Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi | |
---|---|
أَبُو مُصْعَبٍ ٱلزَّرْقَاوِيُّ | |
1st Emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq | |
In office October 17, 2004 – June 7, 2006 | |
Preceded by | Position created |
Succeeded by | Abu Ayyub al-Masri |
1st Emir of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad | |
In office 1999 – October 17, 2004 | |
Preceded by | Position created |
Succeeded by | Merger with Al-Qaeda |
1st Emir of the Mujahideen Shura Council | |
In office January 15, 2006 – June 7, 2006 | |
Preceded by | Position created |
Succeeded by | Abu Ayyub al-Masri |
Personal details | |
Born | Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh أحمد فضيل النزال الخلايلة October 30, 1966 Zarqa, Jordan |
Died | June 7, 2006 Hibhib, Iraq | (aged 39)
Cause of death | Airstrike |
Children | 5 |
Military service | |
Years of service | 1989–2006 |
Rank | Commander |
Battles/wars | Soviet–Afghan War United States invasion of Afghanistan Iraq War |
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (
He formed
In September 2005, he declared "all-out war" on
Personal life
Early life
Abu Musab was a sturdy man who was not really very good at words. He expressed himself spontaneously and briefly. He would not compromise any of his beliefs.
Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh (
Zarqawi is thus usually described as having been a
1989–1998: Afghanistan War, returning to Jordan, time in prison
In the late 1980s, Zarqawi went to Afghanistan to join the Mujahideen who were fighting the invading Soviet troops.[17]
He arrived there in 1989, as the Soviets were already leaving.
He was recruited by Abu Qutaibah al Majali to fight in Afghanistan.[25][26][27][28][29][30][31]
According to a report by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Zarqawi's criminal past and extreme views on takfir (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) created major friction and distrust with bin Laden when the two first met in Afghanistan in 1999."[32]
He was arrested in Jordan after guns and explosives were found in his home
According to Jordanian officials and acquaintances, Zarqawi developed a reputation as a cellblock enforcer and adopted more radical Islamic beliefs.[17][35]
In prison, due to his charisma and stature, he eventually became a sort of leader, issuing
For the Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, who was in jail with him, it was not the Afghan jihad, but his prison years (which included eight and a half months in solitary confinement, as well as loss of his toenails due to infection from torture) that radicalized him: "The prison left a clear mark on al-Zarqawi's personality, which grew more intense. In his opinion, policemen, judges, and government members of all ranks were supporters of the regimes, which he believed were tawagheet [tyrants] who should be fought." He also worked on his physical training.[37]
1999–2000: Training of Jihadists
In 1999, Zarqawi was released from prison in a general
The plot was discovered, and Zarqawi fled to Pakistan.[17]When Pakistan revoked his visa, he crossed into Afghanistan, where he met, still according to Jordanian officials and also German court testimony, with Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders in Kandahar and Kabul.[17][38] He asked them for assistance and money to set up his own training camp in Herat.[17][38] With some "small seed money"[39] of $200,000[17][40] from Osama bin Laden, the camp opened soon and attracted Jordanian militants.[17][38] Zarqawi selected Herat, far from al-Qaeda's established operations in Kandahar and Jalalabad, because his recruits would enter Afghanistan through Iran.[41]
That camp was either for his group
2001: Resistance to U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
In early September 2001, Zarqawi was in Iran during the September 11 attacks in the United States.[38]
After the
In 2001-2002, Zarqawi activated the Abu Ali group, a Palestinian Islamist cell based in Essen, Germany, providing logistical support and later orchestrating plans to attack Jewish targets in Germany. Following the interception of phone calls between Zarqawi and the cell's leader, Mohammed Abu Dhess, German authorities arrested the group in 2002.[44][45]
He fled to Iran in December 2001[46] or January 5, 2002, and received medical treatment in Mashhad.[47] The Iranian government reportedly refused Jordanian requests to extradite Zarqawi.[48] Circumstantial evidence suggests that Iranian authorities may have restricted Zarqawi's activities to some extent.[49]
2002: Involvement in the assassination of Laurence Foley
The U.S. government contended (in 2003 in a U.N. speech) that Zarqawi received medical treatment in Baghdad, Iraq, from March until May 2002.[38] About that time, Jordanian authorities asked Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to extradite Zarqawi for his suspected role in the millennium plot of 1999 (see above).[38]
By, and during the summer of 2002, Zarqawi's location and activities appear in reports that conflict with one another. Jordanian court documents alleged that Zarqawi, during the summer of 2002, began training a band of fighters at a base in
2003–2006: Terrorist activities in and around Iraq
In February 2003, according to Arab intelligence sources, Zarqawi in eastern Iran planned military resistance to the expected U.S. invasion of Iraq.[38] And, by March 2003, according to British intelligence, Zarqawi's network had set up sleeper cells in Baghdad to resist an expected U.S. occupation.[38]
Prior to the
Over 2003–2006, Zarqawi and his group
Zarqawi targeted Shia Islamic mosques as well as civilians, U.N. representatives, Iraqi government institutions, Egypt's ambassador, Russian diplomats and foreign civilians in Iraq and hotel visitors in Jordan, possibly also Christian churches, the Jordanian embassy, and the U.S.-led Multi-National Force in Iraq, most of whom he professedly hated either as apostates of Islam,[39][55] or as "infidels"[56] "giving Palestine to the Jews",[35] or as individuals oppressing and "humiliating our [Islamic] people"[35] or "nation".[55] Al-Zarqawi was part of the leadership of Ansar al-Islam and was believed to have fled into Iran during the assault.[57]
U.S. chasing Zarqawi, 2003–2006
The
On December 17, 2004, the
By May 2005, Zarqawi was the most wanted man in Jordan and Iraq, had claimed scores of attacks in Iraq against Iraqis and foreigners, and was blamed for perhaps even more.[60] The U.S. government then offered a $25m reward for information leading to his capture, the same amount offered for the capture of bin Laden before March 2004.
On February 24, 2006, the
For the U.S. eventually killing Zarqawi in 2006, see the section Death.
Wives and children
- Zarqawi's first wife, Umm Mohammed, was a Jordanian woman who was around 40 years old when Zarqawi died in June 2006. She lived in Zarqa, Jordan, along with their four children, including a seven-year-old son, Musab.[62] She had advised Zarqawi to leave Iraq temporarily and give orders to his deputies from outside the country. "He gave me an angry look and said, 'Me, me? I can't betray my religion and get out of Iraq. In the Name of Allah, I will not leave Iraq until victory or martyrdom'," she said of al-Zarqawi.[63]
- Zarqawi's second wife, Isra, was 14 years old when he married her. She was the daughter of Yassin Jarrad, a Palestinian Islamic militant, who is blamed for the killing in 2003 of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the Iraqi Shia leader.[64] Her brother, Mohammad Jarad, was also a militant, who died in his 20s in 2013 while fighting for the Al-Nusra Front in Syria.[65] They had a child when she was 15, and was killed along with Zarqawi and their child.[66]
- Zarqawi's third wife was an Iraqi who might have perished in the airstrike with her husband.[67]
- Zarqawi is also said to have married a woman from a Pakistani tribe around Peshawar.[22]
Attacks
Attacks outside Iraq
In 1999, Zarqawi, according to Jordanian officials, became involved in a plot to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, where many Israeli and American tourists lodged, before New Year's Day 2000.[38] He failed in this attempt and fled to Afghanistan and then entered Iraq via Iran after the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001.
From Iraq, he started his terrorist campaign by hiring men to kill
Zarqawi, according to the BBC, was named as the brains behind a series of deadly bomb attacks in Casablanca, Morocco and Istanbul, Turkey in 2003.[71] U.S. officials believe that Zarqawi trained others in the use of poison (ricin[72]) for possible attacks in Europe. Zarqawi had also planned to attack a NATO summit in June 2004. According to suspects arrested in Turkey, Zarqawi sent them to Istanbul to organize an attack on a NATO summit there on June 28 or 29, 2004.[73] On April 26, 2004, Jordanian authorities announced they had broken up an al-Qaeda plot to use chemical weapons in Amman. Among the targets were the U.S. Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister's office and the headquarters of Jordanian intelligence. In a series of raids, the Jordanians seized 20 tons of chemicals, including blistering agents, nerve gas[74] and numerous explosives. Also seized were three trucks equipped with specially modified plows, apparently designed to crash through security barricades.[75] Jordanian state television aired a videotape of four men admitting they were part of the plot. One of the conspirators, Azmi Al-Jayousi, said that he was acting on the orders of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and that he obtained training in chemical weapons.[76][77] However, Al-Jayousi would later retract his confession stating that it was obtained via duress.[76] Zarqawi would admit that an attack was planned, but would deny the use of chemical weapons referring to such claims as fabrications by the Jordanian government.[76] Likewise, independent and U.S. investigators were skeptical of Jordanian claims of a chemical weapons attack.[76] Furthermore, many experts and observers suspected that the Jordanian government exaggerated the details of the plot on purpose for political gain.[76] On February 15, 2006, Jordan's High Court of Security sentenced nine men, including al-Zarqawi, to death for their involvement in the plot. Zarqawi was convicted of planning the entire attack from his post in Iraq, funding the operation with nearly $120,000, and sending a group of Jordanians into Jordan to execute the plan. Eight of the defendants were accused of belonging to a previously unknown group, "Kata'eb al-Tawhid" or Battalions of Monotheism, which was headed by al-Zarqawi and linked to al Qaeda.[78]
The November
Attacks inside Iraq
Stephen Hayes wrote for The Weekly Standard, that March 2003 British Intelligence "reporting since (February)" suggests that before the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi ran a "terrorist haven" in Kurdish northern Iraq, and that Zarqawi had set up "sleeper cells" in Baghdad, "to be activated during a U.S. occupation of the city...[80] These cells apparently intend to attack U.S. targets using car bombs and other weapons. (It is also possible that they have received [chemical and biological] materials from terrorists in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone), ... al Qaeda-associated terrorists continued to arrive in Baghdad in early March."[81] Later on, it was discovered that some reporting by Stephen Hayes had been incorrect—among them was Zarqawi's prosthetic limb. When Zarqawi was killed, it was evident he did not have a prosthetic limb. The anti-war movement accused Stephen Hayes of having invented stories,[82] and Loretta Napoleani, author of several books on terrorism, including Terror Incorporated,[83] argued that the importance of Zarqawi was built on incomplete Kurdish intelligence and then fomented by the U.S. to make him the new face of al-Qaeda.[84]
In May 2004, a video appeared on an alleged al-Qaeda website showing a group of five men, their faces covered with
United States officials implicated Zarqawi in over 700 killings in Iraq during the invasion, mostly from bombings.
In a January 2005 internet recording, Zarqawi condemned democracy as "the big American lie" and said participants in
On April 25, 2006, a video appearing to show Zarqawi surfaced.
Attempts to provoke U.S. attack on Iran
A document found in Zarqawi's safe house indicates that the group was trying to provoke the U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the insurgency in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq.[99][100] "The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether America is serious in its animosity towards Iran, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America, and the West in general, of the real danger coming from Iran..." The document then outlines six ways to incite war between the two nations.[101] Some experts questioned the authenticity of the document.[100]
Links to al-Qaeda
After the
According to
Pre-U.S. invasion of Iraq
Before the invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi was the leader of an Islamic militant group with some connections to al-Qaeda. In an interview on Al-Majd TV, former al-Qaeda member Walid Khan, who was in Afghanistan fighting alongside Zarqawi's group explained that from the day al-Zarqawi's group arrived, there were disagreements, differences of opinion with bin Laden.[105] Saif al-Adel, later bin Laden's military chief and an Egyptian who attempted to overthrow the Egyptian government, saw merit in Zarqawi's overall objective of overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. He intervened and smoothed the relations between Zarqawi and Al Qaeda leadership. It was agreed that Zarqawi would be given the funds to start up his training camp outside the Afghan city of Herat, near the Iranian border.[11]
Zarqawi's group continued to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and pursued "a largely distinct, if occasionally overlapping agenda", according to The Washington Post.[106] Counterterrorism experts told The Washington Post that while Zarqawi accepted al-Qaeda's financial help to set up a training camp in Afghanistan he ran it independently and while bin Laden was planning September 11, Zarqawi was busy developing a plot to topple the Jordanian monarchy and attack Israel.[107]
The Washington Post also reported that German Intelligence wiretaps found that in the fall of 2001 Zarqawi grew angry when his members were raising money in Germany for al-Qaeda's local leadership. "If something should come from their side, simply do not accept it," Zarqawi told one of his followers, according to a recorded conversation that was played at a trial of four alleged Zarqawi operatives in Düsseldorf.[106]
In 2001, bin Laden repeatedly summoned al-Zarqawi from Herat to Kandahar, asking that he take an oath of allegiance to him. Al-Zarqawi refused; he didn't want to take sides against the Northern Alliance and doubted the fervor of bin Laden and the Taliban. When the United States launched its air war inside Afghanistan, on October 7, 2001, al-Zarqawi joined forces with al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the first time. He and his Jund al-Sham fought in and around Herat and Kandahar. When Zarqawi finally did take the oath in October 2004, it was after eight months of negotiations.[11]
When
In April 2007, former
Post-U.S. invasion of Iraq
During or shortly before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Zarqawi returned to Iraq, where he met with Bin Laden's military chief, Saif al-Adel (Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi), who asked him to coordinate the entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq through Syria.[111][112][113] Zarqawi readily agreed and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow of Arab Islamists were infiltrating Iraq via Syria. Although many of these foreign fighters were not members of Tawhid, they became more or less dependent on Zarqawi's local contacts once they entered the unfamiliar country. Moreover, given Tawhid's superior intelligence gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid operatives to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi's lieutenants.[111] Consequentially, Zarqawi came to be recognized as the regional "emir" of Islamist terrorists in Iraq without having sworn fealty to bin Laden.[111]
U.S. intelligence intercepted a January 2004 letter from Zarqawi to al Qaeda and American officials made it public in February 2004. In the letter to bin Laden, Zarqawi wrote:
You, gracious brothers, are the leaders, guides, and symbolic figures of jihad and battle. We do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you, and we have never striven to achieve glory for ourselves. All that we hope is that we will be the spearhead, the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the Islamic nation crosses over to the victory that is promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire. This is our vision, and we have explained it. This is our path, and we have made it clear. If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media, vexing the infidels and gladdening those who preach the oneness of Allah. On that day, the believers will rejoice in Allah's victory. If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil our friendship. This is a cause in which we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad. Awaiting your response, may Allah preserve you as keys to good and reserves for Islam and its people.[114][115]
In October 2004, a message on an Islamic Web site posted in the name of the spokesman of Zarqawi's group announced that Zarqawi had sworn his network's allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The message stated:
Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (Allah protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than Allah chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission. Let it be known that al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh 'Osama bin Laden' (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of Allah until there is no more discord [among the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion turns toward Allah... By Allah, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates![116]
On December 27, 2004,
In May 2007, President
Terrorism experts' view on the alliance
Zarqawi gave
U.S. officials' view of the alliance
In June 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded that Zarqawi's ties to al-Qaeda may have been much more ambiguous—and that he may have been more of a rival than a lieutenant to bin Laden. Zarqawi "may very well not have sworn allegiance to [bin Laden]", Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon briefing. "Maybe he disagrees with him on something, maybe because he wants to be 'The Man' himself and maybe for a reason that's not known to me." Rumsfeld added, "someone could legitimately say he's not Al Qaeda."[120]
According to the Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence released in September 2006, "in April 2003 the CIA learned from a senior al-Qa'ida detainee that al-Zarqawi had rebuffed several efforts by bin Ladin to recruit him. The detainee claimed that al-Zarqawi had religious differences with bin Ladin and disagreed with bin Laden's singular focus against the United States. The CIA assessed in April 2003 that al-Zarqawi planned and directed independent terrorist operations without al Qaeda direction, but assessed that he 'most likely contracts out his network's services to al Qaeda in return for material and financial assistance from key al Qaeda facilitators.'"[121]
In the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, declassified in September 2006, it asserts, "Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role."[122]
Links to Saddam Hussein
On February 5, 2003, then Secretary of State
Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These Al Qaeda affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad.[123]
Zarqawi recuperated in Baghdad after being wounded while fighting along with
Jordanian analysis
A Jordanian security official told The Washington Post that documents recovered after the
This claim was reiterated by Jordanian King Abdullah II in an interview with Al-Hayat. Abdullah revealed that Saddam Hussein had rejected repeated requests from Jordan to hand over al-Zarqawi. According to Abdullah, "We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn't respond." Abdullah told the Al-Hayat that Jordan exerted "big efforts" with Saddam's government to extradite al-Zarqawi, but added, "our demands that the former regime hand him over were in vain."[127]
One high-level Jordanian intelligence official told The Atlantic that al-Zarqawi, after leaving Afghanistan in December 2001, frequently traveled to the Sunni Triangle of Iraq where he expanded his network, recruited and trained new fighters, and set up bases, safe houses, and military training camps. He said, however, "We know Zarqawi better than he knows himself. And I can assure you that he never had any links to Saddam."[128]
Counterterrorism scholar Loretta Napoleoni quotes former Jordanian parliamentarian Layth Shubaylat, a radical Islamist opposition figure,[129] who was personally acquainted with both Zarqawi and Saddam Hussein:
First of all, I don't think the two ideologies go together, I'm sure the former Iraqi leadership saw no interest in contacting al-Zarqawi or al-Qaeda operatives. The mentality of al-Qaeda simply doesn't go with the Ba'athist one. When he was in prison in Jordan with Shubaylat, Abu Mos'ab wouldn't accept me, said Shubaylat, because I'm opposition, even if I'm a Muslim. How could he accept Saddam Hussein, a secular dictator?[64][130]
U.S. conclusion
A
According to the 2004 Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence, "The CIA provided four reports detailing the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, a captured senior coordinator for al-Qaida responsible for training and recruiting. Abu Zubaydah said that he was not aware of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. He also said, however, that any relationship would be highly compartmented and went on to name al-Qaida members who he thought had good contacts with the Iraqis. For instance, Abu Zubaydah indicated that he had heard that an important al-Qaida associate, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and others had good relationships with Iraqi Intelligence."[133]
A classified memo obtained by
Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of October 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.[134]
The memo was a collection of raw intelligence reports and drew no conclusions. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed to Newsweek that the "reports [in the memo] were old, uncorroborated and came from sources of unknown if not dubious credibility".[135][82]
The 2006 Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence concluded that Zarqawi was not a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda: "Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi." The report also cited the debriefing of a "high-ranking Iraqi official" by the FBI. The official stated that a foreign government requested in October 2002 that the IIS locate five individuals suspected of involvement in the murder of Laurence Foley, which led to the arrest of Abu Yasim Sayyem in early 2003.
The Army's Foreign Military Studies Office website translated a letter dated August 17, 2002, from an Iraqi intelligence official. The letter is part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom documents. The letter asks agents in the country to be on the lookout for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and another unnamed man. Pictures of both men were attached.[citation needed]
The letter issued the following 3 directives:[citation needed]
- Instructing your sources to continue their surveillance of the above-mentioned individuals in your area of operations and inform us once you initiate such action.
- Coordinate with Directorate 18 to verify the photographs of the above-mentioned with photos of the members of the Jordanian community within your area of operations.
- Conduct a comprehensive survey of all tourist facilities (hotels, furnished apartments, and leased homes). Give this matter your utmost attention. Keep us informed.
The documents also contain responses to this request. One response, dated August 2002, states "Upon verifying the information through our sources and friends in the field as well as office (3), we found no information to confirm the presence of the above-mentioned in our area of operation. Please review, we suggest circulating the contents of this message." Another response, also dated August 2002, states "After closely examining the data and through our sources and friends in (SATTS: U R A) square, and in Al-Qa'im immigration office, and in Office (3), none of the mentioned individuals are documented to be present in our area of jurisdiction."[138][139][140]
According to ABC News, "The letter seems to be coming from or going to Trebil, a town on the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Follow up on the presence of those subjects is ordered, as well as a comparison of their pictures with those of Jordanian subjects living in Iraq. (This may be referring to pictures of Abu Musaab al Zarqawi and another man on pp. 4–6.)"[141]
In his book At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet writes:
... by the spring and summer of 2002, more than a dozen al-Qa'ida-affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad, with apparently no harassment on the part of the Iraqi government. They found a comfortable and secure environment in which they moved people and supplies to support Zarqawi's operations in northern Iraq.[110]
According to Tenet, while Zarqawi did find a safe haven in Iraq and did supervise camps in northeastern Iraq run by the Kurdish group Ansar al-Islam, "the intelligence did not show any Iraqi authority, direction, or control over any of the many specific terrorist acts carried out by al-Qa'ida."[142]
Debates over level of influence
How much influence al-Zarqawi had in Iraq and after his death is disputed.
Importance
Writing in 2015, nine years after his death, an anonymous author in the
He personally beheaded civilians on video; directed suicide bombs at targets that other jihadis considered off limits like the UN, NGOs, and Arab embassies; and struck Shia religious targets with the ultimately successfully goal of provoking a destabilizing Sunni–Shia civil war. Even Al Qaeda thought he was going too far ... but Zarqawi's methods proved to have enduring traction long after his death in 2006.[143]
While the US "
Doubts about his importance
Some months before and after his killing, several sources claimed that Zarqawi was variously an American "Boogeyman" and product of its war propaganda, the product of faulty U.S. intelligence, a U.S. or Israeli agent, did not really exist, was unlikely to be an important insurgent leader because he had no real leadership capabilities, and/or did not behead Nicholas Berg.
According to the
On February 18, 2006,
I believe he is fictitious. He is a knife or a pistol in the hands of the occupier. I believe that all three – the occupation, the takfir (i.e. the practice of declaring other Muslims to be apostates) supporters, and the Saddam supporters – stem from the same source, because the takfir supporters and the Saddam supporters are a weapon in the hands of America and it pins its crimes on them.[149]
On April 10, 2006, The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military conducted a major propaganda offensive designed to exaggerate Zarqawi's role in the Iraqi insurgency.[150] Gen. Mark Kimmitt says of the propaganda campaign that there "was no attempt to manipulate the press". In an internal briefing, Kimmitt is quoted as stating, "The Zarqawi PSYOP Program is the most successful information campaign to date." The main goal of the propaganda campaign seems to have been to exacerbate a rift between insurgent forces in Iraq, but intelligence experts worried that it had actually enhanced Zarqawi's influence.[150] Col. Derek Harvey, who served as a military intelligence officer in Iraq and then was one of the top officers handling Iraq intelligence issues on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned an Army meeting in 2004, "Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will – made him more important than he really is, in some ways."[150] While Pentagon spokespersons state unequivocally that PSYOPs may not be used to influence American citizens, there is little question that the information disseminated through the program has found its way into American media sources. The Washington Post also notes, "One briefing slide about U.S. 'strategic communications' in Iraq, prepared for Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top U.S. commander in Iraq, describes the 'home audience' as one of six major targets of the American side of the war."[150]
On July 4, 2006, the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad, in an interview with the BBC, said: "In terms of the level of violence, it (the death of al-Zarqawi) has not had any impact at this point... the level of violence is still quite high." But Khalilzad maintained his view that the killing had encouraged some insurgent groups to "reach out" and join government reconciliation talks; he believed that previously these groups were intimidated by Zarqawi's presence.[151]
On June 8, 2006, on the BBC's
In a story detailing her captivity in Iraq, Jill Carroll, a journalist for The Christian Science Monitor, casts doubt on al-Zarqawi's alleged unimportance. She describes how one of her captors, who identified himself as Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq, conveyed to her that:
The Americans were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners... So, the Iraqi insurgents went to Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge. But as I saw in coming weeks, Zarqawi remained the insurgents' hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever Nour/Rashid's position. And it seemed to me, based on snatches of conversations, that two cell leaders under him – Abu Rasha and Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti] – might also be on the council. At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of directives from the council and Zarqawi.[153]
Pre-war assassination opportunities
According to NBC News, the Pentagon had pushed to "take out" Zarqawi's operation at least three times prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but had been vetoed by the National Security Council.[154] The NSC reportedly made its decision in an effort to convince other countries to join the U.S. in a coalition against Iraq. "People were more obsessed with developing the coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the president's policy of pre-emption against terrorists," said former National Security Council member Roger Cressey.[155]
In May 2005, former CIA official Michael Scheuer, who headed the CIA's bin Laden unit for six years before resigning in 2004, corroborated this. Paraphrasing his remarks, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation stated Scheuer claimed, "the United States deliberately turned down several opportunities to kill terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the lead-up to the Iraq war." ABC added, "a plan to destroy Zarqawi's training camp in Kurdistan was abandoned for diplomatic reasons." Scheuer explained, "the reasons the intelligence service got for not shooting Zarqawi was simply that the President and the National Security Council decided it was more important not to give the Europeans the impression we were gunslingers" in an effort to win support for ousting Saddam Hussein.[156]
This claim was also corroborated by CENTCOM's Deputy Commander,
We almost took them out three months before the Iraq war started. We almost took that thing, but we were so concerned that the chemical cloud from there could devastate the region that we chose to take them by land rather than by smart weapons.[157]
In his 2010 memoir Decision Points, President Bush recounted:
The question was whether to bomb the poisons lab in the summer of 2002. We held a series of NSC meetings on that topic... Colin [Powell] and Condi [Condoleezza Rice] felt a strike on the lab would create an international firestorm and disrupt our efforts to build a coalition to confront Saddam... I decided to continue on the diplomatic track.[158]
Reports of death, detention and injuries
Missing leg
Claims of harm to Zarqawi changed over time. Early in 2002, there were unverified reports from
In 2004, Newsweek reported that some "senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad" had come to believe that he still had his original legs.[161] Knight Ridder later reported that the leg amputation was something "officials now acknowledge was incorrect".[162]
When the video of the Berg beheading was released in 2004, credence was given to the claim that Zarqawi was alive and active. The man identified as Zarqawi in the video did not appear to have a prosthetic leg. Videos of Zarqawi aired in 2006 that clearly showed him with both legs intact. When Zarqawi's body was autopsied, X-rays revealed that his right lower leg was fractured.[163]
Claims of death
In March 2004, an insurgent group in Iraq issued a statement saying that Zarqawi had been killed in April 2003. The statement said that he was unable to escape the missile attack because of his prosthetic leg. His followers claimed he was killed in a U.S. bombing raid in the north of Iraq.[164] The claim that Zarqawi had been killed in northern Iraq "at the beginning of the war", and that subsequent use of his name was a useful myth, was repeated in September 2005 by Sheikh Jawad Al-Khalessi, a Shiite imam.[165]
On May 24, 2005, it was reported on an Islamic website that a deputy would take command of Al-Qaeda while Zarqawi recovered from injuries sustained in an attack.
In a September 16, 2005, article published by Le Monde, Sheikh Jawad Al-Kalesi claimed that al-Zarqawi was killed in the Kurdish northern region of Iraq at the beginning of the U.S.-led war on the country as he was meeting with members of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam group affiliated to al-Qaeda. Al-Kalesi also claimed "His family in Jordan even held a ceremony after his death." He also claimed, "Zarqawi has been used as a ploy by the United States, as an excuse to continue the occupation" and saying, "It was a pretext so they don't leave Iraq."[169]
On November 20, 2005, some news sources reported that Zarqawi may have been killed in a coalition assault on a house in Mosul; five of those in the house were killed in the assault while the other three died through using 'suicide belts' of explosives. United States and British soldiers searched the remains,[170] with U.S. forces using DNA samples to identify the dead.[171] However, none of those remains belonged to him.[citation needed]
On June 8, 2006, NBC news and the Pentagon reported that the US Special Operations Group Delta Force had been responsible for killing Zarqawi.
Pentagon officials have refused to say whether U.S. special operations forces participated in the al-Zarqawi operation Wednesday, but a comment Friday by President Bush suggested that some of the military's most secretive units may have been involved on the ground. Speaking to reporters, Bush mentioned that among the senior officers he called to offer congratulations for killing Zarqawi was Army Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, whose forces include the Army’s clandestine counterterrorism unit, Delta Force.[168]
Reportedly captured and released
According to a CNN report dated December 15, 2005,[172] al-Zarqawi was captured by Iraqi forces sometime during 2004 and later released because his captors did not realize who he was. This claim was made by a Saudi suicide bomber, Ahmed Abdullah al-Shaiyah, who survived a failed suicide attack to blow up the Jordanian mission in Baghdad in December.[173] "Do you know what has happened to Zarqawi and where he is?" an Iraqi investigator asked Mr. Shaiyah.[173] He answered, "I don't know, but I heard from some of my mujahadeen brothers that Iraqi police had captured Zarqawi in Fallujah."[173] Mr. Shaiyah says he then heard that the police let the terrorist go because they had failed to recognize him. U.S. officials called the report "plausible" but refused to confirm it.[citation needed]
Death
Zarqawi was killed in a
The joint task force (
On June 8, 2006, coalition forces confirmed that Zarqawi's body was identified by facial recognition, fingerprinting, known scars and tattoos.
Initially, the U.S. military reported that Zarqawi was killed directly in the attack. However, according to a statement made the following day by Major General William Caldwell of the U.S. Army, Zarqawi survived for a short time after the bombing and, after being placed on a stretcher, attempted to move and was restrained, after which he died from his injuries.[185] An Iraqi man, who claims to have arrived on the scene a few moments after the attack, said he saw U.S. troops beating up the badly wounded but still alive Zarqawi.[186][187] In contradiction, Caldwell asserted that when U.S. troops found Zarqawi barely alive they tried to provide him with medical help, rejecting the allegations that he was beaten based on an autopsy performed. The account of the Iraqi witness has not been verified.[188] All others in the house died immediately in the blasts. On June 12, 2006, it was reported that an autopsy performed by the U.S. military revealed that the cause of death to Zarqawi was a blast injury to the lungs but he took nearly an hour to die.[189]
The U.S. government distributed an image of Zarqawi's corpse as part of the press pack associated with the press conference. The release of the image has been criticised for being in questionable taste and for inadvertently creating an iconic image of Zarqawi that would be used to rally his supporters.[190][191]
Reactions to death
Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki commented on the death of Zarqawi by saying: "Today, Zarqawi has been terminated. Every time a Zarqawi appears we will kill him. We will continue confronting whoever follows his path."[192]
United States President George W. Bush stated that through his every action Zarqawi sought to defeat America and its coalition partners by turning Iraq into a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Bush also stated, "Now Zarqawi has met his end and this violent man will never murder again."[193]
Zarqawi's brother-in-law has since claimed that he was a martyr even though the family renounced Zarqawi and his actions in the aftermath of the Amman triple suicide bombing that killed at least 60 people.[194] The opinion of Iraqis on his death was mixed; some believed that it would promote peace between the warring factions, while others were convinced that his death would provoke his followers to a massive retaliation and cause more bombings and deaths in Iraq.[181]
A statement attributed to
On June 16, 2006, Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council, which groups five
Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), published a statement on a website where he said: "O infidels and apostates, your joy will be brief and you will cry for a long time... we are all Zarqawi."[198] Al-Zarqawi had been Droukdel's mentor.[199]
Counterterrorism officials have said that al-Zarqawi had become a key part of al-Qaeda's marketing campaign and that al-Zarqawi served as a "worldwide jihadist rallying point and a fundraising icon". Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., who serves on the House Intelligence Committee, called al-Zarqawi "The terrorist celeb, if you will, ... It is like selling for any organization. They are selling the success of Zarqawi in eluding capture in Iraq."[200]
On June 23, 2006, Al Jazeera aired a video in which Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda's No. 2 leader, states that Zarqawi was "a soldier, a hero, an imam and the prince of martyrs, [and his death] has defined the struggle between the crusaders and Islam in Iraq".[201]
On June 30, 2006, Osama bin Laden released an audio recording in which he stated, "Our Islamic nation was surprised to find its knight, the lion of jihad, the man of determination and will, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in a shameful American raid. We pray to Allah to bless him and accept him among the martyrs as he had hoped for." Bin Laden also defended al-Zarqawi, saying he had "clear instructions" to focus on U.S.-led forces in Iraq but also "for those who ... stood to fight on the side of the crusaders against the Muslims, then he should kill them whoever they are, regardless of their sect or tribe." Shortly after, he released another audio tape in which he stated, "Our brothers, the mujahedeen in the al-Qaeda organization, have chosen the dear brother
Alleged betrayal by al-Qaeda
A day before Zarqawi was killed, a U.S. strategic analysis site
Reward
In apparent contradiction to statements made earlier in the day by U.S. ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, an Iraqi spokesman said the US$25 million reward "will be honored".[207] Khalilzad, in an interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, had stated the bounty would not be paid because the decisive information leading to Zarqawi's whereabouts had been supplied by an al-Qaeda in Iraq operative whose own complicity in violent acts would disqualify him from receiving payment.[citation needed]
Rep. Mark Kirk, a Republican of Illinois who drafted the legislation specifying the Zarqawi reward, was quoted as saying contemporaneously that the Bush Administration planned to pay "some rewards" for Zarqawi. "I don't have the specifics," he stated. "The administration is now working out who will get it and how much. As their appropriator who funds them, I asked them to let me know if they need more money to run the rewards program now that they are paying this out."[208]
Post-Zarqawi Iraq environment
Zarqawi's death was seen as a major coup for the U.S. government in terms of the political and propaganda stakes. However, unconfirmed rumors in early April 2006 suggested that Zarqawi had been demoted from a strategic or coordinating function to overseer of paramilitary/terrorist activities of his group and that
After Zarqawi's demise in early June 2006 there was little or no immediately identifiable change in terms of the level of violence and attacks against U.S. and allied troops. In the immediate aftermath insurgency attacks averaged 90 a day, apparently some of the highest on record.[210] Four months after Zarqawi's death, it was estimated that 374 coalition soldiers and 10,355 Iraqis had been killed.[211] Several insurgency groups and heads of Sunni Muslim tribes also formed a coalition called the Mujahideen Shura Council.[212]
By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed by AQI against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image and caused the loss of support among the population, isolating the group. In a major blow to AQI, thousands of former Sunni militants that previously fought along with the group started to actively fight AQI and also work with the American and Iraqi forces, starting with the creation of the Anbar Awakening Council, so called because of its Anbar origins. The group spread to all Sunni cities and communities and some Shiite areas and adopted the broader name Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq was instrumental in giving tips to coalition forces about weapons caches and militants resulting in the destruction of over 2,500 weapons caches and over 800 militants being killed or captured. In addition, the 30,000 strong U.S. troop surge supplied military planners with more manpower for operations targeting Al-Qaeda in Iraq, The Mujahadeen Shura Council, Ansar Al-Sunnah and other terrorist groups. The resulting events led to dozens of high-level AQI leaders being captured or killed. Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared to be severely crippled due to its lack of vast weapons caches, leaders, safe havens, and Iraqis willing to support them. Accordingly, the bounty issued for Abu Ayyub-al-Masri, aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer was eventually cut from $5 million down to a mere $100,000 in April 2008.[citation needed]
On January 8 and 28, 2008, Iraqi and U.S. forces launched
Writings
Kalimāt mudī'a (Enlightening Speech in English) is a more than 600-page compilation of al-Zarqawi's writings and transcribed speeches.[213]
See also
- Abdel Majid al-Majali
Citations
- ^ "FBI Seeking Information - Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi". March 22, 2006. Archived from the original on March 22, 2006.
- ^ Interpol. "Interpol: Al Khalaylen, Ahmad (alias Abu Musab Al-zarqawi)". Archived from the original on April 28, 2006. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
- Rewards for Justice. February 2, 2006. Archived from the originalon February 6, 2006.
- ^ a b Anonymous (August 13, 2015). "The Mystery of ISIS". New York Review of Books. LXII (13). Archived from the original on October 29, 2015. Retrieved October 29, 2015.
- ISBN 978-1941393710. Archivedfrom the original on January 24, 2023. Retrieved October 29, 2015.
- ^ Chehab, Zaki 2006, Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency, IB Tauris & Co, Cornwall, p. 8.
- ^ "Al-Zarqawi declares war on Iraqi Shia". Al Jazeera. September 14, 2005. Archived from the original on March 3, 2011. Retrieved October 22, 2009.
- ^ Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach By Craig Whitlock Archived February 1, 2017, at the Wayback Machine, The Washington Post, November 13, 2005
- ^ Filkins, Dexter; Burns, John F. (June 11, 2006). "At Site of Attack on Zarqawi, All That's Left Are Questions". The New York Times. Archived from the original on March 18, 2017. Retrieved February 21, 2017.
- ^ a b c Bergen, Peter. " The Osama bin Laden I Know, 2006
- ^ a b c d e f Weaver, Mary Ann (July–August 2006). "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". Atlantic Monthly. pp. 95–98. Archived from the original on January 24, 2023. Retrieved May 6, 2011.
- ^ "Zarqawi and the 'al-Qaeda link'". BBC. February 5, 2003. Archived from the original on February 19, 2003. Retrieved July 12, 2016.
- ^ Nimrod Raphaeli (June 30, 2005), "'The Sheikh of the Slaughterers': Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi and the Al-Qaeda Connection", Memri. Retrieved September 5, 2019. (Archived February 13, 2020, at the Wayback Machine).
- ^ Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda, University of California Press (2006), p. 192
- ISBN 978-1441180421.
- ^ Benjamin, Daniel (May 29, 2015). "'Zarqawi': Face of the Insurgency – NYTimes.com". The New York Times. Archived from the original on May 29, 2015. Retrieved July 12, 2016.
{{cite news}}
: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Whitlock, Craig (June 8, 2006). "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". The Washington Post. p. 2. Archived from the original on October 3, 2018. Retrieved February 27, 2015.
- ^ Smith, Laura (June 8, 2006). "Timeline: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on March 13, 2011. Retrieved December 10, 2016.
- ^ Ahmed Hashim, The Caliphate at War: The Ideological, Organisational and Military Innovations of Islamic State, Oxford University Press (2018), p. 76
- ^ Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, Simon and Schuster (2016), p. 7
- ^ Nelly Lahoud (2009) "In Search of Philosopher‐Jihadis: Abu Muhammad al‐Maqdisi's Jihadi Philosophy", Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 10:2, 208
- ^ a b "Zarqawi – the link between Pakistani and Iraqi militants". Dawn. November 23, 2014. Archived from the original on January 17, 2015. Retrieved February 24, 2015.
- ^ Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda by Jean-Charles Brisard with Damien Martinez, Polity (2005), pp. 22–23
- ^ Thomas Joscelyn (December 29, 2018), "Jihadis claim US-designated terrorist killed in Syria" Archived January 7, 2019, at the Wayback Machine, Long War Journal. Retrieved September 7, 2019.
- ^ From Muhammad to Bin Laden: Religious and Ideological Sources of the homicide bombers phenomenon, David Bukay Archived January 24, 2023, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World, Nir Rosen Archived January 24, 2023, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ middle East forum Archived June 12, 2018, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future, Bruce Riedel.
- ^ the "islamic state" organization, hassan abu hanieh and mohammad abu rumman Archived September 21, 2020, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ thedailyephemera Archived June 12, 2018, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ tpaoa.wordpress.com Archived June 12, 2018, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ "Research note" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on February 20, 2015. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
- ^ Smith, Laura (June 8, 2006). "Timeline: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on March 13, 2011. Retrieved December 10, 2016.
- ^ Ratnesar, Romesh (December 19, 2004). "Face Of Terror". Time. Archived from the original on November 5, 2016. Retrieved November 4, 2016.
- ^ February 21, 2006. Retrieved February 22, 2015.
- ^ Lawrence Wright (June 11, 2006), "The terrorist" Archived August 8, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, The New Yorker. Retrieved September 8, 2019.
- ^ Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History, Princeton University Press (2017), p. 55
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Whitlock, Craig (October 3, 2004). "Zarqawi building his own terror network". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Archived from the original on October 28, 2005. Retrieved February 27, 2015.
- ^ Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 2014. pp. 1–2. Archived from the original(PDF) on February 20, 2015. Retrieved February 14, 2015.
- ^ a b Bill Roggio (March 30, 2005). "Exodus and Ascent". The Long War Journal. Archived from the original on April 2, 2015. Retrieved February 24, 2015.
- ^ Atwan, Abdel Bari. Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. University of California Press.
- ISBN 978-981-4324-87-8.
- ^ Whitlock, Craig (June 8, 2006). "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on October 20, 2012. Retrieved April 23, 2010.
- ISBN 978-0-231-50053-1.
- ISSN 0268-4527.
- ^ Bergen, Peter (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know. Simon and Schuster. p. xvii.
- ^ Brisard, Jean-Charles (2005). Zarqawi: The New Face of Al Qaeda. Other Press. p. 124.
- ^ Ghayshan, Nabil (September 2, 2003). "Iran Reportedly Rejects Jordanian Demand to Hand Over Al-Zarqawi". Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
- ^ Bergen, Peter (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know. Simon and Schuster. p. 361.
- ^ ISBN 9780160873744. Archivedfrom the original on January 24, 2023. Retrieved December 7, 2015. (See III.G, Conclusions 5 and 6, p. 109.)
- ^ Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward, Simon and Schuster, 2004.
- ISBN 978-1-59921-366-8.
- ^ "An interview on public radio with the author". Archived from the original on September 30, 2011.
- ^ Chalk, Peter, Encyclopedia of Terrorism Volume 1, 2012, ABC-CLIO
- ^ a b "Al-Qaeda group claims Salim death". BBC News. May 19, 2004. Archived from the original on June 6, 2004. Retrieved December 31, 2014.
- ^ "Group seizes Japanese man in Iraq". BBC News. October 27, 2004. Archived from the original on March 6, 2016. Retrieved December 29, 2014.
- ^ "Ansar al Islam names new leader". Long War Journal. January 5, 2012. Retrieved 2014-01-08.
- ^ "US military: Al-Zarqawi was alive after bombing". CNN. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on February 20, 2015. Retrieved February 24, 2015.
- ^ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on June 30, 2020. Retrieved September 9, 2020.
- ^ "Iraq backs Zarqawi wounded claim". BBC News. May 26, 2005. Archived from the original on April 7, 2022. Retrieved February 23, 2015.
- FBI. February 24, 2006. Archived from the originalon November 14, 2007.
- ^ Brian Ross (September 24, 2004). "Tracking Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi". ABC News. Archived from the original on January 28, 2017. Retrieved November 12, 2006.
- ^ "Zarqawi's wife says she urged him to leave Iraq". USA Today. June 7, 2006. Archived from the original on April 4, 2010. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ a b c Napoleoni, Loretta (November 11, 2005). "The Myth of Zarqawi". Time. Archived from the original on June 21, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ AFP (January 18, 2013), "'Zarqawi brother-in-law killed in Syria'" Archived July 24, 2020, at the Wayback Machine, Gulf News. Retrieved September 7, 2019.
- ^ MacLeod, Scott; Bill Powell (June 11, 2006). "How They Killed Him". Time. Archived from the original on June 14, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ "Al-Zarqawi's Legacy Haunts the al-Khalayleh Clan". Jamestown Foundation. June 13, 2006. Archived from the original on March 7, 2008.
- ^ Arraf, Jane; Boettcher, Mike; Schutser, Henry (December 14, 2002). "Jordan: Al Qaeda killed U.S. diplomat". CNN. Archived from the original on November 11, 2014. Retrieved September 22, 2023.
- ^ Office of Public Affairs (September 24, 2003). "Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaida Terrorists". U.S. Department of the Treasury (Press release). Retrieved September 22, 2023.
- ^ "Militants sentenced to death". The Irish Times. Archived from the original on September 27, 2020. Retrieved December 22, 2019.
- ^ "Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". BBC News. November 10, 2005. Archived from the original on June 15, 2006. Retrieved March 1, 2015.
- ^ "Transcript of Powell's U.N. presentation". CNN. February 6, 2003. Archived from the original on September 20, 2021. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
- ^ Jones, Gareth (May 4, 2004). "Sixteen held as police 'foil plot aimed at NATO summit'". The Scotsman. Edinburgh. Archived from the original on December 27, 2005.
- ^ Whitlock, Craig (June 8, 2006). "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on October 20, 2012. Retrieved April 23, 2010.
- ^ "Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted". CNN. April 26, 2004. Archived from the original on March 28, 2013. Retrieved June 18, 2006.
- ^ a b c d e Peter Chalk. Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Volume 1 Archived January 24, 2023, at the Wayback Machine. pp. 48–49
- ^ "Jordan Airs Confessions of Suspected Terrorists". Fox News. Associated Press. April 27, 2004. Archived from the original on April 21, 2006.
- ^ "Jordan Sentences Zarqawi To Death". CBS News. February 15, 2006. Archived from the original on February 25, 2006. Retrieved September 4, 2006.
- ^ "Jordan 'not afraid' after bombs". BBC News. November 10, 2005. Archived from the original on August 31, 2017. Retrieved March 1, 2015.
- ^ Hayes, Stephen (June 19, 2006). "What Zarqawi – and al Qaeda – were up to before the Iraq war". The Weekly Standard. Archived from the original on September 30, 2007.
- ^ "Zarqawi set up Iraq sleeper cells: UK report". Associated Press. July 15, 2004. Archived from the original on March 16, 2005.
- ^ a b Sperry, Paul (June 14, 2006). "Stephen Hayes, Call Your Editor". Anti War. Archived from the original on January 2, 2017. Retrieved January 1, 2017.
- ISBN 978-1583226735.
Terror Incorporated.
- ^ Napoleoni, Loretta (November 11, 2005). "The Myth of Zarqawi". Anti War. Archived from the original on June 21, 2006. Retrieved October 27, 2006.
- ^ "'Zarqawi' beheaded US man in Iraq". BBC News. May 13, 2004. Archived from the original on January 11, 2019. Retrieved May 13, 2004.
- ^ "Beheaded man's father: Revenge breeds revenge". CNN. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on October 4, 2006. Retrieved October 27, 2006.
- ^ "Another American hostage killed Web site posting claims". September 21, 2004. Archived from the original on October 19, 2017. Retrieved June 2, 2017.
- ^ Miklaszewski, Jim (March 2, 2004). "With Tuesday's attacks, Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant with ties to al-Qaida, is now blamed for more than 700 terrorist killings in Iraq". NBC News. Archived from the original on February 10, 2007.
- ^ "Zarqawi attacked in Iraq Raid". BBC News. June 6, 2006. Archived from the original on May 12, 2021. Retrieved June 8, 2006.
- U.S. Department of State. October 15, 2004. Archivedfrom the original on February 6, 2009. Retrieved April 21, 2006.
- ^ "The Death of Zarqawi: A Major Victory in the War on Terrorism". The Heritage foundation. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on March 11, 2010.
- ^ Ensor and McIntyre, David and James (October 13, 2005). "Al Qaeda in Iraq: Letter to al-Zarqawi a fake". CNN. Archived from the original on October 15, 2005.
- ^ "New ops planned in wake of Zarqawi hunt". United Press International. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on June 4, 2013.
- ^ "U.S. troops find Baghdad arms caches". CNN. January 24, 2005. Retrieved October 28, 2023.
- Brookings.edu. Retrieved October 28, 2023.
- ^ "Purported al-Zarqawi tape: Democracy a lie". CNN. January 23, 2005. Archived from the original on February 10, 2007. Retrieved December 7, 2006.
- ^ "'Zarqawi' shows face in new video". BBC News. April 25, 2006. Archived from the original on June 13, 2006. Retrieved June 9, 2006.
- from the original on August 26, 2019. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
- ^ "Text of a document found in Zarqawi's safe house". USA Today. June 15, 2006. Archived from the original on December 3, 2009. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ a b Soriano, Cesar (June 15, 2006). "Iraqi leaders: Memo details al-Qaeda plans". USA Today. Archived from the original on February 27, 2009. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ "After Zarqawi" (PDF). Brian Fishman. June 15, 2006. Archived from the original (PDF) on November 2, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus (June 10, 2006). "Zarqawi Helped U.S. Argument That Al-Qaeda Network Was in Iraq". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on September 4, 2017. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ Nasr, Vali, Shia Revival, (Norton, 2006), p. 241
- ^ Craig Whitlock (June 10, 2006). "Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda In Iraq and Around the World". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on November 2, 2019. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Al-Qaeda Terrorists Recount Their Experiences in Afghanistan on Saudi TV and Arab Channels". MEMRI. December 7, 2005. Archived from the original on December 13, 2005.
- ^ a b Craig Whitlock (September 27, 2004). "Grisly Path to Power In Iraq's Insurgency: Zarqawi Emerges as Al Qaeda Rival, Ally". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on March 30, 2017. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ a b c d Craig Whitlock (June 10, 2006). "Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda In Iraq and Around the World". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on November 2, 2019. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ Bergen, Peter. "The Osama bin Laden I know", 2006. pp. 359–422
- ^ George Tenet. "At the Center of the Storm: My years at the CIA". HarperCollins. p. 157.
- ^ a b George Tenet. "At the Center of the Storm: My years at the CIA". HarperCollins. p. 351.
- ^ a b c Gary Gambill (December 16, 2004). "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch". The Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on September 30, 2007. Retrieved October 22, 2009.
- ^ "Total war: Inside the new Al-Qaeda". Middle East Online. March 3, 2006. Archived from the original on December 11, 2006. Retrieved December 16, 2006.
- ^ Gilmore, Grainne (February 26, 2006). "Total war: Inside the new Al-Qaeda". The Sunday Times. London. Archived from the original on January 24, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2009.
- ^ Walter Pincus (October 19, 2004). "Zarqawi Is Said to Swear Allegiance to Bin Laden". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on March 30, 2017. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ "Letter from Zarqawi to bin Laden". January 2004. Archived from the original on January 20, 2016.
- ^ Translation by Jeffrey Pool (December 16, 2004). "Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda: from Mu'asker Al-Battar, Issue 21". The Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on December 29, 2007.
- ^ "Purported bin Laden tape endorses al-Zarqawi". CNN. December 27, 2004. Archived from the original on December 28, 2004. Retrieved December 28, 2004.
- ^ Ed Henry and Elaine Quijano (May 23, 2007). "Bush uses bin Laden to defend Iraq war policy". CNN. Archived from the original on January 2, 2017. Retrieved January 1, 2017.
- ^ Paul Wilkinson (June 10, 2006). "Zarqawi's Death and the Iraqi Insurgency". NPR. Archived from the original on August 9, 2018. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
- ^ Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball (June 23, 2004). "The World's Most Dangerous Terrorist: Who is Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi? And why are so many governments scared to death of him?". Newsweek. Archived from the original on April 16, 2007.
- ^ "(p. 90)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 21, 2006.
- ^ "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated April 2006" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 30, 2006.
- ^ "U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council". The White House. February 5, 2003. Archived from the original on May 14, 2012. Retrieved August 25, 2017.
- ^ a b Craig Whitlock (June 8, 2006). "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on October 20, 2012. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ "page 337" (PDF). Archived from the original on June 16, 2007. Retrieved June 5, 2007.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - ^ "page 338" (PDF). Archived from the original on June 16, 2007. Retrieved June 5, 2007.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - ^ "Saddam refused to hand Zarqawi to Jordan: King Abdullah". Khaleej Times Online. May 19, 2005. Archived from the original on May 23, 2005.
- ^ Mary Ann Weaver, "Inventing al-Zarqawi", p. 96.
- ISBN 978-0231134484. Retrieved July 18, 2010.
- ISBN 1-58322-705-9
- ^ "CIA report finds no Zarqawi-Saddam link". Reuters. October 6, 2004. Archived from the original on September 24, 2020. Retrieved November 10, 2019.
- ^ Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott (October 5, 2004). "CIA Review Finds No Evidence Saddam Had Ties to Islamic Terrorists". Knight-Ridder. Archived from the original on August 3, 2009.
- ISBN 978-0-16-073122-8. Retrieved September 22, 2023.
- ^ Stephen F. Hayes (November 24, 2003). "Case Closed". The Weekly Standard. Archived from the original on June 14, 2004. Retrieved October 29, 2006.
- ^ Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball (November 19, 2003). "Case Decidedly Not Closed". Newsweek. Archived from the original on July 9, 2008.
- ^ "Saddam Hussein's Support for Terror – regardless of the Senate Intel. Cmte. Report". Archived from the original on March 4, 2016.
- ^ Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball (October 26, 2005). "Fabricated Links?". Newsweek. Archived from the original on November 15, 2007.
- ^ "Operation Iraqi Freedom document (PDF)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on October 12, 2006.
- ^ "Operation Iraqi Freedom document (PDF)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on November 2, 2006.
- ^ "Operation Iraqi Freedom document (PDF)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on November 2, 2006.
- ^ "Did Russian Ambassador Give Saddam the U.S. War Plan? ("Al Qaeda Presence in Iraq")". ABC News. March 23, 2006. Archived from the original on July 24, 2020. Retrieved June 27, 2020.
- ^ George Tenet. "At the Center of the Storm: My years at the CIA". HarperCollins. p. 341.
- ^ a b Cambanis, Thanassis (October 3, 2015). "Book Review. 'Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS' by Joby Warrick". The Boston Globe. Archived from the original on October 3, 2015. Retrieved October 29, 2015.
- ^ Ignatius, David (October 2015). "How ISIS Spread in the Middle East". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on October 30, 2015. Retrieved October 29, 2015.
- ^ "The al-Zarqawi Assessment: Another Instance of 'Cooked' Intelligence?". The Commonwealth Institute. 2004. Archived from the original on June 7, 2006. Retrieved June 9, 2006.
- ^ Brecher, Gary (2005). "Mister Big Unplugged No. 215". eXile. Archived from the original on November 2, 2006. Retrieved June 9, 2006.
- ^ Blomfield, Adrian (April 10, 2006). "How US fuelled myth of Zarqawi the mastermind". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on April 22, 2008.
- ^ "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". The Daily Telegraph. London. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on March 7, 2008. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ "SD110006". MEMRI. Archived from the original on February 24, 2006. Retrieved July 18, 2010.
- ^ a b c d Ricks, Thomas (April 9, 2006). "Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on January 8, 2021. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ "Zarqawi death has 'little impact'". BBC News. July 4, 2006. Archived from the original on July 6, 2006. Retrieved July 4, 2006.
- ^ Jeffrey Gettleman (June 9, 2006). "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Lived a Brief, Shadowy Life Replete With Contradictions". The New York Times. Archived from the original on March 18, 2017. Retrieved February 21, 2017.
- ^ Jill Carroll (August 21, 2006). "Part 6 • Reciting Koranic verses". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved October 25, 2015.[dead link]
- ^ "Avoiding attacking suspected terrorist mastermind". NBC News. March 5, 2005. Archived from the original on October 8, 2019. Retrieved November 10, 2019.
- ^ Jim Miklaszewski (March 2, 2004). "Avoiding attacking suspected terrorist mastermind: Abu Musab Zarqawi blamed for more than 700 killings in Iraq". NBC News. Archived from the original on October 8, 2019. Retrieved November 10, 2019.
- ^ "Bush turned down chances to kill Zarqawi: Ex-CIA spy". ABC News (Australia). May 2, 2005. Archived from the original on May 2, 2006.
- ^ "Interview with Lt. General Michael DeLong". June 20, 2006. Archived from the original on July 4, 2018. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ Bush, George W. (2010). Decision Points. Crown Publishers. pp. 236–237.
- ^ Reporters, Various (June 15, 2004). "Bush stands by al Qaeda, Saddam link". CNN. Archived from the original on June 15, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ Bush, George W. (October 7, 2002). "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat". Whitehouse.gov. Archived from the original on March 7, 2013. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ Hirsh, Michael (March 14, 2004). "Terror's Next Stop". Newsweek. Archived from the original on January 5, 2006.
- ^ "CIA Review Finds No Evidence Saddam Had Ties to Islamic Terrorists". Knight-Ridder. October 6, 2005. Archived from the original on March 6, 2005.
- ^ Reporters, Various (June 13, 2006). "Autopsy: Bomb Killed Al-Zarqawi". Associated Press. Archived from the original on June 16, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ "Iraq militants claim al-Zarqawi is dead". Associated Press. March 4, 2004. Archived from the original on September 24, 2020. Retrieved November 10, 2019.
- ^ "Abou Moussab Al-Zarkaoui est mort. Son nom est utilisé par les occupants pour rester en Irak". Le Monde. September 17, 2005. Archived from the original on December 18, 2012.
- ^ a b "Zarqawi 'injury' attracts prayers". BBC News. May 25, 2005. Archived from the original on June 24, 2006. Retrieved October 27, 2006.
- ^ Knickmeyer, Ellen (May 26, 2005). "Reports: Zarqawi Shot in Lung". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on July 26, 2008. Retrieved July 18, 2010.
- ^ a b "Al-Zarqawi tried to flee in dying moments". msnbc.com. June 10, 2006. Archived from the original on November 4, 2017. Retrieved November 1, 2017.
- ^ "Cleric says al-Zarqawi died long ago". Al Jazeera. September 17, 2005. Archived from the original on March 3, 2011. Retrieved October 22, 2009.
- ^ "Report: al-Zarqawi may have been killed in Mosul". The Jerusalem Post. November 20, 2005. Archived from the original on April 25, 2016. Retrieved April 15, 2016.
- ^ "DEBKAfile - DEBKAfile Exclusive: US forensic experts should know by Tuesday afternoon, Nov. 22, the identities of the eight high-ranking al Qaeda leaders who blew themselves up in Mosul to escape US capture". November 13, 2008. Archived from the original on November 13, 2008.
- ^ "Official: Al-Zarqawi caught, released". CNN. December 15, 2005. Archived from the original on December 17, 2005. Retrieved December 15, 2005.
- ^ a b c "Saudi Suicide Bomber Claims Zarqawi was Captured, Then Released". VOA. December 24, 2005.[dead link]
- ^ "Iraq Terror Chief Killed In Airstrike". CBS News. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on May 24, 2011. Retrieved June 8, 2006.
- ^ Burns, John F. (June 8, 2006). "U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse". The New York Times. Archived from the original on December 7, 2016. Retrieved February 21, 2017 – via NYTimes.com.
- ^ Knickmeyer, Ellen; Finer, Jonathan (June 8, 2006). "Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on August 12, 2010. Retrieved July 3, 2011.
- ^ "Tucson Raytheon had role in al-Zarqawi death". Arizona Daily Star. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on January 18, 2010.
- ^ Filkins, Dexter; Burns, John F. (June 11, 2006). "Middle East". The New York Times. Retrieved January 21, 2013.[dead link]
- ^ "Iraq terrorist leader Zarqawi 'eliminated'". The Guardian. London. June 21, 2005. Archived from the original on January 1, 2017. Retrieved December 10, 2016.
- ISBN 978-0349123554, pp. 159–60
- ^ a b "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi killed in air raid". Associated Press. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on June 15, 2006.
- ^ "Iraqi PM confirms Zarqawi death". CNN. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on June 13, 2006. Retrieved June 8, 2006.
- ^ "Zarqawi killed in Iraq air raid". BBC News. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on May 12, 2021. Retrieved June 8, 2006.
- ^ a b c McIntyre, Jamie; Starr, Barbara; Schuster, Henry; Habib, Randa (June 8, 2006). "'Painstaking' operation led to al-Zarqawi". CNN. Archived from the original on December 20, 2016. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
- ^ "Zarqawi 'alive when found'". The Guardian. London. June 9, 2006.[dead link]
- ^ "Was Al-Zarqawi Beaten After Bombing?". CBS News. June 10, 2006. Archived from the original on June 13, 2006. Retrieved June 10, 2006.
- ^ Smith, Michael (June 11, 2006). "How Iraq's ghost of death was cornered". London: The Sunday Times.[dead link]
- ^ "Military revises al-Zarqawi account". USA Today. June 10, 2006. Archived from the original on February 27, 2009. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
- ^ "Zarqawi 'died of blast injuries'". BBC News. June 15, 2006. Archived from the original on January 24, 2023. Retrieved June 18, 2006.
- ^ Ververs, Vaughn (June 12, 2006). "There Are Two Sides To Some of the Stories That Pictures Can Tell". CBS News. Archived from the original on June 18, 2006. Retrieved June 20, 2006.
- ^ Kennicott, Philip (June 8, 2005). "A Chilling Portrait, Unsuitably Framed". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on November 6, 2012. Retrieved June 14, 2005.
- ^ "World Reaction: 'This Is An Important Day'" (in Arabic). Sky News. June 8, 2005. Archived from the original on November 16, 2018. Retrieved January 11, 2009.
- ^ "Remarks by President Bush: Justice Delivered to the Most Wanted Terrorist in Iraq". state.gov. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved May 21, 2020.
- ^ "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi Killed in Air Raid". Associated Press. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on May 16, 2008.
- ^ "Qaeda in Iraq confirms Zarqawi's death – Web site". Reuters. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on June 30, 2006.
- ^ Gordon, Craig (June 9, 2006). "Death of a Terrorist Leader / How Aide's Betrayal Doomed Al-Zarqawi / How They Got Him: Inside tip identified his spiritual adviser, who unwittingly aided search". SF Gate. Archived from the original on April 2, 2019. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
- ^ "New tape says Zarqawi death 'great loss'". Associated Press. June 16, 2006.[dead link]
- ^ Trabelsi, Habib (June 9, 2006). "Zarqawi death 'relief' for rival rebels: experts". Lebanon Wire. AFP. Archived from the original on March 20, 2013. Retrieved January 20, 2013.
- ^ Belkadi, Boubker (December 13, 2007). "Ruthless chief, head of Al-Qaeda's NAfrica branch". Middle East Online. Algiers. Archived from the original on December 11, 2013. Retrieved January 18, 2013.
- ^ "Al-Qaida likely to alter marketing efforts". Associated Press. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on June 21, 2006.
- ^ "Al-Qaeda No. 2 mentions al-Zarqawi's death". USA Today. Associated Press. June 24, 2006. Archived from the original on July 24, 2020. Retrieved April 23, 2010.
- ^ "Tape: Bin Laden tells Sunnis to fight Shiites in Iraq". CNN. July 1, 2006. Archived from the original on March 9, 2008. Retrieved July 2, 2006.
- ^ "Bin Laden recording praises al-Zarqawi". itv.com. June 30, 2005. Archived from the original on March 7, 2008.
- ^ "Bin Laden lauds al-Zarqawi; readies message". Associated Press. June 25, 2005. Archived from the original on November 16, 2018.
- ^ "Zarqawi Scheduled for Martyrdom". StrategyPage. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on September 15, 2016. Retrieved August 7, 2016.
- ^ "U.S. Moves to Stop Zarqawi Network in Iraq". Associated Press. June 9, 2006. Archived from the original on June 13, 2006.
- ^ "Reward for al-Zarqawi will be honored". Associated Press. June 8, 2006. Archived from the original on January 28, 2013.
- ^ Lake, Eli (June 14, 2006). "Forces Asked That Price on Zarqawi's Head Be Reduced". The New York Sun. p. 2. Archived from the original on July 3, 2006. Retrieved June 15, 2006.
- ^ "U.S. reveals face of alleged new terror chief". CNN. June 15, 2006. Archived from the original on October 28, 2006. Retrieved October 27, 2006.
- ^ Nelson, Fraser (June 11, 2006). "Death of Zarqawi is a mere sideshow". Edinburgh: Scotland on Sunday. Archived from the original on May 22, 2007.
- ^ "Iraq Coalition Casualty Count". icasualties.org. Archived from the original on November 14, 2006. Retrieved November 12, 2006.
- ^ "Iraq Qaeda-led group forms coalition". The Scotsman. Edinburgh. October 12, 2006. Retrieved October 28, 2006.[dead link]
- ^ Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State" Archived February 22, 2020, at the Wayback Machine, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper | No. 19, March 2015, p. 14
General bibliography
- Brisard, Jean-Charles; Martinez, Damien (2005). Zarqaoui : le nouveau visage d'al-Qaïda (in French). Fayard.
- ISBN 978-2130561514.
- Milelli, Jean-Pierre (2005). La lettre d'al-Zarqaoui à Ben Laden (in French). Paris, France: Choiseul.
External links
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi collected news and commentary at The New York Times
- Articles
- 'How the Zarqawi myth was made in America', Nick Davies
- Zarqawi: Taking Care of Business, Daniel Ross, August 1, 2006
- "Al-Zarqawi: A life drenched in blood", Patrick Cockburn, The Independent, June 9, 2006