Fatimid navy
Fatimid navy | |
---|---|
Abbasid black. Red and yellow banners were associated with the Fatimid caliph's person.[1] | |
Dates of operation | 909–1171 |
Allegiance | Fatimid Caliphate |
Active regions | Mediterranean Sea, Nile, Red Sea |
Ideology | Isma'ilism, Jihad |
Opponents | Byzantine Empire, Abbasid Caliphate, Caliphate of Córdoba, Qarmatians, Republic of Genoa, Republic of Venice |
Battles and wars | Arab–Byzantine wars in Sicily and the Levant, wars of expansion of the Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa, Crusades |
The navy of the
During the first decades after the eventual
Despite it being well funded and equipped, and one of the few standing navies of its time, a combination of technological and geographical factors prohibited the Fatimid navy from being able to secure supremacy at sea, or interdict the Crusaders' maritime lines of communication to Western Europe. The Fatimids retained a sizeable navy almost up to the end of the regime, but most of the fleet, and its great arsenal, went up in flames in the destruction of Fustat in 1169.
Background: the Mediterranean in the early 10th century
Since the mid-7th century, the Mediterranean Sea had become a battleground between the Muslim navies and the
A period of Byzantine supremacy at sea followed the failed sieges of Constantinople and the virtual disappearance of the Muslim navies, until the re-commencement of Muslim raiding activity towards the end of the 8th century, both by the
Historical overview
The
The history of the Fatimid navy follows that of the Fatimid Caliphate itself, and can be roughly divided into two distinctive periods: the first in 909–969, when the dynasty assumed control over Ifriqiya (modern Tunisia) and fought in the Maghreb and Sicily, and the second in 969–1171, after its conquest of Egypt, followed by Palestine, much of Syria and the Hejaz. The latter period can again be divided in two sub-periods, with the arrival of the First Crusade in 1099 as the turning point.[15][16]
Ifriqiyan period (909–969)
Political and strategic context
The Fatimids arrived to power in Ifriqiya. Their missionary activity in the area, begun by
The Fatimids' ideological imperative also coloured their relations with the main non-Muslim power of the Near East, the Byzantine Empire: as Yaacov Lev writes, "Fatimid policy toward Byzantium oscillated between contradicting tendencies; a practical policy of modus vivendi, and the need to appear as champions of the jihād".[21] Inherent limitations were imposed by the weather and available naval technology,[22] so that the early Fatimid conflicts with Byzantium in the region of southern Italy were shaped by geography: Sicily was close to the Fatimids' metropolitan province of Ifriqiya, while conversely for the Byzantines, southern Italy was a remote theatre of operations, where they maintained a minimal naval presence. This gave the Fatimids an advantage in the waging of prolonged naval campaigns, and effectively left the initiative in their hands.[23]
The naval aspect of the war against the Byzantines features prominently in the poems of the celebrated Fatimid court poet
Organization
During the early centuries of Islam, the navies of the caliphates and the autonomous emirates were structured along similar lines. Generally, a fleet (al-usṭūl) was placed under the command of a 'head of the fleet' (rāʾis al-usṭūl) and a number of officers (quwwād, singular qaʿīd'), but the chief professional officer was the 'commander of the sailors' (qaʿīd al-nawātiya), who was in charge of weapons and manoeuvres. Crews comprised sailors (nawātiya, singular nūtī), oarsmen (qadhdhāf), worksmen (dhawu al-ṣināʿa wa'l-mihan), and marines for on-board combat and landing operations, including men charged with deploying incendiary substances (naffāṭūn, 'naphtha men').[29]
During the Ifriqiyan period, the main base and arsenal of the Fatimid navy was the port city of
Apart from Mahdiya, Tripoli also appears as an important naval base,[35] while in Sicily, the capital Palermo was the most important base.[36] Later historians like Ibn Khaldun and al-Maqrizi attribute to al-Mahdi and his successors the construction of vast fleets numbering 600 or even 900 ships, but this is obviously an exaggeration and reflects more the impression subsequent generations retained of Fatimid sea-power than actual reality during the 10th century.[30] In fact, the only references in near-contemporary sources about construction of ships at Mahdiya are in regard to the scarcity of wood, which delayed or even stopped construction, and necessitated the import of timber not only from Sicily, but from as far as India.[37]
The governor of Mahdiya—from 948/9 the post was held by the eunuch chamberlain and chief administrator Jawdhar—seems to have also entailed the supervision of the arsenal and naval affairs in general. A certain Husayn ibn Ya'qub is called ṣāḥib al-baḥr ('lord of the sea') and mutawallī al-baḥr ('supervisor of the sea') in the sources, but his exact role is unclear. He was clearly a subordinate of Jawdhar, but despite his title does not appear to have actively commanded the fleet, and his tasks were probably more related with administration or ship construction. Given the focus of Fatimid naval activities against the Byzantines in southern Italy, actual command of the fleet was apparently in the hands of the governor of Sicily.[38]
The structure of the navy in the lower ranks is equally obscure. Based on the breakdown of the prisoners captured off Rosetta in 920, the crews appear to have been recruited in Sicily and the ports of Tripoli and
Early actions
The exact origin of the first Fatimid fleet is unknown, but it is likely that the victorious Fatimids merely seized what Aghlabid ships they could find.
Attempts to conquer Egypt
The first major overseas expedition of the Fatimid navy was during the
Although a peace agreement in exchange for annual tribute had been concluded the previous year,
Expeditions in southern Italy and the revolt of Abu Yazid
Thwarted in Egypt, the Fatimids remained active in the Western Mediterranean. In 922/3, an expedition of 20 ships under Mas'ud al-Fati took the fortress of St. Agatha near Rhegion, while in spring 925 a large army under Ja'far ibn Ubayd, which had been ferried over to Sicily the previous year, raided Bruzzano near Reggio, before sailing on to sack Oria in Apulia. Over 11,000 prisoners were made, and the local Byzantine commander and bishop surrendered as hostages in exchange for the payment of tribute. In September, the chamberlain returned in triumph to Mahdiya on 3 September 915.[52][48] In 924, the Fatimids also entered into contact with envoys of the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon. Simeon, who was considering attacking Constantinople itself, sought Fatimid naval assistance. Informed of the negotiations after capturing a ship carrying the returning Bulgarian and Arab envoys to Simeon, the Byzantines hastened to renew the 917 peace agreement, including the payment of tribute.[48][53]
Warfare with the Byzantines resumed in 928. In May of that year, the governor of Kairouan, Sabir al-Fata, led a fleet of 44 ships sent from Ifriqiya to Sicily.[48][53] The Fatimids attacked a locality named al-Ghiran ('the caves') in Apulia, and proceeded to sack the cities of Taranto and Otranto.[48][53] The outbreak of a disease forced them to return to Sicily, but then Sabir led his fleet up the Tyrrhenian Sea, forcing Salerno and Naples to ransom themselves with money and precious brocades.[53][54] In 929, with four ships, he defeated the local Byzantine stratēgos in the Adriatic, although the latter had seven ships under his command, and sacked Termoli.[54][55] He returned to Mahdiya on 5 September 930, laden with 18,000 prisoners.[56] Although the Fatimids planned a new and larger naval offensive against the Byzantines in Italy, another truce was concluded in 931/2, which was adhered to for several years, despite the Byzantines' intervention on the side of an anti-Fatimid uprising in Sicily in 936/7.[54][56] In 934–935, Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Tamimi led another raid, reportedly of 30 vessels, into Italian waters. Genoa was sacked, while Sardinia and Corsica were raided.[54]
In 943–947, Fatimid rule was threatened by the revolt of Abu Yazid, which at times came close to overthrowing the dynasty. The absence of a rebel fleet meant that the Fatimid navy played a limited, but crucial, role in ferrying supplies into Mahdiya when it was besieged by the rebels.[57][58] Taking advantage of the turmoil, pirates took over the town of Susa, and allied themselves with the rebels. The first Fatimid attempt to retake it in 945/6 involved troops borne by a squadron of seven ships, but failed; a second attempt shortly after, with a fleet of six ships under the command of Ya'qub al-Tamimi and co-ordinated with a landward assault, was successful in retaking the town.[59]
In the meantime, another uprising against Fatimid rule erupted in Sicily, as the local governor was judged to be to weak towards the Byzantines, allowing the latter to stop paying the agreed-upon tribute in exchange for the truce.
Conflict with the Umayyads and final conquest of Sicily
In 955, relations between the Fatimids and the Umayyads, long tense and hostile, boiled over when a Fatimid courier boat sailing from Sicily to Mahdiya was intercepted by an Andalusian merchant ship. Fearing that it would alert Fatimid privateers, the Andalusians not only removed its rudder, but took along the case containing the dispatches it carried. In retaliation, the new Fatimid caliph
Fatimid sources report that the Umayyads proposed joint action with Byzantium, but although an expeditionary force under
The truce with the Byzantine Empire held despite the
While the Byzantines were concentrating their energies in the east, by 958, the Fatimid general
Egyptian period (969–1171)
Egypt had been the base of a significant navy already in the early Muslim period, mostly manned by native Christian Egyptians (Copts), as the Arabs themselves had little taste for the sea.[80] An Egyptian fleet is attested as late as 736 in an (unsuccessful) attack on Byzantine territory,[81] but after the resurgence of the Byzantine fleet following the disastrous Second Arab Siege of Constantinople, the crushing defeat of the Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Keramaia in 746, and the turmoil of the Abbasid Revolution, a period of neglect began.[82] A concerted effort to re-establish a credible naval force began only following the sack of Damietta in 853 by a Byzantine fleet, which jolted the Abbasid authorities into action. The 15th-century historian al-Maqrizi claims that the Egyptian fleet experienced a renaissance that made it into an effective fighting force, but modern scholarly judgments of the service record of the Egyptian navy under the Tulunids (868–905) are more cautious, and it is commonly held that Egypt boasted again of a powerful naval establishment only after the Fatimids took over the country.[83][84]
Political and strategic context
Until the mid-11th century: Byzantium and regional struggles
During the early Egyptian period of the Fatimid Caliphate, the main external enemy, as in the Ifriqiyan period, remained the Byzantine Empire.
Basing their legitimization on their championing of the fight against the infidels, the Fatimids exploited this fervour for their own purposes, but their first attempt to evict the Byzantines from Antioch was
In the context of these campaigns against Byzantium, the naval element played a relatively limited role, with occasional expeditions followed by long intervals of inactivity. This was the result of both the resurgence in Byzantine military might during the middle of the 10th century, as well as the new geographic circumstances in which the Fatimid navy operated: unlike Ifriqiya and Sicily, Egypt was separated from the nearest Byzantine shores by long stretches of open sea.[85] The main naval preoccupation of the Fatimids was securing control of the coastal towns of Palestine and Syria—Ascalon, Jaffa, Acre, Sidon, Tyre, Beirut, and Tripoli—on which Fatimid rule in the region largely depended, given the insecurity of the overland routes due to the constant revolts and depredations of the Bedouin tribes.[94][95] While the towns of the northern Syrian coast were in Byzantine hands, the Fatimids were generally successful in preserving their control over the remainder, both against Byzantine attacks as well as against attempts by local Syrian warlords to break away from Fatimid control.[96]
After peaceful relations with the Byzantines were established at the turn of the 11th century, the Fatimid navy appears to have atrophied, its place perhaps being taken by the pirates of Barqa, with whom the Fatimids maintained good relations until c. 1051/2.
Late 11th century to the end of the Fatimid state: the era of the Crusades
From the second third of the 11th century, the Fatimid dynasty and state began to decline.[97] During the long reign of al-Mustansir Billah (r. 1036–1094), political instability combined with military uprisings to almost unseat the dynasty; only the establishment of a quasi-dictatorial regime under the vizier Badr al-Jamali saved the Fatimid regime, at the cost of the caliph handing over his powers to his viziers.[99]
By the 1070s, the internal problems and the arrival of the Seljuks in the Levant led to a collapse of Fatimid power in Syria. Only the coastal towns of Ascalon, Acre, Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut remained in Fatimid hands.[100] It was precisely from these holdings that Badr tried to defend, and which formed the power base that allowed him to seize power in Cairo.[101] As Badr's attempts to recover inland Syria failed,[100] the Fatimids now found themselves separated from their old opponent, the Byzantine Empire, by the domains of the Seljuks. This altered strategic situation would once again be upended entirely with the arrival of the First Crusade in 1098.[102][103]
At that time, the Fatimids remained able to field a sizeable, well-funded, and well-organized navy.
While the Crusader states of the Levant themselves lacked a navy and were dependent on the naval assistance of the Byzantines or the Italian maritime republics, with whom relations were often strained,[106] several factors combined to limit the Fatimid navy's effectiveness against the Crusaders. Thus the Fatimids were confronted not by one, but several Christian naval powers, from Byzantium to the Italian maritime republics and the kingdoms of Western Europe. By itself, Egypt lacked the material means and manpower to support a standing navy large enough to overcome them, forcing the Fatimids to operate from a position of numerical inferiority.[107][108] Historian William Hamblin points out that even if the Fatimids defeated one fleet in one year, they could "find themselves facing an equally powerful Venetian, Norse, or Byzantine fleet the next year", while "a naval defeat for the Fatimids represented a major loss which might take several years and great expenditure to replace".[109] Yaacov Lev also stresses that both Byzantine and Muslim naval tactics of the period urged caution, and that, as modern scholarship recognizes, "galley fleets could not achieve naval supremacy and control of the sea in the modern sense".[110] The operational radius of the Egypt-based Fatimid fleets was also limited by the supplies they could carry on board—especially water (see below)—and the navigation patterns in the Mediterranean, which meant that they were never able to strike back at the Christian naval powers in their home waters or successfully interdict the shipping lanes leading to the Levant.[111]
Furthermore, Fatimid naval strategy during the Crusades relied on the control of the coastal cities of the Levant, but these were vulnerable to assault from their hinterland, which the Crusaders controlled. Not only were the limited resources the Fatimids had at hand in Palestine necessarily split up among these cities, thus diminishing their effectiveness, but the bulk of the Fatimid navy, which was based in Egypt, was hard-pressed to respond effectively and on time to any threat. According to Hamblin, it took on the average two months from the onset of a siege against one of the coastal cities until the Fatimids were informed, mobilized their navy and army, and the latter arrived at Ascalon ready for action. By that point, Hamblin points out, "most sieges were either successfully completed or abandoned". Each loss of a city thus strengthened the Crusaders while weakening the Fatimids. A further drawback was the fact that the prevailing winds in the region were to the south, and could cause significant delays for any Egyptian fleet sent to Palestine.[112]
The Fatimid navy remained in existence until it was destroyed at its arsenal in November 1168, when the vizier Shawar set fire to Fustat to prevent its fall to the Crusaders under Amalric of Jerusalem. Although a few ships may have survived, Egypt appears to have remained effectively without a fleet thereafter, as Saladin was forced to re-establish it from scratch in c. 1176/7.[113][114]
Organization
Already before the Fatimid takeover, the main arsenal and naval base in Egypt was at the inland capital of Fustat, specifically at the island of Jazira, located between Fustat and
Al-Qalqashandi also records that the Fatimid fleet at the time of the Crusades consisted of 75 galleys and 10 large transports,[123] while various modern estimates have placed the Fatimid navy's strength at 75–100 galleys and 20 transports of the hammalat and musattahat types.[115] As William Hamblin points out, however, these numbers represent a theoretical establishment size, whereas in reality, the Fatimid fleet probably never reached this size due to losses in battle and storms, or the lack of crews and maintenance. On the other hand, the Fatimids had easy access to a large number of merchant vessels that could be commandeered as transports. Thus although Fatimid fleets of over 70 ships are attested in the sources during the 12th century, only a third of them were warships, with the rest transports.[123] Hamblin estimates that of the nominal strength of 75 warships, 15 to 25 were probably stationed at the Palestinian port cities, with 45 to 55 warships left in Egypt, although of course the exact distribution could change depending on the circumstances.[121] On the other hand, during the conflicts with the Byzantines in the late 10th century, the sources do not report any permanent presence of Fatimid ships in the Levantine ports, suggesting that it operated solely from Egypt.[124]
Although not many details are known, the Fatimid-era Egyptian navy seems to have been well organized. The overall responsibility for the navy lay with the ʾamīr al-baḥr ('commander of the sea'), a rather elevated office in the hierarchy, with the administration entrusted to a special department (dīwān), characteristically named the dīwān al-jihād. The navy was funded by revenue from special estates set aside for the purpose. The total manpower reached some 5,000 men, divided into a system of naval ranks analogous to that of the army, with pay scales of two, five, ten, fifteen, and twenty gold dinars a month. In addition, the Fatimid fleet had a standing force of marine infantry for shipborne combat.[121] The fleet seems to have been well trained, at least if the reports of elaborate fleet reviews in which manoeuvres and wargames were displayed for the Caliph are an indication. There is also evidence of the study of naval tactics on a theoretical basis, and portions of naval manuals, analogous to their better-known Byzantine counterparts, have survived.[121] On the other hand, if the numbers reported by al-Qalqashandi come close to reality, and given the manpower needs of a galley, 5,000 men were insufficient to crew the larger fleets reported in the sources. This means that in times of mobilization, wide-scale impressment of civilian sailors took place—as is indeed indicated by some sources—which probably diminished the cohesion and effectiveness of the navy somewhat.[125] In addition, Fatimid naval strength was hampered by the limitations of Egypt itself: a small coast with a relatively small seafaring population, and the lack of adequate lumber for shipbuilding due to the country's progressive deforestation, which was essentially complete by the 13th century. This placed a greater reliance on the woods of the Levant, especially Mount Lebanon, but access to these was lost with the onset of the Crusades.[108]
Conquest of Egypt and first forays into the Levant
The Fatimid conquest of Egypt was swift: by June 969, the Fatimid army under Jawhar al-Siqilli stood before Fustat, and after the Ikhshidid troops failed in a last-ditch effort to stop the Fatimids, the city, and Egypt with it, surrendered.[126][127] There is no mention of the navy's activity, or even presence, during the conquest.[128] In the spring of 970, the Fatimids under Ja'far ibn Fallah invaded Palestine as well, and defeated the Ikhshidid remnants under al-Hasan ibn Ubayd Allah ibn Tughj.[129]
The first mention of Fatimid naval activity in the Eastern Mediterranean after the takeover of Egypt comes in the second half of 971, when a squadron of 15 ships tried to rescue a Fatimid force besieged in Jaffa. The attempt failed, as thirteen of the ships were sunk by what the sources record as a Qarmatian navy, and the rest were captured by the Byzantines.[128] Shortly after, in June/July 972, thirty Fatimid ships arrived from Ifriqiya and raided up the Syrian coast.[128] At about the same time, the Fatimid fleet escorted al-Mu'izz to Egypt.[128] In mid-September 973, while the Fatimid fleet was being inspected by al-Mu'izz at Cairo, a Qarmatian fleet attacked Tinnis, but lost seven ships and 500 men; the prisoners and the heads of those killed were paraded in Cairo.[128][130]
Conflict with the Byzantines in the Levant
Information about the activities of the Fatimid navy for the next few decades is sparse, but by and large the navy appears to have been inactive, except for brief campaigns during periods of conflict with the Byzantines in Syria.[85] This was the case during the 992–995 clashes over mastery over the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo. Thus, aside from ferrying supplies to the troops of the Fatimid commander Manjutakin, the Fatimid fleet was mobilized to oppose a Byzantine fleet that appeared before Alexandria in May/June 993, leading to a battle in which the Fatimids captured 70 prisoners, while in the next year, the Fatimids launched a naval raid that returned in June/July with 100 prisoners.[85]
Following the defeat of Manjutakin before Aleppo in 995, Caliph
A naval raid shortly after, in summer 996, returned with 220 prisoners, but a fleet of 24 ships sent to the aid of Manjutakin's troops, who were besieging
Defence of the coastal cities of the Levant against the Crusaders
During the Siege of Jerusalem by the First Crusade, the Fatimid fleet was active in support of the land army, blockading the small Genoese squadron at Jaffa.[138] It then supported the land army at the Battle of Ascalon.[139]
Despite his defeat at Ascalon, the Fatimid vizier, al-Afdal, remained an active opponent of the Crusaders. Every year until 1105 he launched his forces in campaigns into Palestine, and instituted reforms to strengthen Egypt's military might.[140][141] The actual effect of these reforms, however, appears to have been negligible.[142] Thus in September 1101, the Fatimid fleet participated in the siege of Jaffa.[143] In the next year, the Crusaders received substantial reinforcements by sea, with the sources putting them from 40 up to 200 vessels; many were lost, however, to storms and to the activity of Fatimid privateers.[143]
In 1102, al-Afdal sent a combined land and naval expedition under his son,
In the next year, however, when a large Genoese fleet arrived to reinforce the siege of Acre, the Fatimids made no further attempt to break the blockade, leading to the city's capitulation.[143][106] The Fatimids again launched an attack on Jaffa in 1105, but the fleet left for Tyre and Sidon after the land army was defeated, and was caught up in a storm that washed 25 ships ashore and sunk others.[143] In 1106 and again in 1108, the Crusaders launched attacks on Sidon. In the latter attempt, the Fatimid fleet managed to defeat the Italian warships supporting the Crusaders. Coupled with the arrival of Damascene troops, the Fatimid victory led to the failure of the siege.[143][145]
When the Crusaders launched their final attack on Tripoli in 1109, however, the Fatimid fleet was delayed both due to timidity—possibly due to the presence of a strong Genoese fleet—and contrary winds, so that it arrived only eight days after the city had fallen. The supplies were offloaded among the other coastal cities still in Fatimid hands, and the fleet returned to Egypt in the same summer.[143][145] In 1110, the Crusaders attacked Beirut. 19 Fatimid ships manage to break through to Beirut, defeating and capturing some of the Christian vessels blockading it, but the arrival of a Genoese fleet bottled them up inside the harbour, forcing their crews to fight alongside the inhabitants on the ramparts until the city fell.[143][145] In the same autumn, the Crusaders besieged Sidon with the aid of a newly arrived Norwegian fleet of 55–60 ships. The presence of this strong fleet, the losses suffered at Beirut, as well as the lateness of the season and the risks of sailing in winter, forced the Fatimid navy, although anchored at nearby Tyre, not try to assist the beleaguered city, which fell on 4 December.[143][146] Not only that, but due to the inability of the Fatimids to provide a naval escort, many Muslim merchant ships were captured by Christian warships off the Egyptian coast at Tanis and Damietta in the same summer.[143][147]
The Fatimid fleet was once again active in 1112, when it brought provisions and grain to Tyre for the garrison and the populace, which, although a Fatimid possession, was actually held by the Turkish ruler of Damascus. Arriving in mid-July, the fleet returned to Egypt in September.[148][149] In 1115, while King Baldwin I of Jerusalem was campaigning in northern Syria, the Fatimids again launched a failed attempt to capture Jaffa, mobilizing some 70 vessels.[150][151] The navy was mobilized in 1118 in support of the land army, but the latter remained inactive. Although the fleet sailed to Tyre and Ascalon, no naval engagements are known.[150][151] In 1122, the Fatimids recovered control of Tyre, where the Turkish governor's tyrannical rule had aroused the opposition of the populace: a Fatimid fleet arrived in the city and took the governor prisoner to Egypt, while replenishing the city's grain supplies. While a successful action, it also meant the rupture of relations with Damascus.[152]
In early 1123, the Fatimids launched another attack on Jaffa, an operation which according to Yaacov Lev provides a textbook example of the ineffectiveness of the Fatimid military in this period. A sizeable army was raised and splendidly equipped, and was accompanied by a fleet of 80 vessels, which carried siege equipment and troops. At the same time, another squadron was conducting raids against Christian Shipping. Jaffa was besieged for five days, but then the Crusader army arrived and the siege had to be abandoned. The Fatimid land army was then defeated at the Battle of Yibneh leaving the Fatimid fleet to sail off towards Ascalon. At about the same time, in late May, a large Venetian fleet of 200 vessels arrived in the Holy Land, and proceeded to pursue the Fatimid fleet. Caught off guard near shallow water on 30 May 1123, the Fatimids suffered heavy losses, with many ships being captured.[150][153][154] The Muslim chroniclers do not report on this battle, instead focusing on the repulsion of a Byzantine–Venetian attack on Alexandria, and the return of a fleet from a raid with three captured vessels.[155] The Venetians followed up their victory by helping the Crusaders to besiege Tyre, which fell after five months in July 1124. The Fatimids failed to send any help whatsoever to the town.[150][156] In 1125, a large fleet of 22–24 warships and 53 other vessels was sent forth to raid the shores of the Levant and Cyprus. Not only did it fail to engage any significant targets, it also lost part of its crews when they landed to find water.[150][156]
After these debacles, the Fatimids abstained from any action against the Crusader
When the Crusaders under King Amalric of Jerusalem
Ancient and medieval naval operations faced severe constraints, compared to modern navies, as the result of the technological limitations inherent in galley-based fleets. Galleys did not handle well in rough waters and could be swamped by waves, which would be catastrophic in the open sea; history is replete with instances where galley fleets were sunk by bad weather (e.g. the Roman losses during the
Medieval Mediterranean naval warfare was therefore essentially coastal and amphibious in nature, carried out to seize coastal territory or islands, and not to exercise "
Ships and armament
The construction of early Muslim ships is still shrouded in mystery, as no pictorial representation prior to the 14th century survives. As the first Muslims relied on the shipbuilding skills and techniques of the maritime peoples they conquered, however, it is generally assumed that their ships were similar to their Byzantine counterparts. Thus the Byzantine
Transport vessels from Saladin's time are variously designated in the sources: sufun, a type of vessel which carried siege engines and other bulk freight; hammala, probably smaller than the sufun, and recorded as carrying men and supplies, including grain; and the little-known musattah ('flat ship'), which on one occasion is said to have had 500 people on board.[177]
Footnotes
- ^ Saladin's reign would mark a brief rebirth of the Egyptian navy: he rebuilt the arsenals, increased salaries for sailors, and established a separate navy bureau, so that his fleet numbered 60 galleys and 20 transports by 1179. This navy had mixed success against the Crusaders, until it was virtually destroyed during its attempts to break the Christian naval blockade during the Siege of Acre (1189–1191). After that the navy was neglected by successive regimes, so that, according to the 15th-century historian al-Maqrizi, the term 'sailor' was used as an insult in Egypt.[159]
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Further reading
- Rapoport, Yossef (2011). "The View from the South: The Maps of the Book of Curiosities and the Commercial Revolution of the Eleventh Century". In R. Margariti; A. Sabra; P. Sijpesteijn (eds.). Histories of the Middle East: Studies in Middle Eastern Society, Economy, and Law in Honor of A.L. Udovitch. Leiden: Brill. pp. 183–212. ISBN 978-9004214736.