Salafi jihadism
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Salafi jihadism, also known as revolutionary Salafism[1] or jihadist Salafism, is a religious-political Sunni Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a global caliphate, characterized by the advocacy of "physical" (military) jihadist attacks on non-Muslim and (takfired) Muslim targets. The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense",[2] which adherents claim will bring about the return to "true Islam".[3][4][5][6][7]
The original use of the term "jihadist Salafists" (also "Salafi-jihadi" or "Salafist jihadis")
Jihadist and Salafist elements of "hybrid"
Early ideologues of the movement were
Definitions
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In the words of Madawi al Rasheed, Salafi jihadism is
a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity[29]
According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions." Thus contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity, rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However, more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadis which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras, such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, al-Jaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreign imperialist and colonial penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World, they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite its critique), and advocate a neo-liberal free-market rationale, in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.[30]
Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by
According to Michael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'."[32] The concept was described by the American-Israeli scholar Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be [simplified to] jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage."[12]
Tenets
According to
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
- immense emphasis on the concept of tawhid (unity of God);
- God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah), which defines right and wrong, good and evil, and which supersedes human reasoning is applicable in all places on earth and at all times, and makes unnecessary and un-Islamic other ideologies such as liberalism or humanism;
- the rejection of all religious innovation (bid‘ah) in Islam;
- the permissibility and necessity of takfir (the declaring of a Muslim to be outside the creed, so that they may face execution);
- and on the centrality of jihad against infidel regimes.[31]
Another researcher,
- Changing the social and political organisation of the state (an example, being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which fought to overthrow the Algerian state and replace it with an Islamic state).[35]
- Establishing sovereignty on a territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims (an example being the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure) in Indian-administered Kashmir and the Caucasus Emirate in the Russian Federation).[35]
- Defending the Muslim community (ummah) from external non-Muslim perceived threats, either the "near enemy" (al-adou al-qarib, this includes jihadists Arabs who travelled to Bosnia and Chechnya to defend local Muslims against non-Muslim armies) or the "far enemy" (al-adou al-baid, often affiliates of Al-Qaeda attacking the West).[35]
- Correcting other Muslims' moral behaviour. (In Indonesia, vigilantes first used sticks and stones to attack those they considered "deviant" in behavior before moving on to guns and bombs.)[35]
- Intimidating and marginalising other Muslim sects (an example being Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which has carried out violent attacks on Pakistani Shia for decades, and killings in Iraq).[35])
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of
- the formal process of taking an oath of allegiance (Bay'ah) to a leader.[36] (This can be by individuals to an emir or by a local group to a transglobal group.)
- "marbling", i.e. pretending to cut ties to a less-than-popular global movement when "strategically or financially convenient". (An example is the cutting of ties to al-Qaeda by the Syrian group Al-Nusra Front with al-Qaeda's approval.[36])
Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation'".[37]
Differences from Quietist and Islamist Salafism
Much of Salafi-Jihadist discourse borrows heavily from Sayyid Qutb's concept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God) and
Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from Quietist salafis whom they label "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – that the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the
Quietist Salafis criticize
History
Origins
The
Fore-runners of Salafi jihadism principally includes Egyptian militant Islamist scholar and theoretician
In his writings, both before and after joining the
A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book "The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning to
He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential book The America that I Have Seen:
the American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs – and she shows all this and does not hide it.[61]
On 29 August 1966,
Evolution of Salafi jihadism after Qutb
The crushing defeat of various Arab states in the 1967 Six-Day War led to the de-legitimization of socialist and nationalist ideologies across the Arab world. Their demise provided a fertile ground for the Salafiyya movement, which spread across the Arab world as well as the wider Islamic world. The rise of oil industry in Gulf states also brought in a large-workforce. The workforce embraced Salafi doctrines and founded Salafi organisations as they returned to their home-countries.[38]
Beginning from 1970s, various Islamist and Jihadist factions attempted to idealize traditional Salafiyya, recasting it as a totalizing political system based on the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb. Majority of Salafis traditionally viewed Salafiyya as a scholarly movement that revived the religious faith of Muslims through teaching and devout adherence to Islamic decrees. Additionally, they advocated Salafism to remain uncontaminated from politics. However, a minority sought the establishment of an Islamic system through violent means, based on Sayyid Qutb's concepts of Hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God). They advocated a global Jihad, with clear political overtones, to fight for Muslim liberation across national boundaries. This movement came to be known as Salafi-Jihadism.[38] Groups like Takfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.[11]
Expansion
Gilles Kepel writes that the Salafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".[9][11] However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violent jihadists created "a volatile mixture".[11] "When you're in the state of such alienation you become easy prey to the jihadi guys who will feed you more savory propaganda than the old propaganda of the Salafists who tell you to pray, fast and who are not taking action".[11]
In the 1990s, militant Islamists of the
In his research, Seth Jones of the
- the number of Salafi jihadist groups increased by over 50% from 2010 to 2013, using Libya and parts of Syria as sanctuary.
- the number of Salafi jihadist fighters "more than doubled from 2010 to 2013" using both low and high estimates. The war in Syria was the single most important attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.
- attacks by al-Qaeda–affiliated groups (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
- despite al-Qaeda's traditional focus on the "far enemy" (US and Europe), approximately 99% of the attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 2013 were against "near enemy" targets (in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions outside of the West).[27]
Leaders, groups and activities
Leaders
"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the Palestinian
Development
Murad al-Shishani of
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on
Groups
Salafist jihadist groups include
In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being the Armee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity".[82] It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all (sane adult male) Muslims,[82] and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called "wholesale massacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners,[82] and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took its campaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war,[83] the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces.[84] Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[85]
Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda.
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the
The group leading the Islamist insurgency in
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against
In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the
In Syria and Iraq both
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group[104] that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,[105]
Activities in Europe
France
In France, in 2015 police say that salafism is represented in 90 out of 2500 investigated religious communities, which was double the number compared to five years earlier.[106] In November and December 2016, authorities closed four salafist mosque in Ecquevilly, the El Islah mosque in Villiers-sur-Marne and two in Seine-Saint-Denis (Clichy-sous-Bois and Stains).[107]
In December 2017, a salafi-Jihadist mosque in Marseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad.[108] In August 2018, after the European Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported the salafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home country Algeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.[109]
Germany
According to
Estimates by German interior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015.[112] In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets,[112] a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth.[112] There are two ideological camps, one advocates Salafi-Activism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society.[112] The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.[112]
In 2015, Sigmar Gabriel, Vice-Chancellor of Germany, spoke out, saying "We need Saudi Arabia to solve the regional conflicts, but we must at the same time make clear that the time to look away is past. Wahhabi mosques are financed all over the world by Saudi Arabia. In Germany, many dangerous Islamists come from these communities."[113] In November 2016, nationwide raids were conducted on the Salafi-Islamist True Religion organization.[114][115][116]
According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne, the number of Salafists in Germany grew from 9,700 in December 2016 to 10,800 in December 2017. In addition to the rise, the Salafist movement in Germany was increasingly fractured which made them harder to monitor by authorities.[110] According to the office, street distributions of Quran took place less frequently which was described as a success for the authorities.[110] Radicalisation changed character, from taking place in mosques and interregional Salafist organisations to more often happening in small circles, which increasingly formed on the internet. A further development was a rise in participation of women.[110] According to the FFGI at Goethe University Frankfurt, wahhabist ideology is spread in Germany as in other European country mostly by an array of informal, personal and organisational networks, where organisations closely associated with the government of Saudi Arabia such as the Muslim World League (WML) and the World Association of Muslim Youth are actively participating.[117]
In February 2017, the German Salafist mosque organisation Berliner Fussilet-Moscheeverein was banned by authorities. Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 Berlin truck attack, was said to be among its visitors. In March 2017, the German Muslim community organisation Deutschsprachige Islamkreis Hildesheim was also banned after investigators found that its members were preparing to travel to the conflict zone in Syria to fight for the Islamic State. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, these examples show that certain Salafist mosques not only concern themselves with religious matters, but also prepare serious crimes and terrorist activities.[118]
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Many Islamic religious buildings were damaged or destroyed in the
Sweden
Representatives from the mosque in
In
According to Swedish researcher Magnus Ranstorp, salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy.[126] According to Anas Khalifa , the salafi movement is present at nearly every major mosque in Sweden "in some form".[127]
United Kingdom
A 2017 report found the number of Wahhabi and Salafi-Jihadist mosques in Britain had increased from 68 in 2007 to 110 in 2014.[128] The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of Salafi-Jihadist materials which expoused "an illiberal, bigoted" ideology.[129][130]
List of groups
According to
Name of group | Base of operations | Years |
---|---|---|
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions) |
Saudi Arabia | 2009–present |
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions) |
Lebanon | 2009–present |
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) | Philippines | 1991–present |
Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) | Yemen | 1994–present |
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) | Somalia, Ethiopia | 1994–2002 |
Al-Qaeda (core) | Pakistan | 1988–present |
Al-Qaeda in Aceh (a.k.a. Tanzim al Qa’ida Indonesia for Serambi Makkah) |
Indonesia | 2009–2011 |
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) | Saudi Arabia | 2002–2008 |
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) | Yemen | 2008–present |
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) |
Algeria | 1998–present |
Al Takfir wal al-Hijrah | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
Al-Mulathamun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar) | Mali, Libya, Algeria | 2012–2013 |
Al-Murabitun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)
|
Mali, Libya, Algeria | 2013–2017 |
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia- Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC) |
Somalia, Eritrea | 2006–2009 |
Ansar al-Islam | Iraq | 2001–present |
Ansar al-Sharia (Egypt) | Egypt | 2012–present |
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) | Libya | 2012–2017 |
Ansar al-Sharia (Mali) | Mali | 2012–present |
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) | Tunisia | 2011–present |
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (a.k.a. Ansar Jerusalem) |
Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2012–present |
Ansaru | Nigeria | 2012–present |
Osbat al-Ansar (AAA) | Lebanon | 1985–present |
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a.k.a. BIFM) |
Philippines | 2010–present |
Boko Haram | Nigeria | 2003–present |
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Basayev faction) |
Russia (Chechnya) | 1994–2007 |
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM,a.k.a. Turkestan Islamic Party) |
China (Xinjiang) | 1989–present |
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) | Egypt | 1978–2001 |
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen | Somalia | 2002–present |
Harakat al-Shuada'a al Islamiyah (a.k.a. Islamic Martyr's Movement, IMM) |
Libya | 1996–2007 |
Harakat Ansar al-Din | Mali | 2011–2017 |
Hizbul al Islam | Somalia | 2009–2010 |
Imarat Kavkaz (IK, or Caucasus Emirate) | Russia (Chechnya) | 2007–present |
Indian Mujahedeen
|
India | 2005–present |
Islamic Jihad Union (a.k.a. Islamic Jihad Group) |
Uzbekistan | 2002–present |
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan | 1997–present |
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
|
Iraq, Syria | 2004–present |
Jabhat al-Nusrah | Syria | 2011–present |
Jaish ul-Adl | Iran | 2013–present |
Jaish al-Islam (a.k.a. Tawhid and Jihad Brigades) |
Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2005–present |
Jaish al-Ummah (JaU) | Gaza Strip | 2007–present |
Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) | Tajikistan | 2010–present |
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) | Indonesia | 2008–present |
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) | Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore |
1993–present |
Jondullah | Pakistan | 2003–present |
Jund al-Sham | Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, Qatar, Afghanistan |
1999–2008 |
Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) | Philippines | 2013–present |
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, a.k.a. Mansoorian) | Pakistan (Kashmir) | 1990–present |
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) | Libya | 1990–present |
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) | Morocco, Western Europe | 1998–present |
Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) |
Mali | 2011–2013 |
Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) | Egypt | 2011–present |
Mujahideen Shura Council | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
Salafia Jihadia (As-Sirat al Moustaquim) | Morocco | 1995–present |
Tawhid wal Jihad | Iraq | 1999–2004 |
Tunisian Combat Group (TCG)
|
Tunisia, Western Europe | 2000–2011 |
Ruling strategy
In several places and times, jihadis have taken control of an area and they have ruled it as an
Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form of sharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire of Osama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.[131]
In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes.[132] One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:
You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones. ... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.[132]
However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war",
Views on violence
In recent years, the Salafi methodology has come to be associated with the jihad of extremist groups that advocate the killing of innocent civilians. The
According to the British Researcher Anabel Inge:
"While aspects of their purist creed are shared by Jihadi groups, most—probably the vast majority of—Salafis in Europe are explicitly against terrorism. ... In Britain, the 'Salafi' label has been associated with non-violent, often quietist groups. ... One preacher, for instance, encouraged his online followers to 'mass distribute' an anti-ISIS leaflet he had written, in which he urged anyone with information about terrorist plots to 'inform the authorities'. That same preacher reported receiving death threats from ISIS sympathizers. ... I found no evidence of so-called brainwashing. On the contrary, I found that the Salafi conversion process was largely intellectual, rather than based on social or other pressures."
Traditional Salafis have rejected the use of violence by Salafi-Jihadists. The Saudi scholar
Condemnations and challenges by Muslims
Many Muslim leaders,
According to Western analysts, obstacles in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track,[156][157][158] Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world,[159] resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap,"[160] weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.[161]
"Salafist Jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) has managed to establish itself as the dominant ideology of rebellion in the early 21st century, just as Fascism and Communism had been the most violent ideologies of the twentieth century. For a brief moment in 2011, the Arab Spring with its non-violent mass demonstrations, seemed to offer an alternative model of rebellion in the absence of democratic regimes but when these mass uprisings were crushed in all countries except Tunisia, jihadism as a non-mass based method of fighting repression and foreign intervention gained the upper hand in the minds of many militant youths."[162][163]
Notes
- ^ Statements issued by major Quietist Salafi scholars:
- Nasiruddin Al Albani, Muhammad (27 August 2014). "You Can't Take the Law into Your Own Hands". Albaani Site. Archived from the original on 23 August 2017.
- "The Speech of Shaykh Muqbil about revolutions and uprisings". Dawatus Salafiyyah Leicester UK. Archived from the original on 2021-02-03.
As for uprisings and revolutions against the rulers who are in the Islamic lands, then this is not the way of rectification. And the way of rectification is teaching the Muslims the Book of their Lord and the Sunnah of their Prophet and teaching them the biography of the Prophet (صلى اللهُ عليه وسَلَّم) and the biography of his companions and how they had patience with the poverty, not having (enough) clothes, leaving their homelands and the infectious diseases which befell them in al-Madeenah after they emigrated. Therefore, it is imperative that we nurture the people in being close (to the way) of the companions, and I do not think that we are able to do that (in its entirety) but at least (it should be) close to the way of the companions.
- Al-Fawzan, Saalih (May 2004). "Is Rebelling Against a Ruler an Issue of Ijtihād?" (PDF). AbdurRahman.org. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-02-03.
It is impermissible to oppose and rebel against the leader of Muslim affairs. Rather, it is an obligation to obey him and forbidden to oppose him due to what that entails of bloodshed, disunity, and the ruining and alienation of a nation. And you all witness now those lands in which people revolted against their leaders. You see the results such as fighting and killing, bloodshed, and the loss of safety and security when some of these leaderships are not Muslim governments. But when people rebel against their leaders, the same thing occurs – that which occurred in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other place. What if the ruler is Muslim? It is not allowed to oppose him due to what that will result in of bloodshed, the loss of security, the opportunity for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslims, and dissension and division among Muslims.
- Abdul Wahid, Abu Khadeeja (19 December 2013). "The Tyranny Of The Rulers, A Reason For Rebellion?". Archived from the original on 4 February 2021.
The noble scholar Shaikh al-Albānī (rahimahullaah, died 1420H) was asked, 'Is that which is known nowadays as a military coup against the ruler mentioned in the Religion or is it an innovation?' So the Shaikh answered: 'There is no basis for these acts in Islām. And it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj (methodology) with respect to the daʿwah (Islamic call) and creating the right atmosphere for it. Rather it is an innovation introduced by the innovators which has affected some Muslims. This is what I have stated and explained in my notes to al-Aqeedah at-Tahāwiyyah' The great scholar Ibn Bāz (died 1420AH) was asked, 'Is it from the methodology of the Salaf [to] criticize the rulers from the pulpits? And what is the methodology of the Salaf in advising the rulers?' So he answered: 'It is not from the methodology of the Salaf to criticize the rulers from the pulpits, because that would incite chaos, and it would involve not listening and obeying in that which is good. And this would mean becoming engrossed in that which harms and does not benefit. However, the way of advising that the Salaf followed was to write to the ruler, or to convey the advice to the Scholars who would then convey it to him, until he has been directed towards good. So opposing the evil can be done without mentioning the doer. So adultery, intoxicants and interest can be opposed without mentioning the one who is involved in them. And it is enough of an opposition to sins that they be warned against without mentioning that so and so is involved in them, whether it is the ruler, or other than the ruler.' Shaikh Sālih al-Fawzān was asked: 'Respected Shaikh, yourself and your brothers who are scholars in this country are Salafīs – and all praise is due to Allāh – and your method in advising the rulers is that of the Sharīʿah and as the Prophet has explained, yet there are those who find fault with you due to your neglect in openly rejecting the various oppositions [to the Sharīʿah] that have occurred. And yet others make excuses for you by saying that you are under the control and pressure of the state. So do you have any words of direction or clarification to these people?' So Shaikh al-Fawzān answered with clear and unambiguous words: 'There is no doubt that the rulers, just like people besides them, are not infallible. Advising them is an obligation. However, attacking them in the gatherings and upon the pulpits is considered to be the forbidden form of backbiting. And this evil is greater than that which occurred from the ruler since it is backbiting and because of what results from backbiting such as the sowing of the seeds of discord, causing disunity and affecting the progression of daʿwah (the call to Islām). Hence what is obligatory is to make sure advice reaches the rulers by sound and trustworthy avenues, not by publicizing and causing commotion. And as for reviling the Scholars of this country, that they do not give advice [to the rulers], or that they are being controlled in their affairs, this is a method by which separation between the Scholars, the youth and the society is desired, until it becomes possible for the mischief-maker to sow the seeds of his evil. This is because when evil suspicions are harbored about the Scholars, trust is no longer placed in them and then the chance is available for the biased partisans to spread their poison. And I believe that this thought is actually a schemed plot that has come into this country, and those who are behind it are foreign to this country. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to be cautious of it.'
- Iyaad, Abu (16 May 2019). "Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn: Revolting Against the Rulers is the Most Corrupt, Vile Innovation". Kharijites.com. Archived from the original on 22 January 2021.
Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said: And rebelling against the ruler, there is no doubt it is from the most corrupt of innovations, the most vile of them and the most evil of them. The ummah was not torn to pieces except due to rebelling against its rulers.
Explanatory notes
- ^ "Defining Salafism and Its Importance:- Foundational to understanding the threat is knowing the meaning behind key terms associated with the global Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Salafism is often conflated or misinterpreted in texts and publications. Literally, the word Salafis means 'pious forefathers,' which is most often understood to mean 'the first three generations of Muslims.' The foundation for this statement can be found in Sahih al-Bukhari's compilation, which quotes Muhammad as saying, 'The best of my community [i.e. Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them and then whose who follow them.' Proximity to Muhammad in the temporal sense matters in that the saying and actions of the early companions of Muhammad carry greater relevance and authority. Of course, the hadiths (a written collection of traditions based on the sayings of Muhammad), and principally the compilations of al-Bukhari and Muslim are held in highest regard.[6] And how these hadiths were understood by the early community of Muslims and acted upon matters greatly. This is essential to understand because Muslims, including Salafis, do not derive their religious beliefs and practices exclusively from the Quran, but also from the hadith, making its contents just as important for Islamic theology and law. The hadiths are also the locus from which Salafi-Jihadists derive many of the violent scriptural references which they use as justification for their methodology and behavior.[17][18]
- ^ "Defining Salafism and Its Importance:- Foundational to understanding the threat is knowing the meaning behind key terms associated with the global Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Salafism is often conflated or misinterpreted in texts and publications. Literally, the word Salafis means 'pious forefathers,' which is most often understood to mean 'the first three generations of Muslims.' The foundation for this statement can be found in Sahih al-Bukhari's compilation, which quotes Muhammad as saying, 'The best of my community [i.e. Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them and then whose who follow them.' Proximity to Muhammad in the temporal sense matters in that the saying and actions of the early companions of Muhammad carry greater relevance and authority. Of course, the hadiths (a written collection of traditions based on the sayings of Muhammad), and principally the compilations of al-Bukhari and Muslim are held in highest regard, And how these hadiths were understood by the early community of Muslims and acted upon matters greatly. This is essential to understand because Muslims, including Salafis, do not derive their religious beliefs and practices exclusively from the Quran, but also from the hadith, making its contents just as important for Islamic theology and law. The hadiths are also the locus from which Salafi-Jihadists derive many of the violent scriptural references which they use as justification for their methodology and behavior.[44][18]
Citations
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- ^ a b c d e "Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002) pp.219-222
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French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism – an historical reference to the precursor of these movements – will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage.
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Another interesting aspect of Salafi Jihadism is that the traditional Salafi scholars debunk it as a Salafi hybrid and that it is far removed from the traditional Salafism.
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al Qaeda is no longer seen as an existential threat to the West ... the hysteria over a global conspiracy against the West has faded.
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Terrorism – most of it arising from domestic groups – was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.
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As for uprisings and revolutions against the rulers who are in the Islamic lands, then this is not the way of rectification. And the way of rectification is teaching the Muslims the Book of their Lord and the Sunnah of their Prophet and teaching them the biography of the Prophet (صلى اللهُ عليه وسَلَّم) and the biography of his companions and how they had patience with the poverty, not having (enough) clothes, leaving their homelands and the infectious diseases which befell them in al-Madeenah after they emigrated. Therefore, it is imperative that we nurture the people in being close (to the way) of the companions, and I do not think that we are able to do that (in its entirety) but at least (it should be) close to the way of the companions.
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It is impermissible to oppose and rebel against the leader of Muslim affairs. Rather, it is an obligation to obey him and forbidden to oppose him due to what that entails of bloodshed, disunity, and the ruining and alienation of a nation. And you all witness now those lands in which people revolted against their leaders. You see the results such as fighting and killing, bloodshed, and the loss of safety and security when some of these leaderships are not Muslim governments. But when people rebel against their leaders, the same thing occurs – that which occurred in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other place. What if the ruler is Muslim? It is not allowed to oppose him due to what that will result in of bloodshed, the loss of security, the opportunity for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslims, and dissension and division among Muslims.
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The noble scholar Shaikh al-Albānī (rahimahullaah, died 1420H) was asked, 'Is that which is known nowadays as a military coup against the ruler mentioned in the Religion or is it an innovation?' So the Shaikh answered: 'There is no basis for these acts in Islām. And it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj (methodology) with respect to the daʿwah (Islamic call) and creating the right atmosphere for it. Rather it is an innovation introduced by the innovators which has affected some Muslims. This is what I have stated and explained in my notes to al-Aqeedah at-Tahāwiyyah' The great scholar Ibn Bāz (died 1420AH) was asked, 'Is it from the methodology of the Salaf [to] criticize the rulers from the pulpits? And what is the methodology of the Salaf in advising the rulers?' So he answered: 'It is not from the methodology of the Salaf to criticize the rulers from the pulpits, because that would incite chaos, and it would involve not listening and obeying in that which is good. And this would mean becoming engrossed in that which harms and does not benefit. However, the way of advising that the Salaf followed was to write to the ruler, or to convey the advice to the Scholars who would then convey it to him, until he has been directed towards good. So opposing the evil can be done without mentioning the doer. So adultery, intoxicants and interest can be opposed without mentioning the one who is involved in them. And it is enough of an opposition to sins that they be warned against without mentioning that so and so is involved in them, whether it is the ruler, or other than the ruler.' Shaikh Sālih al-Fawzān was asked: 'Respected Shaikh, yourself and your brothers who are scholars in this country are Salafīs – and all praise is due to Allāh – and your method in advising the rulers is that of the Sharīʿah and as the Prophet has explained, yet there are those who find fault with you due to your neglect in openly rejecting the various oppositions [to the Sharīʿah] that have occurred. And yet others make excuses for you by saying that you are under the control and pressure of the state. So do you have any words of direction or clarification to these people?' So Shaikh al-Fawzān answered with clear and unambiguous words: 'There is no doubt that the rulers, just like people besides them, are not infallible. Advising them is an obligation. However, attacking them in the gatherings and upon the pulpits is considered to be the forbidden form of backbiting. And this evil is greater than that which occurred from the ruler since it is backbiting and because of what results from backbiting such as the sowing of the seeds of discord, causing disunity and affecting the progression of daʿwah (the call to Islām). Hence what is obligatory is to make sure advice reaches the rulers by sound and trustworthy avenues, not by publicizing and causing commotion. And as for reviling the Scholars of this country, that they do not give advice [to the rulers], or that they are being controlled in their affairs, this is a method by which separation between the Scholars, the youth and the society is desired, until it becomes possible for the mischief-maker to sow the seeds of his evil. This is because when evil suspicions are harbored about the Scholars, trust is no longer placed in them and then the chance is available for the biased partisans to spread their poison. And I believe that this thought is actually a schemed plot that has come into this country, and those who are behind it are foreign to this country. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to be cautious of it.'
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Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said: And rebelling against the ruler, there is no doubt it is from the most corrupt of innovations, the most vile of them and the most evil of them. The ummah was not torn to pieces except due to rebelling against its rulers.
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Many Salafi scholars including Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz have issued statements calling Salafi Jihadist groups like Daesh as an extension of Kharijites. The self-proclaimed pious strand of Islam is thus considered by many as following the practices of a completely deviant strand; it is not surprising that many traditional Muslim scholars have written treatises comparing Salafi Jihadist with Kharijites.
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Further reading
- Oliver, Haneef James. "Sacred Freedom: Western Liberalist Ideologies in the Light of Islam". TROID, 2006, ISBN 0-9776996-0-9 (Free)
- Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, ISBN 978-0-415-45241-0
- Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674010901.
External links
- Manne, Robert (2016). Sayyid Qutb: Father of Salafi Jihadism. ABC Religion and Ethics.