Infiltration tactics
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Forms of these
Infiltration tactics developed slowly through World War I and early World War II, partially as a way of turning these harassing tactics into a decisive offensive doctrine. At first, only special units were trained in these tactics, typified by German Stoßtruppen (storm troops). By the end of World War II, almost all regular ground forces of the major powers were trained and equipped to employ forms of infiltration tactics, though some specialize in this, such as commandos, long-range reconnaissance patrols, US Army Rangers, airborne and other special forces, and forces employing irregular warfare.[1]
While a specialist tactic during World War I, infiltration tactics are now regularly fully integrated as standard part of the modern
Development during World War I
These tactics emerged gradually during World War I. Several nations modified their existing tactics in ways that supported ideas that were later called infiltration tactics, with the German developments having the most impact, both during the war and afterwards.
Germany
As far back as the 18th century,
German infiltration tactics are sometimes called Hutier tactics, after German General
The German stormtrooper methods involve men rushing forward in small but mutually supporting groups, using whatever cover is available, and then laying down covering fire for the other groups as they moved. The tactics aim to avoid attacking any strongpoints directly, by first breaching the weakest points of the defender's line, and using those to gain positional advantages on other points. Additionally, they acknowledge the futility of managing a grand detailed plan of operations from afar, opting instead for junior officers on the spot to exercise initiative, expanding the earlier Prussian doctrine of
Due to the extensive training needed, stormtroopers remained small elite forces. Regular infantry with heavy weapons would follow up, using more standard tactics, reducing isolated and weakened opposing strongpoints with flank attacks, as the stormtroopers continued the advance beyond them. Reserve troops following these had to consolidate gains against counterattacks.[4]: 157
The Germans employed and improved infiltration tactics with increasing success, at first defensively in counterattacks as part of Germany's defence in depth and then offensively, leading up to the Battle of Caporetto against the Italians in 1917 and finally the massive German spring offensive in 1918 against the British and French.[4]: 489 Initial German successes were stunning; of these, Hutier's 18th Army gained more than 50 km (30 mi) in less than a week – the farthest advance in the Western Front since the Race to the Sea had ended the war of movement in 1914. This advance would hereafter associate Hutier's name with infiltration tactics in Western Europe. The German armies began to stall after outrunning their supply, artillery and reinforcements, which could not catch up over the shell-torn ground left ruined by Allied attacks in the Battle of the Somme in 1916; the offensives failed to achieve a war-winning breakthrough dividing the French and British armies.[4]: 137 The exhausted German forces lost the initiative and were soon pushed back in the Allied Hundred Days Offensive, ending in the German surrender.[6]
Though far more successful tactically than traditional attacks, infiltration tactics did not address supporting any resulting advances operationally, so they tended to bog-down over time and allow the defender time to regroup. German artillery, critical during the initial assault, lagged far behind afterwards. The elite stormtroopers took notable casualties on the initial attacks, which could not be readily replaced. German forces lacked mobile forces such as cavalry to exploit and secure deep advances. Most importantly, German logistical capabilities, designed for a static front, failed to sustain troops advancing far into devastated enemy territory.[7][8]
The German military did not use the term infiltration tactics as a distinct new manner of warfare but more as a continuous improvement to their wide array of military tactics. When the "new" German tactics made headlines in
France
New French tactics that included an initial step for infiltration were published by the
In August 1915, a young French infantry officer, Captain
The French Army published Laffargue's pamphlet in 1915 and the following year a commercial edition found wide circulation, but as informational rather than being officially adopted by the French military.[16] The British translated and published Laffargue's pamphlet in December 1915 and, like others, continued to make frequent use of wave attacks.[17] The US Infantry Journal published a translation in 1916.[18]
In contrast to the infiltration tactics then under development in the German army, the tactics of Note 5779 and as expanded by Laffargue remained firmly wedded to the use of the attack by waves, despite the high casualties which could ensue. Laffargue maintained that the psychological support of the attack in line was necessary to enable men to advance against heavy fire.[19]
In 1916, captured copies of Laffargue's pamphlet were translated and distributed by the German army. How much this may have influenced German infiltration tactics is not known; such influence has been dismissed by Gudmundsson.[20] The Germans had started developing their own infiltration tactics in the spring of 1915, months before Laffargue's pamphlet was even published.[21][22][23][24]
Russia
The vast
General
After a thorough reconnaissance, Brusilov directed preparations for several months. Forward trenches were dug as bridgeheads for the attack, which approached the Austro-Hungarian trench lines as closely as 70 m (230 ft).[28] Select forces were trained and tasked with breaking through the defending lines, creating gaps to be widened by 8 total successive waves of infantry, allowing deep penetration. Brusilov committed all his reserves into the initial assault.[29]: 51
Although Brusilov favoured shorter bombardments, the bombardment preparation for this offensive was more than two days long, from 3am on June 4 (May 22
Though the campaign was devastating to the Austro-Hungarian Army, Russian losses were very high.[31] German forces were sent to reinforce, and the initial Russian advantages waned. Though Russian attacks continued for months, their cost in Russian men and materiel increased while gains diminished. In the end, much like the bold French tactics of la percée at the Second Battle of Artois, these tactics were too costly to maintain. The Imperial Russian Army never fully recovered, and the monumental losses of so many Russian soldiers helped fuel the Russian Revolution of 1917, leading to disbanding the Imperial Russian Army.[29]: 53
Though the Brusilov Campaign impressed the German Army High Command, how this may have influenced their further development of infiltration tactics is not known.
Britain
The British Army pursued a doctrine of integrating new technologies and updating old ones to find advantages in trench warfare.[34]
At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, March 1915, a well-planned British attack on German trenches, coordinated with short but effective artillery bombardment, achieved a local breakthrough. Though ammunition shortages and command and control issues prevented exploiting the gains, this demonstrated the importance of a combined infantry-artillery doctrine.[35]
Initial experiences in trench warfare, shared between British and French, led both to increase pre-bombardment (requiring dramatically increased artillery munitions production), and also to supply infantry with more firepower, such as light mortars, light machine guns, and rifle grenades. While the British hoped that this new combination of arms, once improved and properly executed, could achieve decisive breakthroughs, the French moved from their pre-war grand la percée doctrine to more limited and practical tactical objectives. At this same time, the Germans were learning the value of deep trenches, defense in depth, defensive artillery, and quick counter-attacks.[36]
This came to a head with the British
The British Third Army employed tactics giving platoons more independence at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 (most notably the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps), following the reorganisation of British infantry platoons according to the new Manual SS 143. This still advocated wave attacks, taking strongpoints and consolidating before advancing, part of "bite-and-hold" tactics, but this did allow for more local flexibility, and set groundwork for low-level unit initiative, an important aspect of infiltration tactics.[39]
Hurricane bombardment
A new method of artillery use evolved during World War I, colloquially called hurricane bombardment. This is a very quick but intense artillery bombardment, in contrast to the prevailing artillery tactic of long bombardments.[40] Various forms of quick bombardments were employed at several times and places during the war, but the most successful use of hurricane bombardment was when it was combined with German infiltration tactics in which local forces take immediate advantage of any enemy weak points they find.
After the start of trench warfare in World War I, and artillery moved from direct fire to indirect fire, the standard use of artillery preceding any friendly infantry attack became a very long artillery bombardment, often lasting several days, to destroy the opponent's defences and kill the defenders. But trenches were very soon extended to avoid this; they were dug deeper and connected by deep or even underground passages to bunkers far behind the lines, where defenders could safely wait out bombardments. When the bombardment stopped, this signalled the start of the attack to the defenders, and they quickly moved back to their forward positions.[41]: 13–14 This practice of very long bombardments expanded over the course of the war, in the hopes of at least causing a few casualties, damaging surface defences like barbed wire lines and machine gun nests, and exhausting and demoralizing the defenders by the stress of being forced underground for so long, the noise and the vibrations.
The Allies, led by the British, developed alternative artillery tactics using shorter bombardments; these sought to achieve success by surprise. (This was also to use limited ammunition supplies more efficiently.) The effectiveness of short bombardments was dependent on local conditions: the targets had to be identified and located beforehand, many artillery pieces were needed, each with ample ammunition, and the preparations had to be kept hidden from the defenders.
To further increase the chance of success, these short bombardments were sometimes followed by barrages. Many variations were devised, including moving barrages, block barrages, creeping barrages, standing and box barrages. The goal of an artillery barrage was to target a line of impact points repeatedly so as to impede infantry movement; these lines could be held in position or slowly moved to inhibit movement by the opponent or even force them into poor positions. The barrage plans were often quite complicated and could be very effective.[42]
The Germans also experimented with short bombardments and barrages. German Colonel Georg Bruchmüller tailored these significantly to integrate well with infiltration tactics. He began to perfect this while serving as a senior artillery officer on the Eastern Front in 1916. Hurricane bombardments avoided giving the defender several days' warning of an impending attack – vital for infiltration tactics. Barrages had to be carefully limited for use with infiltration tactics, as both the barrage movement and infantry advance must keep to a timetable, necessarily very methodical and slow to avoid casualties from friendly artillery; this takes away almost all initiative from the advancing infantry. Barrages with infiltration tactics had to be more intense and precise, and quickly moved to deeper targets. Bruchmüller enforced having artillery aim from the map, avoiding the typical practise of firing several registering shells before a bombardment to adjust the aim of each gun by trial-and-error, alerting the defenders before the full bombardment. Precise aiming without registering shells requires expertise in ballistics with angles and elevation calculated from accurate maps expressly designed for artillery use, knowledge of the effects of altitude and local weather conditions, and also reliable and consistent manufacturing of guns and ammunition to eliminate uncontrolled variation.[41]: 12–13
Bruchmüller devised intricate, centrally-controlled firing plans for intense bombardments with minimal delays. These plans typically had several bombardment phases. The first phase might be bombardment against enemy communications, telegraph lines, and headquarters, roads and bridges, to isolate and confuse the defenders and delay their reinforcements. The second phase might be against the defenders' artillery batteries and the third against their front-line trenches to drive them back just before the infantry assault on those positions. The last phase was typically a
The creeping barrage phase is often held out as a key part of infiltration tactics, but its use in infiltration attacks is limited by the fact that the rate of infantry advance cannot be predicted. The quickness, intensity, accuracy, and careful selection of targets for maximum effect is more important.[14]
Allied and German styles of bombardments could use tricks of irregular pauses and switching suddenly between targets for short periods of time to avoid being predictable to the defenders.
Bruchmüller's hurricane bombardment tactics in close cooperation with infiltration tactics matured by the time of the German
After World War I, use of radios to quickly redirect artillery fire as needed removed any exclusive reliance on time-table driven artillery bombardment.
Dien Bien Phu
At the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), Major Marcel Bigeard, commander of the French 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion (6th BPC), used infiltration tactics to defend the besieged garrison against Viet Minh trench warfare tactics. Bigeard's parachute assault companies were supported by concentrated artillery and air support and received help from tanks, allowing two companies (the 1st under Lieutenant René Le Page and the 2nd under Lieutenant Hervé Trapp) numbering no more than 180 men to recapture the important hilltop position of Eliane 1 from a full Viet Minh battalion, on the early morning of 10 April 1954. Other parachute battalion and company commanders also used similar tactics during the battle.[44]
See also
Notes
- ^ The Handbook Of The SAS And Elite Forces. How The Professionals Fight And Win. Edited by Jon E. Lewis. p.287-Tactics And Techniques, Landings And Raids On Enemy Territory. Robinson Publishing Ltd 1997. ISBN 1-85487-675-9
- ^ Graf Eberhard von Schwerin: Königlich preußisches Sturm-Bataillon Nr 5 (Rohr); Sporn, Zeulenroda (Thuringia) 1939, 166 pages
- ^ Hermann Cron: Geschichte des Deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege 1914–1918. Berlin 1937, p. 23.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-89839-219-7.
- ^ Hellmuth Gruss: Die deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg. Aufbau und Verwendung; Berlin, 1939
- ISBN 978-0756538583.
- ISBN 978-1855321571.
- ISBN 978-0415558792.
- ISBN 978-0-313-27959-1.
- ISBN 978-0-7006-0541-5.
- ISBN 978-0-8117-3457-8.
- ^ Kraus Podcast Archived 2013-12-17 at the Wayback Machine. Kraus, Early trench tactics in the French Army, pp. 23–32.
- ISBN 978-1-4728-1556-9.
- ^ a b Philpott, William. "Warfare 1914–1918". 1914–1918 Online, International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Retrieved 2 November 2017.
- ^ CSI Report No. 13: Tactical responses to concentrated artillery: Introduction Archived 2011-06-02 at the Wayback Machine (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth).
- ^ Laffargue, André (1916). Étude sur l'attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre: Impressions et réflexions d'un commandant de compagnie [Study on the attack in the present period of the war: Impressions and reflections of a company commander] (in French). Paris, France: Plon-Nourrit et Cie.
- ^ CDS 333 "A Study of the Attack in the Present Phase of War: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander" (December 1915). Microsoft Word.
- ^ Laffargue, André (1916). "Study on the attack in the present period of the war: Impressions and reflections of a company commander". Infantry Journal. 13 (2): 101–138.
- ^ Jones, "Infiltration by Close Order"
- ^ Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, pp. 193–196.
- ^ Samuels, Martin Doctrine and Dogma, passim
- ^ Samuels, Martin Command or Control?, passim
- ^ Stormtroop Tactics, Appendix C and passim
- ^ Samuels, Martin Doctrine and Dogma, 55
- ^ a b Dowling, Timothy C. (8 October 2014). "Eastern Front". 1914-1918 Online. Retrieved 20 November 2017.
- ISBN 978-0988953215.
- ^ Simkin, John (May 2015). "Russian Army and the First World War". Spartacus Educational. Retrieved 20 November 2017.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-253-35130-2.
- ^ .
- ^ Brusilov, A. A. (1983). My Memories. Military Publishing House. pp. 194–197.
- .
- ISBN 978-0-89839-219-7.
- ^ "Brusilov's breakthrough is the forerunner of remarkable breakthroughs, carried out by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War." - M. Galaktionov, Preface to «Моим воспоминаниям» (My Recolections), Aleksei Brusilov, republished 1946.
- ISBN 978-0300066630.
- ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8.
- ^ Philpott, William. "Warfare 1914-1918". International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1). Tactical Systems Emerge. Retrieved 6 December 2017.
- ^ ISBN 9780349120041.
- ISBN 978-0-304-36649-1.
- ^ "Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917". Internet Archive. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
- ISBN 978-1-4738-2702-8.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-275-94749-1.
- ^ Evans, Nigel F. "FIRE PLANNING". BRITISH ARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR 2. Retrieved 4 November 2017.
- ISBN 978-0-8153-3351-7.
- ^ Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 265.
References
- ISBN 0-89141-306-5.
- Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918. New York: Praeger, 1989. ISBN 0-275-93328-8.
- Simon Jones, Infiltration by Close Order: André Laffargue and the Attack of 9 May 1915.
- Kraus, Jonathan. Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: The Second Battle of Artois May–June 1915. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. ISBN 978-1-4094-5500-4.
- Kraus, Jonathan. Podcast: The Second Battle of Artois, May 1915: the new turning-point.
- Laffargue, André. The Attack in Trench Warfare Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander by Capt. André Laffargue 153rd Infantry, French Army, Translated for the Infantry Journal by an Officer of Infantry. Washington, D.C.: The United States Infantry Association, 1916.
- Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. ISBN 0-313-27959-4.
- Samuels, Martin. Command or Control?: Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918. London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1995. ISBN 0-7146-4214-2.
Further reading
- David Goldovt-Ryzhenkov (Translator from German) 2018: Examples of Reconnaissance and Security Operations in Defense, 1942/1944. German Manuals
- ISBN 1-4102-0159-7.
- Pope, Stephen, Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, and Keith Robbins, eds. The Macmillan Dictionary of the First World War. London: Macmillan Reference Books, 1995. ISBN 0-333-61822-X.