Jagdgeschwader 26

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Jagdgeschwader 26
Fighter bomber
SizeWing
Nickname(s)Schlageter
PatronAlbert Leo Schlageter
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Adolf Galland
Josef Priller

Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) Schlageter was a German

Western Allies
.

Formed in May 1939, JG 26 spent the

USAAF Eighth Air Force, and along with the rest of the Luftwaffe fighter force, was worn down over Western Europe combating the Combined Bomber Offensive in Defence of the Reich. In 1944, JG 26 resisted the Normandy landings and served as a "tactical" or frontline unit during Operation Market Garden and Battle of the Bulge. It continued to fight up to the unconditional surrender of Wehrmacht
forces in Western Europe on 8 May 1945.

Elements of JG 26 served in other theatres. A single staffel (squadron) served in the

North African Campaign and Battle of the Mediterranean. One gruppe (group) and a single staffel, fought on the Eastern Front from January to June 1943. A planned move in full to the Soviet Union did not materialise. JG 26 was well known by Allied air forces. The Royal Air Force (RAF) called the Joachim Müncheberg-led II. Gruppe the "Abbeville Boys" after their home base.[1]

Organisation

Main article:
Organisation of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)

A Luftwaffe Geschwader (wing formation) was the largest homogenous flying formation. It typically was made up of three groups (gruppen). Each group contained approximately 30 to 40 aircraft in three squadrons (staffeln). A Jagdgeschwader could field 90 to 120

roman numerals, for example I./JG 26, while staffeln were described with their number (1./JG 26).[3] The wing could be subordinated to a Fliegerkorps, Fliegerdivision or Jagddivision (Flying Corps, Division and Fighter Division) all of which were subordinated to Luftflotten (Air Fleets).[2][4] The use of Fliegerdivision became redundant and the description Fliegerkorps supplanted it until the use of Jagddivision later in the war.[4]

Formation

Jagdgeschwader 26 was one of the earliest fighter units of the Luftwaffe. Its creation began in early 1937. A plan dated 14 March 1936 by Hermann Göring, at the time Reichsminister der Luftfahrt (Minister of Aviation) and Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe), foresaw the creation of two light fighter groups in Luftkreis IV, a territorial Luftwaffe unit with its headquarters in Münster. Göring had planned for these two groups, initially organized under the designation Jagdgeschwader 234 (JG 234–234th Fighter Wing), to become operational on 1 April 1937.[5]

I. Gruppe of JG 234 was created from the redesignation of III. Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 134 on 15 March 1937 at Cologne Butzweilerhof Airfield.[6] Its first commander was Hauptmann Walter Grabmann, who handed over command to Major Gotthard Handrick on 11 September 1938. The Gruppe was initially referred to I.(leichte Jäger) Gruppe and was equipped with the Heinkel He 51 B and started receiving the first Messerschmitt Bf 109 B series in May 1938.[7] In parallel, II. Gruppe of JG 234 was formed in Düsseldorf. This Gruppe had numerous commanders during its creation phase, Major Werner Rentsch (15 March – May 1937), Major Werner Nielsen (May – 31 July 1937), Oberstleutnant Eduard Ritter von Schleich (1 August 1937 – 30 September 1938), Hauptmann Werner Palm (1 October 1938 – 27 June 1939) and Hauptmann Herwig Knüppel, who took command on 28 June 1939.[8]

The Geschwaderstab (headquarters unit) was formed on 1 November 1938 in Düsseldorf and placed under the command of Oberst Eduard Ritter von Schleich. On this day, the Geschwader was renamed to Jagdgeschwader 132 (JG 132–132nd Fighter Wing) and was subordinated to Luftgaukommando IV (Air District Command). Also, on this day, I. and II. Gruppe of JG 234 were placed under the command of JG 132 and were then referred to as I. and II. Gruppe of JG 132. The Geschwaderstab was equipped with the Bf 109 D-1. On 8 December 1938, JG 132 was given the unit name "Schlageter", named after Albert Leo Schlageter. Schlageter was former member of the Freikorps who was executed by the French for sabotage and then became a martyr cultivated by the Nazi Party.[5]

On 1 May 1939, the unit was named Jagdgeschwader 26 "Schlageter". One practical result of being a "named" unit was that for propaganda, if not necessarily operational, reasons. The wing was always among the first to receive new equipment; by January 1939 the Jagdgeschwader had received the newer Bf 109 E-1 which was highest performing fighter aircraft in the world at the time.[9] I. Gruppe was commanded by Gotthard Handrick. Handrick served in Jagdgruppe 88 (J/88), Condor Legion, during the Spanish Civil War. Hauptmann Werner Palm commanded II. Gruppe, while III. Gruppe, formed 23 days into the war, was placed under Major Ernst Freiherr von Berg.[10]

World War II

On 25 August 1939, I. Gruppe was ordered from

French Air Force unit.[13] By 30 September 1939, III. Gruppe had received its full complement of Bf 109s. The wing now had 129 day fighters, with fourteen Bf 109 Ds and six Ar 68s in the night fighter staffel.[14] Walter Kienitz was replaced as III. Gruppe commander by Major Ernst Freiherr von Berg on 31 October, while on 7 November Joachim Müncheberg claimed the last victory during the "Phoney War" over a No. 56 Squadron RAF Bristol Blenheim bomber.[14] The night fighter unit 10.(Nacht)/JG 26 fought in the Battle of the Heligoland Bight under Carl-Alfred Schumacher. Steinhoff was also in the battle; the German unit claimed six (three confirmed) for one pilot drowned.[15] On New Years Day 1940, JG 26 began replacing the Bf 109 E-1 with the E-3, which had more powerful MG FF cannon armament in the wings, though not all staffeln had replaced the E-1 until autumn, 1940.[16] On 10 February 1940 I. Gruppe was assigned to Jagdgeschwader 51 (JG 51—51st Fighter Wing) but remained under JG 26 administration. It did not return to JG 26 until June 1940. To maintain it as a three gruppen wing, JG 26 took operational control of gruppen from other wings.[16] From 1 September 1939 to 9 May 1940, JG 26 lost one pilot killed in action, one interned in the Netherlands, three killed in accidents and one wounded in action. The pilots were credited with four confirmed and four unconfirmed victories.[17]

France and the Low Countries

JG 26 was assigned to

Battle of Belgium, which encouraged the French Army and British Army into the Low Countries while Army Group A outflanked them through lower Belgium and Luxembourg, north of the Maginot Line. JG 51, Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27—27th Fighter Wing) and Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26—26th Destroyer Wing) provided air superiority support. II. and III. Gruppen operated over the Netherlands in the first days, with the attached III. Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3—3rd Fighter Wing). I. Gruppe joined them, under the command of JG 51.[18] Stab/JG 26 had four Bf 109s on strength (three operational), I. Gruppe 44 (35), II. Gruppe 47 (36) and III. Gruppe 42 (22), based at Dortmund, Bonninghardt, Dortmund and Essen respectively.[19]

Bf 109 E, JG 1, similar to those flown by JG 26 in 1940

Sint Truiden. I. Gruppe, under JG 51, transferred to Antwerp 23 May.[25]

The breakthrough at Sedan on 13 May permitted the

Chievres as the attached III./JG 3 moved to Mauriaux. From 24 to 28 May, JG 26 pilots were credited with 13 victories with six unconfirmed. Their opponents on the last date were from 213, 229 and 242.[29]The following morning Fighter Command fielded the largest single patrol when Hurricanes from 229 and 242 Squadrons, covered by Spitfires from 64 and 610. The British formations were too far apart which allowed two gruppen of JG 26 and III./JG 3 to attack them from higher altitudes. In thirty minutes, ten British fighters were shot down while the Junkers Ju 87 "Stukas" made a successful attack on Dunkirk shipping. II./JG 27 moved to Brussels on 30 May and by the following morning, JG 26 controlled all three of its gruppen plus three attached gruppen making it a six-group wing. On 31 May, JG 26 pilots were given credit for nine fighters destroyed; since the 10 May seven of the wings pilots had been killed, seven wounded and four captured (one later released). All but three fell in aerial combat. The penultimate day of combat over Dunkirk on 1 June saw JG 26 claim five for no loss; within twenty four hours seven claims were granted after a large air battle over Dunkirk.[30] Fighter Command reported the loss of 18 in total on the first and 11 on the second in combat with fighter, heavy fighter and bomber formations.[29]

Fall Gelb ended, and the final phase of the

Doberitz to protect the Berlin victory celebration.[36]

Battle of Britain

The capitulation of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark and Norway in mid-1940 left the United Kingdom facing hostile coastlines from Norway to the Bay of Biscay. In the west, the Battle of the Atlantic was taking place. Winston Churchill rejected Adolf Hitler's overtures for a peace settlement and the Nazi leadership resolved to invade Britain as a last resort. Operation Sea Lion could not begin until air superiority over the Channel and Southern England was achieved, at the least.[37] Oberkommando der Luftwaffe ordered attacks on British shipping in the English Channel as a prelude to a full-scale offensive against Fighter Command and its infrastructure, in July 1940. The intention was to draw out Fighter Commandand deplete it in dogfights over the Channel while blocking the Channel to British shipping. The Germans referred to this phase, of what became the Battle of Britain, as the Kanalkampf.[38][39] [40]

Stab and I. Gruppe returned to France on 15 July at Audembert, near Calais, a former grain field. It redeployed to Jagdfliegerführer 2 once again under the command of Luftflotte 2, though the date they became operational is unknown. Some ground crews did not reach France until August. Re-equipment with the more heavily armed and armoured Bf 109 E-4 was incomplete and many E-1s remained on charge. The pilots of JG 26 believed that a campaign against the United Kingdom would end in a swift victory.[41] II. and III. Gruppen were based at Marquise, Pas-de-Calais and Caffiers respectively. II. Gruppe led by Karl Ebbighausen had 35 Bf 109s operational from 39 and Galland 38 from 40 serviceable. All four aircraft of the Stabstaffel Bf 109s were combat ready and I. Gruppe had 34 from 38 operational.[42]

JG 26 Bf 109 E-3, displayed at the Imperial War Museum Duxford.

JG 26 took part in its first action on 24 July and lost two pilots. Oberleutnant Werner Bartels, technical officer, was captured wounded but repatriated in a prisoner-exchange in 1943 and later worked on the Messerschmitt Me 262 project. The losses came as a shock and reinforced Galland's view that the campaign would not be easy. Four victory claims were accepted in July for three men killed and one captured.[43] The Channel battles continued into August. On day one, Galland was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross by Albert Kesselring and JG 26 was stood down for a week until sufficient strength could be built for Adlertag (Eagle Day).[44]

From 1 to 11 August, two Bf 109s were lost and one pilot was killed; three claims were granted to III. Gruppe. In the action of 8 August above Convoy Peewi the gruppe and II./JG 51 claiming eight Spitfires (three were lost). The Germans suffered one casualty and the British claimed nine; JG 26 were credited with two and one unconfirmed.[44] Fighter Command credited JG 51 with two of the losses and JG 26 just one.[45] On 12 August, II. Gruppe claimed a first victory of the battle, while the wing destroyed nine fighters for one pilot killed and another captured.[46]

Adlertag began on 13 August and cost JG 26 one fighter, though the attacks were a failure.

LG 1. II. Gruppe suffered on loss and claimed two in action with 32 Squadron; III. Gruppe engaged 615 Squadron and claimed six (actual losses were three).[49] JG 26 fought in the actions on 15 August, called Black Thursday in the Luftwaffe due to the severity of the losses.[50]

KG 3, escorted by other fighter units damaged the airfields at Rochester and RAF Hornchurch; JG 26 made 13 claims but 8 remained unconfirmed. Twenty four hours later, Ebbighausen was killed in action with 266 Squadron, though the RAF Squadron was destroyed (losing six)<!Is this the squadron destroyed or a flight?--> when an unidentified Bf 109 unit intervened.[52] JG 26 served in the 18 August battles now known as The Hardest Day, claiming nine for the loss of two pilots.[52][53]

Both sides were grounded by poor weather for several days and on 22 August 1940, Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, dissatisfied with his wing commanders and feeling that younger and more aggressive leaders were needed for the battle, replaced eight Geschwaderkommodore. Handrick was replaced by Galland who agreed with Göring that the sole measure of success in a fighter leader was the number of aircraft shot down. Galland began weeding out those he deemed unfit and promoting those he saw as able; Schöpfel and Müncheberg were among those promoted to command Staffeln.[54] From 22 to 30 August, JG 26 were credited with 23 fighters for two killed, two captured and one wounded. On the final day of August, 15 fighters were destroyed for two killed and three captured. In the first week of September, the battles against the airfields died down, as OKL changed tactics. In the first six days, JG 26 were credited with 21 fighters destroyed for the loss of two dead and three prisoners.[55] With Hitler's approval, the Luftwaffe began to attack military objectives in London.[56]

The climax of the campaign was later called Battle of Britain Day. JG 26 fought in the main dogfights, accounting for three fighters according to post-war research.[57] From 7 September, German fighter units were ordered to fly as close escort, which brought Galland into dispute with Göring whose loss of confidence in the fighter arm had as much to do with the switch of strategy to bombing London. To Göring the fighter patrols, free of bomber escort, had not been as successful as the pilots claimed. Henceforth, fighter units no longer had free rein to exploit the qualities of the Bf 109 in flying high and making diving attacks. Flying closer to the bombers forced the German fighters to engage in manoeuvre battles with the Spitfire, which was superior to the Bf 109 in this respect due to its lighter wing loading.[58] In a much-publicised conversation, Galland claimed that in a meeting with Göring and Werner Mölders he requested a Spitfire for his wing if that was how they were to fight. Galland had to settle for some Bf 109 E-4/Ns, JG 26 being the only unit to fly the type. The Daimler-Benz DB 601N required 96 Octane fuel rather than the standard 87 Octane and was in short supply; the DB 601N had a short production run.[58] The decision to attack London placed the Bf 109 at the limit of its range. Galland remarked that a drop tank could have increased flying time by 30 or 40 minutes.[59]

Bf 109 E-3; JG 26 operated the E-1, 3 and 4 in 1940. It was more heavily armed than the E-1. Note the 87 octane triangle on the fuselage

In September tiredness and a decline in morale began to affect the fighter pilots. The Luftwaffe lacked sufficient pilots and aircraft to maintain a constant presence over England. Commanders demanded three to four sorties per day by the most experienced men. By the end of September, Galland noticed that "the stamina of the superbly trained and experienced original [cadre of pilots] was down to a point where operational efficiency was being impaired".[60] Göring's interference with tactics without regard for the situation, the capabilities of German aircraft, rapid adaptation to German tactics by the British and the poorer quality of pilot replacements to JG 26 put a greater burden on the dwindling number of veteran pilots.[61] This situation led to a conflict between the two significant psychological needs of the fighter pilots: confidence in their aircraft and tactics.[61]

Galland found a partial solution to Göring's order to maintain close escort by developing a flexible escort system that allowed his pilots constantly to change altitude, airspeed, direction and distance to the bombers during close-escort operations. The results were better and acceptable to his pilots; by the end of the Battle of Britain, JG 26 had gained a reputation as one of only two fighter wings that performed escort duties with consistently low losses to the bombers.

Fighter bomber (Jabo) operations became prominent in October and November as the bombers turned to night bombing (The Blitz) with London the main target.[63] On 20 October 1940, in Unternehmen Opernball (Operation Opera), jabos flew in support of a 300-aircraft mission against Fighter Command targets.[64]

During the Battle of Britain, the Geschwader claimed 285 fighters shot down for the loss of 56 pilots, a ratio of 5:1.

Nazi propaganda machine. Individuals like Galland, Mölders and Helmut Wick were publicised, unlike the Air Ministry which deprecated emphasis on individuals. Wick was dead before the end of November and Mölders under a year later.[67] Four fighter pilots of the wing claimed 31 per cent of the aircraft shot down.[68] At the end of 1940, seven JG 26 members had been awarded the Knight's Cross.[69]

Malta, Balkans, North Africa

JG 26 played a brief role in the

Greece on 6 April. In support of this invasion, the pilots attacked the airfield at Podgorica.[76] The staffel destroyed three Yugoslav aircraft, but were back to operating from Malta by 8 April, until 31 May when based at Molaoi, Greece. On 14 June the staffel was ordered to North Africa to support the fight against Operation Battleaxe under the command of I. Gruppe of JG 27 from Gazala.[77] 7./JG 26 achieved successes in Africa but during August–September the unit suffered serviceability problems. Ultra routinely reported on the unit's location and orders. On 24 September 1941 it left Africa, never to return. In the Battle of the Mediterranean, 7./JG 26 claimed 52 enemy aircraft but did not lose a single pilot.[78]

Channel Front

The bulk of JG 26 remained on the Channel coast under the command of

Hugh Trenchard's World War I policy.[82]

From 1941 through to 1942, JG 26 were fully occupied with defending German military targets in northern France and Belgium from RAF incursions. JG 26 defended airspace east of the Seine to the Dutch border, while JG 2 covered west of the demarcation line.[83] JG 26 formally came under the command of Theo Osterkamp's Jagdfliegerführer 2.[84] At the beginning of 1941 Galland had three experienced and successful Gruppenkommandeur under his command; Walter Adolph, Rolf Pingel and Schöpfel. Müncheberg and the recently arrived Josef Priller would be appointed to senior commands during the year after the loss of Pingel and Adolph in action and Galland to the high command.[85] 1941 proved to be a successful period for JG 26 tactically. Galland and his gruppen could choose which RAF formations to engage, and when and how to engage them.[81] In essence, the German and British units were fighting a reverse Battle of Britain.[86][87] At the beginning of the year, JG 26 began converting to the Bf 109 F-2. The fighter was aerodynamically cleaner than the E variant, and could out perform the previous version considerably.[88] The type was similar looking to the Spitfire V, entering service simultaneously and the two were comparable.[89] The cannons were deleted from the wing; one cannon remained firing through the propeller hub, and two heavy machine guns remained fixed above the engine to fire through the propeller. I. and III. Gruppe began conversion at Dortmund and Bonn.[88] Consequently, only III./JG 26 were equipped with the F by 28 June 1941—39 machines reported. By 27 September, I. Gruppe had the F-4 while II. Gruppe equipped with the Focke-Wulf Fw 190.[90]

The captured Bf 109 F-2 piloted by Rolf Pingel, commanding II. Gruppe. He force-landed in England and was captured.

From January to June 1941, JG 2 and JG 26 were supported by other fighter wings.

Wing Commander Douglas Bader baled out and was captured.[97] Galland entertained the famous pilot at JG 26 headquarters.[98] The cause of Bader's capture occurred in the midst of combat with III. Gruppe commanded by Schöpfel.[97] Galland, went through every report, even those of German pilots killed in the action, to determine Bader's victor. Each case was dismissed.[99] RAF combat records indicate Bader may have been shot down by Flight Lieutenant "Buck" Casson of No. 616 Squadron RAF, who claimed a Bf 109 whose tail came off and the pilot baled out, before he himself was shot down and captured[100][101] by Schöpfel.[97] In the period 14 June–4 July Fighter Command lost 80 fighters and 62 pilots, while the two German wings lost 48 Bf 109s and 32 pilots; 2:1 in the Luftwaffe's favour.[102]

The impact of Fighter Command's massive daylight operations were offset by the tactical deployment of German units which enjoyed radar-based guidance. They skilfully used this to outweigh their numerical inferiority. 32 Freya radar and 57 Würzburg radar sets were employed from Heligoland to the Bay of Biscay.[103] Fighter Command flew 6,875 sorties from January to June and lost 112 aircraft—57 in June. From July to December this increased to 20,495 with 416 losses.[103] The pressure grew on JG 2, allotted to Jagdfliegerführer 3, JG 1, assigned to Jagdfliegerführer 1 and JG 26. There were 4,385 "alarmstarts" in July 1941 and another 4,258 in August. September saw a reduction to 2,534 and to 2,553 in October before falling to 1,287. Nevertheless, the fighter wings still retained 430 fighters on 27 September 1941.[104] August proved the costliest to the Luftwaffe in the second half of the year with 42 losses which fell to 18 in September and 15 in October.[98] In September 1941 JG 26 began requipping with the Fw 190, and by year's end had mostly adopted the type. The Fw 190 A proved troublesome initially but soon proved formidable and superior to the Spitfire V. Walter Adolph became the first Fw 190 commander and pilot killed and he was replaced by Müncheberg at the head of II. Gruppe.[98]

Fighter Command suffered badly in 1941. Losses were about 2 percent [of aircraft per sortie] while 2 Group Bomber Command suffered 7.68 percent casualties. From 14 June 1941, Fighter Command reported 411 fighters over the Channel; 14 on the last "Circus" of the year. The British claimed 731 German aircraft destroyed though only 103 German fighters were lost. A post-war survey concluded by the Air Ministry asserted that the RAF lost 2.5 pilots for every German fighter downed. The German geschwader, in contrast, destroyed four for every one they lost. Their percent remained at one percent.

General der Jagdflieger after the death of Mölders. Schöpfel replaced him.[106]

Fw 190 of JG 26, 1942.

1942 began with Galland planning and executing the air superiority plan

401 Squadron are known to have suffered on loss against JG 26; no loss or damage in 72 Squadron was listed.[109] In March 1942, post-war analysis credits JG 26 with 27 Fighter Command fighters destroyed; though it sustained many more unattributed losses.[110]

April 1942 continued with Fighter Command continuing the daylight offensive while Bomber Command stepped up the

Air Vice Marshal Johnnie Johnson remarked "Yes, the 190 was causing us real problems at this time. We could out-turn it, but you couldn't turn all day. As the number of 190s increased, so the depth of our penetrations decreased. They drove us back to the coast really.".[112] 48 specific Fighter Command losses have been linked to JG 26 in April 1942. Many more were lost in aerial combat with either JG 2 or JG 26 .[113] Improving weather conditions and the Fw 190 brought more casualties in May and June. At least 46 Fighter Command fighters were lost in action with JG 26 in this period while a further seven fell in combat with both JG 2 and JG 26—many more losses remain unattributed.[114] Over claiming was an issue; for the first nine days of May, JG 2 and JG 26 claimed 53 (31 and 22 respectively). Actual Fighter Command losses were 35. For the same period, the German fighter units lost six between them; the British claimed 18 destroyed and another 18 probably destroyed.[115] Though the subject of overclaiming is polemical, the disparity between the reported losses on either side was significant. Nine Spitfires were lost for every two Fw 190 or Bf 109s that sustained irreparable combat damage up to mid-May.[115]

Fw 190(A-5) of the World Heritage Collection (June 2012)—the 190 was main fighter of JG 26 from late 1941 to 1945

A main change of command occurred when Joachim Müncheberg left II. Gruppe on 21 July 1942 and replaced by Conny Meyer.[116] In August 1942 the British and Canadians carried out Operation Jubilee, a raid on Dieppe harbour. Fighter, Command and Coastal Commands supported the Commando landings with powerful air forces. The RAF did not succeed in forcing the Luftwaffe into a pitched-battle over the beachhead and Fighter Command in particular, suffered heavy casualties. The British claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Luftwaffe, the balance sheet showed the reverse; Allied aircraft losses amounted to 106, including 88 RAF fighters (70 Spitfires were lost to all causes)[117] and 18 bombers, against 48 Luftwaffe aircraft lost. Included in that total were 28 bombers, half of them Dornier Do 217s from KG 2. The two German Jagdgeschwader units had the following results: JG 2 lost 14 Fw 190s with eight pilots killed and JG 26 lost six Fw 190s with six pilots killed.[118] The Spitfire Squadrons, 42 with Mark Vs, and only four with Mark IXs were tasked with close air support, fighter escort and air-superiority missions.[119] The exact number of Spitfires lost to the Fw 190 gruppen is unknown. The Luftwaffe claimed 61 of the 106 RAF machines lost, which included all types: JG 2 claimed 40 and JG 26 claimed 21.[118] Wing Commander Minden Blake was among the notable British casualties. the 130 Squadron leader was captured after being shot down by a Fw 190.[120]

During the course of 1942 and 1943 JG 2 and JG 26 carried out "Jabo" operations in towns and coastal targets in England, and occasionally bombed London. At the beginning of 1943,

SKG 10 had taken over these operations as JG 2 and JG 26 could no longer be spared for offensive operations.[121] JG 26 were at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to JG 2 in "Jabo" operations. Its pilots had little experience and no dedicated staffeln when attacks began in earnest in March 1942. Those deemed unsuitable as fighter pilots, undisciplined or who had clashed with commanders were the first sent into 10. and 13. Staffeln which were to operate as fighter-bombers. The lack of training and enthusiasm in the 17 "tip and run" attacks contributed to the ineffectiveness on 10. Staffel.[122] The imbalance of the raids was noticed by the British; Kent and Sussex being 10./JG 26s area of operations, while the experienced 13./JG 2 operated over Hampshire 49 times, though 10./JG 26s region was more heavily defended. The first certain fighter-bomber mission occurred on 7 March 1942.[122] From 19 April to 18 June German records indicate 32 Jabo missions were flown by Bf 109 F-4s against a variety of targets.[123] Fighter-bomber attacks by 10. Staffel lasted up until 5 February 1943.[124] Five JG 26 Fw 190s were lost this way on 21 January 1943.[125]

In 1942, JG 1, 2 and 26 began to experience a new opponent on the Channel Front. The

B-17 Flying Fortress quickly earned a reputation, almost immediately, of absorbing heavy damage and remaining airborne. In 1942, a typical interception of this type by Fw 190 pilots was difficult. The American bombers flew at altitudes in excess of 8,000 m (26,000 ft), and lacking a super-charger, the Fw 190s struggled to reach altitudes even with considerable warning from American radio/signals traffic.[126] At that altitude, Fw 190A-2s had only slight speed advantages over the B-17. The Revi gunsights were set for fighter, not anti-bomber combat, and set for a range of 100 m (110 yd). The large bombers loomed in quickly long before the German fighters had reached effective range encouraging premature firing. The psychological impact of the massed-firepower of American bombers encouraged inexperienced German pilots to break off too soon from the classic stern-attack position to cause any damage.[126] This anxiety among green pilots heightened through the use of the .50 calibre guns on American aircraft. They out-ranged the MG 151/20 cannon and MG 17 machine gun on German fighters, and in a slow-closing chase the German pilot often had to sit through several minutes of American gunfire before they got within effective firing range of their own armament. American gunners saturated the air with tracers to disrupt or ward off attacks. In response, Galland organised a test group to experiment with air-to-air rockets and heavy calibre cannon to remedy the situation.[126]

For the Luftwaffe, the winter of 1942-43 was spent increasing the engine and firepower of their fighters. Weights rose, and engine power had to follow to keep pace. In order to increase compression ratios in their engines, and unable to do so through the use of high-strength alloys and high-octane fuel lacking in Germany, engineers opted for chemical enhancements. The Bf 109G-1 high-altitude fighter, powered by the

DB 605A was given the GM-1 injection. The Fw 190A-3 was introduced with improved BMW 801D-2 engines providing more power. The Fw 190A-4 and Bf 109G-4 soon followed, with improved radios and homing devices. At their preferred altitudes – below 20,000 ft for the 190 and the reverse for the 109 -each of these types was a match for the Spitfire IX.[126] Most of the fighters arriving at JG 2 and JG 26 bases in late 1942 were Bf 109s.[127] The Fw 190 was in short supply, and given the multi-role function of the Fw 190 the Channel Front wings were to scheduled to revert to Bf 109s to permit the Fw 190 to move to priority theatres – a move encouraged by the Fw 190s lack of performance above 7,500 m (25,000 ft) where US bombers operated.[127]

In contrast, the Bf 109 was a superb dogfighter and above 9,000 m (30,000 ft) was in its element.[127] In the spring, 1943, I/JG 2 and II/JG 26 were flying Bf 109s and Fw 190s. Operationally at gruppe level this was not efficient and it was decided for these units to retain their Fw 190s; and did so until the end of the war. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 were used to complement each other in the coming battles. The Fw 190s armament, considered effective against all enemies, was used against bombers more frequently, while the high-flying Bf 109s engaged escorting fighters. The Bf 109G-4 was “up-gunned” as well to the Bf 109G-6, with two MG 131 machine guns replacing the MG 17, and supplementing the MG 151/20 cannon in the nose. The MW 50 (water-methanol) additive increased lower altitude performance but the increase in weight reduced manoeuvrability. German pilots were critical of the Bf 109s fragility, but praised the Fw 190s strong construction; the latter type remained the preference among western theatre pilots.[127]

Eastern Front

The news JG 26 was ordered to be ordered onto the Eastern Front in January 1943 was greeted with enthusiasm. The perception of the pilots was that the

Red Air Force, in qualitative terms, was weaker and victories, a prerequisite to awards and promotions, easier to obtain.[128] JG 26 was ordered to replace JG 54 in Luftflotte 1, supporting Army Group North in maintaining the Siege of Leningrad. The move would be staged by gruppen and staffeln with key personnel and equipment. All other crews and maintenance devices remained on the bases. The move was ordered as the Red Army began Operation Iskra and scored a victory by establishing a land link to the city. Only 6 miles (9.7 km) wide, every point was covered by German artillery, and although Army Group North sealed the penetration by 18 January 1943, it could not eliminate it. Conversely, the Soviets could not widen it through further offensives which ended on 1 April.[128]

Fighting broke out near III./JG 54's base on

Demyansk pocket. The decision was made to replace III./JG 54 with I./JG 26 first. The intended swap of the wings never took place. While I. Gruppe went east to support Army Group Centre on the Moscow sector, 7 staffel was detached again, and sent to the Leningrad front until late June 1943 as part of I./JG 54. I/JG 26 returned to France after four months of operations.[128]

On 5 and 7 March I. Gruppe claimed 21 Soviet aircraft in total and from 9 to 14 March claimed another eight. During this period, the German army carried out Operation Büffel, a series of local withdrawals in the Battles of Rzhev. The authorised strength of the gruppe was 40 aircraft and pilots. The quarterly report on 31 March stated that 48 pilots were present, 35 available for duty. It had 35 Fw 190s, but only 24 were operational. In the late spring operated form Dno until 6 May.[129] I. Gruppe moved to Smolensk on 9 May and participated in the build-up for the Battle of Kursk. It was involved in Operation Carmen, a series of bombing attacks on Kursk rail targets on 2 June. Johannes Seifert relinquished command of the gruppe and was replaced by Fritz Losigkeit. The group returned to Germany soon afterwards and was not involved in the Kursk battle.[130]

7./JG 26 added their dozen Fw 190s to the 40 from I./JG 54. In this sector they were opposed by 1,200 aircraft of the

13th Air Army and 14th Air Army. Klaus Mietusch commanded the staffel. According to one account, Mietusch cared little for his men as individuals, and judged them solely on their performance in the air. The leader hardly ever spoke to non-commissioned officer.[131] Mietusch was ordered to take command of III. Gruppe on 29 June after the death of the previous commander and left within twenty four hours. The staffel left the Soviet Union on 10 July for Cuxhaven to join III. Gruppe which had been moved to Germany to reinforce those defending Germany from the US Eighth Air Force. But the time of their departure, two pilots had been killed in action, one in an accident, one wounded and one captured on the Eastern Front.[132] While the staffel claimed 63 Soviet aircraft, like I. Gruppe, it made no impression on the course of the air war.[133]

Western Front and Defence of the Reich

The air war changed considerably in the first months of 1943. Fighter Command continued its offensive over Northwest Europe with growing numbers of the Spitfire IX ending the performance superiority of the Fw 190 A.

Operation Blue denied Hitler victory and forced a continuation of the war which compelled the Luftwaffe to fight multiple enemies with inferior resources.[137] From this point, the Luftwaffe, unprepared to fight a war of attrition over Germany, was gradually forced away from the peripheries of German-occupied Europe to defend the homeland.[138] JG 26 was among those fighter wings that switched to reinforce the home defence, which became Luftflotte Reich, and back to the Channel Front when required. The Luftflotte 3 operations staff reported in April 1943, the main defensive effort was against USAAF daylight raids[139]

From September to December 1942 JG 26 come into contract with the US Eighth Air Force with growing frequency. One of the earliest collaborations between the RAF and

Franklin Roosevelt quoted the figures in a radio broadcast, which amused the German unit for it had suffered a single casualty.[142] Nevertheless, some early raids were not intercepted at all, earning JG 26 the wrath of Göring and Galland. Galland was concerned at the perceived timidity of the fighter pilots and visited Schöpfel several times to assure himself that his former command had not declined in quality.[143]

In January 1943 Schöpfel handed command of JG 26 to Josef Priller. The first months of 1943 were not intensive in combat terms for JG 26; one author described them as "The Last Pause".

P-47 Thunderbolt presented a new longer-range threat to the Luftwaffe. The US fighter was heavily armed and had a powerful engine with a super-charger, and performed well at high altitudes. However, lacking drop tanks its range was little better than the Spitfire.[147] With drop tanks, both aircraft could reach the German-Dutch border in 1943; the external tanks were only fourth on the Eighth Air Force's list of priorities.[148] Pressurised drop-tanks were used in a raid on Emden on 27 September 1943, the first time US fighter escorts had made the flight over Germany.[149] The P-47 was not as maneuverable at lower levels than German fighters but could out-dive the Bf 109 and Fw 190. The introduction of paddle blade propellers and water-injection improved the climb and acceleration making the fighter an equal of German fighters, and well suited for the coming battles.[150] JG 26's tactics against the P-47 were summarised by Oberleutnant Hans Hartigs, whose comments were captured on tape in his bugged cell in England in late 1944:

If attacked, we should draw the P-47s to a lower altitude (3,000 metres (9,800 feet)) by diving, then turn about suddenly. The P-47s will overshoot; if they try to turn, they will lose speed and are vulnerable. The P-47 should zoom-climb and dive again. If we get into a turning combat, a P-47 can often get us on the first turn. If the Fw 190 climbs slightly in the turn (below 5,000 m (16,000 ft)) it will gain on the P-47.[150]

Early model P-47 pilots practiced the dive and zoom at high altitude.

56th Fighter Group. The 353rd Fighter Group, three RAF squadrons and bomber crews accounted for the others.[156] Karl Borris' I Gruppe made contact with the bombers and elements of 3./JG 26 attacked while Spitfires were present, losing two. After the Spitfires turned back, I. Gruppe was able to stay with the B-17s for much longer, though they were only able to account for four. Klaus Mietusch and III. Gruppe employed similar tactics, waiting for the US escorts to leave before beginning a 30-minute attack near Aachen claiming four but losing one and three more Bf 109s damaged against the unescorted bombers.[157]

Twelve days later, Adolf Glunz became the only non-commissioned officer to receive the Knight's Cross—he and Wilhelm-Ferdinand Galland were the only members to receive it in 1943.[158]

The

55th Fighter Group and seven other US fighter groups supported a raid on Wilhelmshaven. II./JG 3 and III./JG 1 broke up one group of P-47s, but others completed the defence of the bombers. III. Gruppe, JG 26, loaned JG 3 experienced Bf 109 pilots to fill its ranks because of losses.[162]

During the year, JG 26 lost Johannes Seifert, Seifert and

Friedrich Geißhardt killed in action; all of them group commanders. In 1943, the wing claim-to-loss ratio was 4:1 which suggested a favourable combat performance.[163] However, there were signs Allied operations were wearing it down. The 158 pilots killed or wounded during the year, was double that of 1942 and equivalent to an annual attrition rate of 100 percent.[163] The strength of the wing was 50 percent of authorised strength; but only two thirds of that total were operational. It had 68 fighters on 31 December; all Bf 109 G-6s and Fw 190 A-6s. Of the 185 pilots, 107 were available, the remainder were on leave, convalescing, or considered not ready for combat.[163] At least 84 of RAF Fighter Command's losses during 1943 have been attributed to JG 26.[164]

Major Klaus Mietusch, commanded III. Gruppe until his death in September 1944

The temporary victory ended in February 1944 with

Dwight D Eisenhower's command for the invasion and the Combined Bomber Offensive was suspended.[172]

In June 1944, JG 2 and JG 26 was to form the nucleus of the

Villacoublay, the two best equipped airfields in the region. II. Gruppe flew to Cormeilles. III./JG 54 reinforced JG 26. The unit came under the administrative control of the wing but was never formally attached.[175] From 3 to 7 June JG 26 claimed 12 confirmed victories against five killed and two wounded.[176] JG 26's pilots were given confirmed credit for 50 destroyed and five probably destroyed in June over Normandy—many more claims were made but it is unknown whether they were granted to pilots. The known cost of the fighting for the month was 32 pilots killed, 21 wounded and one captured.[177]

JG 26 pilots were utilised as close air support units. The wing was known to have flown attacks with rockets in the

Falaise Pocket and incurred casualties. On 13 August, all units engaged in rocket-missions were ordered to cease operations. Their aircraft had to fly at more than 30 minutes on emergency power boost and required replacement.[179] The order did not rescind the close support operations. From 15 August JG 26 still flew strafing missions against US armoured formations between Alençon and Le Mans. II Gruppe fought its first major battle since its return on this date. Emil Lang led 34 Fw 190s on a familiarisation flight for new pilots in the Paris area. Three P-47s and two Fw 190s were destroyed. Ground attack operations continued to late August.[180] As the Falaise pocket closed, trapping large German forces, JG 26 lost nine pilots killed and two wounded in a single action with the US 315th Fighter Squadron. The German pilots were given credit for five destroyed against various US fighter units including two from the 315th.[181] On 28 August the German fighter forces moved eastward toward Germany. Only JG 26s three gruppen and II./JG 53 remained operational. Göring rescinded his earlier orders that leaders and commanders fly only with large formations because he feared that they were taking advantage of it. Staffelkapitans were to fly one mission per day every time his unit flew 3 or 4 sorties a day. Each group commander had to fly one mission per two days, and each wing commander one per three days.[182]

Final battles to VE Day

The German collapse in France and Belgium resulted in a rapid Allied advance into western Netherlands and to the German border. Logistics slowed the Allied forces and their advanced stalled as German resistance stiffened and the German army began to recover from the defeat at Falaise. In September 1944, JG 26 lost two experienced group commanders, Klaus Mietusch and Emil Lang on 3rd and 17th. On the last date, British, Canadian, Polish and American forces began

363d Fighter Squadron, 357th Fighter Group led by Chuck Yeager.[184] ULTRA followed JG 26s movements. Their analysts remarked that the tactical fighters—fighters for frontline patrol—were inexperienced in making effective time in assembly and attacking escorted US heavy bomber formations. It regarded the German effort on this occasion as "poor."[185] The Luftwaffe did not attempt to intercept a single Eighth Air Force raid again for the duration of October 1944.[185]

Focke-Wulf Fw 190 D-13/R11, "Yellow 10," Wk. Nr. 836017 from the Champlin Fighter Museum, Phoenix, Arizona, c. 1995. It was flown by Franz Götz of JG 26

In November 1944, the Luftwaffe exhibited a façade of air supremacy, yet superior numbers did not transfer into quality. On the second day of this month, Luftflotte Reich experienced the worst single daily loss of the entire war to date. The US Eighth Air Force lost 40 bombers and 16 fighters in the running battles, some to anti-aircraft artillery—3.6 and 1.8 respectively [the Germans claimed 82]. All while losing 120 fighters, 70 pilots killed or missing and 28 wounded. On 21st another 62 were killed or wounded, then on 26th 87 pilots were killed or posted missing—on 27 November another 51.

Plantlünne at the end of November. JG 26 was to take part in the last major offensive of the Wehrmacht in Western Europe. ULTRA intercepted messages to III. Gruppe ordering it move from Nordhorn, regardless of whether it could equip with GM-1 or not. ULTRA listened to the urgent Luftwaffe messages which belied a German build-up.[189]

The offensive began on 16 December 1944. The Luftwaffe succeeded in challenging Allied air superiority for the first time since 1943 on 17 December. The achievement lay not in shooting down more aircraft than they lost, but forcing the US

474th Fighter Group, began strafing German motor columns, destroying seven trucks. I. Gruppe engaged the P-38s, which had claimed seven German fighters around Trier and attacked trains in the Bitburg area. Four US fighters were downed at no cost—the four Fw 190s the Americans claimed were probably from JG 2, as JG 26 reported no losses.[193] On 23 December JG 2 contributed to the strong Luftwaffe effort to maintain aerial cover for German ground forces on this day; though air superiority was not achieved, the Luftwaffe was still contesting it by nightfall. I. Gruppe committed 23 Fw 190s to cover Army Group B; the gruppe fought its way through American aircraft flying over its airfield before engaging B-26 Marauders. Five German fighters were lost in combat with P-47s and two B-26s were claimed destroyed.[194]

Flying Officer J. Butler of No. 65 Squadron RAF
, as he shot down a Focke-Wulf Fw 190D of II/JG 26 which was attempting to attack an Avro Lancaster over Cologne, Germany

The good news dried up for Göring. The Allied strategic air forces were operational again, drawing the Luftwaffe in, and denying the Germans to counter Allied operations over the front. He scuttled back to

Karinhall for his last wartime Christmas.[191] JG 26 claimed 12 Allied aircraft destroyed, but none are known to have been allowed to stand; the status of the claims are either unknown or unconfirmed.[195] Five JG 26 were killed in action, one wounded while two more were wounded in accidents.[196] On Christmas Eve, II. Gruppe scrambled to intercept US Eighth Air Force heavy bombers attacking Jagdgeschwader 4, Jagdgeschwader 11 and JG 2s airfields. They were repulsed by the escorts, but destroyed five P-47s for four fighters and three pilots; one possibly fired on in error by the supporting JG 27. I. Gruppe also intercepted but their first mission in the Fw 190 D-9s was a disaster for them. Of the 18 sent up, eight aborted due to engine trouble, another went after a US artillery spotter plane, while the remaining nine engaged a formation of 60 B-17s and their strong P-38 escort near Liège. One American fighter was lost for four German.[197] Allied units lost 44 bombers and 12 fighters on another day of heavy air fighting for 125 German fighter claimed destroyed. 85 German pilots were killed or captured on 24 December. Two were gruppen commanders and five staffel leaders were among them. A further 21 were wounded.[198] On Boxing Day the war diary of II. Jagdkorps reported that three I. Gruppe pilots had been killed and two captured for one victory claimed—it reported II./JG 1 suffered the heaviest losses.[199] JG 26 fought over the battlefront near St. Vith on 27 December.[200] On 1 January 1945, JG 26 flew in the airfield attacks for Operation Bodenplatte. Their target was Brussels-Evere. Four pilots were wounded, 12 killed, seven captured. 11 fighters were purportedly shot down in error by German ground-fire. Four fighter pilots were shot down and survived unhurt.[201] Only II. and III./JG 26 hit Evere. Between 44 and 52 Fw 190s from these units took off. II. and III./JG 26 knocked out the flak towers and destroyed anything combustible: hangars, trucks, fuel dumps and aircraft.[202] 127 Wing RCAF lost one Spitfire in the air and 11 on the ground; 11 vehicles were damaged and one was destroyed. A total of 60–61 Allied aircraft were destroyed at Evere.[203] A large number of transports were located there and attracted the attention of German pilots, which left many more Spitfires undamaged. Given the number of Spitfires on the field, the Canadian wing suffered "low" losses. The Canadian wing commander—Johnnie Johnson—blamed the poor marksmanship of German pilots for failing to achieve further success.[204][205]

From 2 January 1945, fuel stocks permitting, JG 26 was ordered into the air on every day until wars end. It was ordered to support the armies in the field [close air support] and it would never engage the heavy bombers of the US Eighth Air Force again.

406th Fighter Group; 10 American fighters were claimed, but whether these were granted to pilots as a victory is unknown.[211]

Fuel reserves had built up permitting a full-strength mission on 13 March. Morale remained reasonably high in JG 26. ULTRA intercepts picked up a request from the 14 Fliegerdivision on 25 March requesting volunteers for conversion onto the Messerschmitt Me 262. 58 pilots from

Hannover toward Berlin. JG 26 carried out s small number of attacks against them, and on the British Army as it neared Bremen. On 9 April IV. Gruppe was disbanded at Stade, and handed its aircraft to I. and II. Gruppen who had no more than 35 Fw 190s between them. On 19 April the wing managed to fly 35 sorties and the following day Hans Dortenmann became the last member of JG 26 awarded the Knight's Cross. On 24 April his unit flew against the Red Air Force over Oranienburg, claiming three Soviet fighters without loss. I. Gruppe withdrew to Klein Kummerfeld on 28 April.[213]

In an unusual mission, on 26 April 1945, 12 Fw 190s from JG 26 under the command of Hans Dortenmann escorted Generaloberst

VE Day occurred the following morning. Götz surrendered JG 26 to the British at Flensburg.[216]

Commanding officers

Geschwaderkommodore

On 1 November 1938, the Geschwaderstab of JG 132 was recreated from elements of JG 234 which then became JG 26 on 1 May 1939.[5]

 • Oberst Eduard Ritter von Schleich 1 November 1938 – 9 December 1939[217]
 • Major Hans-Hugo Witt 14 December 1939 – 23 June 1940[217]
 • Major Gotthard Handrick 24 June 1940 – 21 August 1940[217]
 • Oberstleutnant Adolf Galland 22 August 1940 – 5 December 1941[217]
 • Major Gerhard Schöpfel 6 December 1941 – 10 January 1943[217]
 • Oberst Josef Priller 11 January 1943 – 27 January 1945[218]
 • Major Franz Götz 28 January 1945 – 7 May 1945[218]

Gruppenkommandeure

I. Gruppe of JG 26

 • Hauptmann Oskar Dinort 20 February 1936 – 15 March 1937[217]
 • Hauptmann Walter Grabmann 16 March 1937 – 10 May 1938[217]
 • Hauptmann Karl-Heinz Leesmann 11 May 1938 – 12 July 1938[217]
 • Major Gotthard Handrick 13 July 1938 – 23 June 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Kurt Fischer 24 June 1940 – 21 August 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Rolf Pingel 22 August – 10 July 1941[217]
 • Major Johannes Seifert 11 July 1941 – 31 May 1943 †[217]
 • Hauptmann Fritz Losigkeit 1 June 1943 – 22 June 1943[218]
 • Hauptmann Karl Borris 23 June 1943 – 14 May 1944[218]
 • Hauptmann Hermann Staiger 15 May 1944 – 31 July 1944[218]
 • Major Karl Borris 1 August 1944 – 7 May 1945[218]

II. Gruppe of JG 26

 • Major Eduard Ritter von Schleich 15 May 1937 – 31 October 1938[217]
 • Hauptmann Werner Palm 1 November 1938 – 27 June 1939[217]
 • Hauptmann Herwig Knüppel 28 June 1939 – 19 May 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Karl Ebbighausen 20 May 1940 – 31 May 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Erich Noack 1 June 1940 – 24 July 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Karl Ebbighausen 25 July 1940 – 16 August 1940 †[217]
 • Hauptmann Erich Bode 17 August 1940 – 3 October 1940[217]
 • Hauptmann Walter Adolph 4 October 1940 – 18 September 1941 †[217]
 • Hauptmann Joachim Müncheberg 19 September 1941 – 21 July 1942[217]
 • Hauptmann Conny Meyer 22 July 1942 – 2 January 1943[217]
 • Major Wilhelm-Ferdinand Galland 3 January 1943 – 17 August 1943 †[218]
 • Hauptmann Johannes Naumann 18 August 1943 – 8 September 1943[218]
 • Oberleutnant Johannes Seifert 9 September 1943 – 25 November 1943 †[218]
 • Major Wilhelm Gäth 26 November 1943 – 1 March 1944[218]
 • Hauptmann Johannes Naumann 2 March 1944 – 28 June 1944[218]
 • Hauptmann Emil Lang 29 June 1944 – 3 September 1944 †[218]
 • Hauptmann Georg-Peter Eder 4 September 1944 – 8 October 1944[218]
 • Major Anton Hackl 9 October 1944 – 29 January 1945[218]
 • Oberleutnant Waldemar Radener 30 January 1945 – 22 February 1945[218]
 • Hauptmann Paul Schauder 23 February 1945 – 1 May 1945[218]

III. Gruppe of JG 26

 • Hauptmann Walter Kienitz 23 September 1939 – 31 October 1939[217]
 • Major Ernst Freiherr von Berg 1 November 1939 – 5 June 1940[217]
 • Major Adolf Galland 6 June 1940 – 20 August 1940[217]
 • Major Gerhard Schöpfel 21 August 1940 – 5 December 1941[217]
 • Hauptmann Josef Priller 6 December 1941 – 10 January 1943[217]
 • Hauptmann
Friedrich Geißhardt
 11 January 1943 – 6 April 1943 †[218]
 • Hauptmann Kurt Ruppert 7 April 1943 – 13 June 1943[218]
 • Hauptmann Rolf Hermichen 15 June 1943 – 4 July 1943[218]
 • Major Klaus Mietusch 5 July 1943 – 17 September 1944 †[218]
 • Hauptmann Paul Schauder 18 September 1944 – 26 September 1944[218]
 • Hauptmann Walter Krupinski 27 September 1944 – 25 March 1945[218]

IV. Gruppe of JG 26

 • Major
Rudolf Klemm
 25 February 1945 – 17 April 1945[218]

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Bibliography

Further reading
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