Marxist humanism
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Marxist humanism is an international body of thought and political action rooted in a
Marxist humanism was born in 1932 with the publication of Marx's
Contrary to the official dialectical materialism of the Soviet Union and to interpretations of Marx based in the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser, Marxist humanists argue that Marx's work was an extension or transcendence of enlightenment humanism.[5] Where other Marxist philosophies see Marxism as a natural science, Marxist humanism reaffirms the doctrine of "man is the measure of all things" – that humans are essentially different to the rest of the natural order and should be treated so by Marxist theory.[6]
Origins
The beginnings of Marxist humanism lie with the publication of
Korsch's book underscores Marx's doctrine of the unity of theory and practice, viewing
The salient essay in Lukács's collection introduces the concept of "
The writings of Antonio Gramsci are also extremely influential on the development of a humanist understanding of Marxism. Gramsci insists on Marx's debt to Hegel, seeing Marxism as a "philosophy of praxis" and an "absolute historicism" that transcends traditional materialism and traditional idealism.[12]
The first publication of Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts in 1932 greatly changed the reception of his work.[13] This early work of Marx was written in 1844, when Marx was twenty-five or twenty-six years old.[14] The Manuscripts situated Marx's reading of political economy, his relationship to the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach, and his views on communism, within a new theoretical framework. In the Manuscripts, Marx borrows philosophical terminology from Hegel and Feuerbach to posit a critique of capitalist society based in "alienation".[13] Through his own activity, Man becomes alien from himself: to the products of his own activity, to the nature in which he lives, to other human beings and to his human possibilities. The concept is not merely descriptive, it is a call for de-alienation through radical change of the world.[15]
On publication, the significance of the 1844 Manuscripts was recognized by Marxists such as
As they provided a missing link between the Hegelian philosophical humanism of Marx's early writings and the economics of the later Marx,[19] Marx's Grundrisse were also an important source for Marxist humanism.[20] This 1,000-page collection of Marx's working notes for Capital was first published in Moscow in 1939 and became available in an accessible edition in 1953.[21] Several analysts (most notably Roman Rozdolsky) have commented that the Grundrisse shows the role played by the early Marx's concerns with alienation and the Hegelian concept of dialectic in the formation of his magnum opus.[22]
Currents
In the aftermath of the
In 1939,
Starting in the late 1950s, Roger Garaudy, for many years the chief philosophical spokesman of the French Communist Party, offered a humanistic interpretation of Marx stemming from Marx's early writings which called for dialogue between Communists and existentialists, phenomenologists and Christians.[29]
The period following the death of
This period also saw the formation of a humanist Marxism by Yugoslav philosophers Mihailo Marković and Gajo Petrović that would come to act as the basis of the Praxis School.[20] From 1964 to 1975, this group published a philosophical journal, Praxis, and organized annual philosophical debates on the island of Korčula. They concentrated on themes such as alienation, reification and bureaucracy.[35]
In Britain, the
Philosophy
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Marxist humanism opposes the philosophy of "
Marxist humanists attack an understanding of society based on natural science, as well as science and technology themselves, as
Whereas dialectical materialism sees Marxist theory as primarily scientific, Marxist humanism views Marxist theory as primarily philosophical. Marxist humanism echoes the inheritance of Marx's thought from
Alienation
In line with this, Marxist humanism treats alienation as Marxism's central concept.[6] In his early writings, the young Marx advances a critique of modern society on the grounds that it impedes human flourishing.[40] Marx's theory of alienation suggests a dysfunctional or hostile relation between entities that naturally belong in harmony with one another[41] – an artificial separation of one
entity from another with which it had been previously and properly conjoined.
Marxist humanism views alienation as the guiding idea of both Marx's early writings and his later works.[46] According to this school of thought, the central concepts of Capital cannot be fully and properly understood without reference to this seminal theme.[47] Communism is not merely a new socioeconomic formation that will supersede the present one, but the re-appropriation of Man's life and the abolition of alienation.[48]
In the state
The earliest appearance of this concept in Marx's corpus is the
In Bauer
The most well-known metaphor in Marx's Critique – that of
Since religious belief is the work of a divided mind, it stands in contradiction to itself: the Gospels contradict each other and the world; they contain dogmas so far removed from common sense that they can be understood only as mysteries. The God that men worship is a subhuman God – their own imaginary, inflated and distorted reflection.[53] The Gospel narrative contains no historical truth – it is an expression of a transient stage in the historical development of self-consciousness. Christianity was of service to self-consciousness in awakening a consciousness of values that belong to every human individual, but it also created a new servitude. The task of the present phase of human history is to liberate Man's spirit from the bonds of Christian mythology, free the state from religion, and thereby restore to Man his alienated essence.[54]
In the Critique, Marx adopts Bauer's criticism of religion and applies this method to other fields. Marx sees Man's various alienations as peels around a genuine center.[55] Religion is the most extreme form of alienation: it is at once both the symptom of a deep social malaise and a protest against this malaise.[56] The criticism of religion leads to the criticism of other alienations, which must be dealt with in the same way.[57] The influence of Bauer follows Marx through all his later criticism: this is visible in the many places where Marx establishes an economic point by reference to a religious analogy.[58]
In Hegel
The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right credits Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel with significant insight into both the basic structure of the modern social world and its disfigurement by alienation.[59] Hegel believes alienation will no longer exist when the social world objectively facilitates the self-realization of human individuals, and human individuals subjectively understand that this is so.[60] For Hegel, objective alienation is already non-existent, as the modern social world does facilitate individuals' self-realization. In spite of this, individuals still find themselves in a state of subjective alienation.[60] Hegel wishes not to reform or change the institutions of the modern social world, but to change the way in which society is understood by its members.[61] Marx shares Hegel's belief that subjective alienation is widespread, but denies that the rational or modern state enables individuals to actualize themselves. Marx instead takes widespread subjective alienation to indicate that objective alienation has not been overcome.[62]
Marx further develops his critique of Hegel in the
For Hegel, alienation is the state of
All that exists is the Absolute Spirit (Absolute Mind, Absolute Idea or God). The Absolute is not a static or timeless entity but a dynamic Self, engaged in a cycle of alienation and de-alienation. Spirit becomes alienated from itself in nature and returns from its self-alienation through the finite Mind, Man. Human history is a process of de-alienation, consisting in the constant growth of Man's knowledge of the Absolute. Conversely, human history is also the development of the Absolute's knowledge of itself: the Absolute becomes self-aware through Man.[65] Man is a natural being and is thus a self-alienated Spirit. But Man is also an historical being, who can achieve adequate knowledge of the Absolute, and is thus capable of becoming a de-alienated being.[69]
Marx criticizes Hegel for understanding labor as "abstract mental labour".
In Feuerbach
The main influence on Marx's thinking in this regard is Ludwig Feuerbach, who in his Essence of Christianity aims to overcome an inappropriate separation of individuals from their essential human nature. Feuerbach believes modern individuals are alienated by their holding false beliefs about God. People misidentify as an objective being what in actuality is a man-made projection of their own essential predicates.[73]
For Feuerbach, Man is not a self-alienated God; God is self-alienated Man. God is Man's essence abstracted, absolutized and estranged from Man.
This critique extends beyond religion, as Feuerbach argues in his Theses on the Reform of Philosophy that Hegelian philosophy is itself alienated. Hegel regards alienation as affecting thought or consciousness and not humanity in its material being. For Hegel, concrete, finite existence is merely a reflection of a system of thought or consciousness. Hegel starts and ends with the infinite. The finite, Man, is present as only a phase in the evolution of a human spirit, the Absolute.[77] In opposition to this, Feuerbach argues that Man is alienated because he mediates a direct relationship of sensuous intuition to concrete reality through religion and philosophy.[78] By recognizing that his relationship to nature is instead one of immediate unity, Man can attain a "positive humanism" that is more than just a denial of religion.[79]
In work
Following Feuerbach, Marx places the earthly reality of Man in the center of the picture.
Man's nature is to be his own creator, to form and develop himself by working on and transforming the world outside him in cooperation with his fellow men. Man should be in control of this process but in modern conditions Man has lost control of his own evolution.[82] Where land-ownership is subject to the laws of a market economy,[83] human individuals do not fulfill themselves through productive activity.[84] A worker's labor, his personal qualities of muscle and brain, his abilities and aspirations, his sensuous life-activity, appear to him as things, commodities to be bought and sold like any other.[85] Much as Bauer and Feuerbach see religion as an alienating invention of the human mind, so does Marx believe the modern productive process to reduce the human being to the status of a commodity.[86] In religion, God holds the initiative and Man is in a state of dependence. In economics, money moves humans around as though they were objects instead of the reverse.[82]
Marx claims that human individuals are alienated in four ways:
- From their products
- From their productive activity
- From other individuals
- From their own nature.[87]
Firstly, the product of a worker's labor confronts him "as an alien object that has power over him". A worker has bestowed life on an object that now confronts him as hostile and alien. The worker creates an object, which appears to be his property. However, he now becomes its property.[87] When he externalizes his life in an object, a worker's life belongs to the object and not to himself; his nature becomes the attribute of another person or thing.[88] Where in earlier historical epochs, one person ruled over another, now the thing rules over the person, the product over the producer.[87]
Secondly, the worker relates to the process by which this product is created as something alien that does not belong to him. His work typically does not fulfill his natural talents and spiritual goals and is experienced instead as "emasculation".[87]
Thirdly, the worker experiences mutual estrangement – alienation from other individuals. Each individual regards others as a means to his own end. Concern for others exists mainly in the form of a calculation about the effect those others have on his own narrow self-interest.[89]
Fourthly, the worker experiences self-estrangement: alienation from his human nature. Because work is a means to survival only, the worker does not fulfill his human need for self-realization in productive activity.[89] The worker is only at ease in his animal functions of eating, drinking and procreating. In his distinctly human functions, he is made to feel like an animal.[90] Modern labor turns the worker's essence as a producer into something "alien".[89]
Marx mentions other features of alienated labor: overwork, or the amount of time that the modern worker has to spend engaged in productive activity; "more and more one-sided" development of the worker, or the lack of variety in his activity; the machine-like character of labor, and the intellectual stunting that results from the neglect of mental skills in productive activity.[91]
The
In contrast to this negative account of alienated labor, Marx's Notes on James Mill offer a positive description of unalienated labor.[91] Marx here claims that in self-realizing work, a worker's personality is made objective in his product and he enjoys contemplating that feature in the object he produces.[92] As he has expressed his talents and abilities in the productive process, the activity is authentic to his character. It ceases to be an activity he loathes.[93] Marx further claims that the producer gains immediate satisfaction from the use and enjoyment of his product – the satisfaction arising from the knowledge of having produced an object that corresponds to the needs of another human being.[92] In an unalienated society, a worker can be said to have created an object that corresponds to the needs of another's essential nature. His productive activity is a mediator between the needs of another person and the entire species. Marx suggests that this confirms the "communal" character of human nature, because individuals play this essential role in the affirmation of each other's nature.[93]
To overcome alienation and allow humankind to realize its species-being, it is not enough, as Hegel and Feuerbach believe, to simply understand alienation. It is necessary to transform the world that engenders alienation: the wage-labor system must be transcended, and the separation of the laborer from the means of labor abolished. This is not the task of a solitary philosophical critic, but of
This emancipation is not simply the abolition of private property. Marx differentiates his communism from the crude communism that seeks to abolish everything that cannot be the property of all. For Marx, this would be the generalization of alienation and the abolition of talent and individuality – tantamount to abolishing civilization. Marx instead sees communism as a positive abolition of private property, where Man recovers his own species-being, and Man's activity is no longer opposed to him as something alien. This is a direct affirmation of humanity: just as atheism ceases to be significant when the affirmation of Man is no longer dependent on the negation of God, communism is a direct affirmation of Man independent of the negation of private property.[97]
In division of labor
In
Marx and Engels here attack Feuerbach for advancing an "
In economics
In the Grundrisse, Marx continues his discussion of the problem of alienation in the context of political economy.[100] Here, the central themes of the 1844 Manuscripts are dealt with in a much more sophisticated manner.[101] Marx builds on his earlier conception of Man as a productive, object-creating being.[102] The concepts found in Marx's earlier work – alienation, objectification, appropriation, Man's dialectical relationship to nature and his generic or social nature – all recur in the Grundrisse.[103]
Marx views political economy as a reflection of the alienated consciousness of bourgeois society. Political economy mystifies human reality by transforming the production of
The discussion of alienation in the Grundrisse is also more firmly rooted in history.[105] Marx argues that alienation did not exist in earlier periods – primitive communism – where wealth was still conceived as residing in natural objects and not man-made commodities.[100] However, such societies lacked the creation of objects by purposive human activity. They cannot be a model for a fully-developed communism that realizes human potentiality.[100] Capital is an alienating force, but it has fulfilled a very positive function. It has developed the productive forces enormously, has replaced natural needs by ones historically created and has given birth to a world market. Nonetheless, Marx sees capitalism as transitory: free competition will inevitably hinder the development of capitalism.[105]
The key to understanding the ambivalent nature of capitalism is the notion of time. On the one hand, the profits of capitalism are built on the creation of surplus work-time, but on the other the wealth of capitalism has emancipated Man from manual labor and provided him increasing access to free time.[106] Marx criticizes political economy for its division of Man's time between work and leisure.[100] This argument misunderstands the nature of human activity. Labor is not naturally coercive. Rather, the historical conditions in which labor is performed frustrate human spontaneity.[107] Work should not be a mere means for Man's existence, it should become the very contents of his life.[108]
In property
The Grundrisse also continues the discussion of
The first form of property, according to Marx, is
The unity of the individual and society is preserved by more complex societies in two distinct forms: oriental despotism and the classical polis. In oriental despotism, the despot personifies society – all property belongs to him.[112] In the polis, the basic form of property is public. Economic activity depends on community-oriented considerations. Political rights depend on participation in common ownership of land. Agriculture is considered morally and publicly superior to commerce. Public agricultural policy is judged on its ability to produce more patriotic citizens, rather than economic considerations.[112] Alienation between the public and private sphere does not exist in the polis.[113]
Marx does not idealize the polis or call for its restoration. Its foundation on naturalistic matter is specific and limited. Marx opposes to this the universality of capital. Capital is objectified human labor: on the one hand it indicates hidden human potentialities but on the other its appearance is accompanied by alienation.[113] Capitalism develops a kind of property free from social limitations and considerations. Concurrently, capitalism ends individual private property as traditionally conceived, in that it divorces the producer from the ownership of the means of production. Such property is at the exclusive disposition of its owner. Yet, the development of capitalist society also entails more complex production, requiring combined efforts that cannot be satisfied by individual property.[114]
In commodity fetishism
To make a fetish of something, or fetishize it, is to invest it with a power it does not in itself have.[115] In Capital. Volume 1, Marx argues that the failure of human beings to understand their own social existence arises from the way production is organized in capitalist society. He calls this illusion "commodity fetishism".[116]
The production of a product as a
In market economies, the labor of persons takes the form of the exchange-value of things. The
Marx does not use the term alienation here, but the description is the same as in his earlier works, as is the analogy with religion that he owes to Feuerbach.[123] In religious fetishism an activity of thought, a cultural process, vests an object with apparent power. The object does not really acquire the power mentally referred to it. However, if a culture makes a fetish of an object, its members come to perceive the object as endowed with this power. The fetishized object has this power not in the real world, but in the religious world, which is a world of illusion.[115] Commodity fetishism is partly analogous with religious fetishism,[115] as it is the inability of human beings to see their products for what they are.[123] However, whereas religious fetishism arises from a thought-process, commodity fetishism arises from the way production is organized in commodity society.[115] All other forms of alienation arise in turn from this fetish. Where Man should wield his human power, he instead becomes enslaved by his own works unwittingly. Political institutions appear to have autonomy, turning them into instruments of oppression. Scientific development and the organization of labor, improved administration and multiplication of useful products are transformed into quasi-natural forces and turned against Man.[123]
The value of commodities is constituted by the labor bestowed upon them. However, commodities appear to have value in and of themselves. This appearance, commodity fetishism, arises from the particular social form within which commodity production takes place – the market society. Here, the social character of production is expressed not in production itself but only in exchange. Producers' products do not have a social form prior to their manifestations as commodities, and it is the commodity form alone that connects producers. In other societies –
Money, which is exchange-value divorced from use-value, perfects the alienated mediation of workers. The exchange-value of a commodity assumes an independent existence in money. The money value of a commodity represents the quantity of labor bestowed upon it. Money possesses this social property only because individuals have alienated their own social relationships and embodied them in a thing.
In reification
A particular expression of alienation is the
The use-value of labor power consists in the fact that it creates an exchange-value greater than its own. A capitalist pays for the right to use a worker's labor power over the course of a day, yet the
Praxis
Marx's theory of alienation is intimately linked to a theory of
As human nature
The concept of human nature is the belief that all human individuals share some common features.[135] In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx describes his position on human nature as a unity of naturalism and humanism.[136]
Naturalism is the view that Man is part of the system of nature.
Humanism is the view that Man is a being of praxis who both changes nature and creates himself.[136] It is not the simple attribute of consciousness that makes Man peculiarly human, but rather the unity of consciousness and practice – the conscious objectification of human powers and needs in sensuous reality.[139] Marx distinguishes the free, conscious productive activity of human beings from the unconscious, compulsive production of animals.[140] Praxis is an activity unique to Man: while other animals produce, they produce only what is immediately necessary.[133] Man, on the other hand, produces universally and freely. Man is able to produce according to the standard of any species and at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the object he produces.[133] Man thus creates according to the laws of beauty.[141] The starting point for Man's self-development is the wealth of his own capacities and needs that he himself creates. Man's evolution enters the stage of human history when, through praxis, he acquires more and more control of blind natural forces and produces a humanized natural environment.[136]
As human knowledge
Since Man's basic characteristic is his labor – his commerce with nature in which he is both active and passive – the traditional problems of epistemology must be looked at from a new standpoint.[142] The role of work or labor in the cognitive process is a dominant epistemological theme in Marx's thought. Marx understands human knowledge to be mediated through praxis or intentional human agency.[143] The relations between Man and his environment are relations between the species and the objects of its need.[144] Practical usefulness is a factor in the definition of truth: a judgement or opinion's usefulness is not merely a tool for establishing its truth, but is what creates its truth.[145]
In his
Criticisms and defences
Criticisms
As the terminology of alienation does not appear in a prominent manner in Marx's later works,
Althusser believes socialist humanism to be an ethical and thus
Althusser sees Marxist theory as primarily science and not philosophy but he does not adhere to Friedrich Engels's "natural philosophy". He claims that the philosophy implicit in Marxism is an epistemology (theory of knowledge) that sees science as "theoretical practice" and philosophy as the "theory of theoretical practice".[148] However, he later qualifies this by claiming that Marxist philosophy, unlike Marxist science, has normative and ideological elements:[148] Marxist philosophy is "politics in the field of theory" and "class struggle in theory".[156]
Defences
Althusser is critical of what he perceives to be a reliance among Marxist humanists on Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, which Marx did not write for publication. Marxist humanists strongly dispute this: they hold that the concept of alienation is recognizable in Marx's mature work even when the terminology has been abandoned.[157] Teodor Shanin[158] and Raya Dunayevskaya[159] assert that not only is alienation present in the late Marx, but that there is no meaningful distinction to be made between the "young Marx" and "mature Marx". The Marxist humanist activist Lilia D. Monzó states that "Marxist-Humanism, as developed by Raya Dunayevskaya, considers the totality of Marx's works, recognizing that his early work in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, was profoundly humanist and led to and embeds his later works, including Capital."[160]
Contra Althusser,
Marxist humanists
Notable thinkers and schools of thought associated with Marxist humanism include:
- Kevin B. Anderson (born 1948), American social theorist and activist.
- John Berger (1926–2017), English art critic, novelist, painter, and author.
- Marshall Berman (1940–2013), American Marxist writer and philosopher, author of the philosophical novel All That Is Solid Melts into Air.
- Ernst Bloch(1885–1977), German-Jewish Marxist philosopher.
- Budapest School, a school of Marxist humanism, post-Marxism, and dissident liberalism that emerged in communist Hungary in the early 1960s.
- Raya Dunayevskaya (1910–1987), founder of the philosophy of Marxist humanism in the United States.
- News and Letters Committees (1950s onwards), a small, revolutionary-socialist organization in the United States founded by Dunayevskaya.[163]
- Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and author from Martinique.
- Mark Fisher (1968–2017), English writer, music critic, political and cultural theorist, philosopher, and teacher.
- Frankfurt School (1930s onwards), a school of neo-Marxist critical theory, social research, and philosophy.
- Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), German-Jewish Marxist literary critic, essayist, translator, and philosopher.
- Erich Fromm (1900–1980), German-Jewish Marxist psychoanalyst, social psychologist, and humanist philosopher.
- Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), German-American Marxist philosopher and sociologist.
- Paulo Freire (1921–1997), Brazilian educator and influential theorist of critical pedagogy.
- Roger Garaudy (1913-2012)
- Nigel Gibson (), British philosopher and Marxist theorist.
- Lucien Goldmann (1913–1970), French philosopher and sociologist of Jewish-Romanian origins.
- André Gorz (1923–2007), Austrian-French social philosopher.
- Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), Italian Marxist writer, politician, political philosopher, and linguist.[164]
- Christopher Hill (1912–2003), English Marxist historian.
- C. L. R. James (1901–1989), Afro-Trinidadian historian, journalist, socialist theorist, and writer.
- Andrew Kliman (born 1955), American Marxist economist and philosopher, specializing in Marxian economics.
- Polish 1968 political crisis forced him out of communist Poland.
- dialecticsfrom a Marxist humanist perspective.
- Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991), French sociologist, intellectual, and philosopher, generally considered to be a neo-Marxist.
- John Lewis (philosopher) (1889–1976), British Unitarian minister and Marxist philosopher.
- György Lukács (1885–1971), Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic.
- Open Marxism, an anti-structuralist and heterodox school of Marxist philosophy.
- José Carlos Mariátegui (1894–1930), Peruvian intellectual, journalist, and political philosopher.
- Peter McLaren (born 1948), Canadian-American educator and influential theorist of critical pedagogy.
- David McReynolds (1929–2018), American democratic socialist and pacifist activist.
- historian of Ancient Greek philosophy.
- Praxis School, a Marxist humanist philosophical movement that emerged in Zagreb and Belgrade in the SFR Yugoslavia between the 1960s and 1970s.
- Walter Rodney (1942–1980), Guyanese Marxist historian and political activist.
- Franklin Rosemont (1943–2009), American writer, artist, historian, and activist.[165]
- Maximilien Rubel (1905–1996), Austrian Marxist historian and council communist.
- Wang Ruoshui (1926–2002), Chinese journalist, political theorist, and Marxist philosopher.
- Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), French existentialist philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, biographer, and literary critic.
- Cyril Smith (1929–2008), British lecturer of statistics at the London School of Economics, socialist, and revolutionary humanist.
- Ivan Sviták (1925–1994), Czech social critic and aesthetic theorist.
- E. P. Thompson (1924–1993), English historian, socialist, and peace campaigner.
- Raymond Williams (1921–1988), Welsh literary theorist, co-founder of cultural studies.
See also
- Autonomist Marxism
- Budapest School
- Dialectic
- Frankfurt School
- Historical materialism
- Karl Marx
- Luxemburgism
- Marxism
- New Left
- Orthodox Marxism
- Praxis School
- Secular humanism
- Structure and agency
- Subjectivity
References
Footnotes
- ^ Alderson 2017, p. 17.
- ^ Smith 1998.
- ^ Fromm 1966, pp. 69–79; Petrović 1967, pp. 35–51.
- ^ Marcuse 1972.
- ^ Spencer, Robert (17 February 2017). "Why We Need Marxist-Humanism Now". London: Pluto Press. Retrieved 17 September 2019.
- ^ a b c d e f Edgley 1991, p. 420.
- ^ a b Jacoby 1991, p. 582.
- ^ McLellan 1980, p. 211.
- ^ Mészáros 1991, p. 242.
- ^ Petrović 1991b, p. 463.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 44.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 45.
- ^ a b c Arthur 1991, p. 165.
- ^ Colletti 1992, p. 15.
- ^ Petrović 1991a, p. 11.
- ^ Fromm 1966, p. 74.
- ^ Anderson 1976, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Arthur 1991, p. 165; Fromm 1966.
- ^ McLellan 1991, p. 224.
- ^ a b c d Soper 1986, p. 85.
- ^ McLellan 1980, p. 219.
- ^ a b Harris 1991, p. 67.
- ^ Anderson 1976, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Benton 1984, pp. 5–6.
- ^ Benton 1984, p. 6.
- ^ Benton 1984, p. 10.
- ^ a b c Soper 1986, p. 84.
- ^ Anderson 1976, p. 51.
- ^ McLellan 1980, p. 212; Kołakowski 1978b, p. 482; Garaudy 1967; Garaudy 1970; Garaudy 1966.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978b, p. 464.
- ^ McLellan 1980, p. 214; Kołakowski 1968.
- ^ Schaff 1962.
- ^ McLellan 1980, p. 214.
- ^ a b Soper 1986, p. 86.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978b, pp. 476–477.
- ^ Edgley 1991, pp. 419–420.
- ^ Edgley 1991, p. 419.
- ^ Benton 1991, p. 280.
- ^ Edgley 1991, pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b c Leopold 2007, p. 66.
- ^ Leopold 2007, pp. 67–68.
- ^ a b Sher 1977, p. 71.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 68.
- ^ Leopold 2007, pp. 68–69.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 69.
- ^ Petrović 1967, p. 32.
- ^ Sher 1977, p. 70.
- ^ Petrović 1967, pp. 163–164.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 67.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 65.
- ^ McLellan 1969, p. 78.
- ^ McLellan 1969, p. 64.
- ^ McLellan 1969, p. 64–65.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 89.
- ^ McLellan 1969, p. 79.
- ^ McLellan 1985, p. 88.
- ^ McLellan 1969, p. 80.
- ^ McLellan 1969, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 74.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 75.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 76.
- ^ Leopold 2007, pp. 76–77.
- ^ a b c Kołakowski 1978a, p. 133.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 91.
- ^ a b c d Petrović 1967, p. 136.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 132–133.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 96.
- ^ a b McLellan 1980, pp. 196–197.
- ^ Petrović 1991a, p. 12.
- ^ McLellan 1980, pp. 197–198.
- ^ a b McLellan 1980, p. 198.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 97.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 206.
- ^ Cohen 2001b, p. 93.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 208.
- ^ Cohen 2001b, p. 95.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 31.
- ^ Soper 1986, pp. 31–32.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 32.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 177.
- ^ Wood 2004, pp. 16–17.
- ^ a b McLellan 1980, p. 169.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 138.
- ^ Leopold 2007, p. 229.
- ^ a b Kołakowski 1978a, p. 139.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 138–139.
- ^ a b c d Leopold 2007, p. 230.
- ^ McLellan 1980, pp. 169–170.
- ^ a b c Leopold 2007, p. 231.
- ^ McLellan 1980, pp. 170–171.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 232.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 233.
- ^ a b Leopold 2007, p. 234.
- ^ a b c Garaudy 1967, p. 62.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 139–140.
- ^ Garaudy 1967, p. 63.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 140.
- ^ a b Kołakowski 1978a, p. 172.
- ^ a b Soper 1986, p. 38.
- ^ a b c d e Avineri 1968, p. 103.
- ^ a b c McLellan 1985, p. 296.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 102.
- ^ McLellan 1985, p. 295.
- ^ Avineri 1968, pp. 107–108.
- ^ a b McLellan 1985, p. 297.
- ^ McLellan 1985, p. 298.
- ^ Avineri 1968, pp. 103–104.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 104.
- ^ a b c Avineri 1968, p. 112.
- ^ a b Avineri 1968, p. 109.
- ^ Avineri 1968, pp. 112–113.
- ^ a b Avineri 1968, p. 113.
- ^ a b Avineri 1968, p. 114.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 115.
- ^ a b c d Cohen 2001a, p. 115.
- ^ a b c Kołakowski 1978a, p. 276.
- ^ a b Cohen 2001a, p. 117.
- ^ a b Foley 1991, p. 516.
- ^ Cohen 2001a, p. 100.
- ^ Cohen 2001a, p. 101.
- ^ a b Cohen 2001a, p. 116.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 276–277.
- ^ a b c d Kołakowski 1978a, p. 277.
- ^ Cohen 2001a, pp. 119–120.
- ^ Cohen 2001a, p. 120.
- ^ a b Cohen 2001a, p. 124.
- ^ Cohen 2001a, p. 125.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 278–279.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 279–280.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, pp. 281–282.
- ^ Avineri 1968, p. 138.
- ^ Petrović 1967, p. 56.
- ^ a b c McLellan 1980, p. 171.
- ^ Petrović 1967, pp. 56–57.
- ^ Marković 1991, p. 243.
- ^ a b c d e Marković 1991, p. 244.
- ^ a b c McLellan 1980, p. 199.
- ^ a b Sher 1977, p. 76.
- ^ Sher 1977, p. 77.
- ^ Petrović 1967, pp. 78–79.
- ^ McLellan 1980, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 134.
- ^ Bhaskar 1991, p. 285.
- ^ Kołakowski 1968, p. 42.
- ^ Kołakowski 1968, p. 38.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978a, p. 141–142.
- ^ Wood 2004, p. xxxix.
- ^ a b c Edgley 1991, p. 421.
- ^ a b Soper 1986, p. 101.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 40.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 102.
- ^ a b Soper 1986, pp. 112–113.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 112.
- ^ Soper 1986, p. 113.
- ^ Soper 1986, pp. 86–87.
- ^ Althusser 1976, p. 142.
- ^ Wood 2004, p. xxxix; Fromm 1966, pp. 50–52; Fromm 1966, pp. 69–79.
- Amazon.com
- ^ Dunayevskaya 1965.
- ^ Monzó, Lilia D. (16 September 2019). "Women of Color and Indigeneity: A Revolutionary Subject". The International Marxist-Humanist. International Marxist-Humanist Organization. Retrieved 17 September 2019.
- ^ Kołakowski 1978b, p. 484.
- ^ Soper 1986, pp. 39–40.
- ^ "About Us".
- ISBN 0-271-03522-6, p. 243
- ^ http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2012_02.dir/pdfXSzpVPe6x8.pdf [bare URL PDF]
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Further reading
- Novack, George (1973). Humanism and Socialism. New York: Pathfinder Press. OCLC 890185599.
External links
- C L R James Archive
- The Hobgoblin, a Journal of Marxist-Humanism
- Libertarian Communist Library Marxist Humanism holdings Archived 11 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine
- Marxist Humanism, subject index at marxists.org
- Marxist-Humanist Dialectics
- Marxist-Humanist Initiative
- News & Letters, the Newspaper
- Raya Dunayevskaya Archive
- International Marxist-Humanist Organization official website
- 21st-century Marx