Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Egyptian Islamic Jihad | |
---|---|
الجهاد الإسلامي المصري | |
Leaders | |
Dates of operation | 1979–2001 (merged with Al-Qaeda) |
Merged into | Al-Qaeda[1] |
Headquarters | Egypt, then Afghanistan (unknown after 2001) |
Active regions | Worldwide, but especially in: |
Anti-Communism Anti-Zionism | |
Notable attacks | Assassination of Anwar Sadat |
Allies | State allies:
Non-state allies: |
Opponents | State opponents:
|
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ,
The organization's original primary goal was to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. Later it broadened its aims to include attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. Since September 1998, the leadership of the group has also allied itself to the ‘global Jihad’ ideology expounded by Osama Bin Laden and has also threatened Western interests.
In June 2001,
Following the
History
Al-Jihad or "Tanzim al-Jihad" was formed in 1980 from the merger of two clusters of Islamist groups: a
After the assassination of Egyptian president
The leader of the Cairo militants was
Most of the middle-rank members were discharged from prison after only three years and fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the mujahideen there and escape persecution at home.[15]
Pakistan and Afghanistan
In the mid-1980s, in
It was also at this time that some saw "the Egyptians" of the EIJ begin to exert an influence on
In 1991, EIJ broke with al-Zumur and al-Zawahiri took control of the leadership. At this point, Marc Sageman (a former foreign service officer who was based in Islamabad from 1987 to 1989), says "the EIJ became a free-floating network without any real ties to its original society or to its surrounding society".[21]
Sudan
al-Jihad (EIJ) had a blind-cell structure, meaning members in one group did not know the identities or activities of those in another so that if one member were captured they would not be able to endanger the whole organization. However, Egyptian authorities captured the membership director of EIJ, the one member who had all the other member's names. The database in his computer listed every member's address, aliases, and potential hideouts. Al-Jihad leader al-Zawahiri bitterly lamented "the government newspapers" elation over “the arrest of 800 members of the al-Jihad group without a single shot being fired".[22]
In August 1993, al-Jihad unsuccessfully attempted to kill the Egyptian Interior Minister,
A few months later in November, al-Jihad made another bombing attempt, this time to kill Egypt's prime minister,
EIJ's longtime association with al-Qaeda became closer at this time when "most" of its members were reported to have gone "on the al-Qaeda payroll". The leader of EIJ hoped this would be a temporary measure but later confided to one of this chief assistants that joining with bin Laden had been "the only solution to keeping the Jihad organization abroad alive."[27]
Mubarak assassination attempt
In June 1995, another failed assassination attempt caused yet a greater setback. Operating from its exile base in Sudan, EIJ joined forces with the Egyptian
Their hope was to decapitate the Egyptian government thereby eliminating the "iron grip" of the state security services, and creating a power vacuum which Islamists could then fill. Unfortunately for this plan, the attack was foiled by a malfunctioning grenade launcher and Mubarak’s bulletproof limousine.
Expulsion from Sudan
Back in Egypt, Mubarak launched a ruthless campaign to crush anyone involved in Islamist terrorism,[31] but in Sudan the EIJ had even worse troubles.
In 1994, in a pamphlet written by Al-Zawahri, he alleges that,
When the Sudanese found out about the executions in its jurisdiction, al-Zawahiri and the rest of EIJ were ordered to leave the Sudan.[30] It was a devastating blow to the group. "In Zawahiri's hands, al-Jihad had splintered into angry and homeless gangs".[33]
bin Laden was also weakened by this failed operation. The core of his al-Qaeda group was made up of members of Islamic Jihad. Because of Sudan's collaboration in the plot, the United Nations voted to impose sanction on the country.[34] To rehabilitate itself in the international community, the Sudanese government pressured bin Laden to leave the country.[30][35] Bin Laden and many EIJ returned to war-torn Afghanistan having lost many members and almost all of bin Laden's assets.[36]
On November 19, 1995, EIJ bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad killing 16 and wounding 60. The attack served as a prototype for future attacks by its sister organization al-Qaeda, such as the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa.
Albania
According to journalist Lawrence Wright, based on testimony given at the trial of the Albanian cell members in the late 1990s or early 2000s, EIJ membership had dwindled to 40 members outside Egypt, and none at all inside the country where "the movement had been eradicated".[37]
In 1998, three al-Jihad members were arrested in
Dissent among EIJ members to this change of direction and abandonment of the taking over Egypt as the group's primary goal was so strong that "in the end, Zawahiri pledged to resign if the members failed to endorse his actions. The organization was in such disarray because of arrests and defections, and so close to bankruptcy, that the only choice was to follow Zawahiri or abandon al-Jihad". One of those who did abandon al-Jihad was Zawahiri's own brother Muhammed, the military commander of EIJ.[41]
Merger with al-Qaeda
In June 2001, Al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into an entity formally called jamaa'at Qa'idat al-Jihad,[9] with the leadership of the EIJ having "the majority" – six of nine seats – "of al-Qaeda's ruling council (shura)."[42][43] However, Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif has claimed that only 9 people from the organization, including Zawahiri, actually joined Al-Qaeda.[44]
Consequently, it is often considered synonymous with al-Qaeda (for example, by the US Treasury Department),[45] although some refer to it as a separate organization with al-Zawahiri as its leader and global jihad's main ideologist.[46]
Activities
The organization specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against the official US and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Egyptian Jihad and the rival armed group launched a wave of violence against Egypt's secular government in 1992, a campaign they only abandoned at the end of the decade. Nearly 1300 people died in the unrest, including policemen and government officials. It is responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in
Leadership
Although Ayman al-Zawahiri was "the one in front", Al-Sharif was the actual leader.[47] Nabil Na'eem was the leader of the group from 1988 until 1992.[48]
The al-Zawahiri faction subsequently formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda leading over time to the effective merger of the two groups operations inside Afghanistan. Even though al-Zawahiri was frequently referred to as a 'lieutenant' or 'second in command' of Al-Qaeda, this description is misleading, as it implies a hierarchical relationship.
The modern Al-Qaeda organization is the combination of bin Laden's financial resources with al-Zawahiri's ideological and operational leadership.
External aid
The extent of its aid from outside of Egypt is not known. The
Unlike other militant counterparts, EIJ was noted for condemning only the government as apostate, and seeking to recruit soldiers, reporters and government workers who were untainted by
See also
- Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif
- Hani al-Sibai
- Terrorism in Egypt
- Returnees from Albania
- Ali Mohammed
- Abu Ayyub al-Masri
- Abu Khayr al-Masri
References
- ^ "The Man Behind Bin Laden". The New Yorker. 9 September 2002.
- ^ Gerecht, Reuel Marc (7 January 2009). "Iran's Hamas Strategy". Wall Street Journal.
- ^ "Iran's Partnership with al-Qaeda and Unanswered Questions". 19 September 2015.
- ^ Global Briefings, Issue 27, September 1998, “Osama Bin Laden tied to other fundamentalists”.
- ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower, Knopf, 2006, p. 123
- ^ a b The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, United Nations Security Council Committee 1267
- ^ "'Terror' list out; Russia tags two Kuwaiti groups". Arab Times. February 2003.
- ^ Terrorism Act 2000 (11, Schedule 2). 2000.
- ^ a b "The Man Behind Bin Laden". The New Yorker. 16 September 2002. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- ^ "Pro-Morsy alliance considers presidential elections boycott". Egypt Independent. 31 March 2014. Retrieved 29 April 2014.
- ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 134 [ISBN missing]
- ^ a b Benjamin, Daniel & Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror, 2002 [ISBN missing][page needed]
- al-Zayat, Montasser, The Road to al-Qaeda, 2002 [ISBN missing][page needed]
- ^ Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 67 [ISBN missing]
- ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 147 [ISBN missing]
- ^ Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p. 122 [ISBN missing]
- ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY: Knopf, 2006, p. 124, [ISBN missing]
- ^ 1988 visit to Lion's Den, in Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.129
- ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p. 130
- ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, pp. 107–108
- ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 148
- ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2002), pp. 184–185
- ^ Mickolus, Edward F. "Terrorism: 1992–1995: A Chronology of Events", p. 468
- ^ Reuters, "Egypt rounds up 20 militants in bombing", August 20, 1993
- ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2002), p. 186
- ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p. 186
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers (2006), p. 185
- ^ "Egypt and Sudan repair relations". BBC. 23 December 1999. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- Jihadica. 18 November 2008. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 45
- ^ a b Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, pp. 213–215
- ^ "Al-Qaeda"s Secret Emails Part Four". Asharq Al-Awsat. 19 June 2005. Archived from the original on 9 December 2012. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p. 216
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, pp. 216, 220
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p. 220
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, pp. 222–223
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p. 336
- ^ Le Figaro, "CIA said hunting Bin Laden group in Tirana", September 30, 1998
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p. 259
- ^ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Summary of the Security Intelligence Report concerning Mahmoud Jaballah[permanent dead link], 22 February 2008. Appendix A.
- ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, pp. 260–261
- ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 63
- ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2006), p. 336
- ^ "The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 12". Jihadica. 1 December 2008. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- ^ SDN and SDGT list, US Department of the Treasury
- ^ Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (2004), p. 63
- ^ Lawrence Wright (2 June 2008). "The Rebellion Within, An Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism". The New Yorker. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
- ^ "Egyptian jihadist leader: Bin Laden blew himself up to avoid capture". Gulf News. 27 May 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2014.
- ^ Kevin M. Woods; James Lacey (November 2007). "Iraqi Perspectives Project" (PDF). Institute for Defense Analyses. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
Further reading
- Jamaat al-Islamiyya (and) Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2005
- "In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)". Archived from the original on 9 April 2007. Retrieved 18 September 2017., Center for Defense Information, 17 September 2002
- "Al-Jihad al-Islami". Archived from the original on 25 September 2001. Retrieved 18 September 2017., Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
- Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Australian National Security, Australian Government
- Egypt's Jihad Group leader wants end to violence
- Violence won't work: how author of 'jihadists' bible' stirred up a storm