History of China–Japan relations

The history of China–Japan relations spans thousands of years through trade, cultural exchanges, friendships, and conflicts. Japan has deep historical and cultural ties with China; cultural contacts throughout its history have strongly influenced the nation – including its writing system^[a] architecture,^[b] cuisine,^[c] culture, literature, religion,^[d] philosophy, and law.^[1]

Large-scale trade between the two nations began in the 1860s. Many Chinese students had also studied in Japan and was also used as a base by Chinese political activists to overthrow the imperial Qing dynasty in 1912. A series of wars and confrontations took place between 1880 and 1945, with Japan invading and seizing Taiwan, Manchuria and most of China. Japan was eventually defeated and withdrew in 1945.

Since 1950, relations have been tense after the Korean War, the Cold War and the grievances of Japanese war crimes^[e] committed in China and beyond. Nevertheless, trade has expanded greatly in the 21st century between the two nations and despite geopolitical disagreements are generally at peace with each other. In 2022, both China and Japan commemorated the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations between their two nations.^[2]

First evidences of Japan in Chinese historical records AD 1–300

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The first mention of the

From then on Japan was repeatedly recorded in Chinese historical texts, at first sporadically, but eventually continuously as Japan matured into a notable power in the region.

There is a

era traditions appear in the records as the ancient Japanese built earthen mound tombs.

The first Japanese personage mentioned by the Wei Zhi (Records of

Yamataikoku

. Modern historical linguists believe Yamatai was actually pronounced Yamato.

Introduction of Chinese political system and culture in Japan AD 600–900

During the

, to help establish its own footing as a sovereign nation in northeast Asia. After the fall of the Korean confederated kingdom of Baekje (with whom Japan was closely allied) to combined Tang and Silla forces, Japan was forced to seek out the Chinese state on its own, which in those times was a treacherous undertaking, thus limiting the successes of Japanese overseas contacts during this time.

Important elements brought back from China (and some which were transmitted through Baekje to Japan) included Buddhist teachings, Chinese customs and culture, bureaucracy, architecture and city planning. The Japanese kimono is very similar to the clothing of the Tang dynasty, and many historians believe that the Japanese started wearing robes like what Tang royalty wore, eventually adapting the garb to match Japanese culture. The capital city of Kyoto was also planned according to

.

The use of the Chinese model of Imperial government ceased by the tenth century, overtaken by traditional Japanese clan and family rivalries (

Minamoto

).

First recorded China–Japan battle

In AD 663 the

Samguk

or three Korean kingdoms, coming on the heels of this battle.

The background of that large battle involves Silla (one of the Korean kingdoms) trying to dominate the Korean Peninsula by forging an alliance with the Tang dynasty, who were trying to defeat Goguryeo, an ongoing conflict that dated back to the Sui dynasty. At the time, Goguryeo was allied to Baekje, the third major Korean kingdom. Yamato Japan supported Baekje earnestly with 30,000 troops and sending Abe no Hirafu, a seasoned general who fought the Ainu in campaigns in eastern and northern Japan. As part of Silla's efforts to conquer Baekje, the battle of Baekgang was fought between Tang China, Baekje, Silla, and Yamato Japan.

The battle itself was a catastrophic defeat for the Yamato forces. Some 300 Yamato vessels were destroyed by a combined Silla–Tang fleet of half the number of ships, and thus the aid to Baekje from Yamato could not help on land, having been defeated at sea. Baekje fell shortly thereafter, in the same year.

Once Baekje was defeated, both Silla and Tang focused on the more difficult opponent, Goguryeo, and Goguryeo fell in 668 AD. For the most part, Silla, having been rivals with Baekje, also was hostile to Yamato Japan, which was seen as a brother state to Baekje, and this policy continued (with one pause between roughly AD 670–730) after Silla united most of what is now Korea and repelled Tang China from what is now the Korean peninsula. Yamato Japan was left isolated for a time and found itself having to forge ties with mainland Asia on its own, having had the most safe and secure pathway obstructed by a hostile Silla.

The prosperities of maritime trading 600–1600

Marine trades between China and Japan are well recorded, and many Chinese artifacts could be excavated. Baekje and Silla sometimes played the role of middleman, while direct commercial links between China and Japan flourished.

After 663 (with the fall of allied Baekje) Japan had no choice (in the face of hostility from Silla, which was temporarily deferred in the face of Tang imperialism – as Tang imperialism posed a threat both to Japan and unified Silla – but resumed in after 730 or so) but to directly trade with the Chinese dynasties. At first the Japanese had little long-range seafaring expertise of their own but eventually (some suggest with the aid of Baekje expatriates who fled their country when it fell) the Japanese improved their naval prowess as well as the construction of their ships.

The ports of

of Satsuma province through the Ryukyu Islands and with the Ainu of Hokkaido.

Japanese piracy on China's coasts and Mongol invasions 1200–1600

Japanese pirates (or Wokou) were a constant problem, not only for China and Korea, but also for Japanese society, from the thirteenth century until Hideyoshi's failed invasions of Korea at the end of the sixteenth century. Japanese pirates were often from the undesirable parts of Japanese society, and the Japanese were just as happy to be (for the most part) rid of them as they were raiding more prosperous shores (at the time, Japan was ravaged by civil wars, and so while Korea, China, and the Mongol Empire were enjoying relative peace, prosperity, and wealth, the Japanese were upon hard times).

Ming dynasty during Hideyoshi's Korean invasions of 1592–1598

Toyotomi Hideyoshi was one of the three unifiers of Japan (Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu were the others). After subduing the Mōri and Shimazu clans, Hideyoshi had the dream of eventually conquering China but needed to cross through Korea.

When Hideyoshi received refusals to his demands by Korea to cross the country to

.

After 1593, there was a truce of about four years. During that time, Ming granted Hideyoshi the title as "King of Japan" as withdrawal conditions, but Hideyoshi felt it insulted the

in 1644.

Afterwards, Japan, under the Tokugawa shogunate adopted a policy of isolationism until forced open by Commodore Perry in the 1850s.

Ming and Qing dynasties and Edo period Tokugawa Japan

Chinese dishes, delicacies, sweets, and candies were introduced to Japan by Chinese men, who taught their Japanese girlfriends how to make them. In the

Meiji Restoration and the rise of the Japanese Empire 1868–1931

In 1854 the show of Western naval force by American Commodore Perry led to the Convention of Kanagawa and the opening of Japan to western trading. Senzai Maru's 1862 journey to Shanghai taught Japan the danger of closing off its borders and refusing to change. In the long run it stimulated an expansion of horizons and the need to learn from the outside world. Japanese leaders realized it needed to modernize to avoid the humiliation suffered by China during the First and Second Opium Wars in the 1840s and 1850s. From these lessons, Japan transitioned from isolationism to reformist. After old Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown during the Meiji Restoration in the 1860s Japan initiated structural reforms resulting in rapid modernization, industrialization, militarization and imperialism modeled after the imperialistic Western powers.^[9][10]

China's Manchu leaders meanwhile did not learn comparable lessons. China's communications with the outside world were dramatically transformed in 1871 when the Great Northern telegraphic company opened cables linking Shanghai to Hong Kong, Singapore, Nagasaki, and Vladivostok, with connections to India and Europe. The first landline telegraph opened between Shanghai and Tianjin in 1881.^[11][12] China's first modern commercial treaty with Japan was signed on the basis of equality in 1871. As part of its diplomatic opening China established legations in Tokyo, London, Berlin, Washington, Madrid, and St Petersburg in 1877–1880. Everyone carried optimistic expectations of highly profitable trade with China's hundreds of millions of consumers. It did not happen. By 1890 the total value of all Chinese imports and exports combined was only £50 million, less than many smaller countries. China was too poor, too self-sufficient, too lacking in railways for profitable trade relationships.^[13]

Conflict after 1880

As Japan modernized and built a strong economy and military, friction more and more often arose with China. Hot spots included the

Japanese troops participated in a coalition of imperialist powers that suppressed the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. The Chinese were again forced to pay another huge indemnity, but Japan was pressured to accept much less by the United States. Rivalries between the Eight-Nation Alliance and the American Open Door Policy prevented China from being carved up into various colonies.^[16]

In 1905-1907 Japan made overtures on China to enlarge its sphere of influence to include Fujian. Japan was trying to obtain French loans and also avoid the Open Door Policy. Paris provided loans on condition that Japan respect the Open Door and not violate China's territorial integrity. In the French-Japanese Entente of 1907, Paris secured Japan's recognition of the special interests France possessed in “the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories” where they had “the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation,” which meant the French colonial possessions in Southeast Asia as well as the French spheres of influence in three provinces in southern China—Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong. In return, the French recognized Japan's spheres of influence in Korea, South Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.^[17][18]

The Japanese government had its own uses for anti-Qing elements using the islands as a base. At different times it treated Sun Yat-sen in four different ways: lending support to his causes, keeping a neutral distance, prodding him to leave Japan, and suppressing his revolutionary inclinations. In the most favorable phases the government provided a base of operations to Sun Yat-sen and other members of the Tongmenghui. Thus it helped them to overthrow the Qing dynasty in 1912 and the establishment of the Republic of China. It also helped Sun's failed efforts to remove president Yuan Shikai in 1915–1916.^[19][20]

First World War and 21 Demands

A Japanese expeditionary force quickly moved to capture all German possessions in the Pacific upon the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Japan occupied the German colony of Qingdao, along with occupying portions of Shandong Province. China was financially chaotic, highly unstable politically, and militarily very weak. Its best hope was to attend the postwar peace conference, and hope to find friends would help block the threats of Japanese expansionism. China declared war on Germany in August 1917 as a technicality to make it eligible to attend the postwar peace conference. Beijing planned to send a combat unit to the Western Front, but never did so.^[21][22] British diplomats were afraid that the U.S. and Japan would displace Britain's leading role as a trading partner with China. They sought to play Japan and the United States against each other, while simultaneously maintaining cooperation among all three nations against Germany.^[23]

In January 1915, Japan secretly issued an ultimatum of

Second Sino-Japanese War

Main articles:

Mukden Incident

The 1920s were years in which Japan looked to secure its economic interests through the treaty system, a policy that became unhinged in 1931 when, following the Mukden Incident in Manchuria, the Japanese adopted a more aggressive strategy of colonial annexation. In 1926 at the beginning of the

Between 1931 and the beginning of the

neutrality acts

. The incidents collectively placed pressure on China to sign various agreements to Japan's benefit. These included: the , through the assistance of Soviet, and later German, advisors.

In July 1937, the conflict escalated after a significant

. Chinese nationalist forces retaliated by attacking Shanghai. The Battle of Shanghai lasted for several months, concluding with Chinese defeat on November 26, 1937.

Following this battle, Japanese advances continued to the south and west. A contentious aspect of these Japanese campaigns are the

, when Japanese forces subjected the population to looting, mass rape, torture, massacres, and other war crimes. Other (less publicized) atrocities were committed during Japanese advances; it is estimated that millions of Chinese civilians were killed. Various attempts to quantify the crimes committed have proved contentious, if not divisive.

From 1938 onwards, the war was marked by Chinese use of guerrilla tactics to stall advances, and retreat to the deep interior where necessary. This eventually limited Japanese advances because of supply-line limitations – the Japanese were unable to adequately control remote areas but they did control practically all the major cities and ports, as well as air space.

World War II

By 1938, the United States increasingly was committed to supporting China and, with the cooperation of Britain and the Netherlands, threatening to restrict the supply of vital materials to the Japanese war machine, especially oil. The Japanese army, after sharp defeats by the Russians, wanted to avoid war with the Soviet Union, even though it would have aided the German war against the USSR. The Navy, increasingly threatened by the loss of its oil supplies, insisted on a decision, warning the alternatives were a high-risk war, Japan might lose, or a certain dissent into third-class status and a loss of China and Manchuria. Officially the Emperor made the decision, but he was told by a key civilian official on 5 November 1941:

it is impossible, from the standpoint of our domestic political situation and of our self-preservation, to accept all of the American demands....we cannot let the present situation continue. If we miss the present opportunity to go to war, we will have to submit to American dictation. Therefore, I recognize that it is inevitable that we must decide to start a war against the United States. I will put my trust in what it has been told: namely, that things will go well in the early part of the war; and that although we will experience increasing difficulties as the war progresses, there is some prospect of success.^[30]

The Emperor became fatalistic about going to war, as the military assumed more and more control. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe was replaced by the war cabinet of General Hideki Tojo (1884–1948), who demanded war. Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, as well as British and Dutch strong points. the main American battle fleet was disabled, and in the next 90 days Japan made remarkable advances including the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Malaya and Singapore.^[31]

Following the

Asia significantly weakened the Japanese.

Occupation

After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria, Japan surrendered. During the American occupation, 1945–1952, American officials under Douglas MacArthur supervised the Japanese government. All foreign relations were controlled by the United States, and all Japanese diplomats abroad were brought home. The Communist party inside Japan was tolerated, and it supported Mao Zedong's side of the civil war underway in China. Mao prevailed in 1949, and the Japanese left opened small-scale contacts with China, especially using labor unions and artistic groups.^[32] When Japan surrendered in 1945, six and a half million of its citizens were stranded in Asia and Pacific islands. That included 3.5 million in the military and 3 million civilians. 2.6 million Japanese were in China, including 1.1 million in Manchuria. All of these Japanese citizens were relocated back to Japan over a period of months and even years.^[33] However thousands of Japanese technicians were left behind in Northeast China until they were repatriated in 1953. The Chinese Communist Party was based on peasants and used these skilled men to update the technology, train local workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites.^[34]

The Republic of China (ROC) administrated

See also

• International relations (1814–1919)
• China–Japan relations, since 1949
• Republic of China–Japan relations
• Economic history of China
• Wasei-kango

Notes

References

1. ^ Cartwright, Mark (27 June 2017). "Ancient Japanese & Chinese Relations". World History Encyclopedia. Retrieved 22 March 2022.
2. ^ "Postwar Japan-China Relations: A Timeline". nippon.com. 10 January 2020. Retrieved 22 March 2022.
3. ^ "Gold Seal (Kin-in)". Fukuoka City Museum. Retrieved 2013-08-05.
4. ^ Encounters of the Eastern Barbarians, Wei Chronicles
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6. ISBN 0521497817
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9. ^ Sheng Banghe, "The Senzai Maru's visit to Shanghai and its understanding of China." Chinese Studies in History 49.1 (2016): 19-27.
10. ^ John King Fairbank, et al. East Asia: Tradition & Transformation (1989) pp. 241–261.
11. ^ Erik Baark, Lightning Wires: The Telegraph and China's Technological Modernization 1860-1890 (ABC-CLIO/Greenwood. 1997)
12. ^ Ariane Knuesel, "British diplomacy and the telegraph in nineteenth-century China." Diplomacy and Statecraft 18.3 (2007): 517-537.
13. ^ John King Fairbank, et al. East Asia: Tradition & Transformation (1989) pp. 345, 357, 483, 513.
14. ^ Seo-Hyun Park, "Changing Definitions of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Japan and Korea Between China and the West". Journal of East Asian Studies 13#2 (2013): 281–307.
15. ISBN 9780674054554
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16. ^ Yoneyuki Sugita, "The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China," in Richard Jensen, Jon Davidann, Yoneyuki Sugita, eds., Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth Century (2003) pp. 3–20.
17. ^ Seung-young Kim, "Open Door or Sphere of Influence?: The Diplomacy of the Japanese–French Entente and Fukien Question, 1905–1907." International History Review 41#1 (2019): 105-129; see also Review by Noriko Kawamura in H-DIPLO.
18. ^ "Arrangement between France and Japan Concerning their Policies in China" American Journal of International Law, (1910) Volume 4. online
19. ^ Albert A. Altman, and Harold Z. Schiffrin, "Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese: 1914-16." Modern Asian Studies 6.4 (1972): 385-400 online.
20. ^ Marius B Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen (1970) pp 213–222. online.
21. ^ Stephen G. Craft, "Angling for an Invitation to Paris: China's Entry into the First World War". International History Review 16#1 (1994): 1–24.
22. ^ Guoqi Xu, "The Great War and China's military expedition plan". Journal of Military History 72#1 (2008): 105–140.
23. ^ Clarence B. Davis, "Limits of Effacement: Britain and the Problem of American Cooperation and Competition in China, 1915–1917". Pacific Historical Review 48#1 (1979): 47–63. in JSTOR
24. ^ Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Volume III: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (1960) pp 267–308 online
25. ^ Robert Joseph Gowen, "Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Cooperation versus Effacement," Journal of Modern History (1971) 43#1 pp. 76–106 online.
26. ^ Roy Hidemichi Akagi, Japan Foreign Relations 1542-1936 (1936) pp 332–364 online.
27. ^ Zhitian Luo, "National humiliation and national assertion-The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands" Modern Asian Studies (1993) 27#2 pp 297–319.
28. ^ Rosemary Foot, "Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resurgent China." International Affairs 95.1 (2019): 143-160.
29. ^ Robert H. Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931." Journal of Modern History 27.1 (1955): 66-72 online.
30. ^ Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894–1972 (1975) p 405.
31. ^ Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." Diplomatic History 2007 31#1: 51-79. online
32. ^ June Teufel Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino–Japanese Relations Past and Present (2016) pages 82-87.
33. ^ John W. Dower, Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II (WW Norton & Company, 1999) pp. 49–51.
34. ^ Amy King, "Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China." Modern Asian Studies 50.1 (2016): 141–174.
35. ^ John Dower, Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World (2014) p 127.

Further reading

• Akagi, Roy Hidemichi. Japan Foreign Relations 1542-1936 (1936) online
• Beasley, William G. Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford UP, 1987).
• Beasley, William G. The Modern History Of Japan (1963) online
• Boyle, John Hunter. China and Japan at war, 1937–1945: the politics of collaboration (Stanford UP, 1972)
• Burns, Richard Dean, and Edward Moore Bennett, eds. Diplomats in crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese relations, 1919-1941 (1974) short articles by scholars from all three countries. online free to borrow
• Chi, Madeleine. China Diplomacy, 1914–1918 (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1970).
• Chuan, Lowe-Hua. Japan's Economic Offensive in China (1939) online
• Clyde, Paul H. The Far East: A history of the impact of the West on Eastern Asia (1948) online
• Coox, Alvin, and Hilary Conroy.. China and Japan: The Search for Balance Since World War I (ABC-Clio, 1978). online
• Dower, John W. Empire and aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese experience, 1878–1954 (1988)
• Dower, John W. War without mercy : race and power in the Pacific war (1986) online
• Dower, John W. Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II (WW Norton & Company, 1999).
• Dower, John W. Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World (2014) excerpt
• Dreyer, June Teufel. Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present, (Oxford UP, 2016) excerpt
• Duus, Peter, et al. eds. The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton UP, 1989) online.
• Fairbank, John King, Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. East Asia: Tradition & Transformation (Houghton Mifflin, 1989) online.
• Gordon, David M. "Historiographical Essay: The China-Japan War, 1931-1945" Journal of Military History 70#1 (2006), pp. 137–182
  doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0052 online
• Hiroshi, Nakanishi, et al. The golden age of the US-China-Japan triangle, 1972-1989 (Harvard Asia Center, 2002).
• Ikei, Masaru. "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911." Journal of Asian Studies 25.2 (1966): 213–227. online
• Jansen, Marius B. Japan and China From War to Peace 1894–1972 (1975) online
• Jansen, Marius B. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (1967) online
• Jung-Sun, Han. "Rationalizing the Orient: The 'East Asia Cooperative Community' in Prewar Japan". Monumenta Nipponica (2005): 481–514. in JSTOR
• Kim, Seung-young. "Open Door or Sphere of Influence?: The Diplomacy of the Japanese–French Entente and Fukien Question, 1905–1907." International History Review 41#1 (2019): 105–129; see also Review by Noriko Kawamura in H-DIPLO.
• Kokubun, Ryosei, et al. Japan–China Relations in the Modern Era (Routledge, 2017).
• Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).
• Morley, James William, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide (Columbia UP, 1974), policies toward China pp 236–64; historiography.
• Morley, James William, ed. The China Quagmire Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941: Selected Translations from Taiheiyō Sensō E No Michi: Kaisen Gaikō Shi (Columbia University Press, 1983), primary sourced.
• Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire Vol. 1 (1910) to 1859; online;
  • Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire vol 2 1861–1893 (1918) online;
  • Morse, Hosea Ballou. The international relations of the Chinese empire vol 3 1894–1916. (1918) online
• Morse, Hosea Ballou. The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire (1908) online
• Nobuya, Bamba. Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924–29 (U of British Columbia Press, 1973).
• Nish, Ian. (1990) "An Overview of Relations between China and Japan, 1895–1945." China Quarterly (1990) 124 (1990): 601–623. online
• Reynolds, D.R., “A golden age forgotten: Japan-China relations, 1898–1907,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 4th series, Vol. 2 (1987), pp. 93–153.
• Sugita, Yoneyuki. "The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China," in Richard Jensen, Jon Davidann, Yoneyuki Sugita, eds., Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth Century (2003) pp. 3–20.
• Sun, Youli, and You-Li Sun. China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–1941 (St. Martin's Press, 1993)
• Verschuer, Charlotte von. Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea from the Seventh to the Sixteenth Centuries (Cornell University East Asia Program. 2006)
• Vogel, Ezra F. China and Japan: Facing History (2019) excerpt scholarly survey over 1500 years
• Vogel, Ezra F. et al. eds. The age of uncertainty: The U.S.-China-Japan triangle from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001)
• Wang, Zhenping: Ambassadors from the Islands of the Immortals: China–Japan Relations in the Han–Tang Period. (U of Hawaii Press, 2005) 387 pp.
• Yick, Joseph. "Communist-Puppet collaboration in Japanese-Occupied China: Pan Hannian and Li Shiqun, 1939–43". Intelligence and National Security 16.4 (2001): 61–88.
• Yoshida, Takashi. The making of the 'Rape of Nanking': history and memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford UP, 2006).
• Zachmann, Urs Matthias. China and Japan in the late Meiji period: China policy and the Japanese discourse on national identity, 1895-1904 (Routledge, 2010).
• Zhang, Yongjin. China in the International System, 1918–20: the Middle Kingdom at the periphery (Macmillan, 1991)