Eurasianism

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Eurasianism (Russian: евразийство, romanized: yevraziystvo) is a socio-political movement in Russia that emerged in the early 20th century under the Russian Empire, which states that Russia does not belong in the "European" or "Asian" categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia governed by the "Russian world" (Russian: Русский мир, romanized: Russky mir), forming an ostensibly standalone Russian civilization.

The first Eurasianists were mostly émigré, pacifists, and their vision of the future had features of romanticism and utopianism. The goal of the Eurasianists was the unification of the main Christian churches under the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] A key feature of Eurasianism is the rejection of Russian ethnic nationalism, which seeks to build a pan-Slavic state. The Eurasianists strongly opposed the territorial fragmentation of the Russian Empire that had occurred due to the Bolshevik Revolution and the following civil war (1917–1923). They used their geo-historical theories to insist on the necessity of the geopolitical reconstruction of the Russian state as a unified Eurasian great power.[2] Unlike many of the White Russians, the Eurasianists rejected attempts for Tsarist restoration.[3]

To enable their return, Eurasianist émigré became supportive of the Bolshevik Revolution, but not its stated goals of building a communist state. Many viewed the Soviet Union as a stepping stone on the path of creating a new national identity that would reflect Russia's geopolitical situation. Eurasianist support for the Soviet Union began in the 1920s during the Stalinist era, which witnessed the emergence of a distinct socialist nationalism through CPSU's enforcement of "Socialism in one country" policy. Despite this, all organized Eurasianist activities in the Soviet Union were ended during the Great Terror of Joseph Stalin (1936–1938). After the Second World War, Stalin's efforts to empower an Eastern Bloc of communist states opposed to the Western capitalist world were seen by Eurasianist remnants as compatible with their own ideology.[4]

The Eurasian movement underwent a major resurgence after the collapse of the Soviet Union during the 1990s, and has been mirrored by Turanism in Turkic nations. Modern Eurasianists have coalesced around three prominent ideological currents: the neo-Eurasian movement of Aleksandr Dugin; Eurasian communism of the Russian Communist Party led by Gennedy Zyuganov; and a state-sanctioned Eurasianism that advances Russian geopolitical interests.[4][5] Eurasianism has been officially endorsed in Russia's 2023 Foreign Policy Concept approved by Vladimir Putin, which defined Russia as a "Eurasian and Euro-Pacific" civilizational-state closely aligned with China, the Muslim world, and other countries of the Global South, seeking to replace Western hegemony by a "Greater Eurasian Partnership".[6][7][8]

Early 20th century

See also: Nomad studies

Origins

"We do not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither of the West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either"

— Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev, 1829[9]

The origins of Eurasianism were in the 19th century, when the

Bolshevik Revolution and advocated the formation of a nation-state.[10]

Emergence

southern Kurils)
  Additional annexed/occupied territory from the Russian Empire (Grand Duchy of Finland and Congress Poland)
  Maximum extent of the Soviet near abroad, 1955 (Warsaw Pact, Mongolian People's Republic and North Korea)
  Maximum extent of the Russian Empire's sphere of influence after the sale of Alaska in 1867, despite later Soviet attempts to restore them (Northern Iran, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Afghanistan
)

Eurasianism is a political movement with origins in the

Third-Worldism, resistance to Westernization, championing what it views as the "cultural superiority" of the East over the Western World and defined Eurasia in geographical terms, shared by peoples of Russian-Turkic heritage.[11]

Stalin's "Socialism in one country" policy served as a vindication of Soviet Union in the eyes of many Eurasian activists. These Eurasianists criticized the anti-Bolshevik activities of organizations such as ROVS, believing that the émigré community's energies would be better focused on preparing for this hoped for process of evolution. In turn, their opponents among the emigres argued that the Eurasianists were calling for a compromise with and even support of the Soviet regime, while justifying its ruthless policies (such as the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church and demolition of churches) as mere "transitory problems" that were inevitable results of the revolutionary process. A communist Eurasianist faction led by Pyotr Suvchinsky gained traction during the 1920s, which began denouncing the anti-Soviet critics as "bourgeois".[12]

The key leaders of the Eurasianists were Prince

Bolshevik Revolution as a fact, but he noted that a number of key Eurasianist tenets were completely alien and hostile to him: they did not love freedom as he did, they were statists, they were hostile to Western culture in a way Berdyaev was not, and they accepted Orthodoxy in a perfunctory manner.[13]

In October 1925 a congress was held in Prague with the intention of creating a seminar.[1] One of the participants was Vladimir Nikolaevich Ilyin (1890-1974), a philosopher, theologian and composer from Kyiv and not related to Ivan A. Ilyin who has been presented in the literature by various authors as belonging to the group.[1][14]

Several members of the Eurasianists were affected by the Soviet provocational

TREST operation, which had set up a fake meeting of Eurasianists in Russia that was attended by the Eurasianist leader P.N. Savitsky in 1926 (an earlier series of trips were also made two years earlier by Eurasianist member P. Arapov). The uncovering of the TREST as a Soviet provocation caused a serious morale blow to the Eurasianists and discredited their public image.[15]

In the late 1920s, Eurasianists polarized and became divided in to two groups, the left Eurasianists, who were becoming increasingly pro-Soviet and pro-communist and the classic right Eurasianists, who remained staunchly anti-communist and anti-Soviet.[16] After the emergence of "left Eurasianism" in Paris, where some of the movement's leaders became pro-Soviet, Trubetzkoy who was a staunch anti-communist heavily criticised them and eventually broke with the Eurasianist movement.[17] The Eurasianists faded quickly from the Russian émigré community.[18][19] By 1929, the Eurasianists had ceased publishing their periodical. Several organizations similar in spirit to the Eurasianists sprung up in the émigré community at around the same time, such as the pro-Monarchist Mladorossi and the Smenovekhovtsi.[citation needed]

During the mid-1930s, representatives of the Eurasianist movement who had settled in the Soviet Union were suppressed during the Stalinist purges and émigré Eurasianists had mostly scattered throughout Europe. By 1938, all organized Eurasianist movement had ceased to exist.[15][20]

Early proponents of Eurasianist themes in the West argued that control of the

National Bolsheviks.[23]

Greater Russia

Not to be confused with Great Russia.
Russian growth 1613–1914

The political-cultural concept espoused by some in

Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, among other territories.[24]

Before

war broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin visited South Ossetia and predicted: "Our troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which is historically part of Russia, anyway."[25] Former South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity is a Eurasianist and argues that South Ossetia has never left the Russian Empire and should be part of Russia.[26]

In March 2022 American journalist

Kievan Rus, however specious, is the best explanation for his view that Ukraine must be part of Russia's sphere of influence".[27]

Eurasianism as ideology

Drawing on historical, geographical, ethnographical, linguistic, cultural and religious studies, the Eurasianists suggested that the lands of the Russian Empire, and then of the

French historian Marlene Laurelle, despite admiring aspects of European fascist movements, early Eurasianist intellectuals were repelled by their glorification of violence, militarism, extremism, racism, etc. However, Laurelle has portaryed Aleksandr Dugin's neo-Eurasianism as being very similar to the militant mentality of inter-war fascist movements in Europe.[29]

A key feature of Eurasianism is the rejection of Russian

Russian state as a unified Eurasian great power.[30] Unlike many of the white Russians, the Eurasianists rejected all hope for a restoration of the monarchy.[3] Aversion to democracy is an important characteristic of Eurasianism. Eurasianists considered ideocracy a good thing, provided that the ruling ideas were the right ones.[31]

Appropriation of Joseph Stalin and neo-Stalinism are key features in Eurasianism. Neo-Eurasianist ideologue Aleksandr Dugin described Stalin as the "greatest personality in Russian history" who represented "the spirit of Soviet society and the Soviet people".[32][33]
Former Warsaw Pact
countries

For David Lewis, there are a number of people who assert "an alternative topography, articulated in a series of spatial projects – the '

sphere-of-influence politics of the past. It is Russia's goal [say these thinkers] to assert its own central role as a great power, in just such a 'Great Space', that of Eurasia.[34]

The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's school for future diplomats, Igor Panarin, is a vocal Eurasianist, as is the head of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the Moscow Higher School of Economics, Sergey Karaganov. Academics such as Natalya Narochnitskaya, Igor Kholmogorov [ru], and Vadim Tsymburskii all espouse a messianic version of Eurasianism, and twin it with some form of Eastern Orthodox Church theology.[35][36]

An exponent of neo-Eurasianism is the Russian political theorist

Fourth Political Theory.[citation needed
]

The

political scientist Aleksandr Dugin.[37][38][39][40][41][42]
The organization follows the neo-Eurasian ideology, which adopts an eclectic mixture of
Bolshevik ideas. The organization opposes "American" values such as liberalism, capitalism, and modernism.[43]

Eurasianist geo-politics

Ideologically, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev's speech in March 1994 at Moscow State University became the starting point for the implementation of a pragmatic Eurasianism. He proposed an integration paradigm that was fundamentally new at the time: to move towards a Eurasian Union based on economic integration and common defense.[44] This vision has been later materialized in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Eurasianism in Nazarbayev's reading is seen as a system of foreign policy, economic ideas and priorities (as opposed to a philosophy). This type of Eurasianism is unequivocally open to the outside world.

Eurasian Economic Union

Main articles: Eurasian Economic Union and Enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union
The Eurasian Economic Union

The Eurasian Economic Union was founded in January 2015, consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and observer members Moldova, Uzbekistan and Cuba, all of them (except Cuba) being previous members of the Soviet Union. Members include states from both Europe and Asia; the union promotes political and economic cooperation among members.

Collective Security Treaty Organization

Main article: Collective Security Treaty Organization

The Collective Security Treaty Organization is an

intergovernmental military alliance that was signed on 15 May 1992. In 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States – Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – signed the Collective Security Treaty (also referred to as the "Tashkent Pact" or "Tashkent Treaty").[45] Three other post-Soviet states – Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia
– signed the next year and the treaty took effect in 1994. Five years later, six of the nine – all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan – agreed to renew the treaty for five more years, and in 2002 those six agreed to create the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military alliance. Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO in 2006 but withdrew in 2012.

Eurasianist foreign policy doctrine of Russia

Eurasianist sentiments have been on the rise across Russian society since the ascent of Vladimir Putin in the country. In a poll conducted by Levada Center in 2021, 64% of Russian citizens identify Russia as a non-European country; while only 29% regarded Russia to be part of Europe.[46]

In 2023, Russia adopted a Eurasianist,

post-WWII international order and the United Nations.[47][48][49]

In Turkey

Further information: Pan-Turkism and Turanism
Distribution of the Turkic peoples in Eurasia

Since the late 1990s, Eurasianism has gained some following in

ulusalcı) circles. The most prominent figure who is associated with Dugin is Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi).[50]

In literature

In the future time depicted in

Robert Heinlein's story "Solution Unsatisfactory
" depicts a future in which the Soviet Union would be transformed into "The Eurasian Union". Whether or not there is any connection between these uses of the term "Eurasia" and the geopolitical ideology of Eurasianism is unclear.

Criticism

Eurasianism has been criticized as an

illiberalism".[52]

Australian russologist

Baltic countries,[54] as well as Poland.[35]

Igor Torbakov argued in June 2022 that "According to the Kremlin's geopolitical outlook, Russia could only successfully compete with the United States, China or the European Union if it acts as a leader of the regional bloc. Bringing Russia and its ex-Soviet neighbours into a closely integrated community of states, Russian strategists contend, would allow this Eurasian association to become one of the major centres of global and regional governance."[55]

According to Clover, Eurasianism appeared to be all the rage in early 21st-century Russia. One commentator noted that during Putin's later years, it was "one of the best known and most frequently mentioned political movements of the period."[56]

See also

References

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  28. ^ Böss, Otto (14 January 1961). "Die Lehre der Eurasier: ein Beitrag zur russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts". Otto Harrassowitz Verlag – via Google Books.
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  31. ^ "The Jewish Eurasianism of Yakov Bromberg".
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Sources

External links
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