Kurdistan Region–Russia relations

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Kurdistan Region-Russia relations
Map indicating locations of Russia and Kurdistan Region

Russia
Kurdistan Region

Kurdistan Region–Russia relations are

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[6]

After the Cold War, Russia established ties with the newly founded autonomous

energy sector.[7] Unlike most of the other European powers, Russia did not criticize the unilateral 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum and continued to invest in the Kurdish region despite growing tensions between Kurdistan and Iraq. This made analysts believe that Russia was attempting to fill the gap which America had created from its criticism of the referendum.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani in June 2017 and in May 2018.[9][10]

According to Kurdish officials, the Russian investments worth billions of dollars in the 2010s, prevented the Kurds from going

ISIL.[11]

Kurdish-Soviet relations (1945-1980s)

Barzani's exile in the Soviet Union (1945-1958)

The Kurdish leader of the nationalist movement Mustafa Barzani went to exile in the Soviet Union in 1945 after the Kurdish rebellion was quelled and remained there for 13 years until he returned to Kurdistan in 1958 to resume the independence campaign. During his exile, he received an education and also established close ties to the KGB and the Soviet Army which generated the belief among Americans that he was a Russian agent.[12][13] Despite ideological differences and Barzani's nationalist ideology, the Soviets began supporting his men militarily throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[13] During the Cold War, Barzani had close ties to the Soviet Union, believing that an independent Kurdistan could only be established with Soviet support.[12]

Military assistance amid ambiguous relations (1958-1980)

Main articles: First Iraqi–Kurdish War and Second Iraqi–Kurdish War

Just one year after returning to Kurdistan, Barzani returned to Moscow to hold talks with

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow withdrew from the region politically because of criticism to the invasion.[6]

Russian return to Kurdistan (2003-)

The

American invasion of Iraq in 2003 made it possible for the Kurds and the Russians to open a new chapter in their relations. Russia became one of the first countries to open a representation in Kurdistan Region which was inaugurated in 2007, however relations remained unexploited due to fear of Turkish antagonism.[7] The relations are mainly focused on the energy sector as Russian companies have invested billions of dollars in the region during the 2010s. In 2012, Gazprom and Kurdistan Region signed a contract for the exploration and oil production of two oil blocks which later rose to three oil blocks.[11][18] In February 2017, Rosneft injected $2.1 billion as Russia received its first 600,000 barrels of Kurdish oil in April 2017,[11][19] while Gazprom signed an agreement with the Kurdish authorities in June 2017 worth $400 million.[11]

ISIL entering Iraq in the spring of 2014, prompted the World to deliver weapons to the Peshmerga. The Russian involvement in the equipping of the Kurdish soldiers was limited to three shipments in total. In the third dispatch, the Russians solely delivered five batches of the Soviet-era ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft.[20]

On the Russian approach to Kurdistan in the 2010s, Russian analyst Barmin argued that:

Russia’s ambivalence about its priorities in Iraq resulted in an odd stance on the Kurdish referendum. In official comments, Russian diplomats openly and repeatedly say they support Iraq's territorial integrity — although apparently not for Iraq's sake, but rather because Iraq's unity is “important for maintaining stability and security in the region and for resolving those critical problems that [abound in this region].” However, the narrative that Russia feeds to Kurdistan is significantly more nuanced. In an August interview with Kurdish media, the deputy head of Russia’s consulate in Erbil made a bold statement that Moscow would “support the decision made by the people of Kurdistan because it is a decision through referendum.[21]

Analyst Varfolomeeva argued that Russia needed Kurdistan to be viable to maintain its business relations and to not antagonize with the region which is why Russia did not criticize the referendum in 2017.[22]

See also

References

  1. ^ While Kurdistan Region refers to the autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan is a geographical term referring to the Kurdish area of Iraq
  2. ^ "KRG Representation in Russian Federation". Department of Foreign Relations - Kurdistan Regional Government. Retrieved 21 September 2019.[permanent dead link]
  3. ^ "Consulate General of the Russian Federation". Department of Foreign Relations - Kurdistan Regional Government. Archived from the original on 2017-06-01. Retrieved 2019-09-24.
  4. ^ "History of the Consulate - Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Erbil, Iraq". rusgencons-erbil.mid.ru. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
  5. ^ Pietro A. Shakarian (13 November 2017). "Top Ten Origins: Russia's Relations with the Kurds". origins.osu.edu. Archived from the original on 21 September 2019. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
  6. ^ a b Krajcsír, Lukács (2015). "Czechoslovakia's Main Objectives in the Middle East" (PDF). The V4 and the Arab Middle East: Issues and Relations (SZTE Publicatio Repozitórium). Budapest: Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet: 55–72. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
  7. ^
    ISBN 978-2-36567-408-9. Retrieved 21 September 2019. {{cite book}}: |journal= ignored (help
    )
  8. ^ "Russia becomes Iraq Kurds' top funder, quiet about independence vote". Reuters. 20 September 2017. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
  9. ^ "PM Barzani discusses economic ties, IS war with Putin, Lavrov". Kurdistan24. 2 June 2017. Retrieved 22 September 2019.
  10. ^ "Putin briefly talks with Iraqi Kurdistan PM Barzani". Tass. 9 May 2018. Retrieved 22 September 2019.
  11. ^ a b c d Petkova, Mariya (15 April 2019). "What did Russia get from its KRG gamble?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 23 September 2019.
  12. ^
    ISBN 978-3-319-89947-3
    .
  13. ^
    ISBN 978-0-367-00560-3
    .
  14. ISBN 9780815393337
    .
  15. ISBN 978-9386288875
    .
  16. ISBN 9780822311164
    .
  17. ^ Andrew, Christopher (2014). The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World. pp. 189–190.
  18. ^ "Gazprom Neft Sees Good Prospects in Kurdistan — Gazprom Neft PJSC". Gazprom-neft.com. 28 September 2019. Archived from the original on 2 October 2017. Retrieved 23 September 2019.
  19. ^ "Rosneft to receive first 600,000 barrels of Kurdistan's oil". Tass. 6 April 2017. Retrieved 23 September 2019.
  20. ^ Litovkin, Nikolai (18 March 2016). "Russia delivers first weapons supplies to Iraqi Kurds". RBTH. Retrieved 22 September 2019.
  21. ^ Barmin, Yury (2 October 2017). "Kurdish referendum a double-edged sword for Russia". Eng.globalaffairs.ru. Retrieved 22 September 2019.
  22. ^ "Russia Signals Acceptance Of Kurdistan's Independence From Iraq". The Globe Post. 13 July 2017. Retrieved 23 September 2019.

Further reading

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