Military history of China before 1912
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The recorded military history of China extends from about 2200 BC to the present day. Chinese pioneered the use of crossbows, advanced metallurgical standardization for arms and armor, early gunpowder weapons, and other advanced weapons, but also adopted nomadic cavalry[1] and Western military technology.[2] China's armies also benefited from an advanced logistics system as well as a rich strategic tradition, beginning with Sun Tzu's The Art of War, that deeply influenced military thought.[3]
History of military organization
The military history of China stretches from roughly 2500 BC to the present day. Chinese armies were advanced and powerful, especially after the Warring States period.[citation needed] These armies were tasked with the twofold goal of defending China and her subject peoples from foreign intruders, and with expanding China's territory and influence across Asia[4]
Pre-Warring State
Early Chinese armies were relatively small affairs. Composed of
Under the Shang and Zhou, these armies were able to expand China's territory and influence from a narrow part of the Yellow River valley to all of the North China plain. Equipped with bronze weapons, bows, and armor, these armies won victories against the sedentary
Prehistory and Shang dynasty
Early Bronze Age Chinese cities were characterized by massive defensive walls. The Erlitou culture's bronze workshops probably gave it a decisive edge over competing groups. Armies were probably relatively ineffective given the prevalence of extensive fortifications, although the Erlitou culture probably succeeded in breaching these occasionally since they were able to expand the area of their control.[12] Starting from the 3rd Millennium BC and throughout the 2nd Millennium BC, there is a correlation between elite status and military status in tomb artefacts.[13]
The shi rose to power through their control of the new technology of bronzeworking. From 1300 BC, the shi transitioned from foot knights to being primarily chariot archers, fighting with composite recurved bow, a double-edged sword known as the jian, and armour.[8]
Military affairs carried a high priority in the Shang dynasty and the Shang elite was a warrior class led by clan-based chiefdoms. Martial values and robust physical activity were necessities of Shang culture. Like warrior classes elsewhere, land was granted by the king in reward for military success and was rescinded in the event of failure. Even the last Shang emperor Xin, who was supposedly decadent, still had a reputation for great physical fighting ability. Contrary to the pacifistic assumptions of later scholars writing about the Shang, the Shang clearly viewed the military as paramount and civilian functions as subordinate. The Shang kings took on the roles of Commander-in-chief, Defence minister, as well as field commander, while royal family members, members of other noble clans, and high officials were also delegated battlefield command. Like the ancient Greeks, the Shang relied on divination to make decisions regarding military action. Shi, or army, was already a distinct unit, and this was also used as a prefixed title to designate generals. Lü or brigade was also a common combat unit, and so did hang or line. Battlefield armies were organised into left, right and center. Specialisation of military appointments was already evident under the Shang dynasty. Shi zhang or leader of the armies, may have been a functional title in the later period, where military organisation had become very formalised. There were clearly defined posts such as the ma (horse), ya (commander), fu (“quiver”), she (archer), wei (protector), ch’üan (dog), and shu (border protection), prefixed with tuo (many), indicating higher status and mou for “planning”. The discovery of multiple chariots in graves as well as tombs consisting entirely of horses and chariots demonstrate that the chariot was used in battle and not just prestige transport. The horse officers seemed to be particularly valued and played a prominent command role due to the importance of the horse in warfare.[14] The Shang under Wu Ding were quick to establish suzerainty over defeated enemies such as the Que, Zhi and Yue states, drawing on their manpower to further their conquests without expending their own resources. Marriage alliances were used to secure the loyalty of the submitted states, and submitted vassals sometimes received high positions in the Shang government. Warriors of the Yi (barbarians) to the south were integrated into Shang units due to their archery skills.[15]
Although the Shang depended upon the military skills of their nobility, Shang rulers could mobilize the masses of town-dwelling and rural commoners as conscript laborers and soldiers for both campaigns of defense and conquest. Aristocrats and other state rulers were obligated to furnish their local garrisons with all necessary equipment, armor, and armaments. The Shang king maintained a force of about a thousand troops at his capital and would personally lead this force into battle.[16]
From the reign of Wu Ding on, the numbers of permanent standing warriors increased and the conscription of zhongren (commoners) which originally played a support role, became much more common and important role in the military as army sizes expanded. However, the warrior clans were still the core of the army. A highly efficient military reporting system spanning hundreds of miles was organised with a network of boats, chariots, runners and horse riders supported by widely scattered state guesthouses and hostels. There was a system of drums and possibly also signal fires to signal enemy attacks. Military planning was already developed, with assessment of enemy strength, strategic options, routes of advance and transport and logistical necessities. Military campaigns were ordered to obtain the submission of neighbouring states, and others were meant to exterminate enemy states. Rudimentary tactics of taking advantageous positions, concentrating forces at key points and achieving surprise through for instance, ambush or reconnaissance, were in use. Archery was highly esteemed, and officials were already assigned to train soldiers in archery. Based on archaeological evidence the reflex bows of the period had the strength to pierce bone. The main hand-to-hand weapons were dagger-axes and battleaxes.[17]
Aristocrats and commoners both fought with axe, spear, bow and dagger-axe, except that aristocrats had better quality weapons and more complete armour. Warfare transformed during the Shang period. Aristocrats went from fighting on foot to fighting from chariots, and archery developed due to the introduction of the composite bow. The high levels of requisite training made warfare more socially stratified and gendered.[18]
The massive fortifications of cities disappeared in the late Shang period, coinciding with the rise of the chariot.[13]
Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn period
While chariots had been used in battle previously, only in the Western Zhou era were they used in large numbers. The Zhou conquest of the Shang may have been linked to their use of the chariot.[19] Under the Shang, chariots were extremely ornate, used by high ranking elite as command and archery platforms, but under the Zhou chariots were simpler and more common. The ratio of chariots to foot soldiers under the Shang is estimated to be 1 to 30, while under the Zhou it is estimated to be 1 to 10. However this was still limited as compared to the 1 to 5 in Ancient Egypt.[20]
The royal army of the Western Zhou consisted of two divisions, the Six Armies of the West (西六師), based in the Zhou capital in the Wei River valley, and the Eight armies of Chengzhou (成周八師) based in the eastern capital Chengzhou.[21]
The presence of the Eight Armies stationed in the East was intended to keep the regional states in line. Unlike the Shang, the Zhou were determined to assert their governance over subjugated peoples. These regional states were originally assigned to royal family members to monitor the conquered Shang people, but gradually drifted away from royal authority. The military assistance that the regional states provided to the Zhou was dependent on the cooperativeness of local rulers and the ability of the King.[22]
Military command was divided according to aristocratic rank, and power was shared among the feudal lords. Vassal states were entitled to smaller military forces parallel to the royal court, with large states entitled to 3 armies, medium states having 2, and small states with 1. Top ministers too had their personal armies, limited to 100 riders, and they were similarly expected to partake in military campaigns and fiefs, such as the ministerial role taishi. However, apart from the top rung of leadership, the lower official posts were beginning to be separated along civil-military lines. The position of huchen was in command of the infantry defences of the royal court, shishi were the local town garrison commanders, while sima was the generic title used by officials at every level of the army, in charge of conscription and taxes. Soldiers were drafted from the urban dwellers, which consisted of the clans of the Zhou ruling class, and were required to serve one out of every four seasons in a year. Nobles would form the war chariot core of the Zhou army.[23]
The fourth King, Zhao of Zhou (975-957 BC) suffered a severe defeat at the battle against the
In the Spring and Autumn period, archery switched from targeted shooting to massed volleys.[20] By the end of the Spring and Autumn Period cavalry had appeared on the battlefield, and the chariot would gradually revert to being a command platform in the course of the ensuing Warring States period.[19]
Warring States
By the time of the Warring States, reforms began that abolished feudalism and created powerful, centralized states. The power of the aristocracy was curbed and for the first time, professional generals were appointed on merit, rather than birth. Technological advances such as iron weapons and crossbows put the chariot-riding nobility out of business and favored large, professional standing armies, who were well-supplied and could fight a sustained campaign. The size of armies increased; whereas before 500 BC Chinese field armies numbered in the tens of thousands, by 300 BC armies regularly included up to a couple of hundred thousand drafted soldiers, accompanied by cavalry. For example, during the Battle of Changping the state of Qin drafted all males over 15 years of age. Although these conscripts with one to two years of training would be no match individually against aristocratic warriors with years of experience, they made up for it with superior standardization, discipline, organization, and size.[25] Although most soldiers were conscripts, it was also common to select soldiers based on specific qualifications. The Confucian adviser Xun Zi claimed that foot soldiers from the Wei state were required to wear armor and helmets, shoulder a crossbow with fifty arrows, strap a spear and sword, carry three days' supply of rations, and all the while march 50 kilometers in a day. When a man meets this requirement, his household would be exempted from all corvée labor obligations. He would also be given special tax benefits on land and housing. However, this policy made soldiers in the Wei state difficult to replace.[26]
In addition, cavalry was introduced. The first recorded use of cavalry took place in the Battle of Maling, in which general Pang Juan of Wei led his division of 5,000 cavalry into a trap by Qi forces. In 307 BC, King Wuling of Zhao ordered the adoption of nomadic clothing in order to train his own division of cavalry archers.[27]
In the field of military planning, the niceties of chivalrous warfare were abandoned in favor of a general who would ideally be a master of maneuver, illusion, and deception. He had to be ruthless in searching for the advantage, and an organizer in integrating units under him.[7]
Qin–Han
In 221 BC, the Qin unified China and ushered in the Imperial Era of Chinese history. Although it only lasted 15 years, Qin established institutions that would last for millennia. Qin Shi Huan, titling himself as the "First Emperor", standardized writing systems, weights, coinage, and even the axle lengths of carts. To reduce the chance of rebellion, he made the private possession of weapons illegal. In order to increase the rapid deployment of troops, thousands of miles of roads were built, along with canals that allowed boats to travel long distances.[28] For the rest of Chinese history, a centralized empire was the norm.[4]
During the Qin dynasty and its successor, the Han, the Chinese armies were faced with a new military threat, that of nomadic confederations such as the Xiongnu in the North. These nomads were fast horse archers who had a significant mobility advantage over the settled nations to the South. In order to counter this threat, the Chinese built the Great Wall as a barrier to these nomadic incursions, and also used diplomacy and bribes to preserve peace. Although the Qin general Meng Tian ousted the Xiong-nu from the Ordos region, they regained power under the rule of Maodun. Maodun conquered the Eastern Hu and drove the Yuezhi tribes west. He reclaimed the Ordos from the now crumbling Qin empire and defeated the first Han emperor Gao in battle. This led to a policy of appeasement until the reign of Wudi of Han, who decided to take a tougher stance.[29] However, protecting the borders required a significant investment. Manning the stations of the Great Wall took about ten thousand men. To support them, fifty to sixty thousand soldier-farmers were moved to the frontiers in order to reduce the cost of transporting supplies. These drafted farmers were not good cavalry troops, so a professional army emerged on the frontiers. These consisted of northern Han mercenaries, convicts working for their freedom, and subjected "Southern" Xiong-nu living within Han territory. By 31 BC, the Han dynasty abolished universal military conscription that was passed down from the Warring States.[30] In the South, China's territory was roughly doubled as the Chinese conquered much of what is now Southern China, and extended the frontier from the Yangtze to Vietnam.[31]
Armies during the Qin and
The structure of the army also changed in this period. While the Qin had utilized a conscript army, by
Three Kingdoms–Jin
The end of the Han dynasty saw a massive agrarian uprising that had to be quelled by local governors, who seized the opportunity to form their own armies. The central army disintegrated and was replaced by a series of local warlords, who fought for power until most of the North was unified by Cao Cao, who laid the foundation for the Wei dynasty, which ruled most of China. However, much of Southern China was ruled by two rival Kingdoms, Shu Han and Wu. As a result, this era is known as the Three Kingdoms.[35]
Under the Wei dynasty, the military system changed from the centralized military system of the Han. Unlike the Han, whose forces were concentrated into a central army of volunteer soldiers, Wei's forces depended on the Buqu, a group for whom soldiering was a hereditary profession. These "military households" were given land to farm, but their children could only marry into the families of other "military households". In effect, the military career was inherited; when a soldier or commander died or became unable to fight, a male relative would inherit his position. These hereditary soldiers provided the bulk of the infantry. For the purpose of cavalry, the Wei was similar to the previous Han dynasty in recruiting large numbers of Xiongnu that were settled in southern Shanxi.[36] In addition, provincial armies, which were very weak under the Han, became the bulk of the army under the Wei, for whom the central army was held mainly as a reserve. This military system was also adopted by the Jin dynasty, who succeeded the Wei and unified China.
Advances such as the stirrup helped make cavalry forces more effective.
Era of division
In 304 AD, a major event shook China. The Jin dynasty, who had unified China 24 years earlier, was tottering in collapse due to a major civil war. Seizing this opportunity, Xiong-nu chieftain Liu Yuan and his forces revolted against their Han Chinese overlords. He was followed by many other barbarian leaders, and these rebels were called the "Wu Hu" or literally "Five barbarian tribes". By 316 AD, the Jin had lost all territory north of the Huai river. From this point on, much of North China was ruled by Sinicized barbarian tribes such as the Xianbei, while southern China remained under Han Chinese rule, a period known as the Era of Division. During this era, the military forces of both Northern and southern regimes diverged and developed very differently.[37]
Northern
Northern China was devastated by the Wu Hu uprisings. After the initial uprising, the various tribes fought among themselves in a chaotic era known as the Sixteen Kingdoms. Although brief unifications of the North, such as Later Zhao and Former Qin, occurred, these were relatively short-lived. During this era, the Northern armies, were mainly based around nomadic cavalry, but also employed Chinese as foot soldiers and siege personnel. This military system was rather improvising and ineffective, and the states established by the Wu Hu were mostly destroyed by the Jin dynasty or the Xianbei.[38]
A new military system did not come until the invasions of the Xianbei in the 5th century, by which time most of the Wu Hu had been destroyed and much of North China had been reconquered by the Chinese dynasties in the South. Nevertheless, the Xianbei won many successes against the Chinese, conquering all of North China by 468 AD The Xianbei state of Northern Wei created the earliest forms of the equal field (均田) land system and the Fubing system (府兵) military system, both of which became major institutions under Sui and Tang. Under the fubing system each headquarters (府) commanded about one thousand farmer-soldiers who could be mobilized for war. In peacetime they were self-sustaining on their land allotments, and were obliged to do tours of active duty in the capital.[39]
Southern
Southern Chinese dynasties, being descended from the Han and Jin, prided themselves on being the successors of the Chinese civilization and disdained the Northern dynasties, who they viewed as barbarian usurpers. Southern armies continued the military system of Buqu or hereditary soldiers from the Jin dynasty. However, the growing power of aristocratic landowners, who also provided many of the buqu, meant that the Southern dynasties were very unstable; after the fall of the Jin, four dynasties ruled in just two centuries.[40]
This is not to say that the Southern armies did not work well. Southern armies won great victories in the late 4th century, such as the battle of Fei at which an 80,000-man Jin army crushed the 300,000-man army of Former Qin, an empire founded by one of the Wu Hu tribes that had briefly unified North China.[citation needed] In addition, under the brilliant general Liu Yu, Chinese armies briefly reconquered much of North China.[38]
Sui–Tang
In 581 AD, the Chinese Yang Jian forced the Xianbei ruler to abdicate, founding the Sui dynasty and restoring Chinese rule in the North. By 589 AD, he had unified much of China.[41]
The Sui's unification of China sparked a new golden age. During the Sui and Tang, Chinese armies, based on the Fubing system invented during the era of division, won military successes that restored the empire of the Han dynasty and reasserted Chinese power.[42] The Tang created large contingents of powerful heavy cavalry. A key component of the success of Sui and Tang armies, just like the earlier Qin and Han armies, was the adoption of large elements of cavalry. These powerful horsemen, combined with the superior firepower of the Chinese infantry (powerful missile weapons such as recurve crossbows), made Chinese armies powerful.[43]
However, during the Tang dynasty the fubing (府兵) system began to break down. Based on state ownership of the land under the
During the Tang, professional military writing and schools began to be set up to train officers, an institution that would be expanded during the Song.
Tibetan tradition says that the Tang dynasty seized the Tibetan capital at
In 756, over 4,000 Arab mercenaries joined the Chinese against An Lushan. They remained in China, and some of them were ancestors of the Hui people.[46][47][48][49] During the Tang dynasty, 3,000 Chinese soldiers, and 3,000 Muslim soldiers were traded to each other in an agreement.[50]
Liao, Song and Jurchen Jin
During the Song dynasty, the emperors were focused on curbing the power of the Fanzhen, local generals who they viewed as responsible for the collapse of the Tang dynasty. Local power was curbed and most power was centralized in the government, along with the army. In addition, the Song adopted a system in which commands by generals were ad hoc and temporary; this was to prevent the troops from becoming attached to their generals, who could potentially rebel. Successful generals such as Yue Fei and Liu Zen were persecuted by the Song Court who feared they would rebel.[51][52][53]
Although the system worked when it came to quelling rebellions, it was a failure in defending China and asserting its power. The Song had to rely on new gunpowder weapons introduced during the late Tang and bribes to fend off attacks by its enemies, such as the Liao (Khitans), West Xia (
The military technology of the Song included gunpowder weapons such as
Yuan
Founded by the Mongols who conquered Song China, the Yuan had the same military system as most nomadic peoples to China's north, focused mainly on nomadic cavalry, who were organized based on households and who were led by leaders appointed by the khan.
The Mongol invasion started in earnest only when they acquired their first navy, mainly from Chinese Song defectors. Liu Cheng, a Chinese Song commander who defected to the Mongols, suggested a switch in tactics, and assisted the Mongols in building their own fleet. Many Chinese served in the Mongol navy and army and assisted them in their conquest of Song.[56]
However, in the conquest of China, the Mongols also adopted gunpowder weapons such as the thundercrash bomb and thousands of Chinese infantry and naval forces into the Mongol army. Another weapon adopted by the Mongols were Saracen counterweight trebuchets designed by Muslim engineers; these proved decisive in the Siege of Xiangyang, whose capture by the Mongols precipitated the beginning of the end for the Song dynasty.[57][58][59] The Mongol military system began to collapse after the 14th century and by 1368 the Mongols was driven out by the Chinese Ming dynasty.[60]
The Mongols under
During the Mongol invasion of Iraq, 1,000 Chinese crossbowmen who utilized fire arrows participated in the invasion, along with the Mongol tribesmen.
Many Han Chinese and Khitan defected to the Mongols to fight against the Jin. Two Han Chinese leaders, Shi Tianze, Liu Heima (劉黑馬, Liu Ni),[66][67][68][69] and the Khitan Xiao Zhala (蕭札剌) defected and commanded the 3 Tumens in the Mongol army.[70][71][72][73] Liu Heima and Shi Tianze served Ogödei Khan.[74] Liu Heima and Shi Tianxiang led armies against Western Xia for the Mongols.[75] There were 4 Han Tumens and 3 Khitan Tumens, with each Tumen consisting of 10,000 troops. The three Khitan Generals Shimobeidier (石抹孛迭兒), Tabuyir (塔不已兒) and Xiaozhacizhizizhongxi (蕭札刺之子重喜) commanded the three Khitan Tumens and the four Han Generals Zhang Rou, Yan Shi, Shi Tianze, and Liu Heima commanded the four Han tumens under Ogödei Khan.[76][77][78][79] The Mongols received defections from Han Chinese and Khitans while the Jin were abandoned by their own Jurchen officers.[80]
Shi Tianze was a Han Chinese who lived in the
Ming
The early Ming Emperors from Hongwu to Zhengde continued Yuan practices such as hereditary military institutions, demanding Korean concubines and eunuchs, having Muslim eunuchs, wearing Mongol style clothing and Mongol hats, engaging in archery and horseback riding, having Mongols serve in the Ming military, patronizing Tibetan Buddhism, with the early Ming Emperors seeking to project themselves as "universal rulers" to various peoples such as Central Asian Muslims, Tibetans, and Mongols, modeled after the Mongol Khagan, however, this history of Ming universalism has been obscured and denied by historians who covered it up and presented the Ming as xenophobes seeking to expunge Mongol influence and presenting while they presented the Qing and Yuan as "universal" rulers in contrast to the Ming.[86][87]
A cavalry-based army modeled on the Yuan military was implemented by the Hongwu and Yongle Emperors.[88] Hongwu's army and officialdom incorporated Mongols.[89] Mongols were retained by the Ming within its territory.[90] in Guangxi Mongol archers participated in a war against Miao minorities.[91]
Math, calligraphy, literature, equestrianism, archery, music, and rites were the Six Arts.[92]
At the
The Imperial exam included archery. Archery on horseback was practiced by Chinese living near the frontier. Wang Ju's writings on archery were followed during the Ming and Yuan and the Ming developed new methods of archery.[94]: 271– Jinling Tuyong showed archery in Nanjing during the Ming.[101] Contests in archery were held in the capital for Garrison of Guard soldiers who were handpicked.[102]
The Ming focused on building up a powerful standing army that could drive off attacks by foreign barbarians. Beginning in the 14th century, the Ming armies drove out the Mongols and expanded China's territories to include Yunnan, Mongolia, Tibet, much of Xinjiang and Vietnam. The Ming also engaged in Overseas expeditions which included one
Ming military institutions were largely responsible for the success of Ming's armies. The early Ming's military was organized by the Wei-suo system, which split the army up into numerous "Wei" or commands throughout the Ming frontiers. Each wei was to be self-sufficient in agriculture, with the troops stationed there farming as well as training.[103] This system also forced soldiers to serve hereditarily in the army; although effective in initially taking control of the empire, this military system proved unviable in the long run and collapsed in the 1430s,[104] with Ming reverted to a professional volunteer army similar to Tang, Song and Later Han.
Throughout most of the Ming's history, the Ming armies were successful in defeating foreign powers such as the Mongols and Japanese and expanding China's influence. However, with the little Ice Age in the 17th century, the Ming dynasty was faced with a disastrous famine and its military forces disintegrated as a result of the famines spurring from this event.[105]
The Chinese defeated the Portuguese at the
The Ming dynasty defeated the Dutch in the
Qing
The
The main Manchu tactics were using infantry with bows and arrows, swords, and pikes while cavalry was kept in the rear.[116] Unlike the Song and Ming, however, the Qing armies neglected firearms, and did not develop them in any significant way. The Qing armies also contained a much higher proportion of cavalry than earlier Chinese dynasties.[117]
Hong Taiji, the son of Nurhaci, recognized that Han Chinese were needed in the conquest of the Ming, as he explained why he treated the Ming defector General Hong Chengchou leniently.[118] Ming artillery was responsible for many victories.[119] The Ming would not be easily defeated unless musket and cannon wielding Han Chinese troops were added to the existing banners.[120] Han Chinese Generals who defected to the Manchu were often given women from the Imperial Aisin Gioro family in marriage while the ordinary soldiers who defected were often given non-royal Manchu women as wives. Nurhaci married one of his granddaughters to the Ming General Li Yongfang after he surrendered the city of Fushun in Liaoning in 1618 and a mass marriage of Han Chinese officers and officials to Manchu women numbering 1,000 couples was arranged by Prince Yoto and Hongtaiji in 1632 to promote harmony between the two ethnic groups.[121]
The Qing differentiated between Han Bannermen and ordinary Han civilians. Han Chinese who defected up to 1644 and joined the Eight Banners were made bannermen, giving them social and legal privileges in addition to being acculturated to Manchu culture. Han defected to the Qing and swelled the ranks of the Eight Banners so much that ethnic Manchus became a minority, constituting only 16% in 1648, Han Bannermen 75%, and Mongol Bannermen making up the rest.[122][123][124]
In 1644, the invading army was multi-ethnic, with Han, Mongols, and Manchu banners. The political divide was between Han Chinese non bannermen and the "conquest elite", made up of Han Chinese bannermen, nobles, Mongols and Manchu; ethnicity was not the factor.[125] Among the Banners, gunpowder weapons like muskets and artillery were specifically wielded by the Chinese Banners.[126] Bannermen made up the majority of governors in the early Qing and were the ones who governed and administered China after the conquest, stabilizing Qing rule.[127] Han Bannermen dominated the post of governor-general in the time of the Shunzhi and Kangxi Emperors, and also the post of governors, largely excluding ordinary Han civilians from the posts.[128]
The Qing relied on the Green Standard soldiers, made up of Han Chinese who had defected, to help rule northern China.[129] Green Standard Han Chinese troops governed locally while Han Chinese Bannermen, Mongol Bannermen, and Manchu Bannermen were brought only into emergency situations where there was sustained military resistance.[130]
Since it was not possible for only Manchus to conquer southern China,
Manchu Generals and Bannermen were initially put to shame by the better performance of the Han Chinese Green Standard Army, who fought better than them against the rebels and this was noted by the Kangxi Emperor, leading him to task Generals Sun Sike, Wang Jinbao, and Zhao Liangdong to lead Green Standard Soldiers to crush the rebels.[135] The Qing thought that Han Chinese were superior at battling other Han people and so used the Green Standard Army as the dominant and majority army in crushing the rebels instead of Bannermen.[136]
In 1652–1689, during the
During the reign of the
A British officer said of Qing forces during the First Opium War, "The Chinese are robust muscular fellows, and no cowards; the Tartars desperate; but neither are well commanded nor acquainted with European warfare. Having had, however, experience of three of them, I am inclined to supposed that a Tartar bullet is not a whit softer than a French one."[139] Manchus are called "Tartars" in the text.
Southern Chinese coolies served with the French and British forces against the Qing: "The Chinese coolies entertained in 1857 from the inhabitants of South China, renegades though they were, served the British faithfully and cheerfully before Canton, and throughout the operations in North China in 1860 they likewise proved invaluable. Their coolness under fire was admirable. At the assault of the Peiho Forts in 1860 they carried the French ladders to the ditch, and, standing in the water up to their necks, supported them with their hands to enable the storming party to cross. It was not usual to take them into action; they, however, bore the dangers of a distant fire with the greatest composure, evincing a strong desire to close with their compatriots, and engage them in mortal combat with their bamboos.—(Fisher.)"[140]
During the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the rebel forces led by able generals such as Shi Dakai were well organized and tactically innovative. After the rebel armies defeated Manchu generals in a series of battles, the Qing government allowed armies made up of foreigners, such as the Ever Victorious Army, and eventually responded by forming armies mainly composed of Han Chinese, and under Han Chinese commanders such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai. Examples of these armies were the Xiang Army and the Huai Army. The Qing also absorbed bandit armies and Generals who defected to the Qing side during rebellions, such as the Muslim Generals Ma Zhan'ao, Ma Qianling, Ma Haiyan, and Ma Julung. There were also armies composed of Chinese Muslims led by Muslim Generals like Dong Fuxiang, Ma Anliang, Ma Fuxiang, and Ma Fuxing who commanded the Kansu Braves. Local officials could also take command of military affairs, such as the father of Yang Zengxin during the Panthay Rebellion.
The "First Chinese Regiment" (Weihaiwei Regiment) which was praised for its performance, consisted of Chinese collaborators serving in the British military.[141]
Modernization
The Beiyang Army was the army of northern China.
In 1885 Li Hongzhang founded the Tianjin Military Academy (天津武備學堂) for Chinese army officers, with German advisers, as part of his military reforms.[142][143] The move was supported by Anhui Army commander Zhou Shengchuan.[144] The academy was to serve Anhui Army and Green Standard Army officers. Various practical military, mathematics and science subjects were taught at the academy. The instructors were German officers.[145] Another program was started at the academy for five years in 1887 to train teenagers as new army officers.[146] Mathematics, practical and technical subjects, sciences, foreign languages, Chinese Classics and history were taught at the school. Exams were administered to students. The instruction for Tianjin Military Academy was copied at the Weihaiwei and Shanhaiguan military schools.[147] The 'maritime defense fund' supplied the budget for the Tianjin Military Academy, which was shared with the Tianjin Naval Academy.[148]
The Tianjin Military Academy in 1886 adopted as part of its curriculum the Romance of the Three Kingdoms.[149] Among its alumni were Wang Yingkai and Duan Qirui (段祺瑞). Among its staff was Yinchang.
The Qing founded Baoding Military Academy.
The earliest modernised units of the Qing military were part of the New Army.[151]
China began to extensively modernize its military in the late 19th century. It purchased the most modern Krupp artillery and Mauser repeater magazine rifles from Germany, in addition to mines and torpedoes. It used these with sniper, pincer, and ambush tactics, and China also began to reorganize its military, adding engineer companies and artillery brigades. Mining, engineering, flooding, and simultaneous multiple attacks were employed by Chinese troops along with modern artillery.[152] By 1882, the Qing navy had some fifty steam warships, half of them built in China. The American Commodore Robert Shufeldt, reported that the British-built Chinese ships he inspected had "every modern appliance," including "guns with large calibre and high velocity, moved by hydraulic power, machine guns, electric lights, torpedoes and torpedo boats, engines with twin screws, steel rams, etc. etc." Yet, Shufeldt concludes, in order to be really effective, it needs an intelligent personnel and a thorough organization." Li Hongzhang evidently agreed, and sent Chinese students and officers to the United States and Germany for training. The Tientsin Arsenal developed the capacity to manufacture "electric torpedoes,"[153] that is, what would now be called "mines," US consul general, David Bailey reported that they were deployed in waterways along with other modern military weapons.[154]
The Chinese armies which received the modern equipment and training were the Han Chinese
Chinese military officials were interested in western guns, and eagerly purchased them. Modern arsenals were established at places like Hanyang Arsenal, which produced German Mauser rifles and mountain guns.[159] The Nanjing arsenal was making Hotchkiss, Maxim, and Nordenfeld guns in 1892. A Frenchman reported that China had the ability to reverse engineer any western weapon they needed. A British also noted that Chinese were efficient at reverse engineering foreign weapons and building their own versions. In the first Opium War the Chinese copied the British weapons and upgraded their military hardware while the fighting was going on. Tianjin arsenal made Dahlgren guns, 10,000 Remington rifles monthly, as of 1872. Li Hongzhang in 1890 added equipment, allowing it to make Maxim Machine guns, Nordenfelt cannons, Krupp guns, and ammunition for all of these. China was extremely familiar with R&D on German military hardware.[160] Gatling guns and other artillery were purchased by the Chinese military from western countries.[161] Montigny mitrailleuse guns were also imported from France.[162]
In addition to modern equipment, Chinese weapons, like fire arrows, light mortars,
During the
Historians have judged the Qing dynasty's vulnerability and weakness to foreign imperialism in the 19th century to be based mainly on its maritime naval weakness while it achieved military success against westerners on land, the historian Edward L. Dreyer said that "China’s nineteenth-century humiliations were strongly related to her weakness and failure at sea. At the start of the Opium War, China had no unified navy and no sense of how vulnerable she was to attack from the sea; British forces sailed and steamed wherever they wanted to go......In the Arrow War (1856–60), the Chinese had no way to prevent the Anglo-French expedition of 1860 from sailing into the Gulf of Zhili and landing as near as possible to Beijing. Meanwhile, new but not exactly modern Chinese armies suppressed the midcentury rebellions, bluffed Russia into a peaceful settlement of disputed frontiers in Central Asia, and defeated the French forces on land in the Sino-French War (1884–85). But the defeat of the fleet, and the resulting threat to steamship traffic to Taiwan, forced China to conclude peace on unfavorable terms."[172]
The Qing dynasty forced Russia to hand over disputed territory in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1881), in what was widely seen by the west as a diplomatic victory for the Qing. Russia acknowledged that Qing China potentially posed a serious military threat.[173] Mass media in the west during this era portrayed China as a rising military power due to its modernization programs and as a major threat to the western world, invoking fears that China would successfully conquer western colonies like Australia.[174]
List of arsenals in Qing China
- Hanyang Arsenal
- Jiangnan Shipyard
- Taiyuan Arsenal
- Lanchow Arsenal (Lanzhou Arsenal) built by the Chu Army
- Foochow Arsenal
- Great Hsi-Ku Arsenal
List of modernized armies in Qing China
- Jiangnan Daying
- Yong Ying
- Xiang Army
- Chu Army
- Huai Army
- Kansu Braves
- Tenacious Army
- Hushenying
- Peking Field Force
- Shenjiying
- Wuwei Corps
- Beiyang Army
- New Army
- Beiyang Fleet
- Fujian Fleet
- Nanyang Fleet
- Shuishiying
Military philosophy
Chinese military thought's most famous tome is Sun Tzu's
- The importance of intelligence.[175]
- The importance of manoeuvring so your enemy is hit in his weakened spots.[176]
- The importance of morale.[177]
- How to conduct diplomacy so that you gain more allies and the enemy lose allies.[178]
- Having the moral advantage.[178]
- The importance of national unity.[178]
- All warfare is based on deception.[179]
- The importance of logistics.[180]
- The proper relationship between the ruler and the general. Sun Tzu holds the ruler should not interfere in military affairs.
- Difference between Strategic and Tactical strategy.[177]
- No country has benefited from a prolonged war.[177]
- Subduing an enemy without using force is best.[177]
Sun Tzu's work became the cornerstone of military thought, which grew rapidly. By the Han dynasty, no less than 11 schools of military thought were recognized. During the Song dynasty, a military academy was established.
Military exams and degrees
Equipment and technology
This article needs additional citations for verification. (September 2017) |
In their various campaigns, the Chinese armies through the ages, employed a variety of equipment in the different arms of the army. The most notable weaponry used by the Chinese consisted of crossbows, rockets, gunpowder weapons, and other "exotic weapons", but the Chinese also made many advances on conventional iron weapons such as swords and spears that were far superior to other contemporary weapons.
Crossbow
The crossbow, invented by Chinese in the 7th century BC,[181] and by Greeks in the 5th century BC,[182] was considered the most important weapon of the Chinese armies. The mass use of crossbows allowed Chinese armies to deploy huge amounts of firepower, due to the crossbow's deadly penetration, long range, and rapid rate of fire. As early as the 4th century BC, Chinese texts describe armies employing up to 10,000 crossbowmen in combat, where their impact was decisive.
Crossbow manufacture was very complex, due to the nature of the firing bolt. Historian Homer Dubs claim that the crossbow firing mechanism "was almost as complex as a rifle bolt, and could only be reproduced by very competent mechanics. This gave an additional advantage, as this made the crossbow "capture-proof" as even if China's barbarian enemies captured them they would not be able to reproduce the weapon.Crossbow ammunition could also only be used in crossbows, and was useless in the conventional bows employed by China's nomadic enemies.
In combat, crossbows were often fitted with grid sights to help aim, and several different sizes were used. During the
Gunpowder weapons
As inventors of gunpowder, the Chinese were the first to deploy gunpowder weapons. A large variety of gunpowder weapons were produced, including guns, cannons, mines, the flamethrower, bombs, and rockets. After the rise of the Ming dynasty, China began to lose its lead in gunpowder weapons to the west.[183] This became partially evident when the Manchus' began to rely on the Jesuits to run their cannon foundry,[2] at a time when European powers had assumed the global lead in gunpowder warfare through their Military Revolution.[184][185][186]
Guns and cannons
The first "proto-gun", the fire lance, was introduced in 905 AD. This consisted of a bamboo or metal tube attached to a spear filled with gunpowder that could be ignited at will, with a range of five metres. It was capable of killing or maiming several soldiers at a time and was mass-produced and used especially in the defense of cities. Later versions of the fire lance dropped the spear point and had more gunpowder content.
Traditionally interpreted as a wind god, a sculpture in Sichuan was found holding a bombard, and the date must be as early as AD 1128
Cannon were used by Ming dynasty forces at the Battle of Lake Poyang.[188] Ming dynasty era ships had bronze cannon. One shipwreck in Shandong had a cannon dated to 1377 and an anchor dated to 1372.[189] From the 13th to 15th centuries cannon armed Chinese ships also traveled throughout south east Asia.[190]
Bombs, grenades and mines
High explosive bombs were another innovation developed by the Chinese in the 10th century. These consisted largely of round objects covered with paper or bamboo filled with gunpowder that would explode upon contact and set fire to anything flammable. These weapons, known as "thunderclap bombs", were used by defenders in sieges on attacking enemies and also by trebuchets, which hurled huge numbers of them onto the enemy. A new improved version of these bombs, called the "thunder-crash" bomb, was introduced in the 13th century; it was covered in cast iron, was highly explosive, and hurled shrapnel at the enemy. These weapons were not only used by Song China, but also its Jur'chen and Mongol enemies. In the history of the Jur'chen Jin dynasty, the use of cast-iron gunpowder bombs against the Mongols is described.
By the time of the Ming dynasty, Chinese technology had progressed to making large land mines, many of them were deployed on the northern border.
Flamethrower
Rockets
During the Ming dynasty, the design of rockets were further refined and multi-stage rockets and large batteries of rockets were produced. Multi-stage rockets were introduced for naval combat. Like other technology, knowledge of rockets were transmitted to the Middle East and the West through the Mongols, where they were described by Arabs as "Chinese arrows".
Infantry
In the 2nd century BC, the Han began to produce steel from cast iron. New steel weapons were manufactured that gave Chinese infantry an edge in close-range fighting, though swords and blades were also used. The Chinese infantry were given extremely heavy armor in order to withstand cavalry charges, some 29.8 kg of armor during the Song dynasty.[191]
Cavalry
The cavalry was equipped with heavy armor in order to crush a line of infantry, though light cavalry was used for reconnaissance. However, Chinese armies lacked horses and their cavalry were often inferior to their horse archer opponents. Therefore, in most of these campaigns, the cavalry had to rely on the infantry to provide support.
Some authors, such as
Chemical weapons
During the Han dynasty, state manufacturers were producing stink bombs and tear gas bombs that were used effectively to suppress a revolt in 178 AD. Poisonous materials were also employed in rockets and crossbow ammunition to increase their effectiveness.
Logistics
The Chinese armies also benefited from a logistics system that could supply hundreds of thousands of men at a time. An important innovation by the Chinese was the introduction of an efficient horse harness in the 4th century BC, strapped to the chest instead of the neck, an innovation later expanded to a collar harness. This innovation, along with the wheelbarrow, allowed large-scale transportation to occur, allowing huge armies numbering hundreds of thousands of men in the field.
Chinese armies were also backed by a vast complex of arms-producing factories. State-owned factories turned out weapons by the thousands, though some dynasties (such as the Later Han) privatized their arms industry and acquired weapons from private merchants.
Rations
During the Han dynasty, Chinese developed methods of food preservation for military rations during campaigns such as drying meat into jerky and cooking, roasting, and drying grain.[200]
Command
In early Chinese armies, command of armies was based on birth rather than merit. For example, in the State of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period (771 BC–476 BC), command was delegated to the ruler, the crown prince, and the second son. By the time of the Warring States Period, generals were appointed based on merit rather than birth, the majority of whom were talented individuals who gradually rose through the ranks.[201]
Nevertheless, Chinese armies were sometimes commanded by individuals other than generals. For example, during the Tang dynasty, the emperor instituted "Army supervisors" who spied on the generals and interfered in their commands, although most of these practices were short-lived as they disrupted the efficiency of the army.[202]
See also
- History of the Great Wall of China
- List of Chinese battles
References
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將注豹.則關矣.曰.平公之靈.尚輔相余.豹射出其間.將注.則又關矣.曰.不狎鄙.抽矢.城射之.殪.張匄抽殳而下.射之.折股.扶伏而擊之.折軫.又射之.死.
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晉人或以廣隊.不能進.楚人惎之脫扃.少進.馬還.又惎之拔旆投衡.乃出
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- ^ Griffith (2006), 122
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- Dreyer, Edward L. (1988). "Military origins of Ming China", in Twitchett, Denis and Mote, Frederick W. (eds.), The Ming Dynasty, Part 1, The Cambridge History of China, 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58–107, ISBN 978-0-521-24332-2
- Ebrey, Patricia Buckley (1999). The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Elleman, Bruce (2001). Modern Chinese Warfare. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0203976913.
- Graff, Andrew David (2002). Medieval Chinese Warfare: 200–900. Routledge.
- Graff, David Andrew and Robin Higham. A Military History of China (Boulder: Westview Press 2002).
- Li, Bo and Zheng, Yin (2001). 5000 years of Chinese history (in Chinese). Inner Mongolian People's Publishing Corp. ISBN 7-204-04420-7.
- Sawyer, Ralph D. Ancient Chinese Warfare (Basic Books; 2011) 554 pages; uses archaeological data, oracular inscriptions, and other sources in a study of Chinese warfare, with a focus on the Shang Dynasty (c. 1766–1122 BC).
- ISBN 978-0-393-93451-9.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson (1901). China in Convulsion. Vol. 2. New York: F. H. Revell Co.
- ISBN 1-897035-35-7.
Public domain
- This article incorporates text from Encyclopædia of religion and ethics, Volume 8, a publication from 1916, now in the public domain in the United States.
- This article incorporates text from The Moslem World, Volume 10, a publication from 1920, now in the public domain in the United States.
Further reading
- Bielenstein, Hans (1986). The Bureaucracy of Han Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-22510-8.
- de Crespigny, Rafe (2007). A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220 AD). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-15605-0.
- Di Cosmo, Nicola (2009). Military Culture in Imperial China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Edward L. Dreyer; Frank Algerton Kierman; John King Fairbank; et al. (1974). Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Graff, David Andrew; Higham, Robin, eds. (2012). A military history of China. University Press of Kentucky.
- Hu, Shaohua (2006). "Revisiting Chinese Pacifism". Asian Affairs. 32 (4). Taylor & Francis: 256–278. S2CID 154177471.
- McNeill, William Hardy (1982). The Pursuit of Power : Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0226561578.
- Mott IV, William H.; Kim, Jae Chang (2006). The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture Shih vs. Li. ISBN 1-4039-7187-0.
- Scobell, Andrew (2003). China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van De Ven; Hans J. (2000). Warfare in Chinese History. Brill. ISBN 9004117741.
- Yuan-Kang Wang (2011). Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Whiting, Marvin C. (2002). Imperial Chinese Military History: 8000 BC – 1912 AD. iUniverse. ISBN 978-0595221349.
External links
- Chinese Siege Warfare: Mechanical Artillery and Siege Weapons of Antiquity – An Illustrated History
- "Military Technology" Visual Sourcebook for Chinese Civilization (University of Washington)
- Journal of Chinese military History
- digitalcollections.anu.edu.au