Mountain War (Lebanon)
Mountain War حرب الجبل | |||||||
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Part of the Lebanese Civil War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
SSNP |
Lebanese Forces Supported by: Multinational Force in Lebanon
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Ibrahim Tannous Michel Aoun Fouad Abou Nader Fadi Frem Samir Geagea Ronald Reagan François Mitterrand |
The Mountain War (
Background
In the wake of the June 1982
Historically the relationship between the
Re-organization of the LAF
The new Lebanese President
The Lebanese Army re-enters west Beirut
Between 2 and 15 October 1982, the newly-raised
After the Lebanese Army regained control of west Beirut,[18] Lt. Gen. Tannous turned his attention to the Chouf District and on 18 October, his troops began to reassert their presence in the region. However, they were unable to stop the ongoing Christian-Druze clashes, mostly due to Israeli presence in the area, which tended to restrict Lebanese government' forces activity.[19]
In November, fighting in the Chouf spread into the south-western suburbs of Beirut and friction in the Lebanese Capital increased after 1 December, when the Druze PSP leader
On 18 April a suicide bomber drove a delivery van packed with explosives into the lobby of the
On 28 April, the fighting between Christian LF and Druze PSP/PLA militias resumed in the Chouf and in the northern part of the Matn District, spilling over into the southern suburbs of east Beirut, which were bombarded by Druze artillery batteries positioned at Dhour El Choueir, Arbaniyeh, Salimeh and Maaroufiyeh in the Baabda District. Fighting in the Chouf spilled over again into Beirut, this time in the form of further artillery shelling by the Druze PLA between 5 and 8 May.
17 May Agreement
After six months of prolonged U.S.-mediated secret negotiations, representatives of the Lebanese, Israeli, and American governments signed a withdrawal agreement on 17 May 1983, which became known as the '
Increasing tensions
As a result, internal political and armed opposition to the weak Gemayel administration grew intensively throughout the country. On 22 May, a number of clashes occurred in the Chouf Mountains, as the Druze PSP/PLA militia moved to expel the
During the summer of 1983 the situation in Lebanon degenerated into a vicious power struggle between Lebanese rival factions, with the MNF caught in the middle. Both the Israelis and Syrians withdrew to more defensive positions and tried to outmaneuver each other by playing their local proxies, with mixed results. Seemingly oblivious to the deteriorating political and military situation, the U.S. government did nothing to demonstrate its neutrality. In June, rather than cancelling or descaling the training and arming of the LAF ground forces, the U.S. Marines began joint patrols with them,[15] whilst the French, Italian and British contingents of the Multinational Force refrained from doing so, fearing that such a partisan move would compromise the neutrality of the MNF.
At the same time, the Lebanese central government was planning to re-impose its authority over the Chouf District, and on 9–10 July, LAF troops occupied an observation post recently abandoned by the IDF, located on the hills to the east of Beirut. President Gemayel and Lt. Gen. Tannous wanted to step up full deployment of combat units of the reformed Lebanese Armed Forces to the area, to act as a buffer between the LF and the PSP. This was objected by the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who accused the LAF of primarily serving the Kataeb interests, and began to re-organize and re-arm his PLA militia with Syrian material help. As relations between Lebanese President Gemayel and Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon deteriorated, the IDF was accused of turning a blind eye to the Druze military build-up in the Chouf by doing nothing to impede Syrian arms shipments' convoys bound for the Druze militias from passing through their checkpoints in the region.[25]
Clashes with the Druze in the Chouf
The first engagement between the Druze PSP/PLA and the LAF occurred on 14 July, when a Lebanese Army unit accompanying an IDF patrol was ambushed by Druze guerrillas. Fourteen Lebanese soldiers and two Druze militiamen were killed in the attack, and in response the artillery units of Jumblatt's PLA shelled on 18th, 20th, 22nd and 23rd the Christian-held neighborhoods of east Beirut (in which over 30 people were killed and 600 injured, mostly civilians) and U.S. Marines positions at
On 23 July, Jumblatt announced the formation of a Syrian-backed coalition, the
Clashes with Amal in Beirut
As these events were unfolding in the Chouf, tensions continued to mount at Muslim-populated west Beirut. They finally exploded in mid-August when a general strike called on the 15th quickly escalated into open warfare, which pitted the
The Israelis withdraw from the Chouf
No longer able to sustain the casualties that the IDF was taking in policing the
The Mountain War
September 1983
On 3 September, the
Opposing forces
At this point, Jumblatt's 17,000-strong PSP/PLA militia was now part of a military coalition under the LNSF banner that gathered 300 Druze fighters sent by its Druze rival
The Lebanese Forces militia had about 2,500 lightly equipped Christian militiamen in the Chouf, mostly tied up in static garrison duties throughout the region's main towns whereas another 2,000 fighters were deployed alongside LAF ground units at west Beirut. The Lebanese Army committed nine newly formed
The Druze offensive
As soon as the last Israeli units left the Chouf, the Druze launched on 5 September a full-scale offensive on Lebanese Forces' and Lebanese Army positions at
For their part, the LF garrison forces were completely caught by surprise by the ferocity of the assault and were outnumbered. Supported by obsolescent
Bhamdoun fell on the 7th, followed two days later by Kabr Chmoun, forcing the Lebanese Forces troops' to fall back to Deir el-Qamar, which held 10,000 Christian residents and refugees and was defended by 1,000 LF militiamen;[37] the two LF armored companies managed to hold their ground at Souk El Gharb and Shahhar, and later spearheaded LF counterattacks at nearby Druze-held towns.[55] The Lebanese Forces Command in east Beirut later accused the Druze PSP of both ransacking Bhamdoun and of committing "unprecedented massacres" in the Chouf; in order to deny support, cover or a visible community for the LF to protect, the Druze implemented a 'territorial cleansing' policy to drain the Christian population from the region.[56][32] It is estimated that between 31 August and 13 September, Jumblatt's PLA militia forces overran thirty-two villages killing 1,500 people and drove another 50,000 out of their homes in the mountainous areas east and west of Beirut.[57][37][58] In retaliation, some 127 Druze civilians were killed by LF militiamen between 5–7 September at the Shahhar region, Kfarmatta, Al-Bennay, Ain Ksour, and Abey, where the LF also desecrated the tomb of a prominent Druze religious man. It is estimated that these 'tit-for-tat' killings ultimately led to the displacement of 20,000 Druze and 163,670 Christian villagers from the Chouf.[59][60]
When the Lebanese Army was forced to pull back on 12 September, in order to strengthen their position around Souk El Gharb, the Druze moved forward to fill the gap. This allowed their artillery point-blank line of sight to the U.S. Marines position at Beirut International Airport, overlooked by mountains of strategic value on three sides – designated the 'three 8' hills or Hill 888 – and on 15 September, Druze forces and their allies massed on the threshold of
The Battle of Souk El Gharb
At Souk El Gharb and
The first two combat sorties of the Lebanese Air Force were flown on 16 September, when three Lebanese Hunters, backed by a squadron of
Lt. Gen. Tannous then requested urgent military support from the
Geneva Reconciliation Talks
The 25 September cease-fire temporarily stabilized the situation. The Gemayel government maintained its jurisdiction over west Beirut districts, the Shia Amal movement had not yet fully committed itself in the fighting, and Jumblatt's PSP/PLA remained landlocked in the Chouf Mountains. The Lebanese government and opposition personalities agreed to meet in Geneva, Switzerland, for a national reconciliation conference under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and Syria, and chaired by President Gemayel to discuss political reform and the May 17 Agreement.
For its part, the United States found itself carrying on Israel's role of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government.[61] An emergency arms shipment had been dispatched earlier on 14 September to beleaguered LAF units fighting in the Chouf, which were backed by air strikes and naval gunfire from the battleship USS New Jersey. On 29 September, the U.S. Ambassador's residence in east Beirut was hit by shell-fire and in response, the U.S. Marines' contingent stationed at Beirut International Airport was ordered to use their M198 155mm howitzers in support of the Lebanese Army.[73] That same day, the United States Congress, by a solid majority, adopted a resolution declaring the 1973 War Powers Resolution to apply to the situation in Lebanon and sanctioned the U.S. military presence for an eighteen-month period. U.S. vice-president George H. W. Bush made clear the position of the Reagan administration by demanding that Syria "get out from the Lebanon". A large naval task-force of more than a dozen vessels was assembled off the Lebanese coast and an additional contingent of 2,000 U.S. Marines was sent to the country. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) stated that the increase of its military forces in the eastern Mediterranean had been carried out to "sent a message to Syria".[74]
October 1983
American position
Many international observers believed that these measures implemented by the U.S. government were meant to reshape the power balance in the region in favor of the
Alarmed by this American posture (which compromised the neutrality of the Multinational Force) and fearing for the safety of their own MNF contingents in Lebanon, the British, French and Italian governments expressed their concerns, insisting with the Reagan administration to restrict its activities in the region to the protection of Lebanese civilians and to stop supporting what they considered an ongoing assault of the Gemayel government on his own people.[77] However, President Reagan refused to modify his intransigent position and on 1 October, another shipment of arms was delivered to the Lebanese Army, which included M48A5 main battle tanks (MBTs), additional M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and M198 155mm long-range howitzers.[73] That same day, Walid Jumblatt announced the formation of a separate governmental administration for the Chouf, the "Civilian Administration of the Mountain" (CAM or CAOM), and called for the mass defection of all Druze elements from the Lebanese Armed Forces.[78] A few days later, the Druze LAF Chief-of-Staff and commander of the Seventh Brigade, General Nadim al-Hakim, returned to the Saïd el-Khateeb Barracks at Hammana along with the 800 Officers, NCOs and enlisted men who had deserted previously from the predominately Druze Eleventh Brigade, and announced his decision to remain in the Chouf, while his troops took sides with the Druze PSP/PLA.
The delivery of arms shipments was complemented by naval artillery barrages. Steaming to within two miles of the Lebanese coast, the battleship
MNF barracks bombing
Early in the morning of 23 October, a suicide truck bomb struck the U.S. Marines' Battalion Landing Team 1/8 (BLT, part of the
The French promptly responded to the bombings with air strikes against Islamic Jihad targets in the
November 1983
These retaliatory measures failed to put an end to the bomb attacks however, and on 4 November the Israeli Military Governor's Headquarters in
On 10 November, a French Super Etendard narrowly escaped from being shot down by an SA-7 near Bourj el-Barajneh refugee camp in southwest Beirut while flying over Druze PSP/PLA positions.[86] The Israelis conducted additional retaliatory air strikes on 16 November, hitting a training camp in the eastern Beqaa Valley. The next day, French Super Etendards carried out similar strikes against another Islamic Amal camp in the vicinity of Baalbek.
Persistent and occasionally heavy fighting in the southwestern suburbs of Beirut between the Lebanese Army and the Shia Amal militia continued throughout November. As the month ended, the
December 1983
American-Syrian confrontation in the Chouf
Diplomatic tensions between Syria and the United States escalated to direct confrontation in early December when, despite numerous warnings from Washington, Syrian anti-aircraft batteries fired on a pair of U.S. Navy Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS)‑equipped Grumman F-14A Tomcat fighter jets of Strike Fighter Squadron 31 (VFA-31) from the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy flying on a reconnaissance mission over a section of the Beirut-Damascus Highway in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley.[92][93] Determined to send a clear message to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, the Americans retaliated with an hastily devised air raid on 4 December, when twenty-eight Grumman A-6E Intruder and Vought A-7E Corsair II fighter-bombers, supported by a single E-2C Hawkeye, two EA-6B Prowlers and two F-14A fighter jets, took off from the aircraft carriers USS Independence and USS John F. Kennedy, flashed inland over Beirut and headed for eight Syrian Army and Druze PLA installations, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites and weapons' depots near Falougha-Khalouat and Hammana, within an eight-mile (12.87 km) corridor 20 miles (32.29 km) east of the Lebanese Capital. The list of selected targets included a Syrian-operated Stentor battlefield surveillance radar, Syrian tanks, three artillery sites (which had 28 gun emplacements between them) manned by the Syrian Army's 27th Artillery Brigade dug in near the village of Hammana and positions held by the pro-Syrian As-Sa'iqa Palestinian guerrilla faction[94] in the Beqaa Valley, close to the Syrian border.[95]
As a demonstration of American resolve, however, the hurriedly-executed raid was a fiasco – once over their targets in the Chouf, the U.S. fighter-bombers dispersed and pounded Syrian Army and Druze PLA positions but ran into a heavy barrage of
Two American planes, one A-6E and an A-7E, were shot down by Syrian SA-7 Grail or SA-9 Gaskin missiles. The Pilot of the A-6E,
The bomb damage inflicted was difficult to assess. Although the U.S. Navy planes dropped some 24,000 lbs of ordnance – including 12 CBU‑59 Cluster Bombs and 28
The evacuation of Souk El Gharb and Deir el-Qamar
On 4 December, PSP leader Walid Jumblatt, ostensibly as a gesture of goodwill on humanitarian grounds and without any preconditions, offered to lift the sieges of Souk El Gharb and Deir el-Qamar, which had been cut off since September and had to rely on weekly
Meanwhile, on 14–15 December, as this evacuation was taking place, the battleship
In west Beirut, violent clashes erupted in mid-December between the
January 1984
On 5 January, the Lebanese Government announced that a disengagement plan to demilitarize Beirut and its environs had been approved by
As sporadic fighting broke out again on 16 January, there were fears that the informal cease-fire that had generally prevailed since late September 1983 was breaking down. Druze PLA artillerymen again shelled Christian-controlled east Beirut and the Marines positions around the International Airport, with Amal and the Lebanese Army joining at the fringes.[108] This in turn provoked a response from the 5-inch naval guns of the battleship USS New Jersey and the destroyer USS Tattnall, firing at Druze gun emplacements in the hills surrounding Beirut.[109]
February 1984
The Beirut security plan
As the month of February opened, it became painfully clear that the Lebanese Government and its Armed Forces were now faced with an ominous political and military situation. Artillery and mortar exchanges continued since mid-January between the Christian-held east Beirut districts and the Muslim-controlled west Beirut quarters, the Chouf and the Beqaa, from which Syrian troops still provided logistical support to their Druze, Amal and LNSF allies. Determined to keep Beirut unified under Government control and to prevent the return of the militias to both western and eastern sectors of the Lebanese capital, Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Tannous ordered Lebanese Army troops to take up positions along the Green Line in the city center and its eastern approaches, being bolstered at some locations by Lebanese Forces militiamen. Despite this disadvantageous situation, the LAF Command decided nevertheless to reunify the Lebanese capital by implementing a hastily devised security plan, which called for the deployment of eight Lebanese Army mechanized infantry brigades throughout the Greater Beirut area, placed under the overall command of General Zouheir Tannir. In order to implement this security plan, the LAF Brigades were structured as follows:[110]
- The Hadath and the Faculty of Sciencessectors leading to the southern suburbs of Beirut.
- The Fourth Brigade, under the command of Colonel Nayef Kallas was deployed at the towns of Khalde, Aramoun, Kabr Chmoun and Shahhar, being entrusted with the mission of defending the southern approaches of Beirut.
- The Fifth Brigade, under the orders of Colonel khalil Kanaan was positioned at the Sin el Fil suburb east of Beirut in the Matn District as a reserve force, and the Brigade's primary mission was to provide support to the other Lebanese Army Brigades deployed in the Greater Beirut area.
- The Sixth Brigade, under the command of Colonel Lufti Jabar was tasked with the primary mission of maintaining order and security in west Beirut.
- The Hadath in east Beirut, and at Dahr al-Wahsh facing Aley in the Chouf District, where they faced the main anti-government Druze militia, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Progressive Socialist Party(PSP).
- The Eight Brigade, under the command of Colonel Michel Aoun remained positioned at Souk El Gharb, Kaifun and Bsous facing the Druze PSP/PLA militia, being tasked with the primary mission of defending the south-eastern approaches to east Beirut, including Baabda.
- The Hazmiyeh and Sin el Fileastern suburbs of Beirut as a reserve force.
- The 10th Airmobile Brigade (also still being formed), reinforced by a Lebanese Army Commando battalion (Arabic: Fawj al-Maghaweer) led by then Major Youssef Tahan, under the command of Colonel Nassib Eid was held in reserve at east Beirut, ready to support the LAF Brigades in the field as required.
The February 6 Intifada and the fall of West Beirut
Earlier on 1 February, Walid Jumblatt denounced the Lebanese Government's disengagement plan as a waste of time, while its Druze PLA troops linked the following day with Nabih Berri's Amal militia units in order to attack Lebanese Army positions in the Greater Beirut area, which marked the beginning of the battle for the Lebanese Capital.[111] On 3 February, a combined Druze PLA/Amal full-scale offensive operation was mounted against Lebanese Army positions in the southern and eastern districts of the city, while fighting also erupted in the central area.[112]
At west Beirut tensions remained high, particularly between the Lebanese Army and the Shia militiamen of the Amal Movement, who feared that the LAF Command was planning to launch a large-scale operation against their strongholds in the Shia-populated Chyah, Bir Abed, Bir Hassan, Ouza'i and Khalde southwestern suburbs, where they had firmly entrenched themselves. All what was needed was the spark, and hostilities began three days later on 6 February, when the LAF Command of the Greater Beirut area decided to send the 52nd Infantry Battalion from the Fifth Brigade in M113 APCs supported by a Tank squadron provided with M48A5 MBTs on a routine patrol mission, whose planned route was to pass through the Dora suburb, the Museum crossing in the Corniche el Mazraa, the Barbir Hospital in the Ouza'i district, the Kola bridge, and the Raouché seafront residential and commercial neighbourhood. Alerted by the presence of such a large military force entering west Beirut – which they viewed suspiciously as being abnormally reinforced for a simple routine mission – Amal militia forces misinterpreted this move as a disguised attempt by Government forces to seize the southwestern suburbs of the Lebanese capital by force. An alarmed Amal Command promptly issued a general mobilization order in the ranks of its militia, and as soon as the Lebanese Army patrol arrived at the Fouad Chehab bridge near the Barbir Hospital, they fell into an ambush. Several M48 Tanks that were leading the column were hit by dozens of RPG-7 anti-tank rounds, which brought the advance of the entire patrol to a halt.[113]
Faced with the gravity of the situation, the LAF Command reacted by ordering a reposition of its combat units stationed in the Greater Beirut area and by setting up a new demarcation line across the western and eastern sectors of the Lebanese capital. Situated on portions of the old Green Line, this new line went from the Port district located on the eastern part of the Saint George Bay to the town of Kfarshima in the Baabda District, and was designed to deny the Muslim LNSF and Christian LF militias any opportunity to gain control over both sectors of Beirut and at the same time, to act as a buffer between them. In addition, the Lebanese Army units present at west Beirut were reinforced by the 91st Infantry Battalion and the 94th Armoured Battalion from the Ninth Brigade, under the command of Colonel Sami Rihana. Placed at the disposal of the Seventh Brigade's Command, these two battalions were positioned between the Port district and the Sodeco Square in the Nasra (Nazareth) neighbourhood of the Achrafieh district of east Beirut.[114]
That same day, the Muslim militias rose in an uprising, which became known as the February 6 Intifada, when heavy clashes erupted at the Museum crossing in the Corniche el Mazraa between Army units and Amal militia forces, and the fighting quickly spread throughout west Beirut, escalating into the 'Street War' (Arabic: حرب شوارع | Harb Shawarie). Hundreds of Shia, Sunni and Druze militiamen from Amal, the PSP/PLA, Al-Mourabitoun and other LNSF factions armed with automatic small-arms and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, and backed by technicals took to the streets, mounting combined ground assaults against all the positions held by the Army brigades deployed in the western sector of the Lebanese capital. This forced the LAF Command to alter its previously established demarcation line separating Beirut, and although still running from the Port district to Kfarshima, it was re-adjusted to include the Museum crossing area, the Galerie Semaan and Mar Mikhaël, a residential and commercial neighbourhood in the Medawar district. By the end of the day, amidst intense shelling, the Shia Amal and the Druze PLA took control over west Beirut in a matter of hours, seizing in the process the main Government-owned Television and Radio broadcasting stations' buildings.[114]
Although forced out of the Chyah quarter by Amal, the Lebanese Army launched three days later, on 9 February, a combined counter-offensive with the Lebanese Forces on the Shia-populated southwestern suburbs of the Lebanese capital. The PSP/PLA-Amal alliance forces promptly reacted that same day by mounting simultaneous ground assaults against Government and LF-held positions in the city center along the Green Line, and on the southern and eastern districts. After two days of the heaviest fighting in Beirut since the 1975-76 civil war, the combined Druze PLA/Amal militia forces managed to drive Lebanese Army and LF units out of west Beirut, largely due to the refusal of Shia Muslim soldiers to fight their coregionalists – in fact some actually fought against their own Army units.[115][114] On 8–9 February, in the heaviest shore bombardment since the Korean War,[116] a massive artillery barrage by offshore U.S. warships pounded Druze PLA and Syrian positions in the hills overlooking Beirut, an operation that invoked the disapproval of the U.S. Congress.[112] During a nine-hour period on 8 February, the battleship USS New Jersey alone fired a total of 288 16-inch rounds, each one weighing as much as a Volkswagen Beetle, hence the nickname of "flying Volkswagens" given by the Lebanese to the huge shells that struck the Chouf.[117] Once again, some of these shells missed their intended targets and killed civilians, mostly Shiites and Druze.[118] In addition to destroying Syrian and Druze PLA artillery and missile sites, thirty rounds hit a Syrian command post, killing the general commanding the Syrian forces in Lebanon along with several of his senior officers.[119]
The Lebanese Army's defeat in the Chouf
Meanwhile in the Chouf, on 13 February the local Druze PLA forces and their LNSF allies drove the last remaining Lebanese Army and LF units from the towns of Aley, Kfarmatta and others, with only Souk El Gharb remaining firmly in Government hands.[120] On that same day, an Amal force also succeeded in driving out other Lebanese Army units from their positions in the southern approaches to west Beirut, seizing Khalde (with the exception of the adjoining International Airport, still being held by the U.S. Marines).[121] The Lebanese Air Force Hawker Hunter jets flew their last combat sortie over the Chouf, carrying out air strikes against advancing Druze PLA forces on the western portion of the Shahhar region in support of the Fourth Brigade's units reinforced by the 101st Ranger Battalion from the 10th Airmobile Brigade[122] fighting desperately to retain their positions at Aabey, Kfarmatta, Ain Ksour, and Al-Beniyeh, which achieved little success due to poor planning and lack of coordination with Lebanese Army units fighting on the ground. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that LNSF militias managed to intercept, alter, and retransmit Lebanese Army radio communications, which allowed them to impersonate the LAF command in east Beirut by ordering Fourth Brigade units to retreat to safer positions. Simultaneously, they ordered Lebanese Army's artillery units positioned at east Beirut to shell their own troops' positions in the western Chouf, which wreaked havoc among Fourth Brigade units and forced them to fall back in disorder towards the coast while being subjected to friendly fire.[122]
During the following two days, Amal militia forces moved against Lebanese Forces positions in the
The next day, the towns of
Collapse of the LAF
The decisive defeat of the
The Multinational Force begin its withdrawal
As these events were unfolding in Beirut, the U.S. President Ronald Reagan was pressured for a complete withdrawal of the U.S. contingent of the MNF from Lebanon by the
Faced with the crushing defeat and subsequent collapse of the LAF, and with his own status effectively reduced to that of Mayor of
March 1984
After a peace plan put forward by
That same day, as soon as the declaration from the Lausanne conference was announced, the central districts of the Lebanese capital along the Green Line and the southern suburbs flared up again, with the fighting lasting throughout the night of 20–21 March.[132] Firing across the Green Line continued spasmodically, and on 22 March Druze PLA militiamen backed by Amal drove their erstwhile allies of the Sunni Al-Mourabitoun militia and other smaller factions from their positions in the area, ostensibly to prevent any violations of the ceasefire.[133][134] Their mission at an end, the last French troops of the MNF left Beirut on 31 March.[82] The "Mountain War" was over.
Consequences
The defeat of the LAF and the Lebanese Forces in the Mountain War was catastrophic for the
Moreover, President Amine Gemayel's miscalculation by refusing to grant the Lebanese Druze and Shia Muslim communities the expected political representation, and his excessive reliance on American and French political and military support during the conflict that ensued, seriously undermined his own credibility and authority in his dual role as head of state and leader of the Maronite Christian community. For their part, the war inflicted a heavy blow to the Lebanese Forces' prestige and credibility, due to their arrogant behavior towards the Muslim and Druze civilian population and their incapacity to protect the Christian communities of the Chouf District.
The Mountain War also contributed to shatter the illusion that the Lebanese Civil War had been settled in 1976,[61] a view shared by many Lebanese Christian and Muslim political factions and militias, who believed that the withdrawal of all foreign forces (meaning the Israelis, Syrians and Palestinians) would bring a decisive end to the ongoing conflict, which they regarded as a "war between foreigners". In the end, their hopes were dashed when the MNF pulled out and the Israelis withdrew to southern Lebanon to establish a "Security Belt", which enabled Syria to consolidate its hold on Lebanon. However, the resulting power vacuum proved difficult to fill, even for the Syrians, and the country remained split and in turmoil for years to come.
Aftermath
In August 2001,
See also
- 1983 United States embassy bombing in Beirut
- 1983 Beirut barracks bombing
- Battle of Tripoli (1983)
- Battle of the Hotels
- Damour massacre
- Lebanese Armed Forces
- Lebanese Forces
- List of weapons of the Lebanese Civil War
- Sabra and Shatila massacre
- St George's Church attack
- Syrian military presence in Lebanon
Notes
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 70–71.
- ISBN 978-1-317-93173-7.
the Druze had been able to live in harmony with the Christian
- ISBN 978-965-226-049-9.
.. Europeans who visited the area during this period related that the Druze "love the Christians more than the other believers," and that they "hate the Turks, the Muslims and the Arabs [Bedouin] with an intense hatred.
- ^ CHURCHILL (1862). The Druzes and the Maronites. Montserrat Abbey Library. p. 25.
..the Druzes and Christians lived together in the most perfect harmony and good-will..
- ^ Hobby (1985). Near East/South Asia Report. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. p. 53.
the Druzes and the Christians in the Shuf Mountains in the past lived in complete harmony..
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 129; 138.
- ^ Hinson, Crimes on Sacred Ground: Massacres, Desecration, and Iconoclasm in Lebanon's Mountain War 1983-1984 (2017), p. 51.
- ^ a b Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 109.
- ^ Kechichian, The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s (1985), p. 26.
- ^ a b Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), pp. 123-125.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), pp. 117-118.
- ^ a b "Lebanon - Mechanized Infantry Brigades". www.globalsecurity.org.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 123.
- ^ Guest, Lebanon (1994), pp. 102; 109.
- ^ a b c d Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 110.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 78.
- ^ Sex & Bassel Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 101.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 124.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 120–121.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 121.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 122.
- ^ a b Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon (1985), p. 34.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 123.
- ^ Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 498.
- ^ Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres (1985), p. 294.
- ^ a b DoD commission on Beirut International Airport December 1983 Terrorist Act This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 128.
- ^ Friedman, Thomas L. (8 April 1984). "America's failure in Lebanon". The New York Times.
- ^ a b Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 498.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 70.
- ^ "Never-before-heard tapes of Reagan revealed". New York Post. 8 November 2014.
- ^ a b O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 129.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 125.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 66.
- ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 472.
- ^ Rabah, Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (2020), p. 302.
- ^ a b c d Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 210.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 69.
- ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 77.
- ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), pp. 25; 76.
- ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), pp. 66-67.
- ^ Olivier Antoine and Raymond Ziffredi, BTR 152 & ZU 23, Steelmasters Magazine, October–November 2006 issue, pp. 48–55.
- ^ Kassis, Les TIRAN 4 et 5, de Tsahal aux Milices Chrétiennes, p. 59.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 6; 26.
- ^ Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 58.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 53; 67.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 65-75.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 77; 81; 83.
- ^ Sex & Bassel Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 26.
- ^ Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 61.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 77; 81.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 77; 82; 84-85.
- ^ Mahé, La Guerre Civile Libanaise, un chaos indescriptible! (1975–1990) (2014), p. 81.
- ^ Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 76-80.
- ^ Kassis, Les TIRAN 4 et 5, de Tsahal aux Milices Chrétiennes, p. 60.
- ^ Salmon, Massacre and Mutilation: Understanding the Lebanese Forces through their use of violence (2004), p. 10, footnote 19.
- ^ Laffin, The War of Desperation: Lebanon 1982-85 (1985), pp. 184-185.
- ^ Hinson, Crimes on Sacred Ground: Massacres, Desecration, and Iconoclasm in Lebanon's Mountain War 1983-1984 (2017), p. 8.
- ^ Al-Nahar (Beirut), 16 August 1991.
- ^ Kanafani-Zahar, «La réconciliation des druzes et des chrétiens du Mont Liban ou le retour à un code coutumier» (2004), pp. 55-75.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 211.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 115.
- ^ Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 106.
- ^ William E. Smith, Deeper into Lebanon, TIME Magazine, 26 September 1983.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), pp. 82-83.
- ^ Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (1990), page unknown.
- ^ Dionne Jr., E. J. (21 September 1983). "In the Druse hills, a burst of anger is directed at U.S." The New York Times.
- ^ Dionne Jr, E. J. (20 September 1983). "U.S. WARSHIPS FIRE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF LEBANESE ARMY". The New York Times. No. 20 September 1983. Retrieved 26 July 2018.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 131–132.
- ^ a b Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 225.
- ^ Rolland, Lebanon: Current Issues and Background (2003), pp. 185-186.
- ^ Brinkley, Joel (17 February 1984). "As the Lebanese Army caves in, U.S. evaluates training program; American effort said to have overlooked doubts of officers". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 111.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 75.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 75-76.
- ^ a b c d e f Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon (1985), p. 35.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 76.
- ^ a b O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 132.
- ^ Smith, William E. (3 October 1983). "Helping to hold the Line". TIME Magazine. Archived from the original on 22 December 2008.
- ^ Glass, Charles (July 2006). "Lebanon Agonistes". CounterPunch. Archived from the original on 5 January 2009. Retrieved 17 October 2009.
- ^ Russel and Carroll, The US Marine Corps since 1945 (1984), p. 32.
- ^ UPI, 31 March 1984.
- ^ Pivetta, Beyrouth 1983, la 3e compagnie du 1er RCP dans l'attentat du Drakkar, Militaria Magazine (2014), pp. 41-44.
- ^ Trainor, Bernard E. (6 August 1989). "'83 Strike on Lebanon: Hard Lessons for U.S." The New York Times.
- ^ a b O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 133.
- ^ "Disaster in Lebanon: US and French Operations in 1983". Acig.org. Archived from the original on 7 October 2013. Retrieved 24 August 2013.
- ^ a b c O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 134. This source reports on the loss of an American-made F-16, though it was actually an Israeli made Kfir.
- ^ "Israeli Plane Shot Down by Surface-to-air Missiles over Lebanon". 21 November 1983.
- ^ "Israelis Bomb Lebanese Sites, Lose One Plane - The Washington Post". The Washington Post.
- ^ Friedman, Thomas L. (21 November 1983). "Israeli Jets Bomb Palestinian Bases in Lebanon Hills". The New York Times.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), pp. 83-84.
- ^ Micah Zenko (13 February 2012). "When America Attacked Syria". Politics, Power, and Preventive Action. Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 5 October 2014.
- ^ Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), p. 28.
- ^ a b c Ed Magnuson, Bombs vs. Missiles, TIME magazine, 12 December 1983.
- ^ a b Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), p. 31.
- ^ a b Ed Magnuson, "Steel and Muscle": The U.S. strikes and the Syrians – and charts a new course with Israel, TIME magazine, 12 December 1983.
- ^ a b Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), p. 48.
- ^ Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), pp. 30-31.
- ^ a b Tom Cooper & Eric L. Palmer (26 September 2003). "Disaster in Lebanon: US and French Operations in 1983". Acig.org. Archived from the original on 7 October 2013. Retrieved 24 August 2013.
- ^ a b "2005". Ejection-history.org.uk. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 24 August 2013.
- ^ a b Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), p. 49.
- ^ Mersky, Crutch and Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91 (2021), pp. 48-49.
- ^ William E. Smith, Dug In and Taking Losses, TIME magazine, 19 December 1983.
- ^ William E. Smith, Familiar Fingerprints, TIME Magazine, 26 December 1983, p. 7.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 84.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 134–135.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 85.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 136.
- ^ William E. Smith, Murder in the University, TIME Magazine, 30 January 1984, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), pp. 85-86.
- ^ Pivetta, Beyrouth 1983, la 3e compagnie du 1er RCP dans l'attentat du Drakkar, Militaria Magazine (2014), p. 44.
- ^ a b c d O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 137.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 86.
- ^ a b c d Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 87.
- ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 113.
- ^ "USS New Jersey (BB 62)". navysite.de. Retrieved 27 May 2005.
- ^ "U.S. warship stirs Lebanese fear of war". Christian Science Monitor. 4 March 2008.
- ^ Glass, Charles (July 2006). "Lebanon Agonistes". CounterPunch. Archived from the original on 5 January 2009. Retrieved 17 October 2009.
- ^ "U.S. Navy Battleships - USS New Jersey (BB 62)". www.navy.mil. Archived from the original on 29 May 2018. Retrieved 30 June 2019.
- ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 78.
- ^ a b c d Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 223.
- ^ a b Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 88.
- TIME Magazine. Archived from the originalon 29 October 2010.
- ^ Micheletti and Debay, La 10e Brigade Heliportée, RAIDS magazine (1989), p. 21 (box).
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), pp. 88-89.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 137-138.
- ^ "Civilians Leaving: Shiite and Druse Leaders Call for a Cease-Fire — Marine Wounded", The New York Times, 8 February 1984, p. Al.
- ^ Nerguizian, Cordesman & Burke, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (2009), pp. 56-57.
- ^ Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 212.
- ^ a b O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 139.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 139-140.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), pp. 89-90.
- ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 140.
- ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 90.
- ^ Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Meib, May 2003, archived from the original (dossier) on 11 June 2003
References
- Aïda Kanafani-Zahar, «La réconciliation des druzes et des chrétiens du Mont Liban ou le retour à un code coutumier», Critique internationale, n23 (2004), pp. 55–75. (in French)
- Afaf Sabeh McGowan, John Roberts, As'ad Abu Khalil, and Robert Scott Mason, Lebanon: a country study, area handbook series, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA Pam 550-24), Washington D.C. 1989. - [1]
- Alain Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban: Du coup d'état de Béchir Gémayel aux massacres des camps palestiniens, Albin Michel, Paris 2004. ISBN 978-2-226-12127-1 (in French)
- Aram Nerguizian, Anthony H. Cordesman & Arleigh A. Burke, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), First Working Draft: 10 February 2009. – [2]
- Bassel Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991, Éditions Dergham, Jdeideh (Beirut) 2019. ISBN 978-614-459-033-1
- ISBN 0-333-72975-7
- Éric Micheletti and Yves Debay, Liban – dix jours aux cœur des combats, RAIDS magazine No.41, October 1989, Histoire & Collections, Paris. )
- Ghassan Tueni, Une guerre pour les autres, Éditions JC Lattès, 1985. ISBN 978-2-7096-0375-1 (in French)
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- John C. Rolland (ed.), Lebanon: Current Issues and Background, Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, New York 2003. ISBN 978-1-59033-871-1 – [4]
- John Laffin, The War of Desperation: Lebanon 1982-85, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1985. ISBN 0-85045-603-7
- Joseph A. Kechichian, The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s, Conflict Quarterly, Winter 1985.
- Joseph Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985), Lulu.com, Beyrouth 2012.
- Ken Guest, Lebanon, in Flashpoint! At the Front Line of Today's Wars, Arms and Armour Press, London 1994, pp. 97–111. ISBN 1-85409-247-2
- Lee E. Russel and Andy Carroll, The US Marine Corps since 1945, Elite series 2, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1984. ISBN 0-85045-574-X
- Matthew Hinson, Crimes on Sacred Ground: Massacres, Desecration, and Iconoclasm in Lebanon's Mountain War 1983-1984, Honors Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Georgetown University, 8 May 2017. – [6]
- Matthew S. Gordon, The Gemayels (World Leaders Past & Present), Chelsea House Publishers, 1988. ISBN 1-55546-834-9
- Makram Rabah, Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory, Alternative Histories, Edinburgh University Press, 2020 (1st edition). ISBN 978-1-4744-7417-7
- El-Assad, Moustafa (2008). Civil Wars Volume 1: The Gun Trucks. Sidon: Blue Steel books. ISBN 978-9953-0-1256-8.
- Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society, State University of New York Press, Albany 2009. ISBN 978-0-7914-9345-8 – [7]
- Patrice Pivetta, Beyrouth 1983, la 3e compagnie du 1er RCP dans l'attentat du Drakkar, Militaria Magazine No. 342, January 2014, Histoire & Collections, Paris, pp. 34–45. )
- Peter B. Mersky with Mike Crutch and Tony Holmes, A-7 Corsair II Units 1975-91, Combat aircraft series 135, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford 2021. ISBN 978-1-4728-4063-9
- Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: the PLO in Lebanon, Boulder: Westview Press, Oxford 1990. ISBN 0-86187-123-5 – [8]
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- Samer Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon, Beirut: Elite Group, 2003. ISBN 9953-0-0705-5
- Samer Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon 1975-1981, Trebia Publishing, Chyah 2012. ISBN 978-9953-0-2372-4
- Samer Kassis, Les TIRAN 4 et 5, de Tsahal aux Milices Chrétiennes (1960-1990), Trucks & Tanks Magazine No.50, July–August 2015, pp. 54–61. )
- Samuel M. Katz, Lee E. Russel, and Ron Volstad, Armies in Lebanon 1982-84, Men-at-Arms series 165, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1985. ISBN 0-85045-602-9
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- Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, Anchor Books, New York 1990. ISBN 978-0-385-41372-5
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- Sex, Zachary; Abi-Chahine, Bassel (2021). Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond. Modern Conflicts Profile Guide. Vol. II. AK Interactive. EAN 8435568306073.
Further reading
- Ammoun, Denise (2005). Histoire du Liban contemporain: Tome 2 1943-1990 (in French). Paris: Éditions Fayard. ISBN 978-2-213-61521-9.
- Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon: Second Edition, Pluto Press, London 2012. ISBN 978-0-7453-3274-1
- Paul Andary, War of the Mountain: Israelis, Christians and Druze in the 1983 Mount Lebanon Conflict Through the Eyes of a Lebanese Forces Fighter, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2012. ISBN 978-1-4635-5637-2
- ISBN 978-0-8014-9313-3
- Jean Sarkis, Histoire de la guerre du Liban, Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, Paris 1993. ISBN 978-2-13-045801-2 (in French)
- Jonathan Randall, The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and American Bunglers, Just World Books, Charlottesville, Virginia 2012. ISBN 978-1-935982-16-6
- Samir Kassir, La Guerre du Liban: De la dissension nationale au conflit régional, Éditions Karthala/CERMOC, Paris 1994. ISBN 978-2-86537-499-1 (in French)
- William W. Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions, Princeton Series on the Middle East, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton 1997. ISBN 978-1-55876-115-5