East German uprising of 1953

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East German uprising of 1953
Part of the Cold War

Soviet T-34-85 in East Berlin on 17 June 1953
Date16–17 June 1953 (1953-06-16 – 1953-06-17)
Location
East Germany
Result

East German–Soviet victory

  • suppression of the anti-Stalinist uprising
Belligerents
East Germany
Soviet Union		 Anti-Stalinist demonstrators
Commanders and leaders
 No centralized leadership
Units involved
GSOFG
 None
Strength
East Germany:
16 divisions
Berlin:
[1]		 1,000,000–1,500,000 demonstrators[2]
Casualties and losses
55–125+ killed[3]

The East German uprising of 1953 (German: Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953 ) was an

Government of East Germany and the Socialist Unity Party the next day, involving over one million people in about 700 localities across the country.[4] Protests against declining living standards and unpopular Sovietization policies led to a wave of strikes and protests that were not easily brought under control and threatened to overthrow the East German government. The uprising in East Berlin was violently suppressed by tanks of the Soviet forces in Germany and the Kasernierte Volkspolizei
. Demonstrations continued in over 500 towns and villages for several more days before eventually dying out.

The 1953 uprising was celebrated in West Germany as a public holiday on 17 June until German reunification in 1990, after which it was replaced by German Unity Day, celebrated annually on 3 October.[5]

Background

In May 1952, the

collectivization of agriculture and a concerted campaign against religious activity in East Germany.[6]

In addition, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would introduce a new top-secret project, TP EMBER. This project was directed toward psychological warfare objectives and a secure paramilitary network in East Germany.[7][unreliable source?]   The result of these changes in the GDR's economic direction was the rapid deterioration of workers' living standards, which continued until the first half of 1953, and represented the first clear downward trend in the living standard of East Germans since the 1947 hunger crisis.[

Politburo decided to increase work quotas on a compulsory basis by 10% across all state-owned factories: that is, workers now had to produce 10% more for the same wage.[10][11][unreliable source?] Additionally, there were increases in prices for food, health care, and public transportation. Taken together, the work quota and price increases amounted to a 33 per cent monthly wage cut.[12] The work quota increase would take effect on 30 June, Ulbricht's 60th birthday.[citation needed
]

While Ulbricht's response to the consequences of crash Sovietization was to tighten East Germans' belts, many East Germans' response was to simply leave the GDR, a phenomenon known as Republikflucht. In 1951, 160,000 people left; in 1952, 182,000; in the first four months of 1953, a further 122,000 East Germans left for the West, despite the now-mostly sealed border.[13]

The new

Soviet Control Commission in Germany which provided a detailed, devastating account of the East German economic situation.[14] By 2 June, the Soviet Union leadership issued an order "On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR", in which the SED's policy of accelerated construction of socialism was roundly criticised. The huge flight of all professions and backgrounds from East Germany to the West had created "a serious threat to the political stability of the German Democratic Republic." To salvage the situation, it was now necessary to end forced collectivisation and the war on private enterprise. The Five-Year Plan now needed to be changed at the expense of heavy industry and in favour of consumer goods. Political-judicial controls and regimentation had to be relaxed, and coercive measures against the Protestant Church had to cease. In addition, Ulbricht's "cold exercise of power" was denounced. However, there was no explicit demand to reverse the highly unpopular increased work quotas. The Soviet decree was given to SED leaders Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl on 2 June, the day they landed in Moscow. Soviet Premier Georgy Malenkov warned them that changes were essential to avoid a catastrophe in East Germany.[15]

On 9 June, the SED's Politburo met and determined how to respond to the Soviet leadership's instructions. Although most Politburo members felt the announcement of the "New Course" required careful preparation within the party and the population at large, Soviet High Commissioner for Germany

Marxist-Leninist state that claimed to represent its workers: the bourgeoisie and farmers stood to benefit far more from the New Course than the proletariat. The communiqué and its forthright admission of past mistakes shocked and confused many East Germans, both SED members and the wider populace. Disappointment, disbelief and confusion pervaded local party organisations, whose members felt panicked and betrayed. The wider populace viewed the New Course as a sign of weakness on the part of the East German regime.[16]

On 12 June, the next day, 5,000 people participated in a demonstration in front of Brandenburg-Görden Prison in Brandenburg an der Havel.[17]

On 14 June, more confusion followed as an editorial in Neues Deutschland condemned the new work quotas, yet news articles in the same issue praised workers who had exceeded them.[citation needed]

On 15 June, workers at the

Stalinallee "Block 40" site in East Berlin, now with higher hopes about the cancellation of increased work quotas, dispatched a delegation to East German Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl to deliver a petition calling for their revocation. Grotewohl ignored the workers' demands.[17]

Uprising

16 June

Eastern Bloc
USSR
Allied and satellite states
Related organizations
Dissent and opposition
Anti-Soviet partisans
Guerrilla war in the Baltic states
Protests and uprisings
Cold War events
Fall

An article in the trade union paper Tribune restated the necessity of the 10% work quota increases; evidently, the government was unwilling to retreat on the issue, despite the new quotas' widespread unpopularity.

At 9:00 AM on the morning of 16 June 300 workers from the construction sites at "Hospital Friedrichshain" and "Stalinallee Block 40" in East Berlin went on strike and marched on the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) headquarters on Wallstrasse, then to the city centre, hoisting banners and demanding a reinstatement of the old work quotas. Demands from the striking workers broadened to encompass political matters beyond the quotas. Via Alexanderplatz and Unter den Linden, most of the demonstrators moved to the government seat on Leipziger Straße; others went to SED headquarters on Wilhelm-Pieck-Straße. En route, they took over two sound trucks and used them to spread their calls for a general strike and a demonstration, set for the Strausberger Platz at 7:00 AM the next day. In front of the GDR House of Ministries, the rapidly growing crowd demanded to speak to Ulbricht and Grotewohl. Only Heavy Industry Minister Fritz Selbmann and Professor Robert Havemann, president of the GDR Peace Council, emerged from the building. Their attempts to calm the workers were drowned out by the clamour of the crowd, which shouted the pair down.[18]

Meanwhile, the Politburo deliberated, unable to decide what to do. Despite the urgency of the situation, it was only after hours of discussion – under the pressure of the demonstrators, and probably also from Semyonov – that the leadership decided to revoke the work quota increase. The Politburo members decreed that increases in productivity would now be voluntary, and blamed the strikes and demonstrations on how the increases had been implemented, but also on foreign provocateurs. However, by the time an SED functionary reached the House of Ministries to give the workers the news, the protestors' agenda had expanded well beyond the issue of work increases.[19] Later that afternoon, the crowd dispersed and workers returned to their sites. Save for isolated clashes between the Volkspolizei and groups of demonstrators, the rest of the day was calm. The SED leadership was surprised by the depth of resentment and the extent of anti-regime actions. Indeed, the SED leadership was so out of touch that it expected a massive propaganda drive would be sufficient to cope with the emerging crisis. It would clearly not be enough, and Ulbricht probably realised this only a few hours after the suggestion was made.[20] The Soviet authorities were likewise completely taken aback by the widespread protests that followed the demonstrations in East Berlin. Their response was improvised and uncoordinated. Later that evening, Semyonov met with the SED leadership and informed them of his decision to send Soviet troops to Berlin.[21]

Throughout the night of 16 June and early morning of 17 June, news of events in East Berlin spread quickly throughout the GDR via

Soviet Communist Party that this was true.[citation needed
]

Following West Germany's Federal Minister for All-German Questions Jakob Kaiser's admonition in a late night broadcast to East Germans to shy away from provocations, RIAS, starting with its 11 PM news broadcast, and from then on in hourly broadcasts, repeated the workers' demand to continue the strike the next day, calling specifically for all East Berliners to participate in a demonstration at 7:00 AM on the 17th at Strausberger Platz.[17]

17 June

IS-2 tank
in Leipzig on 17 June

East Berlin

Following Semyonov's decision, Soviet troops entered the environs of East Berlin in the early morning of 17 June. Meanwhile, crowds of workers began to gather at Strausberger Platz and other public places, and began marching towards the city centre. En route, they encountered GDR security forces – regular and Kasernierte Volkspolizei ('Barracked People's Police', KVP) units – who, apparently lacking instructions, did not initially intervene. Along with SED and FDJ functionaries, police officials tried – and mostly failed – to convince the marchers to return to their homes and workplaces. Where police attempted to halt or disperse the crowds, they rapidly ended up on the defensive. As the demonstrators drew in ever-greater numbers, a feeling of solidarity swept over them. Loudspeaker cars and bicycles provided communications between the different columns of marchers from the outer districts as, all morning, they converged on the city centre. On improvised banners and posters, the demonstrators again demanded the reinstatement of the old work quotas, but also price decreases, the release of fellow protestors arrested the day before, even free and fair all-German elections. Slogans like "down with the government!" and "butter, not arms" were also visible. Party posters and statues – especially those depicting SED and Soviet leaders – were burned or defaced.[citation needed]

By 9:00 AM, 25,000 people had gathered in front of the House of Ministries, and tens of thousands more were en route to Leipziger Strasse or in

insurgents". Fighting between the Soviet Army
(and later GDR police) and the demonstrators persisted into the afternoon and night – with, in some cases, tanks and troops firing directly into the crowds. Executions, most prominently of West Berlin worker Willi Gottling, and mass arrests followed.

Overnight, the Soviets and the Stasi started to arrest hundreds of people. Ultimately, up to 10,000 people were detained and at least 32, probably as many as 40, were executed, including Soviet Army soldiers who refused to obey orders.[23] With the SED leadership effectively paralysed at the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst, control of East Berlin passed to the Soviets there.[21]

Detlev-Rohwedder-Haus in Berlin, known as the House of Ministries in 1953.

Outside of East Berlin

Each of East Germany's 24 cities with a population greater than 50,000 experienced upheavals, as did approximately 80% of the towns with populations between 10,000 and 50,000. Approximately 339,000 people participated in the 129 demonstrations that took place outside of Berlin; over 225,000 launched strikes in 332 factories. The main centres of protest included the industrial region around Halle, Merseburg, and Bitterfeld, as well as middle-size towns like Jena, Görlitz, and Brandenburg. No more than 25,000 people participated in strikes and demonstrations in Leipzig, but there were 32,000 in Magdeburg, 43,000 in Dresden, 53,000 in Potsdam – and in Halle, close to 100,000.[citation needed]

At first, such demonstrations were relatively peaceful, but as increasing numbers began to participate, they became more violent. Looting, particularly of SED-owned shops, became a regular occurrence; there was some arson, and many SED functionaries were beaten up later in the day. In some towns, the jails were seized by demonstrators, who demanded the release of certain political prisoners.[24] In Görlitz a group of 30,000 people destroyed the communist party headquarters, the offices of the secret police and the prison, while in Magdeburg the party headquarters and prison were set on fire.[25] When the Soviet Army intervened in these places outside of East Berlin, they seemed more restrained and more passive; some Soviet soldiers even displayed friendly attitudes towards demonstrators.[21]

In the countryside, meanwhile, protests took place in over 200 villages. However, many East German farmers did not take collective action against the regime: the most common expression of protest in rural areas was for farmers to leave and/or dissolve recently formed collective farms and resume farming on their own.[26]

Although the demands made by protesters could be political – e.g. the dissolution of the East German government and organisation of free elections – they were often simply of a local and economic character. They were about issues like bread shortages, unpopular night shifts, even the number of toilets in the workplace and the fact that tea was being served in rusty urns.[27] Also expressed were widely held grievances against the intelligentsia, who were perceived to enjoy 'unfair privileges', such as special deliveries of basic foodstuffs and other commodities.[28]

Others, particularly workers, demanded the restoration of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in East Germany. Among former social democrats, there existed enormous bitterness against Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl, ex-leader of the East German SPD, whom they believed had "betrayed the SPD" by leading its merger with the rival German Communist Party to form the ruling SED in 1946. The Soviet Military Administration (SVAG) had pressured Grotewohl into the merger to protect communist rule in East Germany after the surprisingly poor performance of communist parties in elections in Hungary and Austria in November 1945. Grotewohl was "rewarded" with the post of Prime Minister, but within a few years the SED had significantly reduced his powers and turned the office into a mostly ceremonial role. Many East German social democrats viewed Grotewohl as a traitor who should now "have his neck wrung."[29]

Aftermath

Widespread protests and demonstrations continued for days after 17 June and, according to the GDR security service, the situation had only calmed down 24 June.

Soviet Forces in East Germany, claimed a total casualty figure of 209 by 18 June,[31] Newer estimates claim a death toll of at least 125 by the end of the uprising.[32]

Many workers lost faith in East Germany's

Karl-Marx-Stadt, hundreds of SED members, many of whom had spent decades in the labour movement, left the party. At the Textima plant in Altenberg, 450 SED members had left the party by 7 July – most of them workers, many of whom had much experience in the labour movement. There was also a widespread refusal by workers to pay their trade union dues: they ceased to financially support and confer legitimacy upon the party.[33]

Ulbricht survives

By the time the Politburo met on 8 July, it seemed that Ulbricht's time as party leader was coming to an end. Minister of State Security Wilhelm Zaisser conceded that the entire Politburo was responsible for the "accelerated construction of socialism" and its disastrous fallout, but added that leaving Ulbricht as leader "would be opposed [as] catastrophic for the New Course." By the end of the meeting, just two Politburo members supported Ulbricht's continued leadership: Free German Youth League chief Erich Honecker and Party Control Commission Chairman Hermann Matern. Ulbricht only managed to forestall a decision with a promise to make a statement at the forthcoming 15th SED CC Plenum, scheduled later that month.[34]

The leading Soviet officials in East Berlin – Semyonov,

inter alia – that Ulbricht's position as General Secretary of the SED should be terminated, and that the party would move towards collective leadership, in addition to other far-reaching structural political changes in East Berlin.[35] However, the situation in Moscow dramatically changed just two days later, on 26 June, when Soviet Security Chief Lavrentiy Beria was arrested. On 2 July, when a commission met there to discuss proposals for reform in East Germany, the decision was made to shelve the far-reaching and politically sensitive changes. The Soviet leadership, preoccupied with the Beria affair and its internal implications, became disinclined to rock the East German boat and more inclined to the status quo: maintaining power in East Germany by supporting an experienced, reliable, albeit Stalinist and unpopular, ruler.[citation needed
]

In late July, Ulbricht, ever more certain of his continued backing in Moscow, expelled his main opponents, Zaisser, Hernstadt and Ackermann, from the Politburo, further strengthening his position.[36]

By late August, Moscow had committed to shoring up the existing East German regime with Ulbricht in charge. By then, the situation in East Germany had stabilised thanks to new economic measures implemented by Moscow and East Berlin, and the dropping of major political changes in the GDR from the agenda. Substantial economic and financial aid was to flow into East Germany and reparation payments were to cease by the end of the year. Additional

prisoners of war would be freed and Moscow's mission in East Berlin was elevated to the status of embassy. Ultimately, Ulbricht's position was firmly secured once more.[37]

Impact on the long-term development of the GDR

According to historian Corey Ross, the SED party leadership derived two key lessons from 17 June.

The first was its increased concern over

Combat Groups of the Working Class was established as an on-the-spot force to prevent or quell any signs of unrest, and the Stasi was expanded and improved upon to swiftly deal with any signs of organised protest in the future.[citation needed
]

The second was that a heavy-handed venture such as the "accelerated construction of socialism" could never again be embarked upon. Ulbricht was haunted throughout the 1950s by the specter of another uprising, and the government never again attempted to introduce arbitrary, blanket work quota increases like those of May and June 1953. The "New Course" policies – increased investment in consumer goods, housing and price and travel subventions – led to an improvement in living standards overall but failed to achieve an immediate end to the discontent that had been growing over the past year.[citation needed]

Protestors, meanwhile, learned that little could be gained from open confrontation – to act openly against the SED regime in large numbers was to be left to their own devices by the West against repression from the East German police and Soviet military.[38]

Legacy

Deutsche Bundespost Berlin postage stamp
old town of Dresden
.

In memory of the 1953 East German uprising, West Germany established the

Day of German Unity as an annual national holiday on 17 June. Upon German reunification in October 1990, the holiday was moved to 3 October, the date of formal reunification. The extension of the Unter den Linden boulevard to the west of the Brandenburg Gate, called Charlottenburger Chaussee, was renamed Straße des 17. Juni ("17 June Street") following the 1953 rebellion.[citation needed
]

The uprising is commemorated in "Die Lösung", a poem by Bertolt Brecht. Other prominent GDR authors who dealt with the uprising include Stefan Heym (Fünf Tage im Juni / "Five Days in June", Munich 1974) and Heiner Müller (Wolokolamsker Chaussee III: Das Duell / "Volokolamsk Highway III: The Duel", 1985/86).[citation needed]

West German band Alphaville mention "the seventeenth of June", without referencing the year, in their 1984 song "Summer in Berlin", from their Forever Young album. When the compilation album Alphaville Amiga Compilation was assembled for release in East Germany in 1988, the song "Summer in Berlin" was submitted for inclusion, but rejected "for political reasons."[citation needed]

The 1966

Shakespeare's Coriolanus against the background of the events of 1953.[39]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "17. Juni 1953 — Chronik — Projektsite Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, DeutschlandRadio, Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung".
  2. ^ Dale, Gareth (2005). Popular Protest in East Germany. Routledge. p. 9.
  3. ^ Jones, Timothy (2017). "Berlin marks East German uprising of 1953". DW News.
  4. ^ Alison Smale (17 June 2013). "60 Years Later, Germany Recalls Its Anti-Soviet Revolt". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 June 2013.
  5. ^ Dale, Gareth. "East German rising 17 June 1953". academia.edu. Jacobin Magazine. Retrieved 18 June 2017.
  6. ^ Kopstein, 411
  7. ^ Project
  8. ^ a b c Ross, 54
  9. ^ Kopstein, 411
  10. ^ Hutchinson, 368
  11. ^ The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback
  12. ^ Ross, 55
  13. ^ Ostermann, 3
  14. ^ Richter, 677
  15. ^ Ostermann, 18
  16. ^ a b Ostermann, 20
  17. ^ a b c Ostermann, 163
  18. ^ Ostermann, 162
  19. ^ Ostermann, 165
  20. ^ Ostermann, 166
  21. ^ a b c Ostermann, 169
  22. ^ a b Ostermann, 164
  23. ^ "Of Flowers and Murder". Discover Magazine. 1 February 1999. Retrieved 22 February 2024.
  24. ^ Hutchinson, 369
  25. ^ Applebaum, Anne (2012). Iron Curtain: The crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–1956. p. 470.
  26. ^ Port, 124
  27. ^ Pritchard, 211
  28. ^ Ross, 56
  29. ^ Pritchard, 212
  30. ^ Ostermann, 170
  31. ^ Ostermann 2001, p. 215.
  32. ^ Ostermann 2001, p. 214.
  33. ^ Pritchard, 214
  34. ^ Ostermann, 168
  35. ^ Ostermann, 170–171
  36. ^ Ostermann, 179
  37. ^ Ostermann, 180
  38. ^ Ross, 57–59
  39. ^ Clive Barnes (23 July 1970). "Stage: Grass on Brecht". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 May 2020.

Bibliography

Further reading

External links

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