Era of Stagnation

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Leonid Brezhnev

First, then General Secretary of the CPSU
1964–1982

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The "Era of Stagnation" (Russian: Пери́од засто́я, romanized: Períod zastóya, or Эпо́ха засто́я Epókha zastóya) is a term coined by Mikhail Gorbachev in order to describe the negative way in which he viewed the economic, political, and social policies of the Soviet Union that began during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) and continued under Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985).[1][2] It is sometimes called the "Brezhnevian Stagnation" in English.

Terminology

During the period of Brezhnev's leadership, the term "Era of Stagnation" was not used. Instead in

Soviet ideology the term "period of developed socialism" (Russian: пери́од развито́го социали́зма) was used for the period that started in 1967. This Soviet concept was officially declared at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971. It stemmed from the failure of Khrushchev's promise in 1961 of reaching communism in 20 years[3] and was a replacement for the concept "period of the extensive construction of communism" (Russian: период развёрнутого строительства коммунизма). It was in the 1980s that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev coined the term "Era of Stagnation" to describe the economic difficulties that developed when Leonid Brezhnev led the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982.[4] Scholars have subsequently disagreed on the dates, significance and causes of the stagnation. Supporters of Gorbachev have criticised Brezhnev, and the Brezhnev administration in general, for being too conservative and failing to change with the times.[5]

History

After the death of Soviet leader

Soviet leader, introduced relatively liberal reforms during the period known as the Khrushchev Thaw. This period also brought an economic increase that topped at 6%. The Manege Affair of 1962, during which Khrushchev publicly criticised an exhibition of Soviet art, led to the reassertion of Communist Party control over the arts and marked the beginning of the end of the Cultural Thaw.[6]

Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as Soviet leader in 1964. The

Stalinist policies. Some commentators regard the start of social stagnation as being the Sinyavsky–Daniel trial in 1966, in which two writers were convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and which marked the end of the Khrushchev Thaw.[7] Others place it at the time of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that suppressed the Prague Spring.[8] The period's political stagnation is associated with the establishment of gerontocracy
, which came into being as part of the policy of stability.

The majority of scholars set the starting year for economic stagnation at 1975, although some claim that it began as early as the 1960s. Industrial growth rates declined during the 1970s as

command economy
suffered from systemic flaws that inhibited growth. Others have argued that the lack of reform, or the high expenditures on the military, led to stagnation.

Brezhnev has been criticised posthumously for doing too little to improve the economic situation. Throughout his rule, no major reforms were initiated and the few proposed reforms were either very modest or opposed by the majority of the Soviet leadership. The reform-minded

Council of Ministers (Government), Alexei Kosygin, introduced two modest reforms in the 1970s after the failure of his more radical 1965 reform
, and attempted to reverse the trend of declining growth. By the 1970s, Brezhnev had consolidated enough power to stop any "radical" reform-minded attempts by Kosygin.

After the

Brezhnev's legacy was a Soviet Union that was much less dynamic than it had been when he assumed power in 1964. During Andropov's short rule, modest reforms were introduced; he died little more than a year later in February 1984. Konstantin Chernenko
, his successor, continued much of Andropov's policies. The economic problems that began under Brezhnev persisted into these short administrations and scholars still debate whether the reform policies that were followed improved the economic situation in the country.

The Era of Stagnation ended with Gorbachev's rise to power during which political and social life was democratised

Khozraschyot) and democratic (demokratizatsiya) reforms. These were intended to re-energize the Soviet Union but inadvertently led to its dissolution
in 1991.

Economy

Analysis

Robert Service, author of the History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Century, claims that with mounting economic problems worker discipline decreased,[14] which the government could not counter effectively because of the full employment policy. According to Service, this policy led to government industries, such as factories, mines and offices, being staffed by undisciplined and unproductive personnel ultimately leading to a "work-shy workforce" among Soviet workers and administrators.[15] While the Soviet Union under Brezhnev had the "second greatest industrial capacity" after the United States, and produced more "steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and ... tractors" than any other country in the world,[16] Service treats the problems of agriculture during the Brezhnev era as proof of the need for de-collectivization.[17] In short, Service considers the Soviet economy to have become "static" during this time period,[18] and Brezhnev's policy of stability was a "recipe for political disaster".[19]

Richard Sakwa, author of the book The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union: 1917–1991, takes a dimmer view of the Brezhnev era by claiming that growth rates fell "inexorably" from the 1950s until they stopped completely in the 1980s. His reasoning for this stagnation was the growing demand for unskilled workers resulted in a decline of productivity and labour discipline. Sakwa believes that stability itself led to stagnation and claimed that without strong leadership "Soviet socialism had a tendency to relapse into stagnation."[20]

According to Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, authors of Brezhnev Reconsidered, the economy under Brezhnev was as dynamic as the economy presided over by Nikita Khrushchev, but this dynamism had stalled by the time

globalisation[26] and misinterpretation of a "permanent" post–World War II economic boom leading to faulty economic decisions.[27] He claims that the economic policies of Andropov, and Chernenko, had improved the economic situation in the country and Mikhail Gorbachev inherited a more dynamic and vibrant economy in a "pre-crisis situation" where the economy was still growing with low internal and external debts, compared to the economy that Andropov and Chernenko inherited.[28]

Eighth Five-Year Plan) claiming that the Soviet economy "enjoyed stronger growth in the second half of the 1960s than it ever did thereafter". The link between these growth rates and the Kosygin reform is, according to Brown, "tenuous",[30] but says that "From the point of view of communist rulers, the Brezhnev era was in many ways successful".[31] The Soviet Unions natural resources provided a strong economic foundation, which bore fruit during the 1973 oil crisis and "turned out to be an energy bonanza".[32] On the other hand, Brown states it was a sign of weakness that the Soviet Union grew so dependent on her natural resources, as she did in the 1970s.[31]

Scholars are generally unsure as to what effect the "Kosygin reform", named after its initiator Alexei Kosygin, had on economic growth

Philip Hanson, author of The Rise and Fall of the Soviet economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945, claims that the label stagnation is not "entirely unfair". Brezhnev, according to Hanson, did preside over a period of slowdown in economic growth, but claims that the era started with good growth that was at a higher rate than during the end of Khrushchev's rule. Economic slowdown began in 1973 "when even the official estimates began to show Soviet per capita production no longer closing the gap with the US." Before 1973, there was a reform period launched by

Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia and the previous reform attempts in Hungary.[33] According to Hanson, many assumed that growth during the Brezhnev era did not stop but started to stagnate.[34] Not everything stagnated, as per capita consumption grew by 1.9% during the 1970s, which is a "highly respectable rate" of growth. Another point that Hanson makes is that, in contrast to the repressive policies of Joseph Stalin and instability-inducing policies of Khrushchev, the Brezhnev era was stable and a "period of (comparative) plenty".[35]

Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1981) the Soviet GNP "reached about 60% of the American level, and the net current investment was actually greater in absolute terms". The failure then, according to Daniels, was that the Soviet economy was not able to deliver in certain sectors; agriculture is a sector where this failure occurred. Throughout Soviet history, deficiencies in agriculture and consumer goods always existed. During Brezhnev's reign, the Soviet Union became the largest producer of wheat in the world but was unable to produce meat in sufficient quantities.[38] According to Daniels, the economy began to stagnate in 1975 rather than 1973 and that the following period contradicted the previous one "in almost every way".[39]

The research in

central planning were progressively distorted due to the rapid growth of the shadow economy. It is suggested that failure to account for it by Gosplan contributed to the stagnation, and ultimately to the collapse of the Soviet economy.[40]

Causes

One of the suggested causes of stagnation was the increased military expenditure over

GNP in 1950) and had increased on par with economic growth without previously destabilising the economy.[citation needed
]

During the

Nixon Shock and the 1973 oil crisis, economic growth in the rest of the world plummeted but the Soviet hard currency earnings grew as a result of oil exports. Following the crisis, overall economic activity decreased markedly in the Soviet Union, the Western Bloc and Japan, but in the Soviet Union it was much more pronounced. Kotz and Weir argued that ultimately, economic stagnation in the Soviet Union could only have been caused by internal problems rather than external.[43]

Some Marxist–Leninist writers have argued that economic stagnation was a result of

central planning and towards market socialism.[44]

Summary

Period Growth rates
GNP
(according to
the
CIA
) 		NMP
(according to
G. I. Khanin) 		NMP
(according to
the USSR)
1960–1965 4.8 4.4 6.5
1965–1970 4.9 4.1 7.7
1970–1975 3.0 3.2 5.7
1975–1980 1.9 1.0 4.2
1980–1985 1.8 0.6 3.5
[45][note 1]

One of the main causes for Khrushchev's dismissal from power was the relatively poor economic growth during the early 1960s. Overall economic growth was 6% from 1951 to 1955 but had fallen to 5.8% in the subsequent 5 years and to 5% from 1961 to 1965. Labour productivity, which had grown 4.7% from the 1950s to 1962, had declined to 4% by the early 1960s. Growth, capital out and investments were all showing signs of steady decline.[54] Another problem was Khrushchev's unrealistic promises such as committing to reach communism in 20 years, a near impossibility with the then-current economic indicators.[3] Ultimately, as a result of his failure to deliver on his promises and the problems engendered, Khrushchev was dismissed in October 1964[55] by a collective leadership led by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. To counter Khrushchev's promise of reaching communism, the Soviet leadership created the term developed socialism, which meant that the Soviet Union had developed to a sufficiently advanced stage that the country would move "naturally" to communism (in an unspecified amount of time).[56]

Khrushchev's dismissal led to the establishment of a more conservative Politburo; Kosygin,

Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966–1970), large-scale land reclamation programmes, construction of irrigation channels, and other measures, were enacted.[61][note 2] Overall, the reform failed and links to any high growth rates during the Eighth Five-Year Plan are considered to be "tenuous".[62]

The Brezhnev era, which had begun with high growth, began to stagnate some time in the early 1970s. Kosygin's "radical" reform attempts were halted in 1971 and his second reform was more modest. The second reform was halted because of the 1973 oil crisis, when an international increase in the price of oil prompted economic growth based on selling oil. Another reform was implemented in 1979 but this, too, failed as by this time the Soviet economy had become "addicted" to high oil prices.[61]

In 1980, RIA Novosti reported that the Soviet Union showed the highest, in Europe, and second highest, worldwide, industrial and agricultural output. The Soviet statistics claimed that in 1960, the Soviet Union's industrial output was only 55% that of America, but this increased to 80% by 1980.[61] The 18 years of Brezhnev's leadership of the Communist Party saw real incomes grow by more than 1.5 times.[61] More than 1.6 billion square meters of living space was commissioned and provided to over 160 million people. At the same time, the average rent for families did not exceed 3% of the family income. Housing, health care, and education were affordable and low priced. As the circulation of the work force could not be balanced by salaries, there was a lack of workers in some areas, largely in the agricultural sector. This was partly solved by forcing "nonproductive" urban population (older pupils, students, scientists, soldiers, etc.) to work during the harvesting time as agricultural workers. The practice has been informally called "naryady na kartoshku" (Russian: наряды на картошку "assignments to potato fields").[61]

Opposition

Acts of protest took place in reaction to the

anti-Soviet activity.[66] Supporters of these meetings and demonstrations claimed that the arrests were illegal, because there is no criminality in the realization of the human right to obtain and distribute information. They asserted this right was part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)[67] and the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975).[68]

During the introduction of

Grigory Gorin, directors Eldar Ryazanov and Mark Zakharov
.

See also

References

Notes

  1. Eighth Five-Year Plan
    (1966–1970)
    Ninth Five-Year Plan
    (1971–1975)
    • GNP: 3.7%[49]
    • GNI: 5.1%[51]
    • Labour productivity: 6%[53]
    • Capital investments in agriculture: 27%[52]
    Tenth Five-Year Plan
    (1976–1980)
    Eleventh Five-Year Plan
    (1981–1985)
  2. Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1981) when the economy grew by 5.7 and 4.2, respectively.[61]

References

  1. ^ "The World Factbook". Cia.gov. Retrieved 7 September 2015.
  2. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, pp. 1–2.
  3. ^ a b Dowlah & Elliott 1997, pp. 148–149.
  4. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 1.
  5. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 2.
  6. S2CID 159693587
    .
  7. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 143.
  8. ISBN 978-0-7391-4304-9
    .
  9. ^ "1964-1982 – The Period of Stagnation". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2 August 2017.
  10. ^ Gillula, James W. (1983). The Reconstructed 1972 Input-output Tables for Eight Soviet Republics (Manufactured goods sector was worth 118 billion roubles in 1972). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  11. doi:10.1177/004839319202200205
    .
  12. ^ Grant, Ted (22 September 2006). "Russia, from Revolution to Counter-Revolution". In Defence of Marxism (Part 6). Archived from the original on 6 February 2009. Retrieved 31 December 2011.
  13. ^ Service 2009, p. 427.
  14. ^ Service 2009, p. 416.
  15. ^ Service 2009, p. 417.
  16. ^ Service 2009, p. 397.
  17. ^ Service 2009, p. 402.
  18. ^ Service 2009, p. 407.
  19. ^ Service 2009, p. 409.
  20. ISBN 0-415-12290-2
    .
  21. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 38.
  22. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, pp. 43–44.
  23. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, pp. 44–45.
  24. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 47.
  25. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 53.
  26. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, pp. 50–51.
  27. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 54.
  28. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 63.
  29. ^ Brown 2009, p. 398.
  30. ^ Brown 2009, p. 403.
  31. ^ a b Brown 2009, p. 415.
  32. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, pp. 415–416.
  33. ^ Hanson 2003, p. 98.
  34. ^ Hanson 2003, pp. 98–99.
  35. ^ Hanson 2003, p. 99.
  36. ^ Daniels 1998, p. 46.
  37. ^ Daniels 1998, pp. 47–48.
  38. ^ Daniels 1998, p. 47.
  39. ^ Daniels 1998, p. 49.
  40. ^ Vladimir G. Treml and Michael V. Alexeev, "The Second Economy And The Destabilizing Effect Of Its Growth On The State Economy In The Soviet Union : 1965-1989", Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers On The Second Economy In The Ussr, Paper No. 36, December 1993
  41. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 28.
  42. ISBN 978-0-684-87112-7
    .
  43. ISBN 978-0-415-14317-2
    .
  44. ISBN 1-874613-01-X
    .
  45. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 40.
  46. ^ Kotz & Weir 2007, p. 35.
  47. doi:10.1080/09668139308412080
    .
  48. ^ Kotz & Weir 2007, p. 39.
  49. ^
    ISBN 978-0-7656-2387-4
    .
  50. ^
    ISBN 978-0-04-335053-9
    .
  51. ^
    ISBN 978-0-85664-571-6
    .
  52. ^
    ISBN 978-0-8229-8585-3
    .
  53. ^
    ISBN 0-87332-470-6
    .
  54. ^ Dowlah & Elliott 1997, p. 148.
  55. ^ Dowlah & Elliott 1997, p. 149.
  56. ^ Dowlah & Elliott 1997, p. 146.
  57. ISBN 0-8422-0529-2
    .
  58. ISBN 0-88738-260-6
    .
  59. ISBN 978-1-84331-034-1
    .
  60. ISBN 81-7648-660-4
    .
  61. ^ a b c d e f "Советская экономика в эпоху Леонида Брежнева" [The Soviet economy in the era of Leonid Brezhnev]. RIA Novosti. 8 November 2010. Retrieved 31 December 2011.
  62. ^ Bacon & Sandle 2002, p. 58.
  63. ^ "Хроника Текущих Событий: выпуск 3" [Chronicle of Current Events: Issue 3]. memo.ru (in Russian). 30 August 1968. Archived from the original on 29 September 2012. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  64. ^ Andrew Roth (9 August 2018). "Nearly half of Russians ignorant of 1968's Czechoslovakia invasion – poll". The Guardian.
  65. ^ "Хроника Текущих Событий: выпуск 4" [Chronicle of Current Events: Issue 4]. memo.ru (in Russian). 31 October 1968. Archived from the original on 4 February 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  66. ^ "Letter by Andropov to the Central Committee". 10 July 1970. Archived from the original on 11 March 2007.
  67. ^ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, resolution 217 A (III), accepted 10 Dec. 1948.
  68. ^ "Conference On Security And Co-Operation In Europe Final Act". Helsinki: OSCE. 1 August 1975. Retrieved 27 February 2016.
  69. Chingiz Aitmatov
    , in Russian. С. В. Калистратова. Открытое письмо писателю Чингизу Айтматову Archived 2007-09-26 at the Wayback Machine, 5 мая 1988 г.

Bibliography

External links
Preceded by History of Russia
History of the Soviet Union
14 October 1964 – 10 March 1985 		Succeeded by
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