invisible man among Presidents. Books on him are all but nonexistent. But his accomplishments, while not great, were nonetheless substantial. In addition to the fine legislative engineering that passed the compromise, Fillmore also conducted a disciplined, principled foreign policy.[107]
References
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- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 59–61, 69.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 159–160.
- ^ Snyder, p. 43.
- ^ "The Swearing In of Millard Fillmore July 10, 1850". Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
- ^ "VP Millard Fillmore". United States Senate. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
- ^ Smith 1988, p. 166.
- ^ Finkelman, pp. 56–57, 72–73.
- ^ Finkelman, pp. 58–59.
- ^ a b Holt, pp. 522–525.
- ^ Holt, pp. 525–526.
- ^ Finkelman, pp. 73–78.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 167–168.
- ^ Holt, pp. 529–530.
- ^ Abraham, pp. 88–91.
- ^ "Biographical Dictionary of the Federal Judiciary". Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center. Retrieved March 4, 2012. searches run from page, "select research categories" then check "court type" and "nominating president", then select U.S. District Courts (or U.S. Circuit Courts) and also Millard Fillmore.
- ^ a b c Finkelman, pp. 58–62, 71.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 14–19.
- ^ Smith 1988, p. 16.
- ^ McPherson, p. 51.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 15, 21–22.
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- ^ a b Smith 1988, pp. 98, 101–102.
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- ^ a b c McPherson, p. 74.
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- ^ Smith 1988, p. 188–189.
- ^ Scarry, p. 172.
- ^ Bordewich, pp. 347–348, 359–360.
- ^ McPherson, pp. 75–76.
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- ^ Smith 1988, p. 248.
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- ^ Gienapp, p. 400.
- ^ Finkelman, pp. 92–93.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 199–200.
- ^ Smith 1988, pp. 235–236.
- ^ "Millard Fillmore: The American Franchise". Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. 4 October 2016. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
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- ^ a b c "Millard Fillmore: Foreign Affairs". Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. 4 October 2016. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
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Works cited
- Abraham, Henry Julian (2008). Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-7425-5895-3.
- Bordewich, Fergus M. (2012). America's Great Debate: Henry Clay, Stephen A. Douglas, and the Compromise That Preserved the Union. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9781439124604.
- Calabresi, Steven G.; ISBN 978-0-300-12126-1.
- Finkelman, Paul (2011). Millard Fillmore. The American Presidents. Times Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-8715-4.
- Gienapp, William E. (1984). "The Whig Party, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nomination of Winfield Scott". Presidential Studies Quarterly. 14 (3): 399–415. JSTOR 27550101.
- Grayson, Benson Lee (1981). The Unknown President: The Administration of Millard Fillmore. University Press of America. ISBN 978-0-8191-1457-0.
- Greenstein, Fred I.; Anderson, Dale (2013). Presidents and the Dissolution of the Union: Leadership Style from Polk to Lincoln. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-4641-2.
- Herring, George (2008). From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507822-0.
- Holt, Michael (1999). The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. Oxford University Press.
- McPherson, James (2003). The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-974390-2.
- Rayback, Robert J. (2015) [1959]. Millard Fillmore: Biography of a President (Kindle ed.). Pickle Partners Publishing.
- Scarry, Robert J. (2001). Millard Fillmore (Kindle ed.). McFarland & Co., Inc. ISBN 978-1-4766-1398-7.
- Smith, Elbert B. (1988). The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor & Millard Fillmore. The American Presidency. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0362-6.
- Snyder, Charles M. (1975). The Lady and the President: The Letters of Dorothea Dix and Millard Fillmore. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-1332-6.
Further reading
- Brinkley, Alan; Dyer, Davis (2004). Brinkley, Alan; Dyer, Davis (eds.). The American Presidency. pp. 145–151. ISBN 978-0-618-38273-6.
- Graebner, Norman A. "Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore." in In Henry Graff, ed., The Presidents: A Reference History (2002) Online
- Holman Hamilton. Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Compromise of 1850 (1964) Online free to borrow
- Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union, vol. 1: Fruits of Manifest Destiny, 1847–1852 (1947), covers politics in depth. Online free to borrow
- ISBN 978-1-118-60929-3. pp. 309–344.
- Van Deusen, Glyndon G. "Fillmore, Millard". Encyclopedia Americana. Archived from the original on May 10, 2004. Retrieved 2007-05-09.
External links
- United States Congress. "Presidency of Millard Fillmore (id: F000115)". Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.
- Millard Fillmore: A Resource Guide from the Library of Congress
- White House Biography
- Biography by Appleton's and Stanley L. Klos
- Finding Aid to Millard Fillmore Letters, 1829–1859 at the New York State Library
- Works by Millard Fillmore at Project Gutenberg
- Works by or about Millard Fillmore at Internet Archive
- Works by Millard Fillmore at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
- Millard Fillmore: A bibliography by The Buffalo History Museum
- Millard Fillmore at Encyclopedia American: The American Presidency
- Essays on Fillmore and each member of his cabinet and First Lady
- "Life Portrait of Millard Fillmore", from C-SPAN's American Presidents: Life Portraits, June 11, 1999