Imamate in Zaydi doctrine

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In

Sunni
ones in the 18th century.

History

Isma'ilis) who followed al-Sadiq and his successors.[1]

In Zaydi doctrine, unlike the Imami Shi'a, the imamate is not hereditary, nor is the imam a quasi-divine figure, without sin, possessed of infallibility (

Talaqan (834), and of Yahya ibn Umar in Kufa (864).[4]

Silver dirham of Hasan ibn Zayd, the first Zaydi ruler of Tabaristan

These revolts were unsuccessful, proving that a direct confrontation with the caliphal government in the central lands of Islam was doomed to failure.

Qasimi State evicted the Ottomans and came to rule all of Yemen,[9] but to bolster their own power, the imams gradually moved away from Hadawi Zaydism and adopted doctrines that brought them nearer to Sunni practice and legitimated their hereditary, monarchical rule.[10]

Eligibility for the imamate

Early Zaydis were divided in two camps, the moderate

Khariji doctrine.[15] The Jarudiyya on the other hand followed the Imami Shi'a in rejecting the first three caliphs as illegitimate and usurpers of Ali's rightful place, holding that he and his sons Hasan (d. 670) and Husayn (d. 680) had been explicitly designated as successors of Muhammad.[11][2][16]

The designation of Ali, Hasan, and Husayn makes them unique among Zaydi imams, although two different traditions exist: one holds that all three were explicitly designated as his successors by Muhammad, while another that they each appointed one another in turn.

mujtahid, up to and including the authorship of original works.[11][18] A list of fourteen attributes was evnetually established that qualified a candidate for the imamate.[19]

Qualifications alone were not enough, however; while Zaydi doctrine affirmed the establishment of an imam at all times as an obligation incumbent upon the Muslim community, the imamate could not be passed by contract, election or designation, but had to be claimed by issuing a 'call' or 'summons' (da'wa) which had to be made via public pronouncement to 'rise up' (khuruj)—the terms 'rising' (qiyama) or 'emergence' (zuhur) are also used—to which all true Muslims had to respond by declaring their allegiance.[11][20] In practice the latter meant an armed rebellion, hence a minimum number of armed support (nusrah) was specified and fixed at about 310 followers, based on the number of Muhammad's followers at the Battle of Badr.[21] Crucially, the da'wa was not contingent upon the popularity of the candidate or a general consensus of the Muslims; the prospective imam was compelled to rise by God, and his success depended on God alone.[20] In more practical terms, leadership of a successful uprising against a tyrannical oppressor was proof of the imam's political and military abilities.[22] On the other hand, it was expected that the "most excellent" candidate could be imam, hence if another, more excellent one, were to arise, the incumbent imam would be bound to surrender authority to him. Likewise, any moral transgressions or loss of the qualifying attributes rendered the legitimacy of the imamate void.[11]

The historian Najam Haider sums up the Zaydi imamate as follows: "a qualified candidate earned followers through his scholarly and personal qualities and seized power through his military prowess. The ideal Zaydī Imām was both a 'man of the pen' and a 'man of the sword'."[23] Unlike the Imami Shi'a, who consider their imams to be religious leaders first and foremost, vested with infallibility on matters of doctrine,[24] the political aspects of the imamate were uniquely central to the Zaydi conception of the office: the Zaydi imams were recognized merely as knowledgeable individuals, whose judgment was potentially fallible and represented a "best guess" at God's will, and not inherently superior to the rulings of other Zaydi scholars. Only the collective consensus of the Hasanids and Husaynids could unequivocally establish the correctness or not of doctrinal issues.[22]

Implications

In practice, the intensely personal nature of the Zaydi imamate, bound as it was with the charisma and abilities of the individual imam, run contrary to the creation of a long-lasting, institutionalized Zaydi statehood: the succession was never regulated, often resulting in the proclamations of several rival candidates; the judicial authority was vested in the imam and could not be delegated, precluding the emergence of a bureaucracy, offices like a chief judge (qadi), or even a uniform legal code, as every imam had the right to interpret the law at will; and even the military support an imam enjoyed was voluntarily provided by his followers, instead of relying on an organized army.[25] Historian Bernard Haykel emphasizes the transient and ephemeral nature of Zaydi political structures, due to their "oppositional quality": the Zaydis were most effective when focused against an enemy.[26] Governing an extensive and diverse realm such as the Qasimi State that emerged in Yemen during the 17th century, required different methods. This contributed, according to Haykel, to its progressive Sunnification, which allowed the creation of more permanent offices and institutions, forming a judicial and court bureaucracy along the lines long established in non-Zaydi Muslim states—indeed, often taken over from the previous Ottoman administration.[27] This process crucially also provided an alternative means of legitimacy for its rulers, who by and large lacked the necessary qualities and relied almost exclusively on dynastic legitimacy and military might, couched in Sunni legal formulas that prohibited rebellion.[28]

King of Yemen

Furthermore, while the imam was held to be unique across the Muslim community, this was not always so in practice: apart from succession disputes, the existence of widely separated Zaydi states in Yemen and northern Iran led to the existence of two distinct imams at the same time. While they often recognized each other's legitimacy, this was an exception that was not reflected in doctrine.[11] Likewise, the required high standard of erudition on jurisprudence disqualified many actual Alid potentates from the imamate, even though they might already hold secular power. As a result, the intermediate rank of a 'restricted' imam (muhtasib) or 'summoner' (da'i) was used, denoting a ruler seen as legitimate by the Zaydis and charged with governing and defending the community, but with limited authority compared to full imams (sabiqun, lit.'precursors'), who could levy taxes, mete out punishments, and even conduct offensive war.[11][4] Haider notes that the uniquely Zaydi concept of a 'restricted' imam is another indication of the centrality of political considerations, as "the Zaydı̄ Imāmate was predicated on the exercise of political authority", while the knowledge-focused requirements could be delegated via the consultation of qualified religious scholars.[29] The term appeared very early on, as several early Zaydi rulers in Tabaristan were mere 'summoners', while later Zaydi Alids in northern Itan simply adopted the entirely secular title of emir (amir).[30] It was in Yemen, however, that the concept of the 'restricted' imamate was systematized,[11] as many of the later Qasimi rulers lacked the qualifications for the full imamate.[31] As a result of all these controversies, there never was a definitive list of commonly accepted Zaydi imams, even to this day.[11]

References

  1. ^ a b c Madelung 2002, p. 477.
  2. ^ a b c Madelung 2002, pp. 477–478.
  3. ^ Madelung 1971, pp. 1166–1167.
  4. ^ a b c d Madelung 2002, p. 478.
  5. ^ a b Eagle 1994, p. 109.
  6. ^ Madelung 2002, pp. 478–479.
  7. ^ Haykel 2003, p. 8.
  8. ^ Madelung 2002, pp. 479–480.
  9. ^ Haykel 2003, pp. 15–16.
  10. ^ Haider 2021, pp. 215–220.
  11. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Madelung 1971, p. 1166.
  12. ^ Haider 2014, pp. 104–108.
  13. ^ Haider 2014, pp. 105–106.
  14. ^ Madelung 1971, p. 1165.
  15. ^ Madelung 1971, p. 1167.
  16. ^ Haider 2014, pp. 107–108.
  17. ^ Haider 2014, p. 39 (note 17).
  18. ^ Haider 2021, p. 214.
  19. ^ Eagle 1994, p. 107.
  20. ^ a b Eagle 1994, pp. 107–108.
  21. ^ Eagle 1994, p. 108.
  22. ^ a b Haider 2014, p. 40.
  23. ^ Haider 2021, p. 215.
  24. ^ Haider 2014, pp. 41–43.
  25. ^ Haider 2021, pp. 215–216.
  26. ^ Haykel 2003, pp. 28–30.
  27. ^ Haykel 2003, pp. 16–18, 47–75.
  28. ^ Haider 2021, pp. 217–218.
  29. ^ Haider 2014, pp. 40–41.
  30. ^ Madelung 2002, p. 479.
  31. ^ Haider 2021, p. 217.

Sources

  • Eagle, A. B. D. R. (1994). "Al-Hādī Yahyā b. al-Husayn b. al-Qāsim (245–98/859–911): A Biographical Introduction and the Background and Significance of his Imamate". New Arabian Studies. 2: 103–122.
    ISSN 1351-4709
    .
  • Haider, Najam (2014). Shī'ī Islam: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press. .
  • Haider, Najam (2021). "Zaydism" (PDF). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. .
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