Kurds in Iraq

Several Kurdish dynasties such as Annazids (990/1–1117)^[6][7] and Hasanwayhids (or Hasanuyids, 959–1015)^[7] ruled in northern Iraq. The Kurdish^[8][7][9] Marwanid dynasty (983–1096) temporarily ruled over Mosul.^[10] The Ayyubid dynasty, a powerful Islamic dynasty of Kurdish origin^[11] and also ruled northern Iraq.

Ottoman conquest and after

In the 1500s most Kurds fell under Ottoman Rule. Iraqi Kurds developed as a subgroup of the Kurdish peoples when

Kurdish people have played an important role in Iraqi state-building since the United States invaded in 2003. Many Kurds seek to build an autonomous federal state in the post-Hussein era, however, a solution for Kurdish problems in Iraq was not even mentioned in the 2004 UN resolution that established Iraq's interim government.^[21]

Politics

Factors that play into their future include Kurdish diversity and factions, Kurdish relationships with the United States, Iraq's central government, and neighboring countries, previous political agreements, disputed territories, and Kurdish nationalism.

Disputed internal boundaries have been a core concern for Arabs and Kurds, especially since US invasion and political restructuring in 2003. Kurds gained territory to the south of Iraqi Kurdistan after the US-led invasion in 2003 to regain what land they considered historically theirs.^[22]

One of the major problems in trying to implement Article 140 was a discrepancy in the definition of 'disputed area'.^[22] The article only refers to regions that would go through this normalization process as "Kirkuk and other disputed area".^[22] In 2003 Kurdish negotiator Mahmud Othman suggested that Kurdish majority areas below the Green line be attached to the KRG immediately, and 'mixed areas' should be questioned on a case-by-case basis.^[22] Sunnis felt as if Kurds should gain no additional land as a result of the US invasion.^[22] Reattaching Kirkuk districts to reflect the 1975 boundaries posed many problems to Iraqis and brought along unintended consequences.^[22]

2014 Northern Iraq offensive

During the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive, Iraqi Kurdistan seized the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding area, as well as most of the disputed territories in Northern Iraq.^[23]

Article 140

Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution vowed to place disputed areas under the jurisdiction of the

In 2008, the Iraqi, Kurdish and US governments came to the consensus that these types of reparations to the Kurdish people would not be able to be carried out without further negotiations and political agreements on boundaries.[24] The US government faced many problems trying to implement Article 140. This was not an ideal form of reparation for many Kurds. After being displaced, many formerly Kurdish regions lacked in development and agricultural upkeep.^[24] Educational and economic opportunities were often greater for Kurds outside of these disputed territories, so many people did not want to be forced to return.^[24]

Culture and diversity

Religion

Before the spread of

After political changes in Iraq in the 1990s, however, Kurdish was increasingly used in the regional administration and education system, given their greater autonomy.[4]

Political parties

A major weakness of Kurdish national cohesiveness has been the strength of tribal and regional factions, often resulting in strong breaks between

Kurdish leaders in Iraq have pushed for the prosperity of divided local governments rather than an independent state; this is because leadership is derived from tribal legitimacy, rather than political institutions. Talabani and Barzani, for instance, did not come from the most populous Kurdish tribe, but rather from well-organized tribes.[21] This could be an inhibitor to democracy in the region since those trying to preserve the status quo hold power but do not represent the majority.^[21]

From 1986 to the present, Turkey has held different alliances with the KDP and PUK parties of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has protected the KDP from the PKK and PUK. Turkey has also attacked the political parties PUK and PKK, while keeping good relations with the KDP, partially for access to cheap

National identity

Throughout the 1990s, when Kurds were given regional control after the

Development of Kurdish infrastructure has also become an integral aspect of their successful autonomy.[20] Previously dependent on the socioeconomic infrastructure of Baghdad, Kurds were able to efficiently build up their region, physically and politically, from scratch.^[20] They built a fully functioning autonomous government, free from Ba'athist Iraq. They were able to manage local governments, establish free and active Kurdish political parties, and institutionalize a Kurdish parliament.^[20] With these developments, the de facto Kurdish government gained recognition for the first time in the international sphere. They have quasi-official representation in Turkey, Iran, France, Britain, and the United States.^[20]

Though Kurdish people had some success in forming a national identity, there have been factors that have stunted its growth. Under the state of Iraq, Kurds were subjugated to the nationalism process for all Iraqis, given the arbitrary state lines.^[21] Kurds were starting to think of themselves as Iraqis, rather than focus on their collective development as Kurds. Nationalism was also hindered by divisions of tribes, languages, and geography that prevented the Kurdish people from identifying completely as one unit.^[21] No leader has yet to rise above this tribal status and the infighting hurts those fighting for Kurdish autonomy because they are divided by other factions or political boundaries.^[21] For example, during the Iran–Iraq War, from 1980 to 1988, Turkey supported one Iraqi Kurdish group over another in order to play the Iraqi Kurds off against Turkey's own rebellious Kurds.^[21]

Technology and telecommunications have helped Kurds to establish an ethno-national group, or self-defined national identity. Though this has developed a sense of pride and definition across political boundaries, it reveals a less promising scenario of Kurdish statehood.^[21] It has disclosed disparities across countries about which Kurdish populations are gaining international support and relief. For Iraqi Kurds, this international network was established after the Gulf War of 1991. They had new forms of financial and political support as well as the resources and the legal geographic space to advance their nationalist agenda. This access allowed Kurdish language publications, texts, educational programs, and cultural organizations to flourish—benefits that Kurds only were experiencing within the state of Iraq and in European academic institutions.^[21] Transnational social and cultural networks for Kurds were still tied to characteristics of certain states.^[21]

Autonomy

With a

Even at a crossroads for the political future of Iraqi Kurds, Barzani and Talabani have both opted for establishing a federalist system within post-Saddam Iraq in order to ensure the future wellbeing of the Kurdish people.^[21]

On 1 July 2014, Massud Barzani announced that "Iraq's Kurds will hold an independence referendum within months." After previously opposing the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey has later given signs that it could recognize an independent Kurdish state. On 11 July 2014 KRG forces seized control of the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk oilfields, prompting a condemnation from Baghdad and a threat of "dire consequences," if the oilfields were not relinquished back to Iraq's control.^[32]

References