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Appeasement in an international context is a diplomatic policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power in order to avoid conflict.[1] The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of the UK governments of Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald (in office: 1929–1935), Stanley Baldwin (in office: 1935–1937) and (most notably) Neville Chamberlain (in office: 1937–1940) towards Nazi Germany (from 1933) and Fascist Italy (established in 1922)[2] between 1935 and 1939. Under British pressure, appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in French foreign policy of the period, but was always much less popular than in the United Kingdom.[3]
At the beginning of the 1930s, appeasing concessions were widely seen as desirable—due to the anti-war reaction to the trauma of
As alarm grew about the rise of fascism in Europe, Chamberlain resorted to attempts at news censorship to control public opinion.[5] He confidently announced after Munich that he had secured "peace for our time".[6]
Academics, politicians, and diplomats have intensely debated the 1930s appeasement policies for more than eighty years. The historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation ("Lesson of Munich") for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong, to the judgment that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and that postponement of a showdown was in their country's best interests.
Failure of collective security
Appeasement policy, the policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini, operating jointly at that time, during 1937 and 1938 by continuous concessions granted in the hope of reaching a point of saturation when the dictators would be willing to accede to international collaboration. ... It came to an end when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, in defiance of his promises given at Munich, and Prime Minister Chamberlain, who had championed appeasement before, decided on a policy of resistance to further German aggression.
— Walter Theimer (ed.), The Penguin Political Dictionary, 1939
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement emerged from the failure of the
Invasion of Manchuria
In September 1931, the
In this 1935 pact, the UK permitted Germany to begin rebuilding its navy, including its U-boats, in spite of Hitler already having violated the Treaty of Versailles.
Abyssinia crisis
Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini had imperial ambitions in Abyssinia. Italy was already in possession of neighbouring Eritrea and Somalia. In December 1934, there was a clash between Italian and Abyssinian troops at Walwal, near the border between British and Italian Somaliland, in which Italian troops took possession of the disputed territory and in which 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians were killed. When Italy demanded apologies and compensation from Abyssinia, Abyssinia appealed to the League, Emperor Haile Selassie famously appealing in person to the assembly in Geneva. The League persuaded both sides to seek a settlement under the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 but Italy continued troop movements and Abyssinia appealed to the League again. In October 1935 Mussolini launched an attack on Abyssinia. The League declared Italy to be the aggressor and imposed sanctions, but coal and oil were not included; blocking these, it was thought, would provoke war. Albania, Austria, and Hungary refused to apply sanctions; Germany and the United States were not in the League. Nevertheless, the Italian economy suffered. The League considered closing off the Suez Canal also, which would have stopped arms to Abyssinia, but, thinking it would be too harsh a measure, they did not do so.[9]
Earlier, in April 1935, Italy had joined Britain and France in protest against
Remilitarisation of the Rhineland
Under the
Spanish Civil War
Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of the Establishment's anti-Communist stance. Scott Ramsay (2019) instead argues that Britain demonstrated "benevolent neutrality". It was simply hedging its bets, avoiding favouring one side or the other. The goal was that in a European war Britain would enjoy the 'benevolent neutrality' of whichever side won in Spain.[10]
Conduct of appeasement, 1937–1939
In 1937
Anschluss
When the
The Austrian Chancellor
Although the victorious
Munich Agreement
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.
— Neville Chamberlain, 27 September 1938, 8 p.m. radio broadcast, on Czechoslovak refusal to accept Nazi demands to cede border areas to Germany.
Under the Versailles Settlement,
France and Britain advised Czech acceptance of Sudeten autonomy. The Czech government refused and ordered a partial mobilisation in expectation of German aggression.
and there was an increase of violence by Sudeten Nazis against Czech and Jewish targets.Chamberlain, faced with the prospect of a German invasion, flew to Berchtesgaden on 15 September to negotiate directly with Hitler. Hitler now demanded that Chamberlain accept not merely Sudeten self-government within Czechoslovakia, but the absorption of the Sudeten lands into Germany. Chamberlain became convinced that refusal would lead to war. The geography of Europe was such that Britain and France could forcibly prevent the German occupation of the Sudetenland only by the invasion of Germany.[17] Chamberlain, therefore, returned to Britain and agreed to Hitler's demands. Britain and France told the Czech president Edvard Beneš that he must hand to Germany all territory with a German majority. Hitler increased his aggression against Czechoslovakia and ordered the establishment of a Sudeten German paramilitary organisation, which proceeded to carry out terrorist attacks on Czech targets.
German annexation of the Sudetenland
On 22 September, Chamberlain flew to Bad Godesberg for his second meeting with Hitler. He said he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. He was startled by Hitler's response: Hitler said that cession of the Sudetenland was not enough and that Czechoslovakia (which he had described as a "fraudulent state") must be broken up completely. Later in the day, Hitler resiled, saying that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland by 1 October. On 24 September, Germany issued the Godesberg Memorandum, demanding cession by 28 September, or war. The Czechs rejected these demands, France ordered mobilisation and Britain mobilised its Navy.
On 26 September Hitler made a speech at the
In this atmosphere of growing conflict, Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference and on 29 September 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier (the French Prime Minister) and Mussolini met in Munich. Czechoslovakia was not to be a party to these talks, nor was the Soviet Union. The four powers agreed that Germany would complete its occupation of the Sudetenland but that an international commission would consider other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was told that if it did not submit, it would stand alone. At Chamberlain's request, Hitler readily signed a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. Chamberlain returned to Britain promising "peace for our time". Before Munich, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chamberlain saying "Goodman", and afterward told the American ambassador in Rome William Phillips, "I am not a bit upset over the final result."[20]
First Vienna Award, German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia
As a result of the annexation of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia lost 800,000 citizens, much of its industry and its mountain defences in the west. It left the rest of Czechoslovakia weak and powerless to resist subsequent occupation. In the following months Czechoslovakia was broken up and ceased to exist as Germany annexed the Sudetenland, Hungary part of Slovakia including
In March 1939, Chamberlain foresaw a possible disarmament conference between himself,
In effect, the British and French had, through the Munich negotiations, pressured their ally Czechoslovakia to cede part of its territory to a hostile neighbour in order to preserve peace.
Czechoslovakia had a modern, well-prepared military and Hitler, on entering Prague, conceded that a war would have cost Germany much blood[26][22] but the decision by France and Great Britain not to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of war (and the exclusion from the equation of the Soviet Union, whom Chamberlain distrusted) meant that the outcome would have been uncertain.[22] This event forms the main part of what became known as Munich betrayal (Czech: Mnichovská zrada) in Czechoslovakia and the rest of Eastern Europe,[27] as the Czech view was that Britain and France pressured them to cede territory in order to prevent a major war that would involve the West. The Western view is that they were pressured in order to save Czechoslovakia from total annihilation.
German annexation of Lithuania's Klaipėda Region
Rumors had reached the Lithuanian government to the effect that Germany had specific plans to take over Klaipėda. On 12 March Foreign Minister Urbšys represented Lithuania at the coronation of
Lithuania secretly informed the signatories of the
Outbreak of World War II and the Phoney War
By August 1939 Hitler was convinced that the democratic nations would never put up any effective opposition to him. He expressed his contempt for them in a speech he delivered to his Commanders in Chief: "Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action… Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich."[33]
On 1 September 1939, German forces
Attitudes towards appeasement
As the policy of appeasement failed to prevent war, those who advocated it were quickly criticised. Appeasement came to be seen as something to be avoided by those with responsibility for the diplomacy of Britain or any other democratic country. By contrast, the few who stood out against appeasement were seen as "voices in the wilderness whose wise counsels were largely ignored, with almost catastrophic consequences for the nation in 1939–40".[36] More recently, however, historians have questioned the accuracy of this simple distinction between appeasers and anti-appeasers. "Few appeasers were really prepared to seek peace at any price; few, if any, anti-appeasers were prepared for Britain to make a stand against aggression whatever the circumstances and wherever the location in which it occurred."[36]
Avoiding the mistakes of the Great War
Chamberlain's policy in many respects continued the policies of MacDonald and Baldwin, and was popular until the failure of the Munich Agreement to stop Hitler in Czechoslovakia. "Appeasement" had been a respectable term between 1919 and 1937 to signify the pursuit of peace.
Government views
Appeasement was accepted by most of those responsible for British foreign policy in the 1930s, by leading journalists and academics and by members of the royal family, such as King
Most Conservative MPs were also in favour, though Churchill said their supporters were divided and in 1936 he led a delegation of leading Conservative politicians to express to Baldwin their alarm about the speed of German rearmament and the fact that Britain was falling behind.
The week before Munich, Churchill warned "The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from the UK and France amounts to the complete surrender of the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force. Such a collapse will bring peace or security neither to the UK nor to France."[22] He and a few other Conservatives who refused to vote for the Munich settlement were attacked by their local constituency parties.[22] However Churchill's subsequent leadership of Britain during the war and his role in creating the post-war consensus against appeasement has tended to obscure the fact that "his contemporary criticism of totalitarian regimes other than Hitler's Germany was at best muted".[36] Not until May 1938 did he begin "consistently to withhold his support from the National Government's conduct of foreign policy in the division lobbies of the House of Commons", and he seems "to have been convinced by the Sudeten German leader, Henlein, in the spring of 1938, that a satisfactory settlement could be reached if Britain managed to persuade the Czech government to make concessions to the German minority".[36]
Military views
In Britain the Royal Navy generally favoured appeasement. In the Italian Abyssinia Crisis of 1937 it was confident it could easily defeat the Royal Italian Navy in open warfare. However, it favoured appeasement because it did not want to commit a large fraction of its naval power to the Mediterranean, thereby weakening its positions against Germany and Japan.[44] In 1938, the Royal Navy approved appeasement regarding Munich because it calculated that at that moment, Britain lacked the political and military resources to intervene and still maintain an imperial defence capability.[45][46]
Public opinion in Britain throughout the 1930s was frightened by the prospect of German terror bombing of British cities, as they had started to do in the First World War. The media emphasised the dangers, and the general consensus was that defence was impossible and, as Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had said in 1932 "The bomber will always get through."[47] However, the Royal Air Force had two major weapons systems in the works—better interceptors (Hurricanes and Spitfires) and especially radar. These promised to counter the German bombing offensive. However they were not yet ready, so that appeasement was necessary to cause a delay.[48][49] Specifically regarding the fighters, the RAF warned the government in October 1938 that the German bombers would probably get through: "the situation... will be definitely unsatisfactory throughout the next twelve months."[50]
In France, the Air Force intelligence section closely examined the strength of the Luftwaffe. It decided the German pursuit planes and bombers were the best in the world, and that the Nazis were producing 1000 warplanes a month. They perceived decisive German air superiority, so the Air Force was pessimistic about its ability to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938. Guy La Chambre, the civilian air minister, optimistically informed the government that the air force was capable of stopping the Luftwaffe. However, General Joseph Vuillemin, air force chief of staff, warned that his arm was far inferior. He consistently opposed war with Germany.[51]
Opposition parties
The Labour Party opposed the Fascist dictators on principle, but until the late 1930s it also opposed rearmament and it had a significant pacifist wing.[52][53] In 1935 its pacifist leader George Lansbury resigned following a party resolution in favour of sanctions against Italy, which he opposed. He was replaced by Clement Attlee, who at first opposed rearmament, advocating the abolition of national armaments and a world peace-keeping force under the direction of the League of Nations.[54] However, with the rising threat from Nazi Germany, and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, this policy eventually lost credibility, and in 1937 Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton persuaded the party to support rearmament[55] and oppose appeasement.[56]
A few on the left said that Chamberlain looked forward to a war between Germany and the
Public opinion
British public opinion had been strongly opposed to war and rearmament at the beginning of the 1930s, although this began to shift by mid-decade. At a
Czechoslovakia did not concern most people until the middle of September 1938, when they began to object to a small democratic state being bullied.[9][15] Nevertheless, the initial response of the British public to the Munich agreement was generally favourable.[9] As Chamberlain left for Munich in 1938, the whole House of Commons cheered him noisily. On 30 September, on his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his famous "peace for our time" speech to delighted crowds. He was invited by the Royal family onto the balcony at Buckingham Palace before he had reported to Parliament. The agreement was supported by most of the press, only Reynold's News and the Daily Worker dissenting.[9] In parliament the Labour Party opposed the agreement. Some Conservatives abstained in the vote. However, the only MP to advocate war was the Conservative Duff Cooper, who had resigned from the government in protest against the agreement.[9]
Role of the media
Positive opinion of appeasement was shaped partly by
Chamberlain's direct manipulation of the BBC was sustained and egregious.
[Chamberlain] had successfully demonstrated how a government in a democracy could influence and control the press to a remarkable degree. The danger in this for Chamberlain was that he preferred to forget that he exercised such influence, and so increasingly mistook his pliant press for real public opinion...the truth of the matter was that by controlling the press he was merely ensuring that the press was unable to reflect public opinion.[70]
The journalist Shiela Grant Duff's Penguin Special, Europe and the Czechs was published and distributed to every MP on the day that Chamberlain returned from Munich. Her book was a spirited defence of the Czech nation and a detailed criticism of British policy, confronting the need for war if necessary. It was influential and widely read. Although she argued against the policy of "peace at almost any price"[71] she did not take the personal tone that Guilty Men was to take two years later.
At the start of World War II
Once Germany invaded Poland, igniting World War II, consensus was that appeasement was responsible. The Labour MP Hugh Dalton identified the policy with wealthy people in the City of London, Conservatives and members of the peerage who were soft on Hitler.[72] The appointment of Churchill as Prime Minister after the Norway Debate hardened opinion against appeasement and encouraged the search for those responsible. Three British journalists, Michael Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard, writing under the name of "Cato" in their book Guilty Men, called for the removal from office of 15 public figures they held accountable, including Chamberlain. The book defined appeasement as the "deliberate surrender of small nations in the face of Hitler's blatant bullying". It was hastily written and has few claims to historical scholarship,[73] but Guilty Men shaped subsequent thinking about appeasement and it is said[74][75] that it contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election.
The change in the meaning of "appeasement" after Munich was summarised later by the historian David Dilks: "The word in its normal meaning connotes the pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Neville Chamberlain['s] premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense."[76]
After the Second World War: historians
Churchill's book The Gathering Storm, published in 1948, made a similar judgment to Guilty Men, though in moderate tones. This book and Churchill's authority confirmed the orthodox view.[citation needed]
Historians have subsequently explained Chamberlain's policies in various ways. It could be said that he believed sincerely that the objectives of Hitler and Mussolini were limited and that the settlement of their grievances would protect the world from war; for safety, military and air power should be strengthened. Many have judged this belief to be fallacious, since the dictators' demands were not limited and appeasement gave them time to gain greater strength.
One of the first dissents to the prevailing criticism of appeasement was made by John F. Kennedy in his 1940 Harvard College thesis Why England Slept, in which he argued that appeasement had been necessary because the United Kingdom and France were unprepared for a world war.[77][78]
In 1961 the view of appeasement as avoidable error and cowardice was similarly set on its head by
His view has been shared by other historians, for example Paul Kennedy, who says of the choices facing politicians at the time, "Each course brought its share of disadvantages: there was only a choice of evils. The crisis in the British global position by this time was such that it was, in the last resort, insoluble, in the sense that there was no good or proper solution."[79] Martin Gilbert has expressed a similar view: "At bottom, the old appeasement was a mood of hope, Victorian in its optimism, Burkean in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good and that progress could only be for the better. The new appeasement was a mood of fear, Hobbesian in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was there to stay and, however horrible it might be, should be accepted as a way of life with which Britain ought to deal."[80]
The arguments in Taylor's Origins of the Second World War (sometimes described as "revisionist"[9][81]) were rejected by many historians at the time, and reviews of his book in Britain and the United States were generally critical. Nevertheless, he was praised for some of his insights. By showing that appeasement was a popular policy and that there was continuity in British foreign policy after 1933, he shattered the common view of the appeasers as a small, degenerate clique that had mysteriously hijacked the British government sometime in the 1930s and who had carried out their policies in the face of massive public resistance; and by portraying the leaders of the 1930s as real people attempting to deal with real problems, he made the first strides towards explaining the actions of the appeasers rather than merely condemning them.
In the early 1990s a new theory of appeasement, sometimes called "counter-revisionist",[81] emerged as historians argued that appeasement was probably the only choice for the British government in the 1930s, but that it was poorly implemented, carried out too late and not enforced strongly enough to constrain Hitler. Appeasement was considered a viable policy, considering the strains that the British Empire faced in recuperating from World War I, and Chamberlain was said to have adopted a policy suitable to Britain's cultural and political needs. Frank McDonough is a leading proponent of this view of appeasement and describes his book Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War[82] as a "post revisionist" study.[83] Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst error", says McDonough, "was to believe that he could march Hitler on the yellow brick road to peace when in reality Hitler was marching very firmly on the road to war." He has criticised revisionist historians for concentrating on Chamberlain's motivations rather than how appeasement worked in practice – as a "usable policy" to deal with Hitler. James P. Levy argues against the outright condemnation of appeasement. "Knowing what Hitler did later," he writes, "the critics of Appeasement condemn the men who tried to keep the peace in the 1930s, men who could not know what would come later. ... The political leaders responsible for Appeasement made many errors. They were not blameless. But what they attempted was logical, rational, and humane."[84]
The view of Chamberlain colluding with Hitler to attack Russia has persisted, however, particularly on the far-left.
After the Second World War: politicians
Statesmen in the post-war years have often referred to their opposition to appeasement as a justification for firm, sometimes armed, action in international relations.
U.S. President
After the Viet Minh won the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in a letter to British Prime Minister Churchill, "We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?" Similarly, President Lyndon B. Johnson said in defense of the Vietnam War, "Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression."[78]
During the
During the Cold War, the "lessons" of appeasement were cited by prominent conservative allies of Reagan, who urged Reagan to be assertive in "rolling back" Soviet-backed regimes throughout the world. The Heritage Foundation's Michael Johns, for instance, wrote in 1987 that "seven years after Ronald Reagan's arrival in Washington, the United States government and its allies are still dominated by the culture of appeasement that drove Neville Chamberlain to Munich in 1938."[90] Some conservatives even compared Reagan to Chamberlain after his withdrawal of the Multinational Force in Lebanon following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.[78]
British Prime Minister
U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair also cited Churchill's warnings about German rearmament to justify their action in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War.[93]
In 2013, Obama administration officials such as Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel claimed that a failure of the United States to intervene in the Syrian Civil War after the 2013 Ghouta chemical attack would be an act of appeasement towards Bashar al-Assad.[78]
In May 2008, President Bush cautioned against "the false comfort of appeasement" when dealing with Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[94] Opponents of President Barack Obama later criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an act of appeasement with Iran.[95][96] Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later stated that the Trump administration's foreign policy was "trying to correct for what was the Obama administration's appeasement of Iran."[88]
Dutch politician
Tibetan separatists consider the policy of the West towards China with regard to Tibet as appeasement.[98]
Some experts noted that
See also
- Confidence and security-building measures
- Containment
- Danegeld
- Deterrence theory
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Mutual Assured Destruction
- Peace through strength
- Realpolitik
- Why Die for Danzig?
- Why England Slept
References
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Hucker, Daniel (2011). Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France. London: Routledge (published 2016). ISBN 9781317073543. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
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By and large, the Chamberlain government tried to persuade editors to operate an informal self-censorship. [...] Editors of leading national newspapers were asked to support Chamberlain's efforts to gain a peaceful settlement and to avoid critical comment. Yet the freedom enjoyed by the press ensured that total government control was never feasible and critical comment continued to appear.
Government pressure to restrict criticism of appeasement on BBC radio was far more successful. Radio coverage of foreign policy during the inter-war years was severely restricted through a combination of discreet pressure, self-censorship and guidance from Downing Street and the foreign office. - ^ Hunt, The Makings of the West p. 861.
- .
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- ^ Olson, Lynne (2008) Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 120–22]
- ^ David Deacon, "A Quieting Effect? The BBC and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)." Media History, 18 (2), pp. 143–58
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- ^ Olson, Lynne (2008)Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 258
- ^ Cited in Caputi, Robert J. (2000) Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement Susquehanna University Press, pp. 168–69
- ^ Grant Duff 1938, p. 201.
- ^ Dalton, H. Hitler's War, London, Penguin Books, 1940
- ^ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
- ^ David Willets and Richard Forsdyke, After the Landslide, London: Centre For Policy Studies, 1999
- ^ Hal G.P. Colebatch, "Epitaph for a Liar", American Spectator, 3.8.10 Archived 17 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Dilks, D. N., "Appeasement Revisited", Journal of Contemporary History, 1972
- )
- ^ a b c d e f Shachtman, Tom. "It's Time to Abandon 'Munich'". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 1 May 2021.
- ISBN 0-00-686165-2.
- ^ Gilbert, M., The Roots of Appeasement, 1968
- ^ a b Dimuccio, R.A.B., "The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 2, March 1998
- ^ Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, Manchester University Press, 1998
- ^ See, for example, McDonough, F., Brown, R., and Smith, D., Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 2002
- ^ James P. Levy, Appeasement and rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006
- ISBN 0-85345-999-1
- ^ Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (Penguin, 2006), p. 133
- ^ Beck, R.J., "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Autumn, 1989), pp. 161–91
- ^ a b Cummings, William. "Secretary of State Pompeo blames current tension with Iran on 'Obama administration's appeasement'". USA TODAY. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- )
- ^ "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", by Michael Johns, Policy Review, Summer 1987.
- ISBN 0-00-637457-3.
- ^ Vuilliamy, E., "Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement", International Affairs , 1998, pp. 73–91 Year: 1998
- ^ "Appeasement: The Gathering Storm (Teachers Exercises)". Churchill College Cambridge.
- ^ Thomas, E., "The Mythology of Munich", Newsweek, 23 June 2008, Vol. 151, Issue 25, pp. 22–26
- ^ Loyola, Mario (12 January 2020). "Obama Should Never Have Appeased Iran". The Atlantic. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- ^ Picard, Joe (25 August 2015). "Appeasing Iran?". TheHill. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- ^ (in Dutch) Confrontatie, geen verzoening, de Volkskrant, 8 April 2006, copy here
- ^ Penny McRae, "West appeasing China on Tibet, says PM-in-exile", AFP, 15 September 2009
- ^ "Appeasing Putin in Ukraine would be disastrous for European security". Atlantic Council. 6 January 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Lewis, Simon; Melander, Ingrid (4 March 2022). "NATO rejects Ukraine no-fly zone, unhappy Zelenskiy says this means more bombing". Reuters. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "The west knows the cost of appeasement. We can't rule out any option for stopping Putin | Ian Bond". The Guardian. 22 February 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
Further reading
- Adams, R.J.Q., British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–1939 (1993)
- Alexandroff A. and Rosecrance R., "Deterrence in 1939," World Politics 29#3 (1977), pp. 404–24.
- Beck R.J., "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered" in International Security, 14, 1989
- Bouverie, Tim. Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War (2019) online review
- Cameron Watt, Donald. How War Came: Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–39 (1990)
- Doer P.W., British Foreign Policy 1919–39 (1988)
- Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932–1939 (2004); translation of his highly influential La décadence, 1932–1939 (1979)
- Dutton D., Neville Chamberlain
- Faber, David. Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (2009) excerpt and text search
- Farmer Alan. British Foreign and Imperial Affairs 1919–39 (2000), textbook
- Feiling, Keith. The Life of Neville Chamberlain (1947) online
- Gilbert, Martin, Winston Churchill, The Wilderness Years. (Macmillan, 1981).
- Goddard, Stacie E. "The rhetoric of appeasement: Hitler's legitimation and British foreign policy, 1938–39." Security Studies 24.1 (2015): 95–130.
- Grant Duff, Sheila (1938). Europe and the Czechs. London: Penguin.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Hill C., Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938 – June 1941, (1991).
- Hucker, Daniel. Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France. (Routledge, 2016).
- Jenkins Roy, Baldwin New York: HarperCollins (1987)
- Johns, Michael, "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", Policy Review magazine, Summer 1987
- Levy J., Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939, 2006
- McDonough, F., Neville Chamberlain, appeasement, and the British road to war (Manchester UP, 1998)
- Mommsen W.J. and Kettenacker L. (eds), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983 ISBN 0-04-940068-1.
- Murray, Williamson. "Munich, 1938: The military confrontation." Journal of Strategic Studies (1979) 2#3 pp. 282–302.
- Neville P., Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War, 2005
- Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Proponents and Critics of Appeasement
- Parker, R.A.C. Chamberlain and appeasement: British policy and the coming of the Second World War (Macmillan, 1993)
- Peden G. C., "A Matter of Timing: The Economic Background to British Foreign Policy, 1937–1939," History, 69, 1984
- Post G., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934–1937, Cornell UP, 1993.
- Ramsay, Scott. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939". International History Review 41:3 (2019): 604–623. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211. online review in H-DIPLO
- Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Naval Institute Press, 2002).
- Riggs, Bruce Timothy. "Geoffrey Dawson, editor of "The Times" (London), and his contribution to the appeasement movement" (PhD dissertation, U of North Texas, 1993) online, bibliography pp. 229–33.
- Rock S.R., Appeasement in International Politics, 2000
- Rock W.R., British Appeasement in the 1930s
- Shay R.P., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Sontag, Raymond J. "Appeasement, 1937" Catholic Historical Review 38#4 (1953), pp. 385–396 online
- Stedman, A. D. (2007). 'Then what could Chamberlain do, other than what Chamberlain did'? A Synthesis and Analysis of the Alternatives to Chamberlain's Policy of Appeasing Germany, 1936–1939 (PhD). Kingston University. OCLC 500402799. Docket uk.bl.ethos.440347. Retrieved 24 October 2016.
- Valladares, David Miguel. "Imperial Glory or Appeasement? the Cliveden Set's Influence on British Foreign Policy during the Inter-War Period." (MA thesis, Florida State U. 2014); with detailed bibliography pp. 72–80 online
- Wheeler-Bennett J., Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948
Historiography
- Barros, Andrew, Talbot C. Imlay, Evan Resnick, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jack S. Levy. "Debating British Decision-making toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s." International Security 34#1 (2009): 173–98. online.
- Cole, Robert A. "Appeasing Hitler: The Munich Crisis of 1938: A Teaching and Learning Resource," New England Journal of History (2010) 66#2 pp. 1–30.
- Dimuccio, Ralph BA. "The study of appeasement in international relations: Polemics, paradigms, and problems." Journal of peace research 35.2 (1998): 245–259.
- Finney, Patrick. "The romance of decline: The historiography of appeasement and British national identity." Electronic Journal of International History 1 (2000). online; comprehensive evaluation of the scholarship
- Hughes, R. Gerald. "The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement." Journal of Contemporary History (2013) 48#4 pp. 688–716.
- Record, Jeffrey. "Appeasement Reconsidered – Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s" (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005) online
- Roi, Michael. "Introduction: Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers." Diplomacy and Statecraft 19.3 (2008): 383–390.
- Strang, G. Bruce. "The spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and british appeasement in the 1930s." Diplomacy and Statecraft 19.3 (2008): 481–526.
- Van Tol, David. "History extension 2019: Constructing history case study: Appeasement." Teaching History 51.3 (2017): 35+.
- Walker, Stephen G. "Solving the Appeasement Puzzle: Contending Historical Interpretations of British Diplomacy during the 1930s." British Journal of International Studies 6#3 (1980): 219–46. online.
- Watt, D. C. "The Historiography of Appeasement", in Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor, ed. A. Sked and C. Cook (London, 1976)
External links
- Media related to Appeasement at Wikimedia Commons
Category:1930s in the United Kingdom Category:1930s in politics Category:1930s controversies Category:20th century in international relations Category:Politics of World War II Category:Political terminology Category:International relations Category:Types of diplomacy Category:History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom Category:Late modern Europe Category:Ethically disputed political practices Category:Munich Agreement Category:Neville Chamberlain Category:Adolf Hitler Category:Interwar Britain Category:History of diplomacy