1966 Syrian coup d'état
| 1966 Syrian coup d'état | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Syrian Arab Army, who launched the coup | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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 Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba'ath Party | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Munif al-Razzaz Sect. Gen. of the National Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party Salah al-Din al-BitarPrime Minister of Syria Amin al-HafizPresident of Syria Muhammad UmranMinister of Defence Shibli al-AysamiVice President of Syria |
Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas Syrian Army commander | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 400 killed[1] | |||||||
The 1966 Syrian coup d'état refers to events between 21 and 23 February during which the government of the Syrian Arab Republic was overthrown and replaced. The ruling National Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party were removed from power by a union of the party's Military Committee and the Regional Command, under the leadership of Salah Jadid.[2]
The coup was precipitated by a heightening in the power struggle between the party's old guard, represented by
Ba'athist military committee's seizure of power and subsequent purges marked the total ideological transformation of the
Background
Consolidation of power
| Part of a series on |
| Ba'athism |
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After the success of the 1963 Syrian coup d'état, officially the 8th of March Revolution, a power struggle erupted between the Nasserites in the National Council for the Revolutionary Command and the Ba'ath Party.[3] The Nasserites sought to reestablish the United Arab Republic, the former federation encompassing Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, on Gamal Abdel Nasser's terms, but the Ba'athists were skeptical of a new union with Nasser and wanted a loose federation where the Ba'ath Party could rule Syria alone without interference.[3] The Nasserites mobilised large street demonstrations in favour of a union.[4] It took time before the Ba'ath Party knew how to respond to the issue, since the majority of Syrian Arab Nationalists were not adherents to Ba'athism, but of Nasserism and Nasser in general.[4]
Instead of trying to win the support of the populace, the Ba'athists moved to consolidate their control over the
The cost of clamping down on the protests was a loss of legitimacy, and the emergence of
The majority of
Conflict with the Aflaqists
Cohesive internal unity had all but collapsed after the 1963 seizure of power;
In the aftermath of the
Syrian Ba'ath party's left-wing argued that the
Power struggle
Before the crushing of the riots of 1964, a power struggle started within the Military Committee between
After Umran's downfall, the National Command and the Military Committee continued their respective struggle for control of the Ba'ath Party.[15] While the National Command invoked party rules and regulations against the Military Committee, it was clear from the beginning that the initiative lay with the Military Committee.[15] The reason for the Military Committee's success was its alliance with the Regionalists, a group of branches which had not adhered to Aflaq's 1958 orders to dissolve the Syrian Regional Branch.[15] The Regionalists disliked Aflaq and opposed his leadership.[15] Assad called the Regionalists the "true cells of the party".[15]
The power contest between the allied Military Committee and the Regionalists against the National Command was fought out within the party structure. However, the Military Committee and the Regionalists managed to turn the party structure on its head.
The coup
Arrangements devised in 1963 between Aflaq and the Military Committee led to a very close mutual involvement of the military and civilian sectors of the regime, so that by the end of 1965 the politics of the Syrian army had become almost identical to the politics of the Ba'th Party.
The coup began on 21 February 1966 when Umran tested his authority as Minister of Defence by ordering the transfer of three key Jadid supporters; Major-General
Aftermath
Neo-Ba'athist takeover of the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party
1966 Syrian coup d'état marked the total ideological transformation of the Ba'ath party's Syrian regional branch into a
Avraham Ben-Tzur asserted that the Ba'athist ideology preached in Syria after the coup should be referred to as
The new government
Immediately after the coup, officers loyal to Umran and the Aflaqites were purged from the armed forces, being imprisoned alongside Umran at
Jadid's government has been referred to as Syria's most radical government in history.
Jadid appointed
Salah Jadid's reign was characterized by extremely brutal repression, state terror, intensification of totalitarian measures, and imposition of hardline Marxist policies.[32][33] The properties of traders, local businessmen and land owners were confiscated by Jadid's radical leftist regime, while the Syrian military forces became thoroughly politicized with neo-Ba'athist officers.[32] In the sphere of foreign policy, the neo-Ba'athist government established close ties with the Soviet Union and began receiving large amounts of weaponry from the Soviet military.[34][32]
Counter-coup attempt
Druze officer
Intra-Ba'athist split
In picture, from left to right Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Michel Aflaq
The ousting of Aflaq, Bitar, and the National Command became the deepest schism in the Ba'ath movement's history.
Following the exile of the National Command, some of its members, including Hafiz, convened the 9th Ba'ath National Congress (to differentiate it from the Syrian "9th National Congress") and elected a new National Command, with Aflaq, who did not attend the congress, as the National Command's Secretary General.[41] For those like Bitar and Razzaz, the exile from Syria was too hard, and they left the party.[41] Aflaq moved to Brazil, remaining there till 1968.[41]
Party-to-party relations
When the National Command was toppled in 1966, the Iraqi Regional Branch remained, at least verbally, supportive of the "legitimate leadership" of Aflaq.
From the beginning, the Damascus government began an overwhelmingly anti-Iraqi Ba'athist propaganda campaign, to which their counterparts in Baghdad responded.[44] However, the Iraqi Ba'athists helped Assad, who at the 4th Regional Congress of the Syrian Regional Branch called for the reunification of the Ba'ath Party in an attempt to seize power from Jadid.[47] It was reported that Assad promised the Iraqis to recognize Aflaq's historical leadership.[47] Iraq's foreign minister Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly even had his own personal office in the Syrian Ministry of Defence, which Assad headed.[47] However, this should not be misconstrued, as the Iraqi Regional Branch was Arab nationalist in name only, and was in fact Iraqi nationalist.[48]
The Syrian Regional Branch began denouncing Aflaq as a "thief". They claimed that he had stolen the Ba'athist ideology from Zaki al-Arsuzi and proclaimed it as his own,[49] with Assad hailing Arsuzi as the principal founder of Ba'athist thought.[50] The Iraqi Regional Branch, however, still proclaimed Aflaq as the founder of Ba'athism.[50] Assad has referred to Arsuzi as the "greatest Syrian of his day" and claimed him to be the "first to conceive of the Ba'ath as a political movement."[51] Bitar was sentenced to death "in absentia" in 1969,[52][53] and Aflaq was condemned to death in absentia in 1971 by Assad's government.[54] The Syrian Regional Branch erected a statue in Arsuzi's honour not long after the 1966 coup.[55] Nevertheless, the majority of Ba'ath followers outside Syria still view Aflaq, not Arsuzi, as the principal founder of Ba'athism.[56]
When the Iraqi Regional Branch seized power, the Syrian Regional Branch responded by not mentioning in the press release that a Ba'ath organisation had taken power in Iraq.[57] For instance, it mentioned that Bakr had been appointed president, but did not mention his party's affiliation, and instead referred to the incident as a military coup.[57] While the Syrian Ba'ath denied giving any legitimacy to Iraqi Ba'ath, the Iraqi Ba'ath were more conciliatory.[58] For instance, Bakr stated "They are Ba'athists, we are Ba'athists" shortly after the Iraqi Regional Branch seized power.[58] Foreign Minister Shaykli stated shortly after that "there is nothing preventing co-operation between us [meaning Iraq and Syria]".[58] The anti-Iraq propaganda reached new heights within Syria at the same time that Assad was strengthening his position within the party and state.[58] When Jadid was toppled by Assad during the Corrective Movement in 1970, it did not signal a change in attitudes, and the first joint communique of the Syrian-dominated National Command and the Syrian Regional Command referred to the Iraqi Ba'ath as a "rightist clique".[59]
See also
References
Notes
- ^ a b Mullenbach, Mark (ed.). "Syria (1946–present)". The Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. University of Central Arkansas. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
- ^ a b c Rabinovich 1972.
- ^ a b Hinnebusch 2001, p. 44.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 44–45.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Hinnebusch 2001, p. 45.
- S2CID 144922816.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Hinnebusch 2001, p. 46.
- ^ Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 46–47.
- ^ a b c d e f Hinnebusch 2001, p. 47.
- ^ Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 47–48.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-115-7.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Seale 1990, p. 96.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 95.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 96–97.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 97.
- ^ a b c d e f g Seale 1990, p. 99.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 99–100.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 100.
- ^ a b c d e f g Seale 1990, p. 101.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 102.
- S2CID 159345006.
- S2CID 159345006.
- ISBN 978-1-4039-8273-5.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 88.
- ^ a b c Pipes 1992, p. 158.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 103.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 104.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 104–105.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 105.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 106.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 107.
- ^ ISBN 0-8103-1515-7.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-115-7.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-115-7.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-797-5.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-797-5.
- ISBN 978-1-78453-797-5.
- ^ a b Rabinovich 1972, pp. 204–205.
- ^ a b c Rabinovich 1972, p. 205.
- ^ a b Rabinovich 1972, pp. 205–206.
- ^ a b c Dishon 1973, p. 735.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 34.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 15.
- ^ a b Kienle 1991, p. 31.
- ^ a b c Kienle 1991, p. 35.
- ^ Moubayed 2006, p. 347.
- ^ a b c Kienle 1991, p. 37.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 38.
- ^ Curtis 1971, p. 138.
- ^ a b Sluglett 2001, p. 147.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 27.
- ISBN 0-520-06976-5.
- ISBN 0-929692-69-1.
- ^ Tucker 2010, p. 30.
- ^ Helms 1984, p. 89.
- ^ Ayubi 1996, p. 140.
- ^ a b Kienle 1991, p. 39.
- ^ a b c d Kienle 1991, p. 40.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 42.
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- Curtis, Michel (1971). People and Politics in the Middle East. ISBN 978-0-87855-500-0.
- Dishon, Daniel, ed. (1973). Middle East Record 1968. Vol. 4. ISBN 0-470-21611-5.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond (2001). Syria: Revolution from Above (1st ed.). ISBN 978-0-415-26779-3.
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