Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. (August 2011) |
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis | |||||||
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Part of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War | |||||||
Taiwan Strait | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Republic of China United States | People's Republic of China | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai Ye Fei Xu Xiangqian | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
192,000 Naval and air support | 215,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
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Second Taiwan Strait Crisis | |
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Hanyu Pinyin | bā èr sān pào zhàn[4] |
Bopomofo | ㄅㄚ ㄦˋ ㄙㄢ ㄆㄠˋ ㄓㄢˋ |
Wade–Giles | Pa1-erh4-san1 P'ao4-chan4 |
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was a conflict between the
Then U.S. Secretary of State
Overview
The conflict was a continuation of the
On August 24 and 25, 1958 Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist forces clashed in the vicinity of Dongding Island, which the Nationalist troops controlled. The action was seen as an attempt by the communists to land on the island. This was the only naval and amphibious landing action during the crisis. The communist forces were repelled from taking the island.[6][7][8][9] The action has also been seen as an attempt to draw Nationalist forces away from other areas.[10]
{…}on the 24th two night naval engagements took place near Quemoy. The clashes resulted from a Chinese Communist attempt at landing on the small island of Tung-Ting in the Quemoy complex. The first attack involved four Chinese Communist gunboats and six small landing craft while the second involved five Chinese Communist gunboats and thirty motorized junks. According to the GRC Ministry of National Defense, several enemy ships were sunk and the attack was driven off by seven Chinese Nationalist Patrol craft. The GRC lost one LSM (landing craft, mechanized) and had one LST (landing ship, tank) damaged. Prior to September 3, when they were advised of U. S. escort plans, the Nationalists made five attempts to land an LST with troop replacements and several ships. These efforts were turned back by Chinese Communist PT boats and artillery fire.[7]
In the days after shelling began, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined to defend the islands even if the defense necessitated a nuclear response.[5] Throughout the following weeks as the crisis continued to unfold, contingency plans were developed as it became clear that the critical issue was supplying Kinmen. In a meeting on September 2, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other top officials to formulate an ongoing American strategy. The group determined that the use of nuclear weapons would ultimately be necessary for the defense of Kinmen, but that the United States should initially limit itself to using conventional forces.[5] Throughout the crisis, coordination between American policymakers and military commanders was hampered by communication delays of days at a time,[11] but by September American officials had authorized naval escorts to accompany ROC convoys up to 3 miles off Kinmen and begun to supply the ROC with advanced weapons. The Chinese Communists considered the escorts a violation of the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China. On September 19, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a letter warning that the American actions threatened world war, claiming that the Soviet Union would be forced to honor its commitments to the territorial integrity of Communist China. The letter was rejected by the American government.[5]
The
By September 11, the artillery crisis was overall stabilized (even though numerous rounds of artillery would still be fired by Communist China almost daily for the next two months or so) because U.S. Navy warships started to escort ROC convoys to Kinmen, breaking the previous artillery blockade due to constant PRC artillery shells that prevented any air or naval relief for Kinmen. The PRC did not want to risk war with the United States so they refrained from firing on any convoys if they observed U.S. Navy ships. The biggest issues in the crisis after September 11 were the air battles and the success or failure of the naval convoys relieving the Kinmen garrison.[3]
Landing units with LVTs from the ROC Marine Corps spent the next few months delivering supplies to the Kinmen Islands, starting from September 10. Despite continued artillery fire from the PRC, the Marines were able to keep the islands supplied. For this action, the ROC Marines were later awarded a presidential banner from Chiang Kai-shek.[13]
Also, under a secret effort called "Operation Black Magic", the U.S. Navy modified some of the
The US Army's contribution reinforced the strategic
Twelve long-range 203 mm (8.0 in)
Soon, the Soviet Union dispatched its
On September 24, 1958, the Sidewinder missile was used for the first time in
Soon, the People's Republic of China was faced with a stalemate, as the PLA's artillerymen had run out of artillery shells. The Communist Chinese government announced a unilateral ceasefire on October 6, 1958. However, on October 20 the PLA resumed artillery fire on Kinmen because a U.S. Navy warship had breached the PRC-declared 3 nautical miles exclusive zone from the coast of China that they claimed was a stipulation for their unilateral ceasefire agreement. Another more likely reason for the resumption of the PRC artillery bombardment was U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had arrived in
U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air Group 11 stationed at
Aftermath
Intermittently shelling until 1979
"On October 25, [the Chinese Communists] … declared that they would not fire on even-numbered days … if there were no American escort." This allowed Taiwan to resupply their military units on those islands on those days.
The crisis subsided and returned to status quo ante bellum on December 2 when the U.S. Navy secretly and quietly removed their extra warships from the Taiwan Strait and the ROC Navy resumed unilateral combat and escort duties.[21]
On August 23, 2019, the sixty-first anniversary of the beginning of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Tsai Ing-wen visited the Taiwushan martyrs' shrine (太武山忠烈祠) where she placed flowers and offered incense.[22]
During the crisis, American leadership risked the alienation of the American public, relations with key allies such as France and Japan, and even nuclear war. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that while the status quo result was a victory, the American government could not permit such a situation to arise again. Other than the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 to 1996 there has been no crisis involving the United States since 1958 in the Taiwan Strait.[23]
See also
- Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
- List of battles over Kinmen
- Chinese Civil War
- Republic of China Armed Forces
- Kinmen knife
- Dongding Island
References
Citations
- ^ "Anniversaire de la bataille de Kinmen : l'Unité nationale au cœur de la défense de Taiwan, selon Tsai Ing-wen". 24 August 2021. Archived from the original on 26 August 2021. Retrieved 26 August 2021.
- ^ Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and the West by Shih-Shan Henry Tsai. Page 189. Published 2009
- ^ a b c d "The Meaning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis". www.airforcemag.com. Archived from the original on 27 September 2021. Retrieved 26 September 2021.
- ^ 教育部重編國語辭典修訂本 (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
字詞 【八二三炮戰】 注音 ㄅㄚ ㄦˋ ㄙㄢ ㄆㄠˋ ㄓㄢˋ 漢語拼音 bā èr sān pào zhàn
- ^ a b c d M.H. Halperin (December 1966). The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History. Daniel Ellsberg. pp. i–xvii.
- ^ TAIWAN STRAITS. CIA. 27 August 1958.
Nationalists{...}claim to have driven off "invasion fleet" headed for Tungting Island.
- ^ a b The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis_ A Documented History. 1975.
- ^ DTIC ADA234362: Use of Naval Force in Crises: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction. Volume 2. December 1988.
- ^ 1958 Awake. 8 October 1958.
- ^ 八二三砲戰60週年(四)824海戰 東碇島曾開火. 22 August 2018. Archived from the original on 27 August 2019. Retrieved 27 August 2019.
- ^ Halperin, M. H. (December 1966). The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History. Daniel Ellsberg. p. 250.
- ISBN 978-1-78096-313-6.
- ^ Hao-Chang, Yu (November 1966). "Republic of China Marine Corps". Marine Corps Gazette. Marine Corps Association.
- ^ Halperin, M. H. (December 1966). The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History. p. 241.
- ^ https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4900.html Archived 1 November 2020 at the Wayback Machine . Page 471. Retrieved 26 September 2021
- ^ Sidewinder AIM-9. US Naval Academy 2012. Archived from the original on 2 July 2018. Retrieved 21 November 2017.
- ^ Halperin, Morton H. (January 1966). "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History". www.rand.org. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2021.
- ^ SSgt. B Tharp, VMF(AW)531
- Wikidata Q107251229..
- ^ "Taiwan in Time: Greeting by artillery fire – Taipei Times". www.taipeitimes.com. 16 June 2019. Archived from the original on 28 September 2021. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
- ^ Halperin, Morton H. (December 1996). "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, A Documented History". RAND Corporation. p. 539. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 27 September 2021.
- ^ 陳冠霖 (24 August 2019). 823祭拜先烈 總統蔡英文:勿忘823精神. Kinmen Daily News (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Archived from the original on 21 September 2019. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
- ^ Halperin, M.H. (December 1966). The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History. Daniel Ellsberg. p. 505.
Sources
- Chen Jian. (2001). Mao's China and the Cold War – Beijing and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. The University of North Carolina Press.
- www
.generals .dk /general /Qiu _Qing-quan / _ /China .html - Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C. Archived 6 July 2008 at the Wayback Machine
- US Naval War College
- web
.archive .org /web /20090326011824 /http: //cgsc .leavenworth .army .mil /carl /download /csipubs /bjorge _huai .pdf
Further reading
- Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0-471-98677-1
- Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1290-1
- Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6841-1
- Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. ISBN 0-415-36581-3
- Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0-275-98888-0
- Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
- Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3146-9
- Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-530609-0
- Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40785-0
- Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13564-5
- Watry, David M. Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014.
External links
- Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958
- Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise to Beijing During the 1958 Crisis[permanent dead link]
- First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Quemoy and Matsu Islands of Taiwan from the Cold War Museum
- The Communist Threat in the Taiwan Area Contemporary US government reaction