British contribution to the Manhattan Project
Britain initiated the first research project to design an
Following the discovery of
In August 1943, the
Cooperation ended with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, known as the McMahon Act, and Ernest Titterton, the last British government employee, left Los Alamos on 12 April 1947. Britain then proceeded with High Explosive Research, its own nuclear weapons programme, and became the third country to test an independently developed nuclear weapon in October 1952.
Background
The 1938
Even at such long odds, the danger was sufficiently great to be taken seriously. Thomson, at
Oliphant took the Frisch–Peierls memorandum to Tizard, and the MAUD Committee was established to investigate further.[10] It directed an intensive research effort, and in July 1941, produced two comprehensive reports that reached the conclusion that an atomic bomb was not only technically feasible, but could be produced before the war ended, perhaps in as little as two years. The Committee unanimously recommended pursuing the development of an atomic bomb as a matter of urgency, although it recognised that the resources required might be beyond those available to Britain.[11][12] A new directorate known as Tube Alloys was created to coordinate this effort. Sir John Anderson, the Lord President of the Council, became the minister responsible, and Wallace Akers from Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) was appointed the director of Tube Alloys.[13]
Contribution
Early Anglo-American cooperation
In July 1940, Britain had offered to give the United States access to its scientific research,
The British and Americans exchanged nuclear information, but did not initially combine their efforts. British officials did not reply to an August 1941 offer by Bush and Conant to create a combined British and American project.
Yet the United Kingdom did not have the manpower or resources of the United States, and despite its early and promising start, Tube Alloys fell behind its American counterpart and was dwarfed by it.
By then, the positions of the two countries had reversed from what they were in 1941.
The British considered how they would produce a bomb without American help. A gaseous diffusion plant to produce 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) of
Cooperation resumes
By March 1943 Conant decided that British help would benefit some areas of the project. In particular, the Manhattan Project could benefit enough from assistance from
Churchill took up the matter with Roosevelt at the Washington Conference on 25 May 1943, and Churchill thought that Roosevelt gave the reassurances he sought; but there was no follow-up. Bush, Stimson and William Bundy met Churchill, Cherwell and Anderson at 10 Downing Street in London. None of them was aware that Roosevelt had already made his decision,[31] writing to Bush on 20 July 1943 with instructions to "renew, in an inclusive manner, the full exchange with the British Government regarding Tube Alloys."[32]
Stimson, who had just finished a series of arguments with the British about the need for an
The Quebec Agreement established the
Even before the Quebec Agreement was signed, Akers had already cabled London with instructions that Chadwick, Peierls, Oliphant and Francis Simon should leave immediately for North America. They arrived on 19 August, the day it was signed, expecting to be able to talk to American scientists, but were unable to do so. Two weeks would pass before American officials learnt of the contents of the Quebec Agreement.[39] Over the next two years, the Combined Policy Committee met only eight times.[38]
The first occasion was on 8 September 1943, on the afternoon after Stimson discovered that he was the chairman. The first meeting established a Technical Subcommittee chaired by
There remained the issue of cooperation between the Manhattan's Project's Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago and the Montreal Laboratory. At the Combined Policy Committee meeting on 17 February 1944, Chadwick pressed for resources to build a nuclear reactor at what is now known as the Chalk River Laboratories. Britain and Canada agreed to pay the cost of this project, but the United States had to supply the heavy water. At that time, the United States controlled, by a supply contract, the only major production site on the continent, that of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company at Trail, British Columbia.[44][45] Given that it was unlikely to have any impact on the war, Conant in particular was cool about the proposal, but heavy water reactors were of great interest.[45] Groves was willing to support the effort and supply the heavy water required, but with certain restrictions. The Montreal Laboratory would have access to data from the research reactors at Argonne and the X-10 Graphite Reactor at Oak Ridge, but not from the production reactors at the Hanford Site; nor would they be given any information about plutonium. This arrangement was formally approved by the Combined Policy Committee meeting on 19 September 1944.[46][47] The Canadian ZEEP (Zero Energy Experimental Pile) reactor went critical on 5 September 1945.[48]
Chadwick supported British involvement in the Manhattan Project to the fullest extent, abandoning any hopes of a British project during the war.
The September 1944 Hyde Park Agreement extended both commercial and military cooperation into the post-war period.[51][52] The Quebec Agreement specified that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without mutual consent. On 4 July 1945, Wilson agreed that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan would be recorded as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee.[53][54]
Gaseous diffusion project
Tube Alloys made its greatest advances in gaseous diffusion technology,[55] and Chadwick had originally hoped that the pilot plant at least would be built in Britain.[56] Gaseous diffusion technology was devised by Simon and three expatriates, Nicholas Kurti from Hungary, Heinrich Kuhn from Germany, and Henry Arms from the United States, at the Clarendon Laboratory in 1940.[57] The prototype gaseous diffusion equipment, two two-stage models and two ten-stage models,[58] was manufactured by Metropolitan-Vickers at a cost of £150,000 for the four units.[21] Two single-stage machines were later added. Delays in delivery meant that experiments with the single-stage machine did not commence until June 1943, and with the two-stage machine until August 1943. The two ten-stage machines were delivered in August and November 1943, but by this time the research programme they had been built for had been overtaken by events.[58]
The Quebec Agreement allowed Simon and Peierls to meet with representatives of Kellex, who were designing and building the American gaseous diffusion plant,
The British mission consisting of Akers and fifteen British experts arrived in December 1943. This was a critical time. Severe problems had been encountered with the Norris-Adler barrier. Nickel powder and electro-deposited nickel mesh diffusion barriers were pioneered by American chemist Edward Adler and British interior decorator Edward Norris at the SAM Laboratories. A decision had to be made whether to persevere with it or switch to a powdered nickel barrier based upon British technology that had been developed by Kellex. Up to this point, both were under development. The SAM Laboratory had 700 people working on gaseous diffusion and Kellex had about 900. The British experts conducted a thorough review, and agreed that the Kellex barrier was superior, but felt that it would be unlikely to be ready in time. Kellex's technical director, Percival C. Keith,[59] disagreed, arguing that his company could get it ready and produce it more quickly than the Norris-Adler barrier. Groves listened to the British experts before he formally adopted the Kellex barrier on 5 January 1944.[60][55]
The United States Army assumed responsibility for procuring sufficient quantities of the right type of powdered nickel.
The Americans planned to have the K-25 plant in full production by June or July 1945. Having taken two years to get the prototype stages working, the British experts regarded this as incredibly optimistic, and felt that, barring a miracle, it would be unlikely to reach that point before the end of 1946. This opinion offended their American counterparts and dampened the enthusiasm for cooperation, and the British mission returned to the United Kingdom in January 1944. Armed with the British Mission's report, Chadwick and Oliphant were able to persuade Groves to reduce K-25's enrichment target; the output of K-25 would be enriched to weapons grade by being fed into the electromagnetic plant. Despite the British Mission's pessimistic forecasts, K-25 was producing enriched uranium in June 1945.[55]
After the rest of the mission departed, Peierls, Kurti and Fuchs remained in New York, where they worked with Kellex. They were joined there by
Electromagnetic project
On 26 May 1943, Oliphant wrote to Appleton to say that he had been considering the problem of electromagnetic isotope separation, and believed that he had devised a better method than Lawrence's, one which would result in a five to tenfold improvement in efficiency, and make it more practical to use the process in Britain. His proposal was reviewed by Akers, Chadwick, Peierls and Simon, who agreed that it was sound. While the majority of scientific opinion in Britain favoured the gaseous diffusion method, there was still a possibility that electromagnetic separation might be useful as a final stage in the enrichment process, taking uranium that had already been enriched to 50 per cent by the gaseous process, and enriching it to pure uranium-235. Accordingly, Oliphant was released from the radar project to work on Tube Alloys, conducting experiments on his method at the University of Birmingham.[62][63]
Oliphant met Groves and Oppenheimer in Washington, D.C., on 18 September 1943, and they attempted to persuade him to join the Los Alamos Laboratory, but Oliphant felt that he would be of more use assisting Lawrence on the electromagnetic project.
Members of the British mission occupied several key positions in the electromagnetic project. Oliphant became Lawrence's de facto deputy, and was in charge of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory when Lawrence was absent.
Los Alamos Laboratory
When cooperation resumed in September 1943, Groves and Oppenheimer revealed the existence of the Los Alamos Laboratory to Chadwick, Peierls and Oliphant. Oppenheimer wanted all three to proceed to Los Alamos as soon as possible, but it was decided that Oliphant would go to Berkeley to work on the electromagnetic process and Peierls would go to New York to work on the gaseous diffusion process.[77] The task then fell to Chadwick. The original idea, favoured by Groves, was that the British scientists would work as a group under Chadwick, who would farm out work to them. This was soon discarded in favour of having the British Mission fully integrated into the laboratory. They worked in most of its divisions, only being excluded from plutonium chemistry and metallurgy.[78]
First to arrive was Otto Frisch and Ernest Titterton and his wife Peggy, who reached Los Alamos on 13 December 1943. At Los Alamos Frisch continued his work on critical mass studies, for which Titterton developed electronic circuitry for high voltage generators, X-ray generators, timers and firing circuits.[61] Peggy Titterton, a trained physics and metallurgy laboratory assistant, was one of the few women working at Los Alamos in a technical role.[79] Chadwick arrived on 12 January 1944,[61] but only stayed for a few months before returning to Washington, D.C.[80]
When Oppenheimer appointed
Nuclear physicists knew about fission, but not the hydrodynamics of conventional explosions. As a result, there were two additions to the team that made significant contributions in this area of physics. First was
William Penney worked on means to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion, and wrote a paper on what height the bombs should be detonated at for maximum effect in attacks on Germany and Japan.
Bethe declared that:
For the work of the theoretical division of the Los Alamos Project during the war the collaboration of the British Mission was absolutely essential ... It is very difficult to say what would have happened under different conditions. However, at least, the work of the Theoretical Division would have been very much more difficult and very much less effective without the members of the British Mission, and it is not unlikely that our final weapon would have been considerably less efficient in this case.[97]
From December 1945 on, members of the British Mission began returning home. Peierls left in January 1946. At the request of Norris Bradbury, who had replaced Oppenheimer as laboratory director, Fuchs remained until 15 June 1946. Eight British scientists, three from Los Alamos and five from the United Kingdom, participated in Operation Crossroads, the nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, known as the McMahon Act, all British government employees had to leave. Titterton was granted a special dispensation, and remained until 12 April 1947. The British Mission ended when he departed.[98] Carson Mark remained, as he was a Canadian government employee.[99] He remained at Los Alamos, becoming head of its Theoretical Division in 1947, a position he held until he retired in 1973.[100] He became a United States citizen in the 1950s.[101]
Feed materials
The Combined Development Trust was proposed by the Combined Policy Committee on 17 February 1944. The
The role of the Combined Development Trust was to purchase or control the mineral resources needed by the Manhattan Project, and to avoid competition between the three. Britain had little need for uranium ores while the war continued, but was anxious to secure adequate supplies for its own nuclear weapons programme when it ended. Half the funding was to come from the United States and half from Britain and Canada. The initial $12.5 million was transferred to Groves from an account in the office of the United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., that was not subject to the usual accounting auditing and oversight. By the time Groves resigned from the Trust at the end of 1947, he had deposited $37.5 million into an account he controlled at the Bankers Trust. Payments were then made from this account.[105]
Britain took the lead in negotiations to reopen the
Intelligence
In December 1943, Groves sent
At the urging of Groves and Furman, the
Results
Groves appreciated the early British atomic research and the British scientists' contributions to the Manhattan Project, but stated that the United States would have succeeded without them. He considered British assistance "helpful but not vital", but acknowledged that "without active and continuing British interest, there probably would have been no atomic bomb to drop on Hiroshima."[121] He considered Britain's key contributions to have been encouragement and support at the intergovernmental level, scientific aid, the production of powdered nickel in Wales, and preliminary studies and laboratory work.[122]
Cooperation did not long survive the war. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, and the Hyde Park Agreement was not binding on subsequent administrations.
Harry S. Truman (who had succeeded Roosevelt), Clement Attlee (who had replaced Churchill as prime minister in July 1945), Anderson and United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes conferred while on a boat cruise on the Potomac River, and agreed to revise the Quebec Agreement. On 15 November 1945, Groves, Robert P. Patterson and George L. Harrison met a British delegation consisting of Anderson, Wilson, Malcolm MacDonald, Roger Makins and Denis Rickett to draw up a communiqué. They agreed to retain the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust. The Quebec Agreement's requirement for "mutual consent" before using nuclear weapons was replaced with one for "prior consultation", and there was to be "full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy", but in the longer Memorandum of Intention, signed by Groves and Anderson, this was only "in the field of basic scientific research". Patterson took the communiqué to the White House, where Truman and Attlee signed it on 16 November 1945.[127]
The next meeting of the Combined Policy Committee on 15 April 1946 produced no accord on collaboration, and resulted in an exchange of cables between Truman and Attlee. Truman cabled on 20 April that he did not see the communiqué he had signed as obligating the United States to assist Britain in designing, constructing and operating an atomic energy plant.[128] Attlee's response on 6 June 1946[129] "did not mince words nor conceal his displeasure behind the nuances of diplomatic language."[128] At issue was not just technical cooperation, which was fast disappearing, but the allocation of uranium ore. During the war this was of little concern, as Britain had not needed any ore, so all the production of the Congo mines and all the ore seized by the Alsos Mission had gone to the United States, but now it was also required by the British atomic project. Chadwick and Groves reached an agreement by which ore would be shared equally.[130]
The
As the
British wartime participation in the Manhattan Project provided a substantial body of expertise that was crucial to the success of
Notes
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 1–2.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 23–29.
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 34–35.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 37–39.
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 3–5.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 39–41.
- Frisch, Otto (March 1940). Frisch-Peierls Memorandum, March 1940. atomicarchive.com (Report). Retrieved 2 January 2015.
- ISSN 0002-9505.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 39–40.
- ^ a b Phelps 2010, pp. 282–283.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 42.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 108–111.
- ^ Phelps 2010, pp. 126–128.
- ^ Rhodes 1986, pp. 372–374.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 45–46.
- ^ Bernstein 1976, pp. 206–207.
- ^ Paul 2000, p. 26.
- ^ Bernstein 1976, pp. 206–208.
- ^ a b Gowing 1964, p. 162.
- ^ a b Bernstein 1976, p. 208.
- ^ Bernstein 1976, p. 209.
- ^ Groves 1962, p. 23.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 150–151.
- ^ a b Bernstein 1976, p. 210.
- ^ Bernstein 1976, p. 212.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 162–165.
- ^ Bernstein 1976, p. 213.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 157.
- ^ a b Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 275–276.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 274.
- ^ Farmelo 2013, p. 229.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 168.
- ^ a b Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 277.
- ^ United States Department of State 1943, pp. 1117–1119.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 296.
- ^ a b Gowing 1964, p. 234.
- ^ a b c Jones 1985, pp. 242–243.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 173.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 280.
- ^ a b Jones 1985, p. 245.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 241.
- ^ Dahl 1999, p. 178.
- ^ Laurence, George C. (May 1980). "Early Years of Nuclear Energy Research in Canada". Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Archived from the originalon 4 January 2015. Retrieved 3 January 2015.
- ^ Jones 1985, pp. 246–247.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 271–275.
- ^ "ZEEP – Canada's First Nuclear Reactor". Canada Science and Technology Museum. Archived from the original on 6 March 2014.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 237.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 242–244.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 340–342.
- ^ United States Department of State 1944a, pp. 492–493.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 372.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 372–373.
- ^ a b c d e f Gowing 1964, pp. 250–256.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 137.
- ^ Clark 1961, pp. 88–89.
- ^ a b Gowing 1964, pp. 220–221.
- ISBN 9780309034821. NAP:14723.
- ^ a b Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 134–137.
- ^ a b c d Szasz 1992, pp. 148–151.
- ^ Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p. 111.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 226–227.
- ^ a b Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, pp. 113–115.
- ^ a b c Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 282.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 128.
- ^ a b c d e Gowing 1964, pp. 256–260.
- ^ ISSN 0035-9173.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 5 January 1944. Retrieved 23 February 2015.
- ^ The members of the mission were M. L. Oliphant, H. S. W. Massey, T. E. Allibone, J. Sayers, S. M. Duke, E. H. S. Burhop, O. Bunemann, H. J. Emeleus, R. H. Dawton, D. F. Stanley, K. J. R. Wilkinson. M. E. Haine, J. P. Keene, M. J. Moore, S. Rowlands, C. S. Watt, R. M. Williams, H. S. Tomlinson, R. R. Nimmo, P.P. Starling, H. Skinner, M. H. F. Wilkins, S. C. Curran, Joan Curran, W. D. Allen, F. Smith, G. Page, H. J. Morris, M. P. Edwards, J. P. Baxter, C. J. Milner, J. D. Craggs, A. G. Jones, H. E. Evans, A. A. Smales. Gowing 1964, p. 258.
- ^ Priestley 2013, pp. 53–54.
- ^ Priestley, Rebecca. "New Zealand scientists on the Manhattan Project". Science & stuff. Archived from the original on 23 December 2014. Retrieved 15 December 2014.
- ^ Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, pp. 117–118.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 301.
- ISSN 1833-7538. Retrieved 31 August 2010.
- ^ "Eric H. S. Burhop interviewed by Hazel de Berg for the Hazel de Berg collection". National Library of Australia. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 260–261.
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 18–19.
- Canberra Times. National Library of Australia. 23 October 1995. p. 2. Retrieved 21 December 2014.
- ^ a b c Hawkins, Truslow & Smith 1961, p. 29.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 20.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 21.
- William Penney, George Placzek, Michael Poole, Joseph Rotblat (Poland), Herold Sheard, Tony Skyrme, Geoffrey Taylor, Ernest Titterton, Peggy Titterton, James L. Tuck and W. L. Webster. Hoddeson et al. 1993, pp. 98–99 and Szasz 1992, pp. 148–151.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 248–249.
- ^ Hawkins, Truslow & Smith 1961, p. 28.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 23.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 24.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 265.
- ^ Gowing 1964, p. 263.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 150.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 89.
- ^ Wellerstein, Alex (8 August 2012). "The Height of the Bomb". Restricted Data. Retrieved 2 January 2015.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 528.
- ^ "Project Alberta/Destination Team roster of personnel". The Manhattan Project Heritage Preservation Association. Archived from the original on 17 October 2013. Retrieved 8 March 2014.
- ^ Laurence, William L. "Eyewitness Account of Atomic Bomb Over Nagasaki". National Science Digital Library. Retrieved 18 March 2013.
- ^ Szasz 1992, p. 64.
- ^ Fakley 1983, p. 189.
- ^ Szasz 1992, pp. 46–49.
- ^ Hawkins, Truslow & Smith 1961, p. 30.
- ^ Hilchey, Tim (9 March 1997). "J. Carson Mark, 83, Physicist In Hydrogen Bomb Work, Dies". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
- ^ "Staff Biographies – J. Carson Mark". Los Alamos National Laboratory. Archived from the original on 16 July 2012. Retrieved 1 October 2014.
- ^ United States Department of State 1944, pp. 1026–1030.
- ^ Jones 1985, pp. 295–299.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 297–303.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 300.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 285–288.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 307–315.
- ^ United States Department of State 1945, pp. 1–98.
- ^ Helmreich 1986, pp. 57–58.
- ^ Forsburg, C. W.; Lewis, L. C. (24 September 1999). Uses For Uranium-233: What Should Be Kept for Future Needs? (PDF) (Report). Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ORNL-6952.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 316–319.
- ^ Groves 1962, p. 194.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 194–196.
- ^ Jones 1978, p. 480.
- ^ Groves 1962, p. 207.
- ^ Pash 1969, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 285.
- ^ Jones 1978, p. 478.
- , pp. 255–256
- ^ Jones 1978, pp. 481–483.
- ^ Groves 1962, p. 408.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 406–407.
- ^ a b Paul 2000, pp. 72–73.
- ^ a b Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 457–458.
- ^ Nichols 1987, p. 177.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 401–402.
- ^ Paul 2000, pp. 80–83.
- ^ a b Paul 2000, p. 88.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 126–130.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 102–104.
- ^ Jones 1985, pp. 576–578.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Farmelo 2013, p. 322.
- ^ Farmelo 2013, p. 326.
- ^ Calder 1953, pp. 303–306.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 245–254.
- ^ a b Young, Ken. "Trust and Suspicion in Anglo-American Security Relations: the Curious Case of John Strachey". History Working Papers Project. Retrieved 2 January 2015.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974, pp. 164–165.
- ^ Gott 1963, pp. 245–247.
- ^ "Public Law 85-479" (PDF). US Government Printing Office. 2 July 1958. Retrieved 12 December 2013.
References
- JSTOR 448105.
- Calder, Ritchie (17 October 1953). "Cost of Atomic Secrecy: Anglo-US Rivalry". ISSN 0027-8378.
- OCLC 824335.
- Cockburn, Stewart; Ellyard, David (1981). Oliphant, the Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant. Adelaide: Axiom Books. ISBN 978-0-9594164-0-4.
- Dahl, Per F. (1999). Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy. Philadelphia: CRC Press. ISBN 978-0-7503-0633-1.
- Fakley, Dennis C. (1983). "The British Mission" (PDF). Los Alamos Science (Winter/Spring): 186–189. ISSN 0273-7116. Retrieved 12 January 2015.
- ISBN 978-0-465-02195-6.
- Gott, Richard (April 1963). "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent". International Affairs. 39 (2): 238–252. JSTOR 2611300.
- OCLC 3195209.
- OCLC 611555258.
- OCLC 537684.
- ISBN 978-0-938228-08-0. Retrieved 20 February 2014.
Originally published as Los Alamos Report LAMS-2532
- Helmreich, Jonathan E. (1986). Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-5824-8.
- OCLC 637004643. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
- OCLC 26764320.
- OCLC 3717534.
- Jones, Vincent (1985). Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 10913875. Archived from the original(PDF) on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 25 August 2013.
- OCLC 15223648.
- OCLC 568716894.
- Paul, Septimus H. (2000). Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. OCLC 43615254.
- Phelps, Stephen (2010). The Tizard Mission: the Top-Secret Operation that Changed the Course of World War II. Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme. OCLC 642846903.
- Priestley, Rebecca (2013). Mad on Radium: New Zealand in the Atomic Age. Auckland: Auckland University Press. OCLC 865508996.
- OCLC 13793436.
- Szasz, Ferenc Morton (1992). British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: the Los Alamos Years. New York: St. Martin's Press. OCLC 23901666.
- United States Department of State (1943). Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 (PDF). Foreign relations of the United States. US Government Printing Office. Retrieved 2 January 2015.
- United States Department of State (1944). Agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium regarding the acquisition and control of uranium (PDF). Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers – General: economic and social matters. Vol. II. US Government Printing Office. pp. 1026–1030. Retrieved 2 January 2015.
- United States Department of State (1944a). Conference at Quebec, 1944 (PDF). Foreign relations of the United States. US Government Printing Office. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
- United States Department of State (1945). Acquisition of materials for use in the development of the atomic bomb; efforts to establish a system of international control of atomic energy (PDF). Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers – General : political and economic matters. Vol. II. US Government Printing Office. Retrieved 2 January 2015.
External links
- "Conant on the Role of the British in the Manhattan Project" (PDF). Nuclear Secrecy. 14 December 1942. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
- "British Group associated with the Manhattan Project (Mark Oliphant Group)". National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved 17 March 2015.
- "Destroyer of Worlds". Archive on 4. 11 July 2015. Retrieved 1 September 2023. Radio programme describing how "Britain invented the bomb and the Americans made it".