Franco-Mongol alliance
Several attempts at a Franco-Mongol alliance against the Islamic
Contact between Europeans and Mongols began around 1220, with occasional messages from the papacy and European monarchs to Mongol leaders such as the
European attitudes began to change in the mid-1260s, from perceiving the Mongols as enemies to be feared, to potential allies against the Muslims. The Mongols sought to capitalize on this, promising a re-conquered Jerusalem to the Europeans in return for cooperation. Attempts to cement an alliance continued through negotiations with many leaders of the Mongol Ilkhanate in Persia, from its founder
Modern historians debate whether an alliance between the Franks and Mongols would have been successful in shifting the balance of power in the region, and if it would have been a wise choice on the part of the Europeans.[8] Traditionally, the Mongols tended to see outside parties as either subjects or enemies, with little room in the middle for a concept such as an ally.[9][10]
Background (1209–1244)
There had long been rumors and expectations among Western Europeans that a great Christian ally would come from the East. These rumors circulated as early as the
During the
After the division of the Mongol Empire in 1259, his empire was divided by his descendants into four sections or Khanates, which degenerated into civil war, although the
The northwestern
Papal overtures (1245–1248)
The first official communications between Western Europe and the Mongol Empire occurred between Pope Innocent IV (fl. 1243–1254) and the Great Khans, via letters and envoys that were sent overland and could take years to arrive at their destination. The communications initiated what was to become a regular pattern in European–Mongol communications: the Europeans would ask the Mongols to convert to Christianity, and the Mongols would respond with demands for submission.[9][16]
The
You should say with a sincere heart: "I will submit and serve you." Thou thyself, at the head of all the Princes, come at once to serve and wait upon us! At that time I shall recognize your submission. If you do not observe God's command, and if you ignore my command, I shall know you as my enemy.
A second mission sent in 1245 by Pope Innocent was led by the
Christian vassals
As the Mongols of the Ilkhanate continued to move towards the Holy Land, city after city fell to them. The typical Mongol pattern was to give a region one chance to surrender. If the target acquiesced, the Mongols absorbed the populace and warriors into their own Mongol army, which they would then use to further expand the empire. If a community did not surrender, the Mongols forcefully took the settlement or settlements and slaughtered everyone they found.[27] Faced with the option of subjugation to or combat with the nearby Mongol horde, many communities chose the former, including some Christian realms.[28]
Starting in 1220, the
Antioch
The
Around 1262 or 1263, the Mamluk leader
In 1271, Baibars sent a letter to Bohemond threatening him with total annihilation and taunting him for his alliance with the Mongols:
Our yellow flags have repelled your red flags, and the sound of the bells has been replaced by the call: "Allâh Akbar!" ... Warn your walls and your churches that soon our siege machinery will deal with them, your knights that soon our swords will invite themselves in their homes ... We will see then what use will be your alliance with Abagha.
— Letter from Baibars to Bohemond VI, 1271[45]
Bohemond was left with no estates except the County of Tripoli, which was itself to fall to the Mamluks in 1289.[46]
Saint Louis and the Mongols
Louis's campaign against Egypt did not go well. He
Louis attempted a second crusade (the Eighth Crusade) in 1270. The Mongol Ilkhanate leader Abaqa wrote to Louis IX offering military support as soon as the Crusaders landed in Palestine, but Louis instead went to Tunis in modern Tunisia. His intention was evidently to first conquer Tunis, and then to move his troops along the coast to reach Alexandria in Egypt.[55] The French historians Alain Demurger and Jean Richard suggest that this crusade may still have been an attempt at coordination with the Mongols, in that Louis may have attacked Tunis instead of Syria following a message from Abaqa that he would not be able to commit his forces in 1270, and asking to postpone the campaign to 1271.[56][57] Envoys from the Byzantine emperor, the Armenians and the Mongols of Abaqa were present at Tunis, but events put a stop to plans for a continued crusade when Louis died of illness.[57] According to legend, his last word was "Jerusalem".[58]
Relations with the Ilkhanate
Hulagu (1256–1265)
In 1238, the European kings
Fall of Baghdad (1258)
The
For Asiatic Christians, the fall of Baghdad was cause for celebration.
Invasion of Syria (1260)
After Baghdad, in 1260 the Mongols with their Christian subjects conquered Muslim Syria, domain of the Ayyubid dynasty. They took together the city of Aleppo in January, and in March, the Mongols with the Armenians and the Franks of Antioch took Damascus, under the Christian Mongol general Kitbuqa.[15][38] With both the Abbasid and Ayyubid dynasties destroyed, the Near East, as described by historian Steven Runciman, "was never again to dominate civilization."[68] The last Ayyubid sultan An-Nasir Yusuf died shortly thereafter, and with the Islamic power centers of Baghdad and Damascus gone, the center of Islamic power transferred to the Egyptian Mamluks in Cairo.[15][69] However, before the Mongols could continue their advance towards Egypt, they needed to withdraw because of the death of the Great Khan. Hulagu was needed back at the capital and took the bulk of his forces with him, leaving a small force under Kitbuqa to occupy Palestine during his absence. Mongol raiding parties were sent south into Palestine towards Egypt, with small Mongol garrisons of about 1,000 established in Gaza.[38][70][71]
Battle of Ain Jalut
Despite the cooperation between the Mongols and their Christian subjects in Antioch, other Christians in the Levant regarded the Mongol approach with unease. Jacques Pantaléon, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, saw the Mongols as a clear threat, and had written to the Pope to warn him about them in 1256.
The Franks of Acre did their best to maintain a position of cautious neutrality between the Mongols and the Mamluks.[5] Despite their long history of enmity with the Mamluks, the Franks acknowledged that the Mongols were a greater threat, and after careful debate, chose to enter into a passive truce with their previous adversaries. The Franks allowed the Mamluk forces to move northward through Christian territory to engage the Mongols, in exchange for an agreement that the Franks could purchase any captured Mongol horses at a low price.[75][76] The truce allowed the Mamluks to camp and re-supply near Acre, and engage the Mongols at Ain Jalut on September 3, 1260. The Mongol forces were already depleted due to their main force withdrawing, so with the passive assistance of the Franks, the Mamluks were able to achieve a decisive and historic victory over the Mongols. The remainder of the Mongol army retreated to Cilician Armenia, where they were received and re-equipped by Hethum I.[43] Ain Jalut marked a major turning point in the history of the Mongols, as it was the first major battle that they had lost, and set the western border for what had seemed an unstoppable expansion of the Mongol Empire.[5]
Papal communications
In the 1260s, a change occurred in the European perception of the Mongols, and they became regarded less as enemies, and more as potential allies in the fight against the Muslims.[77] As recently as 1259, Pope Alexander IV had been encouraging a new crusade against the Mongols, and had been extremely disappointed in hearing that the monarchs of Antioch and Armenia had submitted to Mongol overlordship. Alexander had put the monarchs' cases on the agenda of his upcoming council, but died in 1261 just months before the council could be convened, and before the new crusade could be launched.[78] For a new pope, the choice fell to Pantaléon, the same Patriarch of Jerusalem who had earlier been warning of the Mongol threat. He took the name Pope Urban IV, and tried to raise money for a new crusade.[79]
On April 10, 1262, the Mongol leader Hulagu sent through
Historians dispute the exact meaning of Urban's actions. The mainstream view, exemplified by British historian Peter Jackson, holds that Urban still regarded the Mongols as enemies at this time. This perception began changing a few years later, during the pontificate of Pope Clement IV (1265–68), when the Mongols were seen more as potential allies. However, the French historian Jean Richard argues that Urban's act signaled a turning point in Mongol-European relations as early as 1263, after which the Mongols were considered as actual allies. Richard also argues that it was in response to this forming coalition between the Franks, Ilkhanid Mongols and Byzantines, that the Mongols of the Golden Horde allied with the Muslim Mamluks in return.[82][83] However, the mainstream view of historians is that though there were many attempts at forming an alliance, the attempts proved unsuccessful.[2]
Abaqa (1265–1282)
Hulagu died in 1265, and was succeeded by
Edward I's crusade (1269–1274)
In 1269, the English Prince Edward (the future
Council of Lyon (1274)
In 1274 Pope Gregory X convened the Second Council of Lyon. Abaqa sent a delegation of 13 to 16 Mongols to the council, which created a great stir, particularly when three of their members underwent a public baptism.[93] Abaqa's Latin secretary Rychaldus delivered a report to the Council which outlined previous European-Ilkhanid relations under Abaqa's father, Hulagu, affirming that after Hulagu had welcomed Christian ambassadors to his court, he had agreed to exempt Latin Christians from taxes and charges, in exchange for their prayers for the Khan. According to Rychaldus, Hulagu had also prohibited the molestation of Frank establishments, and had committed to return Jerusalem to the Franks.[94] Rychaldus assured the assembly that even after Hulagu's death, his son Abaqa was still determined to drive the Mamluks from Syria.[36]
At the council, Pope Gregory promulgated a new crusade in liaison with the Mongols,[92] putting in place a vast program in his "Constitutions for the zeal of the faith", with four main elements: imposing a new tax for three years, forbidding trade with Muslims, arranging the supply of ships by the Italian maritime republics, and the alliance of the West with both Byzantium and the Mongol Ilkhan Abaqa.[95] Abaqa then sent another embassy, led by the Georgian Vassali brothers, to further notify Western leaders of military preparations. Gregory answered that his legates would accompany the crusade, and that they would be in charge of coordinating military operations with the Ilkhan.[96]
However, the papal plans were not supported by the other European monarchs, who had lost enthusiasm for the Crusades. Only one western monarch attended the council, the elderly James I of Aragon, who could only offer a small force. There was fundraising for a new crusade, and plans were made, but never followed through. The projects essentially came to a halt with the death of Pope Gregory on January 10, 1276, and the money which had been raised to finance the expedition was instead distributed in Italy.[46]
Invasion of Syria (1280–1281)
Without support from the Europeans, some Franks in
In September 1281 the Mongols returned, with 19,000 of their own troops, plus 20,000 others including Armenians under Leo III, Georgians, and 200 Knights Hospitaller from Marqab, who sent a contingent even though the Franks of Acre had agreed a truce with the Mamluks.[98][99][100] The Mongols and their auxiliary troops fought against the Mamluks at the Second Battle of Homs on October 30, 1281, but the encounter was indecisive, with the Sultan suffering heavy losses.[97] In retaliation, Qalawun later besieged and captured the Hospitaller fortress of Marqab in 1285.[99]
Arghun (1284–1291)
Abaqa died in 1282 and was briefly replaced by his brother
The first of Arghun's embassies was led by Isa Kelemechi, a Christian Assyrian interpreter who had been head of Kublai Khan's Office of Western Astronomy and sent to Greater Iran at the order of the Great Khan.[103] The embassy was sent because the Great Khan Kublai (Qubilai) ordered Arghun to free Holy Land and protect Christians.[104][105] Kelemechi met with Pope Honorius IV in 1285, offering to "remove" the Saracens (Muslims) and divide "the land of Sham, namely Egypt" with the Franks.[102][106] The second embassy, and probably the most famous, was that of the elderly cleric Rabban Bar Sauma, who had been visiting the Ilkhanate during a remarkable pilgrimage from China to Jerusalem.[102]
Through Bar Sauma and other later envoys, such as Buscarello de Ghizolfi, Arghun promised the European leaders that if Jerusalem were conquered, he would have himself baptized and would return Jerusalem to the Christians.[107][108][109] Bar Sauma was greeted warmly by the European monarchs,[102] but Western Europe was no longer as interested in the Crusades, and the mission to form an alliance was ultimately fruitless.[110][111] England did respond by sending a representative, Geoffrey of Langley, who had been a member of Edward I's Crusade 20 years earlier, and was sent to the Mongol court as an ambassador in 1291.[112]
Genoese shipmakers
Another link between Europe and the Mongols was attempted in 1290, when the Genoese endeavored to assist the Mongols with naval operations. The plan was to construct and man two galleys to attack Mamluk ships in the Red Sea, and operate a blockade of Egypt's trade with India.[113][100] As the Genoese were traditional supporters of the Mamluks, this was a major shift in policy, apparently motivated by the attack of the Egyptian Sultan Qalawun on the Cilician Armenians in 1285.[102] To build and man the fleet, a squadron of 800 Genoese carpenters, sailors and crossbowmen went to Baghdad, working on the Tigris. However, due to a feud between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the Genoese soon degenerated into internal bickering, and killed each other in Basra, putting an end to the project.[113][100] Genoa finally cancelled the agreement and signed a new treaty with the Mamluks instead.[102]
All these attempts to mount a combined offensive between the Franks and Mongols were too little and too late. In May 1291, the city of Acre was conquered by the Egyptian Mamluks in the siege of Acre. When Pope Nicholas IV learned of this, he wrote to Arghun, again asking him to be baptized and to fight against the Mamluks.[102] But Arghun had died on March 10, 1291, and Pope Nicholas died as well in March 1292, putting an end to their efforts towards combined action.[114]
Ghazan (1295–1304)
After Arghun's death, he was followed in rapid succession by two brief and fairly ineffective leaders, one of whom only held power for a few months. Stability was restored when Arghun's son Ghazan took power in 1295, though to secure cooperation from other influential Mongols, he made a public conversion to Islam when he took the throne, marking a major turning point in the state religion of the Ilkhanate. Despite being an official Muslim, however, Ghazan remained tolerant of multiple religions, and worked to maintain good relations with his Christian vassal states such as Cilician Armenia and Georgia.[115]
In 1299, he made the first of what were to be three attempts to invade Syria.
In July 1300, the Crusaders launched naval operations to press the advantage.
Ruad expedition
Ghazan announced that he would return by November 1300, and sent letters and ambassadors to the West so that they could prepare themselves. After their own naval raids, the Cypriots attempted a major operation to re-take the former Syrian Templar stronghold of
Plans for combined operations between the Franks and the Mongols were again made for the following winter offensives, in 1301 and 1302. But in mid-1301 the island of Ruad was attacked by the Egyptian Mamluks. After a lengthy siege, the island surrendered in 1302.[124][125] The Mamluks slaughtered many of the inhabitants, and captured the surviving Templars to send them to prison in Cairo.[124] In late 1301, Ghazan sent letters to the pope asking him to send troops, priests, and peasants, to make the Holy Land a Frank state again.[127]
In 1303, Ghazan sent another letter to Edward I, via Buscarello de Ghizolfi, who had also been an ambassador for Arghun. The letter reiterated their ancestor Hulagu's promise that the Ilkhans would give Jerusalem to the Franks in exchange for help against the Mamluks. That year, the Mongols again attempted to invade Syria, appearing in great strength (about 80,000) together with the Armenians. But they were again defeated at Homs on March 30, 1303, and at the decisive
Oljeitu (1304–1316)
Last contacts
In the 14th century, diplomatic contact continued between the Franks and the Mongols, until the Ilkhanate dissolved in the 1330s, and the ravages of the
After Abu Sa'id, relations between Christian princes and the Ilkhanate became very sparse. Abu Sa'id died in 1335 with neither heir nor successor, and the Ilkhanate lost its status after his death, becoming a plethora of little kingdoms run by Mongols, Turks, and Persians.[13]
In 1336, an embassy to the French
In the early 15th century, Timur resumed relations with Europe, attempting to form an alliance against the Egyptian Mamluks and the Ottoman Empire, and engaged in communications with Charles VI of France and Henry III of Castile, but died in 1405.[13][135][136][137][138]
Cultural contacts
In the cultural sphere, there were some
Views from historians
Most historians describe the contacts between the Mongol Empire and the Western Europeans as a series of attempts,[140] missed opportunities,[141][142][143] and failed negotiations.[2][114][140][144] Christopher Atwood, in the 2004 Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire, summed up the relations between Western Europe and the Mongols: "Despite numerous envoys and the obvious logic of an alliance against mutual enemies, the papacy and the Crusaders never achieved the often-proposed alliance against Islam."[2]
A few other historians argue there was an actual alliance,[123][145] but do not agree on the details: Jean Richard wrote that an alliance began around 1263.[145] Reuven Amitai stated that the closest thing to actual Mongol-Frankish military coordination was when Prince Edward of England attempted to coordinate activities with Abaga in 1271. Amitai also mentioned the other attempts towards cooperation, but said, "In none of these episodes, however, can we speak of Mongols and troops from the Frankish West being on the Syrian mainland at the same time."[91] Timothy May described the alliance as having its peak at the Council of Lyon in 1274,[146] but that it began to unravel in 1275 with the death of Bohemond, and May too admitted that the forces never engaged in joint operations.[147] Alain Demurger, in his own book The Last Templar, said that an alliance was not sealed until 1300.[148]
There also continues to be debate about whether or not an alliance would have been a wise idea, and whether the Crusaders at that point in history were even relevant to the Persian-Mongol conflict.[8] The 20th-century historian Glenn Burger said, "The refusal of the Latin Christian states in the area to follow Hethum's example and adapt to changing conditions by allying themselves with the new Mongol empire must stand as one of the saddest of the many failures of Outremer."[149] This was similar to the view of Steven Runciman, who argued, "Had the Mongol alliance been achieved and honestly implemented by the West, the existence of Outremer would almost certainly have been prolonged. The Mameluks would have been crippled if not destroyed; and the Ilkhanate of Persia would have survived as a power friendly to the Christians and the West".[150] However, David Nicolle, describing the Mongols as "potential allies",[151] said that early historians were writing from the benefit of hindsight,[152] and that overall the major players were the Mamluks and the Mongols, with Christians just "pawns in a greater game."[153]
Reasons for failure
There has been much discussion among historians as to why the Franco-Mongol alliance never became a reality and why, despite all the diplomatic contacts, it stayed a chimera or fantasy.[3][8] Many reasons have been proposed: one was that the Mongols at that stage in their empire were not entirely focused on expanding to the West. By the late 13th century, the Mongol leaders were several generations removed from the great Genghis Khan, and internal disruption was brewing. The original nomadic Mongols from the day of Genghis had become more settled, and had turned into administrators instead of conquerors. Battles were springing up that were Mongol against Mongol, which took troops away from the front in Syria.[154] There was also confusion within Europe as to the differences between the Mongols of the Ilkhanate in the Holy Land, and the Mongols of the Golden Horde, who were attacking Hungary and Poland. Within the Mongol Empire, the Ilkhanids and the Golden Horde considered each other enemies, but it took time for Western observers to be able to distinguish between the different parts of the Mongol Empire.[154] From the Mongol side, there were also concerns as to just how much clout the Franks could have brought to bear,[155] especially as there was decreased interest in Europe in pursuing the Crusades.[153] Court historians of Mongol Persia made no mention whatsoever of the communications between the Ilkhans and the Christian West, and barely mentioned the Franks at all. The communications were evidently not seen as important by the Mongols, and may have even been considered embarrassing. The Mongol leader Ghazan, a converted Muslim since 1295, might not have wanted to be perceived as trying to gain the assistance of infidels against his fellow Muslims in Egypt. When Mongol historians did make notes of foreign territories, the areas were usually categorized as either "enemies", "conquered", or "in rebellion". The Franks, in that context, were listed in the same category as the Egyptians, in that they were enemies to be conquered. The idea of "ally" was foreign to the Mongols.[156]
Some European monarchs responded positively to Mongol inquiries, but became vague and evasive when asked to actually commit troops and resources. Logistics also became more complex – the Egyptian Mamluks were genuinely concerned about the threat of another wave of Crusader forces, so each time the Mamluks captured another castle or port, instead of occupying it, they systematically destroyed it so that it could never be used again. This both made it more difficult for the Crusaders to plan military operations, and increased the expense of those operations. Monarchs in Western Europe often vocally entertained the idea of going on crusade as a way of making an emotional appeal to their subjects, but would ultimately take years to prepare, sometimes never actually left for Outremer. Internal wars in Europe, such as the
The Europeans were also concerned about the long-term goals of the Mongols. Early Mongol diplomacy had been not a simple offer of cooperation, but straightforward demands for submission. It was only in later communications that Mongol diplomats started to adopt a more conciliatory tone; but they still used language that implied more command than entreaty. Even the Armenian historian Hayton of Corycus, the most enthusiastic advocate of Western-Mongol collaboration, freely admitted that the Mongol leadership was not inclined to listen to European advice. His recommendation was that even if working together, European armies and Mongol armies should avoid contact because of Mongol arrogance. European leaders were aware that the Mongols would not have been content to stop at the Holy Land, but were on a clear quest for world domination. If the Mongols had achieved a successful alliance with the West and destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate, they certainly would have eventually turned upon the Franks of Cyprus and the Byzantines.[159] They also would have surely conquered Egypt, from which they could have continued an advance into Africa, where no strong state could have stood in their way until Morocco and the Islamic caliphates in the Maghreb.[154][160]
Lastly, there was not much support among the general populace in Europe for a Mongol alliance. Writers in Europe were creating "recovery" literature with their ideas about how best to recover the Holy Land, but few mentioned the Mongols as a genuine possibility. In 1306, when Pope Clement V asked the leaders of the military orders, Jacques de Molay and Fulk de Villaret, to present their proposals for how the Crusades should proceed, neither of them factored in any kind of a Mongol alliance. A few later proposals talked briefly about the Mongols as being a force that could invade Syria and keep the Mamluks distracted, but not one that could be counted on for cooperation.[154]
See also
- France-Mongolia relations
Notes
- ^ Many people in the East used the word "Frank" to denote a European of any variety.
- ^ a b c d e Atwood. "Western Europe and the Mongol Empire" in Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. p. 583. "Despite numerous envoys and the obvious logic of an alliance against mutual enemies, the papacy and the Crusaders never achieved the often-proposed alliance against Islam".
- ^ a b Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 4. "The failure of Ilkhanid-Western negotiations, and the reasons for it, are of particular importance in view of the widespread belief in the past that they might well have succeeded."
- ^ a b c Ryan. pp. 411–421.
- ^ a b c Morgan. "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean". p. 204. "The authorities of the crusader states, with the exception of Antioch, opted for a neutrality favourable to the Mamluks."
- ^ a b c d Edbury. p. 105.
- ^ Demurger. "The Isle of Ruad". The Last Templar. pp. 95–110.
- ^ a b c See Abate and Marx. pp. 182–186, where the question debated is "Would a Latin-Ilkhan Mongol alliance have strengthened and preserved the Crusader States?'"
- ^ a b Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 46. See also pp. 181–182. "For the Mongols the mandate came to be valid for the whole world and not just for the nomadic tribes of the steppe. All nations were de jure subject to them, and anyone who opposed them was thereby a rebel (bulgha). In fact, the Turkish word employed for 'peace' was that used also to express subjection ... There could be no peace with the Mongols in the absence of submission."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 121. "[The Mongols] had no allies, only subjects or enemies".
- ^ a b Foltz. pp. 111–112.
- ^ Amitai. "Mongol raids into Palestine (AD 1260 and 1300)". p. 236.
- ^ a b c d Knobler. pp. 181–197.
- ^ Quoted in Runciman. p. 246.
- ^ a b c d Morgan. The Mongols. pp. 133–138.
- ^ Richard. p. 422. "In all the conversations between the popes and the il-khans, this difference of approach remained: the il-khans spoke of military cooperation, the popes of adhering to the Christian faith."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 72.
- ^ Tyerman. pp. 770–771.
- ^ Riley-Smith. pp. 289–290.
- ^ Tyerman. p. 772.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 90.
- ^ Morgan. The Mongols. p. 102.
- ^ Dawson (ed.) The Mongol Mission. p. 86.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 88.
- ^ Sinor. "Mongols in Western Europe". p. 522. "The Pope's reply to Baidju's letter, Viam agnoscere veritatis, dated November 22, 1248, and probably carried back by Aibeg and Sargis." Note that Sinor refers to the letter as "Viam agnoscere" though the actual letter uses the text "Viam cognoscere".
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 89.
- ^ Hindley. p. 193.
- ^ Bournotian. p. 109. "It was at this juncture that the main Mongol armies appeared [in Armenia] in 1236. The Mongols swiftly conquered the cities. Those who resisted were cruelly punished, while those submitting were rewarded. News of this spread quickly and resulted in the submission of all of historic Armenia and parts of Georgia by 1245 ... Armenian and Georgian military leaders had to serve in the Mongol army, where many of them perished in battle. In 1258 the Ilkhanid Mongols, under the leadership of Hulagu, sacked Baghdad, ended the Abbasid Caliphate and killed many Muslims."
- ^ Stewart. "Logic of Conquest". p. 8.
- ^ a b Nersessian. p. 653. "Hetoum tried to win the Latin princes over to the idea of a Christian-Mongol alliance, but could convince only Bohemond VI of Antioch."
- ^ Stewart. "Logic of Conquest". p. 8. "The Armenian king saw alliance with the Mongols — or, more accurately, swift and peaceful subjection to them — as the best course of action."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 74. "King Het'um of Lesser Armenia, who had reflected profoundly upon the deliverance afforded by the Mongols from his neighbbours and enemies in Rum, sent his brother, the Constable Smbat (Sempad) to Guyug's court to offer his submission."
- ^ Ghazarian. p. 56.
- ^ May. p. 135.
- ^ Bournotian. p. 100. "Smbat met Kubali's brother, Mongke Khan and in 1247, made an alliance against the Muslims"
- ^ a b c d e Jackson. Mongols and the West. pp. 167–168.
- ^ Lebedel. p. 75. "The Barons of the Holy Land refused an alliance with the Mongols, except for the king of Armenia and Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and Count of Tripoli"
- ^ a b c Tyerman. p. 806
- ^ Richard. p. 410. "Under the influence of his father-in-law, the king of Armenia, the prince of Antioch had opted for submission to Hulegu"
- ^ Richard. p. 411.
- ^ Saunders. p. 115.
- ^ Richard. p. 416. "In the meantime, [Baibars] conducted his troops to Antioch, and started to besiege the city, which was saved by a Mongol intervention"
- ^ a b Richard. pp. 414–420.
- ^ Hindley. p. 206.
- ^ Quoted in Grousset. p. 650.
- ^ a b c d Tyerman. pp. 815–818.
- ^ Jackson. "Crisis in the Holy Land". pp. 481–513.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 181.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 99.
- ^ Tyerman. p. 798. "Louis's embassy under Andrew of Longjumeau had returned in 1251 carrying a demand from the Mongol regent, Oghul Qaimush, for annual tribute, not at all what the king had anticipated."
- ^ Sinor. p. 524.
- ^ Tyerman. pp. 789–798.
- ^ Daftary. p. 60.
- ^ a b c d e Calmard. "France" article in Encyclopædia Iranica
- ^ Sinor. p. 531.
- ^ Demurger. Croisades et Croisés au Moyen Age. p. 285. "It really seems that Saint Louis's initial project in his second Crusade was an operation coordinated with the offensive of the Mongols."
- ^ a b Richard. pp. 428–434.
- ^ Grousset. p. 647.
- ISBN 978-0-521-42974-0.
- ^ Daftary, Farhad. "The Mediaeval Ismailis of the Iranian Lands". www.iis.ac.uk. Retrieved 31 March 2020.
- ^ Lane. pp. 29, 243.
- ^ a b Angold. p. 387. "In May 1260, a Syrian painter gave a new twist to the iconography of the Exaltation of the Cross by showing Constantine and Helena with the features of Hulegu and his Christian wife Doquz Khatun".
- ^ Le Monde de la Bible N.184 July–August 2008. p. 43.
- ^ a b c Joseph p. 16.
- ^ a b Folda. pp. 349–350.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 120.
- ^ Takahashi. p. 102.
- ^ Runciman. p. 304.
- ^ Irwin. p. 616.
- ^ Richard. pp. 414–415. "He [Qutuz] reinstated the emirs expelled by his predecessor, then assembled a large army, swollen by those who had fled from Syria during Hulegu's offensive, and set about recovering territory lost by the Muslims. Scattering in passage the thousand men left at Gaza by the Mongols, and having negotiated a passage along the coast with the Franks (who had received his emirs in Acre), he met and routed Kitbuqa's troops at Ayn Jalut."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 116.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 105.
- ^ Richard. p. 411.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. pp. 120–122.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 115.
- ^ Richard. p. 425. "They allowed the Mamluks to cross their territory, in exchange for a promise to be able to purchase at a low price the horses captured from the Mongols."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 165.
- ^ Richard. pp. 409–414.
- ^ Tyerman. p. 807.
- ^ Richard. pp. 421–422. "What Hulegu was offering was an alliance. And, contrary to what has long been written by the best authorities, this offer was not in response to appeals from the Franks."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 166.
- ^ Richard. p. 436. "In 1264, to the coalition between the Franks, Mongols and Byzantines, responded the coalition between the Golden Horde and the Mamluks."
- ^ Richard. p. 414. "In Frankish Syria, meanwhile, events had taken another direction. There was no longer any thought of conducting a crusade against the Mongols; the talk was now of a crusade in collaboration with them."
- ^ Reinert. p. 258.
- ^ Bisson. p. 70.
- ^ a b Hindley. pp. 205–207.
- ^ Nicolle. The Crusades. p. 47.
- ^ Richard. p. 433. "On landing at Acre, Edward at once sent his messengers to Abaga. He received a reply only in 1282, when he had left the Holy Land. The il-khan apologized for not having kept the agreed rendezvous, which seems to confirm that the crusaders of 1270 had devised their plan of campaign in the light of Mongol promises, and that these envisaged joint operation in 1271. In default of his own arrival and that of his army, Abaga ordered the commander of this forces stationed in Turkey, the 'noyan of the noyans', Samaghar, to descend into Syria to assist the crusaders."
- ^ Sicker. p. 123. "Abaqa now decided to send some 10,000 Mongol troops to join Edward's Crusader army".
- ^ Hindley. p. 207.
- ^ a b Amitai. "Edward of England and Abagha Ilkhan". p. 161.
- ^ a b Richard. p. 487. "1274: Promulgation of a Crusade, in liaison with the Mongols".
- ^ Setton. p. 116.
- ^ Richard. p. 422.
- ^ Balard. p. 210. "Le Pape Grégoire X s'efforce alors de mettre sur pied un vaste programme d'aide à la Terre Sainte, les "Constitutions pour le zèle de la foi", qui sont acceptées au Concile de Lyon de 1274. Ce texte prévoit la levée d'une dime pendant trois ans pour la croisade, l'interdiction de tout commerce avec les Sarasins, la fourniture de bateaux par les républiques maritimes italiennes, et une alliance de l'Occident avec Byzance et l'Il-Khan Abagha".
- ^ a b c d e f g Richard. pp. 452–456.
- ^ a b c Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 168.
- ^ a b c Amitai. Mongols and Mamluks. pp. 185–186.
- ^ a b Harpur. p. 116.
- ^ a b c Jackson. "Mongols and Europe". p. 715.
- ^ Grands Documents de l'Histoire de France (2007), Archives Nationales de France. p. 38.
- ^ a b c d e f g Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 169.
- ^ Glick. p. 485.
- ^ René Grousset, Naomi Walford (Translator), The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, p. 127
- ^ JOHN ANDREW BOYLE, "THE IL-KHANS OF PERSIA AND THE PRINCES OF EUROPE, Central Asiatic Journal Vol. 20, No. 1/2 (1976), pp.31"
- ^ Fisher and Boyle. p. 370.
- ^ Rossabi. pp. 99, 173.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. pp. 174–175.
- ^ Richard. p. 455.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 170. "Arghun had persisted in the quest for a Western alliance right down to his death without ever taking the field against the mutual enemy."
- ^ Mantran. "A Turkish or Mongolian Islam" in The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Middle Ages: 1250–1520. p. 298.
- ^ Phillips. p. 126.
- ^ a b Richard. p. 455.
- ^ a b Tyerman. p. 816. "The Mongol alliance, despite six further embassies to the west between 1276 and 1291, led nowhere. The prospect of an anti-Mamluk coalition faded as the westerners' inaction rendered them useless as allies for the Mongols, who, in turn, would only seriously be considered by western rulers as potential partners in the event of a new crusade which never happened."
- ^ Richard. pp. 455–456. "When Ghazan got rid of him [Nawruz] (March 1297), he revived his projects against Egypt, and the rebellion of the Mamluk governor of Damascus, Saif al-Din Qipchaq, provided him with the opportunity for a new Syrian campaign; Franco-Mongol cooperation thus survived both the loss of Acre by the Franks and the conversion of the Mongols of Persia to Islam. It was to remain one of the givens of crusading politics until the peace treaty with the Mamluks, which was concluded only in 1322 by the khan Abu Said."
- ^ Amitai. "Ghazan's first campaign into Syria (1299–1300)". p. 222.
- ^ Barber. p. 22: "The aim was to link up with Ghazan, the Mongol Il-Khan of Persia, who had invited the Cypriots to participate in joint operations against the Mamluks".
- ^ a b Nicholson. p. 45.
- ^ Demurger. The Last Templar. p. 99.
- ^ Phillips. p. 128.
- ^ a b c Schein. p. 811.
- ^ a b Jotischky. p. 249.
- ^ a b c Demurger. The Last Templar. p. 100.
- ^ a b c d Barber. p. 22.
- ^ a b c Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 171.
- ^ Mutafian. pp. 74–75.
- ^ Richard. p. 469.
- ^ Nicolle. The Crusades. p. 80.
- ^ Demurger. The Last Templar. p. 109.
- ^ Stewart. Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks. p. 181.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 216.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 203.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 314.
- ^ Phillips. p. 112.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 360.
- ^ Sinor. Inner Asia. p. 190.
- ^ Daniel and Mahdi. p. 25.
- ^ Wood. p. 136.
- ^ Mack. Throughout, but especially pp. 16–18, 36–40 (textiles), 151 (costume).
- ^ a b Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 173. "In their successive attempts to secure assistance from the Latin world, the Ilkhans took care to select personnel who would elicit the confidence of Western rulers and to impart a Christian complexion to their overtures."
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 119.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 4.
- ^ Morgan. The Mongols. p. 136. "This has long been seen as a 'missed opportunity' for the Crusaders. According to that opinion, most eloquently expressed by Grousset and frequently repeated by other scholars, the Crusaders ought to have allied themselves with the pro-Christian, anti-Muslim Mongols against the Mamluks. They might thus have prevented their own destruction by the Mamluks in the succeeding decades, and possibly even have secured the return of Jerusalem by favour of the Mongols."
- ^ Prawer. p. 32. "The attempts of the crusaders to create an alliance with the Mongols failed."
- ^ a b Richard. pp. 424–469.
- ^ May. p. 152.
- ^ May. p. 154.
- ^ Demurger. The Last Templar. p. 100. "Above all, the expedition made manifest the unity of the Cypriot Franks and, through a material act, put the seal on the Mongol alliance."
- ^ Burger. pp. xiii–xiv. "The refusal of the Latin Christian states in the area to follow Hethum's example and adapt to changing conditions by allying themselves with the new Mongol empire must stand as one of the saddest of the many failures of Outremer."
- ^ Runciman. p. 402.
- ^ Nicolle. The Crusades. p. 42. "The Mongol Hordes under Genghis Khan and his descendants had already invaded the eastern Islamic world, raising visions in Europe of a potent new ally, which would join Christians in destroying Islam. Even after the Mongol invasion of Orthodox Christian Russia, followed by their terrifying rampage across Catholic Hungary and parts of Poland, many in the West still regarded the Mongols as potential allies."
- ^ Nicolle and Hook. The Mongol Warlords. p. 114. "In later years Christian chroniclers would bemoan a lost opportunity in which Crusaders and Mongols might have joined forces to defeat the Muslims. But they were writing from the benefit of hindsight, after the Crusader States had been destroyed by the Muslim Mamluks."
- ^ a b Nicolle. The Crusades. p. 44. "Eventually the conversion of the Il-Khans (as the Mongol occupiers of Persia and Iraq were known) to Islam at the end of the 13th century meant that the struggle became one between rival Muslim dynasties rather than between Muslims and alien outsiders. Though the feeble Crusader States and occasional Crusading expeditions from the West were drawn in, the Crusaders were now little more than pawns in a greater game."
- ^ a b c d Jackson. Mongols and the West. pp. 165–185.
- ^ Amitai. "Edward of England and Abagha Ilkhan". p. 81.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. pp. 121, 180–181.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 179.
- ^ Phillips. p. 130.
- ^ Jackson. Mongols and the West. p. 183.
- ^ Amitai. "Mongol imperial ideology". p. 59.
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