German cruiser Prinz Eugen
As USS Prinz Eugen, before the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll
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History | |
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Nazi Germany | |
Name | Prinz Eugen |
Namesake | Prince Eugene of Savoy |
Builder | Germaniawerft |
Laid down | 23 April 1936 |
Launched | 22 August 1938 |
Commissioned | 1 August 1940 |
Decommissioned | 7 May 1945 |
Fate | Surrendered 8 May 1945, transferred to US Navy |
United States | |
Name | USS Prinz Eugen |
Acquired | 13 December 1945 |
Commissioned | 5 January 1946 |
Decommissioned | 29 August 1946 |
Identification | Hull number: IX-300 |
Fate | Towed to Kwajalein Atoll after Operation Crossroads nuclear weapons tests; capsized 22 December 1946 |
General characteristics | |
Class and type | Admiral Hipper-class cruiser |
Displacement |
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Length | 212.5 m (697 ft 2 in) overall |
Beam | 21.7 m (71 ft 2 in) |
Draft | Full load: 7.2 m (24 ft) |
Installed power | 132,000 kW ) |
Propulsion |
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Speed | 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph) |
Complement |
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Armament |
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Armor |
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Aircraft carried | 3 Arado Ar 196 |
Aviation facilities | 1 catapult |
Notes | Figures are for the ship as built |
Prinz Eugen (German pronunciation:
Prinz Eugen saw action during
Upon returning to active service, the ship spent several months training
Design
The
Prinz Eugen was 207.7 meters (681 ft)
The ship's primary armament was eight
Service history
Prinz Eugen was ordered by the Kriegsmarine from the
Commissioning was delayed slightly due to light damage sustained during a Royal Air Force attack on Kiel on the night of 1 July 1940. Prinz Eugen suffered two relatively light hits in the attack,[9] but she was not seriously damaged and was commissioned into service on 1 August.[8] The cruiser spent the remainder of 1940 conducting sea trials in the Baltic Sea.[6] In early 1941, the ship's artillery crews conducted gunnery training. A short period in dry dock for final modifications and improvements followed.[11] In April, the ship joined the newly commissioned battleship Bismarck for maneuvers in the Baltic. The two ships had been selected for Operation Rheinübung, a breakout into the Atlantic to raid Allied commerce.[12]
On 23 April, while passing through the Fehmarn Belt en route to Kiel,[13] Prinz Eugen detonated a magnetic mine dropped by British aircraft. The mine damaged the fuel tank, propeller shaft couplings,[12] and fire control equipment.[13] The planned sortie with Bismarck was delayed while repairs were carried out.[12] Admirals Erich Raeder and Günther Lütjens discussed the possibility of delaying the operation further, in the hopes that repairs to the battleship Scharnhorst would be completed or Bismarck's sistership Tirpitz would complete trials in time for the ships to join Prinz Eugen and Bismarck. Raeder and Lütjens decided that it would be most beneficial to resume surface actions in the Atlantic as soon as possible, however, and that the two ships should sortie without reinforcement.[14]
Operation Rheinübung
By 11 May 1941, repairs to Prinz Eugen had been completed. Under the command of
The code-breakers at Bletchley Park confirmed that an Atlantic raid was imminent, as they had decrypted reports that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had taken on prize crews and requested additional navigational charts from headquarters. A pair of Supermarine Spitfires were ordered to search the Norwegian coast for the German flotilla.[19] On the evening of 20 May, Prinz Eugen and the rest of the flotilla reached the Norwegian coast; the minesweepers were detached and the two raiders and their destroyer escorts continued north. The following morning, radio-intercept officers on board Prinz Eugen picked up a signal ordering British reconnaissance aircraft to search for two battleships and three destroyers northbound off the Norwegian coast.[20] At 7:00 on the 21st, the Germans spotted four unidentified aircraft that quickly departed. Shortly after 12:00, the flotilla reached Bergen and anchored at Grimstadfjord. While there, the ships' crews painted over the Baltic camouflage with the standard "outboard gray" worn by German warships operating in the Atlantic.[21]
While in Bergen, Prinz Eugen took on 764 t (752 long tons; 842 short tons) of fuel; Bismarck inexplicably failed to similarly refuel.[22] At 19:30 on 21 May, Prinz Eugen, Bismarck, and the three escorting destroyers left port.[23] By midnight, the force was in the open sea and headed toward the Arctic Ocean. At this time, Admiral Raeder finally informed Hitler of the operation, who reluctantly allowed it to continue as planned. The three escorting destroyers were detached at 04:14 on 22 May, while the force steamed off Trondheim. At around 12:00, Lütjens ordered his two ships to turn toward the Denmark Strait to attempt the breakout into the open waters of the Atlantic.[24]
By 04:00 on 23 May, Lütjens ordered Prinz Eugen and Bismarck to increase speed to 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph) to make the dash through the Denmark Strait.[25] Upon entering the Strait, both ships activated their FuMO radar detection equipment sets.[26] Bismarck led Prinz Eugen by about 700 m (2,300 ft); mist reduced visibility to 3,000 to 4,000 m (9,800 to 13,100 ft). The Germans encountered some ice at around 10:00, which necessitated a reduction in speed to 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph). Two hours later, the pair had reached a point north of Iceland. The ships were forced to zigzag to avoid ice floes. At 19:22, hydrophone and radar operators aboard the German warships detected the cruiser HMS Suffolk at a range of approximately 12,500 m (41,000 ft).[25] Prinz Eugen's radio-intercept team decrypted the radio signals being sent by Suffolk and learned that their location had indeed been reported.[27]
Admiral Lütjens gave permission for Prinz Eugen to engage Suffolk, though the captain of the German cruiser could not clearly make out his target and so held fire.[28] Suffolk quickly retreated to a safe distance and shadowed the German ships. At 20:30, the heavy cruiser HMS Norfolk joined Suffolk, but approached the German raiders too closely. Lütjens ordered his ships to engage the British cruiser; Bismarck fired five salvoes, three of which straddled Norfolk and rained shell splinters on her decks. The cruiser laid a smoke screen and fled into a fog bank, ending the brief engagement. The concussion from the 38 cm guns disabled Bismarck's FuMo 23 radar set; this prompted Lütjens to order Prinz Eugen to take station ahead so she could use her functioning radar to scout for the formation. The British cruisers tracked Prinz Eugen and Bismarck through the night, continually relaying the location and bearing of the German ships.[29]
Battle of the Denmark Strait
The harsh weather broke on the morning of 24 May, revealing a clear sky. At 05:07 that morning, hydrophone operators aboard Prinz Eugen detected a pair of unidentified vessels approaching the German formation at a range of 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi), reporting "Noise of two fast-moving turbine ships at 280° relative bearing!".
The British ships approached the Germans head on, which permitted them to use only their forward guns, while Bismarck and Prinz Eugen could fire full
Lütjens then ordered Prinz Eugen to drop behind Bismarck, so she could continue to monitor the location of Norfolk and Suffolk, which were still some 10 to 12 nmi (19 to 22 km; 12 to 14 mi) to the east. At 06:00, Hood was completing her second turn to port when Bismarck's fifth salvo hit. Two of the shells landed short, striking the water close to the ship, but at least one of the 38 cm
After a few more minutes, during which Prince of Wales scored three hits on Bismarck, the damaged British battleship withdrew. The Germans ceased fire as the range widened, though Captain
Separation and return to France
With the weather worsening, Lütjens attempted to detach Prinz Eugen at 16:40. The squall was not heavy enough to cover her withdrawal from Wake-Walker's cruisers, which continued to maintain radar contact. Prinz Eugen was therefore recalled temporarily.[42] The cruiser was successfully detached at 18:14. Bismarck turned around to face Wake-Walker's formation, forcing Suffolk to turn away at high speed. Prince of Wales fired twelve salvos at Bismarck, which responded with nine salvos, none of which hit. The action diverted British attention and permitted Prinz Eugen to slip away.[43]
On 26 May, Prinz Eugen rendezvoused with the supply ship
Operation Cerberus and Norwegian operations
Brest is not far from bases in southern England and during their stay in Brest Prinz Eugen and the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were repeatedly attacked by Allied bombers.[49] The Royal Air Force jokingly referred to the three ships as the Brest Bomb Target Flotilla, and between 1 August and 31 December 1941 it dropped some 1200 tons of bombs on the port.[51] On the night of 1 July 1941,[44] Prinz Eugen was struck by an armor-piercing bomb that destroyed the control center deep down under the bridge. The attack killed 60 men and wounded more than 40 others.[52][49][53] The loss of the control center also made the main guns useless and repairs lasted until the end of the year.[51]
The continuous air attacks led the German command to decide Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would have to move to safer bases as soon as they were repaired and ready. Meanwhile, the Bismarck operation had demonstrated the risks of operating in the Atlantic without air cover. In addition, Hitler saw the Norwegian theater as the "zone of destiny", so he ordered the three ships' return to Germany in early 1942 so they could be deployed there.
At 23:00 on 11 February, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen left Brest. They entered the Channel an hour later; the three ships sped at 27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph), hugging the French coast along the voyage. By 06:30, they had passed
Off Dover, Prinz Eugen came under fire from British coastal artillery batteries, though they scored no hits. Several
On 21 February 1942, Prinz Eugen, the heavy cruiser
On 16 May, Prinz Eugen made the return voyage to Germany under her own power. While en route to Kiel, the ship was attacked by a British force of 19
Service in the Baltic
As the
In early September, Prinz Eugen supported a failed attempt to seize the fortress island of Hogland. The ship then returned to Gotenhafen, before escorting a convoy of ships evacuating German soldiers from Finland.[64] The convoy, consisting of six freighters, sailed on 15 September from the Gulf of Bothnia, with the entire Second Task Force escorting it. Swedish aircraft and destroyers shadowed the convoy, but did not intervene. The following month, Prinz Eugen returned to gunfire support duties. On 11 and 12 October, she fired in support of German troops in Memel.[67] Over the first two days, the ship fired some 700 rounds of ammunition from her main battery. She returned on the 14th and 15th, after having restocked her main battery ammunition, to fire another 370 rounds.[64]
While on the return voyage to Gotenhafen on 15 October, Prinz Eugen inadvertently rammed the light cruiser
The cruiser was ready for action by mid-January 1945, when she was sent to bombard Soviet forces in
The following month, on 8 April, Prinz Eugen and Lützow steamed to
On 27 May 1945, Prinz Eugen and the light cruiser
After arriving in Boston, the ship was extensively examined by the US Navy.[72] Her very large GHG passive sonar array was removed and installed on the submarine USS Flying Fish for testing.[79] American interest in magnetic amplifier technology increased again after findings in investigations of the fire control system of Prinz Eugen.[80][81] The guns from turret Anton were removed while in Philadelphia in February.[82] On 1 May the German crewmen left the ship and returned to Germany. Thereafter, the American crew had significant difficulties in keeping the ship's propulsion system operational—eleven of her twelve boilers failed after the Germans departed. The ship was then allocated to the fleet of target ships for Operation Crossroads in Bikini Atoll. Operation Crossroads was a major test of the effects of nuclear weapons on warships of various types. The trouble with Prinz Eugen's propulsion system may have influenced the decision to dispose of her in the nuclear tests.[78][83]
She was towed to the Pacific via Philadelphia and the Panama Canal,[78] departing on 3 March.[82] The ship survived two atomic bomb blasts: Test Able, an air burst on 1 July 1946 and Test Baker, a submerged detonation on 25 July.[84] Prinz Eugen was moored about 1,200 yards (1,100 m) from the epicenter of both blasts and was only lightly damaged by them;[85] the Able blast only bent her foremast and broke the top of her main mast.[86] She suffered no significant structural damage from the explosions but was thoroughly contaminated with radioactive fallout.[84] The ship was towed to the Kwajalein Atoll in the central Pacific, where a small leak went unrepaired due to the radiation danger.[87] On 29 August 1946, the US Navy decommissioned Prinz Eugen.[84]
By late December 1946, the ship was in very bad condition; on 21 December, she began to list severely.
Beginning in 1974, the US government began to warn about the danger of an oil leak from the ship's full fuel bunkers. The government was concerned about the risk of a severe
Footnotes
Notes
- ^ "L/60" denotes the length of the gun. The length of 60 caliber gun is 60 times its bore diameter.
- ^ The British were unaware that the German ships had reversed positions while in the Denmark Strait. Observers on Prince of Wales correctly identified the ships, but failed to inform Admiral Holland. See Zetterling & Tamelander, p. 165.
Citations
- ^ Williamson, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Koop & Schmolke, p. 9.
- ^ Busch, p. 10.
- ^ a b c d Gröner, p. 65.
- ^ a b Gröner, p. 66.
- ^ a b Williamson, p. 37.
- ^ Schmalenbach, pp. 121–122.
- ^ a b c Gröner, p. 67.
- ^ a b Koop & Schmolke, p. 146.
- ^ Williamson, p. 35.
- ^ Williamson, pp. 37–38.
- ^ a b c d Williamson, p. 38.
- ^ a b Schmalenbach, p. 140.
- ^ Müllenheim-Rechberg, p. 60.
- ^ Müllenheim-Rechberg, p. 76.
- ^ a b Garzke & Dulin, p. 214.
- ^ a b Bercuson & Herwig, p. 65.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 68.
- ^ Zetterling & Tamelander, p. 114.
- ^ Müllenheim-Rechberg, p. 83.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 71.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 72.
- ^ Garzke & Dulin, p. 215.
- ^ a b Garzke & Dulin, p. 216.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 126.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 127.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 129–133.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 133–134.
- ^ Garzke & Dulin, pp. 219–220.
- ^ Garzke & Dulin, p. 220.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 151–153.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 153.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 155–156.
- ^ Garzke & Dulin, p. 223.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 162–165.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 165–166.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 167.
- ^ Bercuson & Herwig, p. 168.
- ^ a b Bercuson & Herwig, p. 173.
- ^ Zetterling & Tamelander, pp. 192–193.
- ^ Garzke & Dulin, p. 227.
- ^ a b c Schmalenbach, p. 141.
- ^ Busch, p. 93.
- ^ Busch, p. 97.
- ^ Busch, p. 104.
- ^ Busch, p. 108.
- ^ a b c Williamson, p. 39.
- ^ Busch, pp. 108–109.
- ^ a b Busch, p. 117.
- ^ Koop & Schmolke, p. 150.
- ^ Busch, pp. 113–118.
- ^ a b c d e Garzke & Dulin, p. 146.
- ^ Williamson, pp. 39–40.
- ^ a b c Williamson, p. 40.
- ^ Hooton, pp. 114–115.
- ^ Hooton, p. 114.
- ^ Weal, p. 17.
- ^ a b c Schmalenbach, p. 142.
- ^ Busch, p. 145.
- ^ Rohwer, p. 146.
- ^ Busch, pp. 157–160.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Williamson, p. 41.
- ^ a b c Koop & Schmolke, p. 160.
- ^ Koop & Schmolke, pp. 182–183.
- ^ a b c d e f g Schmalenbach, p. 143.
- ^ a b c d e f Koop & Schmolke, p. 154.
- ^ Rohwer, p. 351.
- ^ Rohwer, p. 363.
- ^ Williamson, pp. 41–42.
- ^ a b c Williamson, p. 42.
- ^ Rohwer, p. 409.
- ^ Dörr, p. 169.
- ^ Delgado, p. 44.
- ^ Busch, pp. 212–213.
- ^ Slavick, p. 245.
- ^ Naval History & Heritage Command. Retrieved 27 July 2011.
- ^ Friedman, p. 62.
- ^ Geyger, p. 11.
- ^ Black, pp. 427–435.
- ^ a b Roberts, p. 60.
- ^ Koop & Schmolke, p. 159.
- ^ a b c d e Sieche, p. 229.
- ^ Roberts, p. 59.
- ^ Roberts, p. 65.
- ^ a b Lenihan, p. 200.
- ^ Mizokami.
- ^ a b Shavers.
References
- Bercuson, David J. & Herwig, Holger H. (2003). The Destruction of the Bismarck. New York: The Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1-58567-397-1.
- Black, A. O. (November 1948). "Effect of Core Material on Magnetic Amplifier Design". Proceedings of the National Electronics Conference. 4: 427–435.
- Busch, Fritz-Otto (1975). Prinz Eugen. London: First Futura Publications. ISBN 0-8600-72339.
- Delgado, James P. (1996). Ghost fleet: the sunken ships of Bikini Atoll. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-1864-7.
- Dörr, Manfred (1996). Die Ritterkreuzträger der Überwasserstreitkräfte der Kriegsmarine—Band 2: L–Z [The Knight's Cross Bearers of the Surface Forces of the Navy—Volume 2: L–Z] (in German). Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag. ISBN 978-3-7648-2497-6.
- Friedman, Norman (1994). U.S. Submarines Since 1945: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-260-5.
- Garzke, William H. & Dulin, Robert O. (1985). Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-101-0.
- Geyger, William A. (1957) [1954]. "Historical Development of Magnetic-amplifier Circuits". Magnetic-Amplifier Circuits (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. p. 11. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 56-12532.
One reason for the increased interest in magnetic amplifiers in this country was the successful German development work for various military applications, especially for naval fire-control systems, as used on the German heavy cruiser "Prinz Eugen."
- ISBN 978-0-87021-790-6.
- Hooton, E. R. (1997). Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe. London: Brockhampton. ISBN 978-1-86019-995-0.
- Koop, Gerhard & Schmolke, Klaus-Peter (1992). Die Schweren Kreuzer der Admiral Hipper-Klasse [The Heavy Cruisers of the Admiral Hipper Class] (in German). Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag. ISBN 978-3-7637-5896-8.
- Lenihan, Daniel (2003). Submerged: Adventures of America's Most Elite Underwater Archeology Team. New York: Newmarket. ISBN 978-1-55704-589-8.
- Mizokami, Kyle (17 September 2018). "The U.S. Nuked This Warship in 1946. Now America Is Trying To Save Its Oil Before It's Too Late". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved 17 September 2018.
- Müllenheim-Rechberg, Burkhard von (1980). Battleship Bismarck, A Survivor's Story. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-096-9.
- Roberts, John, ed. (1979). "Warship Pictorial: Prinz Eugen". Warship. III. London: Conway Press: 59–65. ISBN 978-0-85177-204-2.
- ISBN 978-1-59114-119-8.
- Schmalenbach, Paul (1971). "KM Prinz Eugen". Warship Profile 6. Windsor: Profile Publications. pp. 121–144. OCLC 10095330.
- Shavers, Clyde (15 October 2018). "U.S. Navy divers recover oil from wrecked WWII ship Prinz Eugen". www.cfp.navy.mil. Archived from the original on 15 October 2018. Retrieved 19 October 2018.
- Sieche, Erwin (1992). "Germany". In Gardiner, Robert; Chesneau, Roger (eds.). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press. pp. 218–254. ISBN 978-0-85177-146-5.
- Slavick, Joseph P. (2003). The Cruise of the German Raider Atlantis. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-537-8.
- Weal, John (1996). Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Aces of the Western Front. Oxford: Osprey Books. ISBN 978-1-85532-595-1.
- ISBN 978-1-84176-502-0.
- Zetterling, Niklas & Tamelander, Michael (2009). Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship. Drexel Hill: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-935149-04-0.
Further reading
- Burdick, Charles Burton (1996). The End of the Prinz Eugen (IX300). Menlo Park: Markgraf Publications Group. ISBN 0944109101.
- Whitley, M. J. (1987). German Cruisers of World War Two. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-217-8.