Anglo-French Supreme War Council
The Anglo-French Supreme War Council (SWC) was established to oversee joint military strategy at the start of the Second World War. Most of its deliberations took place during the period of the Phoney War, with its first meeting at Abbeville on 12 September 1939. The final three sessions were held in France (Paris, Briare and Tours) during the German blitzkrieg of May and June 1940.
Meetings of the SWC
During the Phoney War
Its first meeting was at
The meeting of the SWC held in Paris on 5 February 1940 was the first to be attended by Winston Churchill, who, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had been invited to participate by Neville Chamberlain.[10] Here, the British rejected France's proposal for an expedition to Petsamo in Finland to help the Finns in the Winter War for fear that this would provoke the Soviet Union. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, described it as a "silly scheme". However, a French plan to send forces to Narvik was approved, dependent on agreement from Norway and Sweden. The meeting was described by General Ironside as having been harmonious with "everyone purring with pleasure. Wondered if we should all be in the state if we had a little adversity to touch us up." In the event, Norway and Sweden, fearful of compromising their neutrality, did not consent to the Narvik plan. The Scandinavian view was interpreted differently by Britain and France. Britain took the view that the operation should be cancelled, but France maintained that it had been agreed that the operation should proceed regardless of opposition. However, events overtook the impasse, when, on 13 March, the Finns agreed an armistice with the Soviet Union.[11]
The sixth meeting of the SWC was held in London on 28 March 1940 with Britain represented by the Prime Minister,
In Paris, on 5 April, at a meeting not of the SWC, Churchill pressed for Operation Royal Marine, but, fearing German reprisals, the French refused to countenance any mining of the Rhine. Churchill, therefore, decided that Britain alone would undertake the mining off Narvik; this action (Operation Wilfred) was planned for 8 April.[15] However, in the meantime, the Germans had launched Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Paul Reynaud, Édouard Daladier and Admiral Darlan flew to London for an emergency meeting of the SWC on 9 April.[16] Here, it was resolved that an Anglo-French task force would be sent to Norway, but the operation (Plan R 4) was a failure. Not only did it prove impossible to stop the export of iron ore from Scandinavia to Germany but also the troops had to be evacuated, in what was known as Operation Alphabet.
A further meeting of the council took place in Paris on 22 and 23 April, when it was agreed that the Allies would stand fast in Norway; Trondheim and Narvik would continue to be the main objectives. It was also decided that the RAF would, without further discussion, bomb the Ruhr if the Germans were to invade the Netherlands or Belgium.[17]
When the Supreme War Council met on 27 April, the French mistakenly hoped that Britain would postpone the evacuation of Norway. Reynaud was furious, deploring "the old men [in London] who do not know how to take a risk" and returning to Paris with influenza. There was acrimony on both sides; the French convinced that
During the Battle of France
Crisis meetings in Paris
At 7.30 on the morning of 15 May, Winston Churchill, who had been prime minister for just five days, received a desperate telephone call from Paul Reynaud announcing that "the French were beaten ... that they had lost the battle." Reynaud begged for all the aircraft and troops that could be spared. The British Prime Minister agreed to fly to Paris the following day to attend what would be the first crisis meeting of the SWC.[19]
On 16 May, Churchill flew to Paris, with Sir
There was a meeting of the SWC in Paris on 22 May 1940.
A private meeting between Churchill and Reynaud took place over lunch in London on 26 May. Both men deal with the meeting in their memoirs, but the precise details are confused. Churchill says that the French prime minister "dwelt not obscurely with the possible French withdrawal from the war". Reynaud pressed for more British air support and warned that if the Battle of France were lost, Pétain would urge strongly for an armistice. However, it seems that Reynaud did not directly ask Britain to release France from its promise made on 28 March not to enter into a separate armistice with Germany. Another meeting was held later the same day, now with Churchill, Chamberlain, Attlee, and
On 31 May 1940, Churchill flew again to Paris for a meeting of the SWC, this time with
Meeting at Briare
The penultimate session was in France, on 11/12 June at the Chateau du Muguet near
Last-ditch talks at Tours
What would prove to be the final meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council took place at the
Churchill fails to address French cabinet
The day ended in confusion; Churchill flew back to London without speaking to the French cabinet, as had been promised by Reynaud. The ministers were dismayed and angry; Spears was depressed, realising that "an opportunity that might not recur had been missed". He was at a loss to understand why a meeting had not taken place: had Reynaud simply forgotten? Did Reynaud wish to be the one to explain the situation to the ministers? In any event, his ministers were disillusioned and felt abandoned. Spears believed that the event played its part in swaying the majority of the cabinet towards surrender. He was sure that "by the night of 13 June, the possibility of France remaining in the war had almost disappeared". The only hope rested on the decision of President Roosevelt on if America now join the war.[27]
Military participation
When the composition of the SWC was decided, the commander-in-chief of the
Organisations associated with the SWC
Associated bodies were the Anglo-French Purchasing Committee and the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee. The latter, announced in The Times on 28 November and set up in December 1939 was chaired by Jean Monnet; it was responsible for joint economic planning and oversaw ten executive committees which were created in January of the following year.[29] In December 1939, an Anglo-French financial agreement was signed to ensure that contributions to the war effort would be made according to the respective national wealth of each country – France would contribute 40% with Britain responsible for 60%. In addition to the latter, trading agreements and industrial agreements were signed on 16 February 1940 and 7 March 1940 respectively.[30] Paul Reynaud spoke of "a unity of purpose" which had created a solidarity between the two countries which was more than an alliance. It was agreed that there would be no alteration to the rate of exchange between the two currencies during the war and that each country would be able to cover its requirements in the other's currency without the need to find gold.[31]
Diplomatic activity in parallel with the SWC
Officials from both sides endeavoured to find ways to make the British and the French view each other more favourably.
The Ambassador further asked the MOI to ensure that there were more articles about France in British newspapers. The few that were published were likely to offend: "the Englishman in France must be severe with begging children and be prepared to find the French mean and grasping".[35] There was a suggestion that "La Marseillaise" be played in cinemas after "God Save the King" and another that the two languages be made compulsory for pupils in each country. It was even put forward that unemployed French chefs in London should tour British schools to introduce children to French cuisine.[30]
A more ambitious idea came from a
See also
References
- ^ The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001.
- ISBN 978-0-521-52938-9.
- ISBN 0-304-93737-1.
- Aldermen. A functionary asked H [Halifax] if he was a 'Government official'. He said 'Yes'. We had been decanted at the back door and had to walk round to the front entrance. Some people recognised PMand I heard 'Chamberlain! Cor Blimey!' Corbin [French ambassador] joined us, and we had a long wait for the French, till 12.15. Meanwhile, the Town Clerk recognised us and sent for the Mayor, who arrived breathless – the local butcher, I presume, but quite nice".
- ^ ISBN 978-0-19-280550-8.
- ^ According to Jackson (p. 80), the differing views stemmed from experiences during the First World War. Britain had suffered against the Turks at Gallipoli whereas the French expedition to Salonika had been more successful.
- ISBN 978-0-8264-1761-9.
- ^ "Supreme War Council in London". The Mirror. Perth: National Library of Australia. 18 November 1939. p. 5. Retrieved 27 December 2014.
- ^ "Supreme War Council". The West Australian. Perth: National Library of Australia. 21 December 1939. p. 13. Retrieved 27 December 2014.
- ^ Churchill, Winston (1966). The History of the Second World War, Book II The Gathering Storm: The Twilight War, September 3, 1939 – May 10, 1940. London: Cassell. p. 73.
- ^ Jackson, p.81
- ^ "none". Le Petit Journal. 29 March 1940.
- ^ Jackson, p 82-83
- ^ "Present and Future Plans" Time. (8 April 1940) Retrieved 22 October 2008.
- ^ In The Gathering Storm (p.522) Churchill describes how he himself coined the name of the operation, using "Wilfred" because it was so small. It is a reference to a comic strip series called Pip, Squeak and Wilfred.
- ISBN 978-0-395-41055-4.
- ^ Gates p.56
- ^ Jackson, p.84-85
- ^ Gates, Eleanor M. (1981). End of the Affair – The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1939-40. London: George Allen & Unwin. pp. 630, p.77.
- ^ Gates p.77-79
- ^ Gates p.143-147
- ^ Jackson, p.95
- ISBN 0-7538-0147-7.
- ISBN 978-2246770411), p. 309-315.
- ^ Spears, Sir Edward (1954). The Fall of France. London: Heinemann. pp. 333, p.137–171.
- ^ The Fall of France p.199-208
- ^ The Fall of France, p.221-234
- ^ Spears, Sir Edward (1954). Prelude to Dunkirk. London: Heinemann. pp. 332, p.34.
- ISBN 0-521-46243-6.
- ^ a b c d Jackson, p.79
- ^ The Times, Wednesday, 13 December 1939; p. 9
- ^ Dockerill, p.174
- ^ Nicolson, Harold (1967). "Diaries and Letters – 1939–1945". London: Collins.
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(help) - ^ Dockrill, p. 174
- ^ Dockrill, p.175