Operation Anaconda: Difference between revisions
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* [http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/CoTTP/AnacondaNaylor.pdf Defense and National Security Studies ] |
* [http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/CoTTP/AnacondaNaylor.pdf Defense and National Security Studies ] |
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* [https://web.archive.org/web/20160304022502/http://www.combatfilms.com/gallery_3_anaconda/gallery_anaconda_all.asp Combat Films and Research] |
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20160304022502/http://www.combatfilms.com/gallery_3_anaconda/gallery_anaconda_all.asp Combat Films and Research] |
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* http://www.stripesonline.com |
* https://web.archive.org/web/20040728014146/http://www.stripesonline.com/ |
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* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1857599.stm BBC News: Al Qaeda 'executed US serviceman'] |
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1857599.stm BBC News: Al Qaeda 'executed US serviceman'] |
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* [http://strategypage.com/onpoint/articles/20020627.asp Strategypage interview of Col. Wiercinski] |
* [http://strategypage.com/onpoint/articles/20020627.asp Strategypage interview of Col. Wiercinski] |
Revision as of 04:18, 3 December 2017
Operation Anaconda | |
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Part of the | |
Result | Coalition victory, Taliban evacuates but suffers heavy casualties |
al-Qaeda
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[1]
Rowan Tink
15 killed total:
8 (7 in the Battle of Takur Ghar)[2]82 wounded
23 bodies found
United States claimed: 200–800 killed[3][4]Operation Anaconda took place in early March 2002. CIA Paramilitary Officers, working with their allies, attempted to destroy
Between March 2 and March 16, 2002 1,700 airlifted U.S. troops and 1,000 pro-government Afghan
Background
The Shahi-Kot (which translates as the 'Place of the King') stretches 9km in length and 5km across at its widest point. It is composed of two distinct areas, the Lower and Upper the Shahi-Kot which run roughly parallel to each other. In the Lower Shahikot several imposing mountains dominate the landscape; chief among them is Takur Ghar at the southeastern end of the valley; to the northeast is Tsapare Ghar, dominating the northern entrance to the valley. During the Soviet–Afghan War, Mujahideen leader Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor was in charge of the valley and invited foreign jihadists to base themselves in the Lower Shahikot. Mansoor fortified the valley, digging trench systems, building bunkers and firing positions into the ridgelines, many of which would be put to effect during the operation.[7]
In February 2002, a Special Forces intelligence analyst working for
It was decided to use U.S. conventional infantry. The forces used, consisting of the
The Afghans had successfully defeated the Soviet Army twice in this valley, and were expecting events to pan out in a similar fashion.[13]
Prelude
This section needs additional citations for verification. (February 2012) |
The operation was composed of elements: Task Force Dagger: ODAs from the
SOF teams from
Other units that took part are the B Co. 159th Avn Rgt,
In the planning phase of the operation, the commander of
Battle
1 March 2002
Near H-Hour, Mako 31 found a group of foreign fighters that had established a position and were manning a DShK HMG on the peak where they planned to set up an observation post. If the DShK was not disabled before then it could shootdown Chinooks carrying the conventional forces, the SEALs planned to ambush the terrorists in the pre-dawn darkness before the Rakkasans flow into the valley. However they were spotted by an Uzbek insurgent and a brief firefight ensued, killing 5 out of 7 foreign fighters, as another insurgent joined the firefight by firing a PKM, the team broke contact and brought in an AC-130 which destroyed the enemy encampment with 105mm rounds.[17]
2 March 2002
Canadian and US sniper teams and Afghan forces begin to sweep the Shahi-Kot valley area to root out rebel forces regrouping in the valley after the fall of the Taliban regime.
TF Hammer/TF Anvil
Around midnight, the units of TF Hammer loaded into their vehicles and left their base in Gardez at 33°35′58″N 69°13′44″E / 33.59944°N 69.22889°E for the Shahi-Kot Valley. TF Hammer consisted of a large force of Afghan militia led by Zia Lodin and the Special Forces A-teams Texas 14/ODA 594 and Cobra 72/ODA 372. The road was in poor condition and difficulties ensued. Several soldiers were injured after their
The main body of TF Hammer reached its pre-assault point around 06:15 and waited for the expected "55 minute" aerial bombardment of enemy positions.
TF Rakkasan
At 06:30 the first wave of Rakkasans and Mountain troops landed via Chinook helicopter along the eastern and northern edges of the valley to await the fleeing fighters at their assigned blocking positions. The terrorists appeared surprised and did not fire on the Chinooks, its possible that they were distracted by TF Hammer's advance or the ineffective communication between the foreign fighters themselves. The first shots rung out the infantry took up security positions around the HLZ as the Chinooks lifted off and departed. They came under fire almost immediately after landing on their way to their objectives, and remained pinned down by heavy mortar fire and locked in a fierce firefight throughout the day. Orbiting Apache helicopters attempted to suppress enemy mortar teams, but ran into a wall of RPG and 12.7mm fire, with one Apache losing all of its electronics to an RPG hit. Instead of 150-200 fighters in the valley as expected, post assessment held that the area contained 750 to 1,000 terrorists dug in on the high ground around the valley. The insurgents used there ZPU-1 antiaircraft guns, DSHK and small arms fire against the attack helicopters supporting the Rakkasans.[19]
The troops of the 1st Battalion,
Despite heavy opposition, Task Force Rakkasan managed to secure its blocking positions to the north by the middle of the morning. TF Rakkasan and TF Hammer fought all day with the AFO teams calling in continuous airstrikes on al-Qaeda positions while Apaches protected the Rakkasans on the valley floor. AFO's only frustration was that Rakkasan ETAC/JTAC had priority for calling in airstrikes over the AFOs requests and the other SOF reconnaissance teams in and around the valley.
3 March and 4 March 2002
Battle of Takur Ghar
This section needs additional citations for verification. (February 2012) |
In the late evening of 3 March, Lieutenant Colonel Blaber received notice from Brigadier General
The SEAL fire team, Mako 30, was picked up by an MH-47 Chinook helicopter, at 23:23 on 3 March. However, the Chinook experienced engine difficulties, and new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original helicopters. This delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the LZ east of the peak until 02:30 on 4 March, which did not allow enough time to reach the peak before daylight. Blaber was notified that the SEALs were forced to insert on the peak in order to fulfill the order to infil Mako 30 that night. Nail 22, an AC-130H Spectre, reconnoitered the peak, and, seeing no enemy activity, declared the mountain top secure. It was then called away to support other troops before the Chinook arrived.
At approximately 03:00, the Chinook attempted to land atop the mountain. As they approached, the pilots and SEALs observed tracks in the snow and other signs of recent human activity. As they discussed a possible mission abort, the helicopter was met with effective RPG fire. Two Rocket Propelled Grenades slammed into the helicopter, shutting down one of its engines, the electric system, and the hydraulic systems and causing Petty Officer First Class
Around this time command decided to change the frequencies for satellite radio communications which different units, including the AFO teams in their reconnaissance positions, were relying on to conduct and adapt the mission as the battle unfolded. One of the generals in overall charge of the events at Takur Ghar ordered the radio frequencies switched to prevent the plan being modified.[citation needed] Though the change may have been meant to enhance direct control of the rescue of the downed SEAL atop Takur Ghar, it had the critical effect of severely limiting communications between the different teams participating in the battle.
The SEAL team Mako 30, regrouped and was ferried by nearby units to a CH-47 to go back to Takur Ghar and search for Roberts. The AC-130 was then directed to attack the large groupings of enemy combatants currently exposed on top of the mountain, one to three minutes before the Mako 30 was scheduled to arrive. As the CH-47 neared their return, the AC-130 radioed on the new satellite frequency for confirmation to fire. They were unable to get a clear answer from the officer they reached and also were unable to connect with the AFO teams. As a result, they did not fire and the CH-47 made an entry similar to the first, this time successfully landing the team on the ground amidst heavy machine gun and rocket fire while taking some casualties. They were able to establish communications via a line-of-sight radio with the teams of the AFO positioned around the Takur Ghar, taking advantage of the AFO's knowledge of enemy movements in real time.
At 03:45, the Ranger quick reaction force was alerted by the DCG to the area. Though they weren't given a specific mission, they were to establish communication for further instructions upon reaching Gardez, 10 minutes from the mountain. The
At approximately 06:10, Razor 01 reached the landing zone. The aircraft immediately began taking fire, and the right door
Australian SASR soldiers had infiltrated the area prior to the first helicopter crash undetected as part of a long range reconnaissance mission when the Chinooks went down. They remained undetected in an observation post through the firefight and proved critical in co-ordinating multiple Coalition air strikes to prevent the al-Qaeda fighters from overrunning the downed aircraft, to devastating effect. This, plus the actions of the two SASR officers working with the 10th Mountain Division, earned the commander of the Australian SASR force in Afghanistan the US Bronze Star for his unit's outstanding contribution to the war on terrorism. Australian soldiers had utilised 'virtual reality' style software for mission rehearsal prior to insertion, and this contributed significantly to their situational awareness in the darkness and poor weather conditions. This was the first time this capability had been used for a live combat mission.
At around 20:00, the quick-reaction force and Mako 30/21 were exfiltrated from the Takur Ghar peak. As a result of this action, both Technical Sergeant Chapman and Senior Airman Cunningham were awarded the
Also on March 4, 2nd Battalion of the Rakkasans air assaulted into the eastern end of the valley, immediately attacking the heights under Apache cover. Meanwhile, the 3rd battalion were dropped into the northern end of the valley with the objective of linking up with the stranded forces at the blocking positions. Supported by 16 Apaches, 5 USMC Cobras helicopters and several A-10A ground attack aircraft; the Rakkasans methodically cleared an estimated 130 caves, 22 bunkers and 40 buildings to finally secure the valley.[23]
Fate of Roberts
It is not certain whether the sailor died immediately or was killed by opposing soldiers. There is a possibility that Roberts was captured by the al Qaeda fighters, and executed later with a single shot to the back of the head (One of the feeds showed a group of 8-10 fighters huddling around what appeared to be a body; both GRIM 32 and MAKO 30 noted that an
A paper written by Col. Andrew Milani (Former commander of the
10 March 2002
Major Bryan Hilferty states that the "major battle ended three or four days ago." The U.S. sends 400 of its troops back to base.
12 March 2002
The exhausted Rakkasans were replaced by fresh elements from the 10th Mountain Division, who continued to clear the southern end of the Shahikot. AFO teams launched further Recce teams into the nearby Naka Valley, hunting for al-Qaeda terrorists that had escaped but did not find anything.[27] By this day, following heavy bombing by U.S. strike fighter aircraft, joint U.S. and Afghan forces swept through the valley and cleared it of remaining rebel forces, with little significant combat by 18 March. A total of 8 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen were killed and 82 wounded, along with several Afghan militiamen; U.S. estimates of other casualties vary, indicating rebel casualties between 500 and 800 and at least 14 civilian casualties. An undetermined number of rebels are said to have escaped the fighting through rugged terrain.
17 March 2002
Task Force 11 received time-sensitive intelligence that a possible HVT was travelling within a convoy of al-Qaeda fighters who were attempting to escape by vehicle from Shahikot into Pakistan. A Predator UAV had the convoy under surveillance, showing 3 SUVs, a pickup truck and a large security element of gunman. TF 11 element assigned the mission included SEAL operators from DEVGRU (commanded by the SEAL who led the Mako 30 mission on Takur Ghar) to conduct the vehicle stop, with a mixed force of Rangers as back up. The operators and an assigned CSAR team boarded 3 MH-47Es while the Rangers climbed aboard a pair of MH-60G Blackhawks, launching from Bagram in the early morning. The MH-47Es carrying the SEALs caught up to their targets: the lead Chinook landed in front of the convoy, as the occupants leapt out of their vehicles the door gunner hosed the vehicles down with his minigun, cutting down a number of al-Qaeda terrorists; the second Chinook overshot the column and raked it with minigun fire as it passed. The TF 11 operators added their firepower. Two Chinooks then landed their passengers in cover nearby and the operators took up positions overlooking the convoy. Both teams of SEAL operators now opened fire down on the enemy fighters in a crossfire and the third Chinook landed its operators nearby to investigate a suspicious looking vehicle. the firefight was over in minutes of the 18 al-Qaeda fighters 16 were killed, 2 were seriously wounded, they received medical attention and were detained. The fighters were a mix of Uzbeks, Chechens and Afghan Arabs and were well equipped, the operators recovered a lot of US military equipment: a US-made suppressor, a number of US fragmentation grenades issued to TF 11 and a Garmin handheld GPS, later traced to the crew of Razor 01.[28]
18 March 2002
General Tommy Franks declares Operation Anaconda over, terming it "an unqualified and complete success."[citation needed] Seymour Hersh goes on to refute the official account, describing it as "in fact a debacle, plagued by squabbling between the services, bad military planning and avoidable deaths of American soldiers, as well as the escape of key al-Qaeda leaders, likely including Osama bin Laden."[citation needed]
Assessment
The operation ran into problems from the outset. American Forces mistakenly landed in the middle of the valley, instead of the outside and were immediately caught in the Taliban's kill zone. In the heavy fire fight that followed two Chinooks were shot down and a number of others were severely damaged. American forces eventually gained the upper hand, inflicting heavy casualties on the Taliban forces and pushing them out of the valley.
At the end of Operation Anaconda, the US and Afghan forces had succeeded at removing the majority of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban presence from the Shahi-Kot Valley. The US forces suffered 80 casualties in the operation, with 8 killed and 72 wounded. Estimates of Al-Qaeda and Taliban casualties range from 100 to 1,000, with U.S. commanders favoring the higher estimates and Afghan commanders favoring the lower estimates. An unknown number of fighters were able to escape the Shahi-Kot Valley into Pakistan.[citation needed]
In the wake of Operation Anaconda, relations between US and UK forces on the ground soured when Stars and Stripes, the magazine for American forces and their families, openly criticized the Royal Marines for returning "empty-handed" from their search for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters claiming that Britain's contribution to the campaign was "disappointing."[citation needed] Relations were further soured with reports from a number of publications that Osama bin Laden might have escaped due to a substantial delay from the original H-hour of the deployment of American Forces.
Long-distance sniper record
The record for the longest combat kill by a sniper was set during Operation Anaconda by Canadian Army sniper Corporal Rob Furlong of the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and held for seven years until surpassed in 2009. Using a McMillan TAC-50 .50-calibre rifle, Furlong killed a Taliban fighter armed with an RPK machine gun at a confirmed distance of 2,430 metres (1.51 miles).[29] The previous record of 2,310 metres (7,580 ft) was set a few days before by his teammate Arron Perry, also of the 3rd Battalion PPCLI.
The five-man team, including MCpl Graham Ragsdale, MCpl Tim McMeekin, MCpl Arron Perry, Cpl Dennis Eason, and Cpl Rob Furlong, killed over 20 enemy fighters during the operation and were awarded Bronze Star medals by the United States for their service.
Reverse side of the operation
Operation Anaconda was also met with criticism. According to an interview[30] of some soldiers of the German Special Forces KSK, the post-operation briefing was broken down by an argument between the KSK soldiers and U.S. soldiers. The cause of the conflict is said to have been the complaint of some U.S. soldiers that the KSK soldiers had only changed their position when a shepherd stumbled into their hideout instead of killing him. "Use your silenced gun, then move on."[30]
"Die Amis eliminieren solche Bedrohungen tatsächlich," sagt ein Ex-Offizier des KSK. (...) Die Deutschen hätten auch erlebt, wie Amerikaner "bei der Operation Anaconda ganze Dörfer platt machten"(...): Hier Jungs, frei zum Plündern." Der hochrangige Ex-KSK-Mann sagt: "Die Bilder von Abu Ghraib, das Foltern in irakischen Gefängnissen, haben mich absolut nicht überrascht."[30]
"The U.S. soldiers would in fact eliminate such 'threats,' says a former KSK officer. (...) The Germans are quoted to have witnessed U.S. Forces flattening entire villages during Operation Anaconda: 'Let's go, free to pillage' (...). A former KSK commander is quoted in the German magazine Stern to have said: 'The pictures of Abu Ghraib, the torture in Iraqi prison camps, did absolutely not surprise me.'[30]
Aftermath
By July the tactical-level units from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division, including TF Rakkasan, had all departed Afghanistan; the CTF Mountain headquarters staff followed in early September.[31] They were replaced by CTF 82, formed from the headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division and led by the division's commander, Major General John R. Vines. CTF 82's headquarters was at Bagram Airfield, and Vines based TF Panther, his primary maneuver element, at the Kandahar Airfield. TF Panther was under the command of Colonel James L. Huggins and had two infantry battalions from the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and one attached infantry battalion from the division's 1st Brigade. Huggins also had support from artillery, aviation, military intelligence, and other units. TF Panther deployed to Afghanistan in late June 2002 and would serve under CTF 82 until 5 December 2002. At that point TF Devil, a unit formed around the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division arrived to take the lead in tactical-level security operations.
See also
- War in Afghanistan (1978–present)
- Mountain warfare
- Special Activities Division
- Timeline of the history of Afghanistan
Notes
This article needs additional citations for verification. (June 2012) |
- ^ a b "Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan's Tribal Region" (PDF). Institute for the Study of War. 27 January 2011. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.66-67
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.67
- ^ "Operation Anaconda winds down - CNN". Archives.cnn.com. 2002-03-17. Retrieved 2013-11-22.[dead link]
- ^ a b c d e Naylor, Sean. "Not a Good Day to Die" Penguin Group (New York), 2014:
- ^ Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, Page 317
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.50-51
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.50
- ^ ISBN 1-58544-624-6.
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.52
- ^ Holmes, Tony. "F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Enduring Freedom", 2013
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.29-31 p.52
- ^ Robert H. McElroy. "Fire Support for Operation Anaconda" (PDF). Field Artillery. September–October 2012. Fort Sill. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2013-04-04.
{{cite journal}}
: Unknown parameter|dead-url=
ignored (|url-status=
suggested) (help) - ISBN 978-1472807908, p.29-31 p.50
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.54
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.50-54
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.54
- ^ "Report: Friendly fire killed U.S. soldier". CNN. 29 October 2002.[dead link]
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.56
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.56-57
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.57
- ISBN 0-7322-8246-2.
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.66
- ^ Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013.:
- ^ Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013:
- ^ Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013. Page 352:
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.66-67
- ISBN 978-1472807908, p.67-69
- Macleans magazine. pp. 18–25. Retrieved 2011-11-22.
- ^ a b c d "Kommando Spezialkräfte: Die Profis", Stern
- ^ U.S. Army, A Different Kind of War
Further reading
- Bahmanyar, Mir. Afghanistan Cave Complexes 1979–2004: Mountain strongholds of the Mujahideen, Taliban & Al Qaeda. Osprey Publishing, 2004.
- Bahmanyar, Mir. Shadow Warriors: A History of the US Army Rangers. Osprey Publishing, 2005.
- Bahmanyar, Mir. US Army Ranger 1983-2002. Osprey Publishing, 2003.
- Blaber, Pete. "The Mission the Men and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander" US Army Colonel, Retired 2006. Executive Director Global Commercial Operations Amgen
- ISBN 0-7603-3150-2
- Grau, Lester W. and Dodge Billingsley. Operation Anaconda: America's First Major Battle in Afghanistan. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011. ISBN 978-0700618019
- Hersh, Seymour, Chain of Command, The Road from 911 to Abu Ghraib, Harper Collins, 2004
- MacPherson, M. 2005. Roberts Ridge : A Story of Courage and Sacrifice on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan, Delacorte, ISBN 0-553-80363-8
- Moore, Robin (2003). Taskforce Dagger: The Hunt for Bin Laden. London: MacMillan. ISBN 1405034076.
- Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die, Berkley Reprint, ISBN 0425207870
External links
- United States Army Center of Military History The U.S. Army in Afghanistan Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
- Defense and National Security Studies
- Combat Films and Research
- https://web.archive.org/web/20040728014146/http://www.stripesonline.com/
- BBC News: Al Qaeda 'executed US serviceman'
- Strategypage interview of Col. Wiercinski
- Executive Summary of the Battle of Takur Ghar (pdf)
- VFW Magazine: Valor in the Face of the Enemy - Air Force Cross awarded to Senior Airman Jason Dean Cunningham and Tech. Sgt. John Chapman
- Operation Enduring Freedom October 2001 - March 2002