Tatmadaw
Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) | |
---|---|
တပ်မတော် (Burmese) (lit. 'Grand Army') | |
Founded | 27 March 1945[2] |
Service branches | |
Headquarters | General Maung Maung Aye[3] |
Personnel | |
Military age | 18 years of age |
Conscription | 18-45 years of age (male)
18-35 years of age (female) 2 years (during peacetime) 3 years (for people with professions) 5 years (during emergencies) |
Available for military service | 14,747,845 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.), 14,710,871 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.) |
Fit for military service | 10,451,515 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.), 11,181,537 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.) |
Reaching military age annually | 522,478 males (2010 est.), 506,388 females (2010 est.) |
Active personnel | 150,000[4] |
Reserve personnel | 18,998 (23 battalions of Border Guard Force, BGF (7498 personnel),[5] 46 groups of People's Militia Group, PMG and Regional People's Militia Groups, RPMG (3500 personnel)[5] five corps of university Training Corp, UTC (8000 personnel)[6] |
Expenditures | |
Budget | $2.7 billion[7] (2023) |
Percent of GDP | 4% (2014) |
Industry | |
Domestic suppliers |
|
Foreign suppliers | Belarus[9] China[10] India[10] Iran[11] Israel[10][12] North Korea[10] Philippines[10] Russia[10] Ukraine[10] |
Related articles | |
Ranks | Military ranks of Myanmar |
Parliamentary Seats တပ်မတော်သား လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ (Burmese) | |
---|---|
Seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw | 56 / 224 |
Seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw | 110 / 440 |
Seats in the State Administration Council | 9 / 18 |
The Tatmadaw (
In 2008, the Tatmadaw
According to the
Name
The name "Tatmadaw" literally means "Royal Armed Forces" in the Burmese language.[24][25][26] Since Burma has not been a monarchy since the era prior to British colonial rule, the word "royal" in this usage is understood to mean "glorious". This name has become controversial in Myanmar, especially since 2021, as many people in Myanmar have opposed the military during the country's renewed civil war and object to the usage of the complimentary term "royal" to describe it.[24] As a result, many Burmese people have taken to using an alternative name "Sit-Tat", which simply means "military" with no positive or negative connotations.[24][25][26] Some citizens and activists also use the openly derogatory variant "Sit-kwe", which means "dog-soldiers", in reference to the perceived blind loyalty of the soldiers.[24][26]
History
Burmese monarchy
The Royal Armed Forces was the
The army was organised into a small standing army of a few thousands, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger
units.While the army had held its own against the armies of the kingdom's neighbours, its performance against more technologically advanced European armies deteriorated over time. While it defeated the Portuguese and French intrusions in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively, the army proved unable to match the military strength of the British Empire in the 19th century, losing the First, Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars. On 1 January 1886, the Royal Burmese Army was formally disbanded by the British government.
British Burma (1885–1948)
Under
At the beginning of the
After the
In December 1941, a
Disillusioned by the
Post-independence
At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of
In accordance with the agreement reached at the
Battalion | Ethnic/Army Composition |
---|---|
No. 1 Burma Rifles | Bamar (Military Police + Members of Taungoo Guerilla group members associated with Aung San's PBF)
|
No. 2 Burma Rifles | 2 Karen Companies + 1 Chin Company and 1 Kachin Company |
No. 3 Burma Rifles | Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by then Major Kyaw Zaw BC-3504 |
No. 4 Burma Rifles | Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by the then Lieutenant Colonel Ne Win BC-3502
|
No. 5 Burma Rifles | Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel Zeya BC-3503 |
No. 6 Burma Rifles | Formed after Aung San was assassinated in later part of 1947, Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – First CO was Lieutenant Colonel Zeya |
No. 1 Karen Rifles | British Burma Army and ABRO
|
No. 2 Karen Rifles | Karen / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 3 Karen Rifles | Karen / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 1 Kachin Rifles | Kachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 2 Kachin Rifles | Kachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 1 Chin Rifles | Chin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 2 Chin Rifles | Chin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO |
No. 4 Burma Regiment | Gurkha |
Chin Hill Battalion | Chin |
The War Office was officially opened on 8 May 1948 under the
According to the war establishment adopted on 14 April 1948, Chief of Staff was under the War Office with the rank of major general. It was subsequently upgraded to a lieutenant general. Vice Chief of Staff was a brigadier general. The Chief of Staff was staffed with GSO-I with the rank of lieutenant colonel, three GSO-II with the rank of major, four GSO-III with the rank of captain for operation, training, planning and intelligence, and one Intelligence Officer (IO). The Chief of Staff office also had one GSO-II and one GSO-III for field engineering, and the Chief Signal Officer and a GSO-II for signal. Directorate of Signal and Directorate Field Engineering are also under General Staff Office.[34]
Under Adjutant General Office were Judge Advocate General, Military Secretary, and Vice Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (AG) was a brigadier general whereas the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Secretary (MS) and Vice Adjutant General (VAG) were colonels. VAG handles adjutant staff matters and there were also three branch offices; AG-1 planning, recruitment and transfer; AG-2 discipline, moral, welfare, and education; AG-3 salary, pension, and other financial matters. The Medical Corps and the Provost Marshal Office were under the Adjutant General Office.[34]
The Quarter Master General office also had three branch offices: QG-1 planning, procurement, and budget; QG-2 maintenance, construction, and cantonment; and QG-3 transportation. Under the QMG office were Garrison Engineering Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps, Military Ordnance Corps, and the Supply and Transport Corps.[34]
Both AG and QMG office similar structure to the General Staff Office, but they only had three ASO-III and three QSO-III respectively.[34]
The Navy and Air Force were separate services under the War office but under the chief of staff.[34]
Post | Name and Rank | Ethnicity |
---|---|---|
Chief of Staff |
Lieutenant General Smith Dun BC 5106 |
Karen |
Chief of Army Staff | Brigadier General Saw Kyar Doe BC 5107 |
Karen |
Chief of Air Staff | Lieutenant Colonel Saw Shi Sho BAF-1020 |
Karen |
Chief of Naval Staff | Commander Khin Maung Bo | Bamar |
North Burma Sub District Commander | Brigadier General Ne Win BC 3502 | Bamar |
South Burma Sub District Commander | Brigadier General Aung Thin BC 5015 | Bamar |
1st Infantry Division | Brigadier General Saw Chit Khin | Karen |
Adjutant General |
Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Win | Bamar |
Judge Advocate General | Colonel Maung Maung (Bull dog) BC 4034 | Bamar |
Quarter Master General |
Lieutenant Colonel Saw Donny | Karen |
Reorganisation in 1956
As per War Office order No. (9) 1955 on 28 September 1955, the Chief of Staff became the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Army), the Chief of Naval Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Navy) and the Chief of Air Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Air).[citation needed]
On 1 January 1956, the War Office was officially renamed as the
Caretaker government
Due to deteroriating political situations in 1957, the then
Serial | Name and Rank | Command | Date | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
BC3505 | Brigadier Aung Shwe | Commander, Southern Burma Sub-District Command | 13 February 1961 | |
BC3507 | Brigadier Maung Maung | Director of Directorate of Military Training / Commandant, National Defence College | 13 February 1961 | |
BC3512 | Colonel Aye Maung | No. 2 Infantry Brigade | 13 February 1961 | |
BC3517 | Colonel Tin Maung | No. 12 Infantry Brigade | 13 February 1961 | |
BC3570 | Colonel Hla Maw | No. 5 Infantry Brigade | 13 February 1961 | Father of Thein Hla Maw |
BC3572 | Colonel Kyi Win | No. 7 Infantry Brigade | 8 March 1961 | |
BC3647 | Colonel Thein Tote | No. 4 Infantry Brigade | 13 February 1961 | |
BC3181 | Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Myint | 23 June 1962 | No. 10 Infantry Brigade // 13 February 1961 | |
BC3649 | Lieutenant Colonel Chit Khaing | Deputy Commandant, Combat Forces School | 13 February 1962 |
1962 coup d'état
The elections of 1960 had put U Nu back as the Prime Minister and Pyidaungsu Party (Union Party) led civilian government resume control of the country.
On 2 March 1962, the then Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, General Ne Win staged a coup d'état and formed the "Union Revolutionary Council".[38] Around midnight the troops began to move into Yangon to take up strategic position. Prime Minister U Nu and his cabinet ministers were taken into protective custody. At 8:50 am, General Ne Win announced the coup over the radio. He said "I have to inform you, citizens of the Union that Armed Forces have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety, owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions of the Union." [39]
The country would be ruled by the military for the next 12 years. The Burma Socialist Programme Party became the sole political party and the majority of its full members were military.[40] Government servants underwent military training and the Military Intelligence Service functioned as the secret police of the state.
1988 coup d'état
At the height of the Four Eights Uprising against the socialist government, Former General Ne Win, who at the time was chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), issued a warning against potential protestors during a televised speech. He stated that if the "disturbances" continued the "Army would have to be called and I would like to make it clear that if the Army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the Air, it would shoot straight to hit".[41]
Subsequently, the 22 Light Infantry Division, 33 Light Infantry Division and the 44 Light Infantry Division were redeployed to Yangon from front line fighting against ethnic insurgents in the Karen states. Battalions from three Light Infantry Divisions, augmented by infantry battalions under Yangon Regional Military Command and supporting units from Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps were deployed during the suppression of protests in and around the then capital city of Yangon.
Initially, these troops were deployed in support of the then
The armed forces under General Saw Maung formed a
Political reforms (2008–2020)
In 2008, the current constitution was released by the military government for a public referendum. The SPDC claimed that the referendum was a success, with an approval rate of 93.82%; however, there has been widespread criticism of the veracity of these claims, partially because Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar a few days before the referendum, and the government did not allow postponement of the referendum.[42] Under the 2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw is guaranteed 25% of the seats in the parliament, making it difficult to pass meaningful reforms that the Tatmadaw does not approve of.
In 2010, conscription legislation was passed that compelled able-bodied men and women between 18–45 and 18–35 respectively to serve up to three years in the military, or face significant jail sentences.[43]
Following Myanmar's political reforms, Myanmar has made substantial shifts in its relations with major powers
Moreover, in response to Naypyidaw's post-2011 political and economic reforms, Australia re-established a ‘normal’ bilateral relationship with Myanmar to support democratisation and reform. In June 2016, the Australian Federal Police signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with its Myanmar counterparts aimed at enhancing transnational crime cooperation and intelligence sharing.[48] In December 2017, the US imposed sanctions on General Maung Maung Soe, a general of Western Myanmar Command who oversaw the military's crackdown in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw had sentenced seven soldiers to 10-year prison terms for killing 10 Rohingya men in Rakhine in September 2017.[49] A 2019 UN report revealed the degree to which the country's military uses its own businesses, foreign companies and arms deals to support, away from the public eye, a “brutal operations” against ethnic groups that constitute “serious crimes under international law”, bypassing civilian oversight and evading accountability.[50] In June 2020, the Tatmadaw accused China for arming rebel groups in the country's frontier areas.[51]
2021 coup d'état and aftermath
In February 2021, the Tatmadaw detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking politicians after a contested election with disputed results. A state of emergency had been declared for one year.[52] The State Administration Council was established by Min Aung Hlaing on 2 February 2021 as the current government in power. On 1 August 2021, the State Administration Council was re-formed as a caretaker government, which appointed Min Aung Hlaing as Prime Minister.[53][54] The same day, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the country's state of emergency had been extended by an additional two years.[55]
As the Myanmar Civil War has progressed, the Tatmadaw has become more reliant on military aid from Russia and China.[56][57] As of 2023, analysts suggested that the Tatmadaw has sustained significant losses due to both combat against the pro-democracy insurgents as well as desertions within the rank and file soldiers. The United States Institute for Peace estimates that the Tatamadaw has sustained at least 13,000 combat losses and 8,000 losses due to desertion.[25] The Tatmadaw itself has acknowledged that it does not have control over 132 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, or 42 percent of the country's towns.[58][59]
On February 10, 2024, the State Administration Council activated conscription under the 2010 SPDC People's Military Service Law in response to anti-junta ethnic militias and pro-democracy rebels capturing massive swathes of territory.[60]
Budget
According to an analysis of budgetary data between FY 2011–12 and 2018–19, approximately 13% to 14% of the national budget is devoted to the Burmese military.[61] However, the military budget remains opaque and subject to limited civilian scrutiny, and a 2011 Special Funds Law has enabled the Burmese military to circumvent parliamentary oversight to access supplemental funding.[62] Defence budgets were publicly shared for the first time in 2015, and in recent years, parliamentary lawmakers have demanded greater transparency in military spending.[62][63]
The military also generates substantial revenue through 2 conglomerates, the Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).[64] Revenues generated from these business interests have strengthened the Burmese military's autonomy from civilian oversight, and have contributed to the military's financial operations in "a wide array of international human rights and humanitarian law violations."[64] Revenues from MEHL and MEC are kept "off-book," enabling the military to autonomously finance military affairs with limited civilian oversight.[65]
Between 1990 and 2020, Myanmar's military officers received US$18 billion in dividends from MEHL, whose entire board is made up of senior military officials.[66]
In the FY 2019–20 national budget, the military was allocated 3,385 billion kyats (approximately US$2.4 billion).
Doctrine
Post-independence/civil war era (1948–1958)
The initial development of Burmese military doctrine post-independence was developed in the early 1950s to cope with external threats from more powerful enemies with a strategy of Strategic Denial under
The objective was to contain the offensive of the invading forces at the border for at least three months, while waiting for the arrival of international forces, similar to the police action by international intervention forces under the directive of
Kuomintang invasion/Burma Socialist Programme Party era (1958–1988)
At the beginning of the 1950s, while the Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mi, with support from the United States, invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against China, which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February 1953 against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from the United States and as a result it failed to deliver its objectives and ended in a humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw.[36]
The Tatmadaw leadership then argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example,
Despite failure, the Tatmadaw continued to rely on this doctrine until the mid-1960s. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late 1950s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late 1950s as the insurgents and KMT changed their positional warfare strategy to hit and run guerrilla warfare.[70][71]
At the 1958 the Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference,
This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress insurgency with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the foreign policy based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable,[72] therefore counterinsurgency became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1961, the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of conflicts, collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion.[36]
In 1962, as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and
To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine,
The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active foreign policy, total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences.
The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space (du-thone-du) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale (Panama-lay-yat). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its
In April 1968, the Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush, counterinsurgency weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, commando tactics, and reconnaissance. Battalion size operations were also practised in the Southwest Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in 1971.[citation needed] BSPP laid down directives for "complete annihilation of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making.
Throughout the BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In 1985, the then
In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about 0.01%. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops... therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. To defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war.
SLORC/SPDC era (1988–2010)
The third phase of doctrinal development of the Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of the
The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing
Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that the Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats.[73]
The Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence.[73]
It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of the Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people
Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, the Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine.[73]
Organisational, command and control structure
This section needs to be updated.(February 2021) |
Before 1988
Overall command of the Tatmadaw (
The Joint Staff within the Ministry of Defence consisted of three major branches, one each for Army, Navy and Air Force, along with a number of independent departments. The Army Office had three major departments; the General (G) Staff to oversee operations, the
These BSO are similar to "Army Groups" in Western armies, high level staff units formed to manage different theatres of military operations. They were responsible for the overall direction and co-ordination of the Regional Military Commands (RMC) with BSO-1 covering Northern Command (NC), North Eastern Command (NEC), North Western Command (NWC), Western Command (WC) and Eastern Command (EC). BSO-2 responsible for South Eastern Command (SEC), South Western Command (SWC), Western Command (WC) and Central Command (CC).[75]
The Army's elite mobile
The Navy and Air Force Offices within the Ministry were headed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff for those Services. Each was supported by a staff officer at full colonel level. All these officers were responsible for the overall management of the various naval and air bases around the country, and the broader administrative functions such as recruitment and training.
Operational Command in the field was exercised through a framework of Regional Military Commands (RMC), the boundaries of which corresponded with the country's Seven States and Seven Divisions.
1988 to 2005
The Tatmadaw's organisational and command structure dramatically changed after the military coup in 1988. In 1990, the country's most senior army officer become a
From 1989, each service has had its own
A new command structure was introduced at the Ministry of Defence level in 2002. The most important position created is the Joint Chief of Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force) that commands commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Air Force.
The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS, or Sit Maha Byuha Leilaryay Htana) was formed around 1994 and charged with formulating defence policies, and planning and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The OSS was commanded by
A number of new subordinate command headquarters were formed in response to the growth and reorganisation of the Army. These include Regional Operation Commands (ROC, or Da Ka Sa), which are subordinate to RMCs, and Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha), which are equivalent to Western infantry divisions.
The
Under the Adjutant General Office, there are three directorates: Medical Services, Resettlement, and Provost Martial. Under the Quartermaster General Office are the directorates of Military Engineering (garrison section), Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, and Electricaland Mechanical Engineering.
Other independent department within the Ministry of Defence are Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Military Appointment General, Directorate of Procurement, Record Office, Central Military Accounting, and Camp Commandant.
All RMC Commander positions were raised to the level of major general and also serve as appointed chairmen of the state- and division-level Law and Order Restoration Committees. They were formally responsible for both military and civil administrative functions for their command areas. Also, three additional regional military commands were created. In early 1990, a new RMC was formed in Burma's north west, facing India. In 1996, the Eastern Command in Shan State was split into two RMCs, and South Eastern Command was divided to create a new RMC in country's far south coastal regions.[77]
In 1997, the
2005 to 2010
On 18 October 2004, the OSS and DDSI were abolished during the purge of General Khin Nyunt and military intelligence units. OSS ordered 4 regiment to raid in DDSI Headquarter in Yangon. At the same time, all of the MIU in the whole country were raided and arrested by OSS corps. Nearly two thirds of MIU officers were detained for years. A new military intelligence unit called Military Affairs Security (MAS) was formed to take over the functions of the DDSI, but MAS units were much fewer than DDSI's and MAS was under control by local Division commander.
In early 2006, a new Regional Military Command (RMC) was created at the newly formed administrative capital, Naypyidaw.
Service branches
Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw Kyee)
The
Myanmar Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay)
Personnel: 23,000 [82]
The Myanmar Air Force was formed on 16 January 1947, while Myanmar (also known as Burma) was under British colonial rule. By 1948, the new air force fleet included 40 Airspeed Oxfords, 16 de Havilland Tiger Moths, 4 Austers and 3 Supermarine Spitfires transferred from Royal Air Force with a few hundred personnel. The primary mission of Myanmar Air Force since its inception has been to provide transport, logistical, and close air support to Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations.
The
Myanmar Police Force (Myanmar Ye Tat Hpwe)
The
Rank structure
Air Defence
The
Military intelligence
The Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym Sa Ya Pha (စရဖ), is a branch of the Myanmar's Armed Forces tasked with intelligence gathering. It was created to replace the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI), which was disbanded in 2004.[86]
Defence industries
The Myanmar Directorate of Defence Industries (DI) consists of 25 major factories throughout the country that produce approximately 70 major products for Army, Navy and Air Force.
Political representation in Myanmar's legislature
25% of the seats in both houses of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Myanmar's legislature, are reserved for military appointees.
House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw)
Election | Total seats reserved | Total votes | Share of votes | Outcome of election | Election leader |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2010
|
56 / 224
|
56 seats | Than Shwe | ||
(after) 2012
|
56 / 224
|
Min Aung Hlaing | |||
2015 | 56 / 224
|
Min Aung Hlaing | |||
2020 | 56 / 224
|
Min Aung Hlaing |
House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw)
Election | Total seats reserved | Total votes | Share of votes | Outcome of election | Election leader |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2010
|
110 / 440
|
110 seats | Than Shwe | ||
(after) 2012
|
110 / 440
|
Min Aung Hlaing | |||
2015 | 110 / 440
|
Min Aung Hlaing | |||
2020 | 110 / 440
|
Min Aung Hlaing |
See also
- Military intelligence of Myanmar
- Aung San
- Royal Burmese armed forces
- Military history of Myanmar
- Ma Chit Po
Notes
- ^ also the formation patch of Chiefs of Staffs’ offices each.
References
Citations
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