Ion Antonescu
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Michael I | |||||||||||
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Deputy | Horia Sima (1940–1941) Mihai Antonescu (1941–1944) | ||||||||||
Preceded by | Ion Gigurtu | ||||||||||
Succeeded by | Constantin Sănătescu | ||||||||||
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Carol II | |||||||||||
Preceded by | Constantin Lăzărescu | ||||||||||
Succeeded by | Nicolae Samsonovici | ||||||||||
Personal details | |||||||||||
Born | [1] Pitești, Argeș County, Kingdom of Romania | 14 June 1882||||||||||
Died | 1 June 1946 Jilava, Ilfov County, Kingdom of Romania | (aged 63)||||||||||
Cause of death | Execution by firing squad | ||||||||||
Political party | None[a] | ||||||||||
Spouse | |||||||||||
Profession | Soldier | ||||||||||
Known for | Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces | ||||||||||
Battles/wars | See list
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Awards | |||||||||||
Criminal conviction | |||||||||||
Criminal status | Romani people | ||||||||||
a. ^ Formally allied with the Iron Guard (1940–41) | |||||||||||
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Fascism in Romania |
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Ion Antonescu (
A
An atypical figure among
Aerial attacks on Romania by the Allies occurred in 1944 and Romanian troops suffered heavy casualties on the Eastern Front, prompting Antonescu to open peace negotiations with the Allies, ending with inconclusive results. On 23 August 1944, the king Michael I led a coup d'état against Antonescu, who was arrested; after the war he was convicted of war crimes, and executed in June 1946. His involvement in the Holocaust was officially reasserted and condemned following the 2003 Wiesel Commission report.
Biography
Early life and career
Born in the town of
According to one account, Ion Antonescu was briefly a classmate of Wilhelm Filderman, the future Romanian Jewish community activist whose interventions with Conducător Antonescu helped save a number of his coreligionists.[5] After graduation, in 1904, Antonescu joined the Romanian Army with the rank of Second Lieutenant. He spent the following two years attending courses at the Special Cavalry Section in Târgoviște.[1] Reportedly, Antonescu was a zealous and goal-setting student, upset by the slow pace of promotions, and compensated for his diminutive stature through toughness.[6] In time, the reputation of being a tough and ruthless commander, together with his reddish hair, earned him the nickname Câinele Roșu ("The Red Dog").[6] Antonescu also developed a reputation for questioning his commanders and for appealing over their heads whenever he felt they were wrong.[6]
During the repression of the
World War I
After 1916, when Romania entered World War I on the Allied side, Ion Antonescu acted as chief of staff for General Constantin Prezan.[1] When enemy troops crossed the mountains from Transylvania into Wallachia, Antonescu was ordered to design a defense plan for Bucharest.[1]
The Romanian royal court, army, and administration were subsequently forced to retreat into Moldavia. Antonescu took part in an important decision involving defensive efforts, an unusual promotion which probably stoked his ambitions.[6] In December, as Prezan became the Chief of the General Staff, Antonescu, who was by now a major, was named the head of operations, being involved in the defence of Moldavia. He contributed to the tactics used during the Battle of Mărășești (July–August 1917), when Romanians under General Eremia Grigorescu managed to stop the advance of German forces under the command of Field Marshal August von Mackensen.[8] Being described as "a talented if prickly individual",[9] Antonescu lived in Prezan's proximity for the remainder of the war and influenced his decisions.[10] Such was the influence of Antonescu on General Prezan that General Alexandru Averescu used the formula "Prezan (Antonescu)" in his memoirs to denote Prezan's plans and actions.[11]
That autumn, Romania's main ally, the Russian Provisional Government, left the conflict. Its successor, Bolshevik Russia, made peace with the Central Powers, leaving Romania the only enemy of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. In these conditions, the Romanian government made its own peace treaty with the Central Powers. Romania broke the treaty later in the year, on the grounds that King Ferdinand I had not signed it. During the interval, Antonescu, who viewed the separate peace as "the most rational solution," was assigned command over a cavalry regiment.[10] The renewed offensive played a part in ensuring the union of Transylvania with Romania. After the war, Antonescu's merits as an operations officer were noticed by, among others, politician Ion G. Duca, who wrote that "his [Antonescu's] intelligence, skill and activity, brought credit on himself and invaluable service to the country."[10] Another event occurring late in the war is also credited with having played a major part in Antonescu's life: in 1918, Crown Prince Carol (the future King Carol II) left his army posting to marry a commoner. This outraged Antonescu, who developed enduring contempt for the future king.[6]
Diplomatic assignments and General Staff positions
Lieutenant Colonel Ion Antonescu retained his visibility in the public eye during the interwar period. He participated in the political campaign to earn recognition at the
He became attache in Paris in 1922. He negotiated a credit worth 100 million French francs to purchase French weaponry.
After returning to Romania in 1926, Antonescu resumed his teaching in Sibiu, and, in the autumn of 1928, became Secretary-General of the
As Chief of Staff, Antonescu reportedly had his first confrontation with the political class and the monarch. His projects for weapon modernization were questioned by Defense Minister
Defense portfolio and the Codreanu trials
In late 1937, after the
The Goga cabinet ended when the tentative rapprochement between Goga and Codreanu[25] prompted Carol to overthrow the democratic system and proclaim his own authoritarian regime (see 1938 Constitution of Romania, National Renaissance Front). The deposed Premier died in 1938, while Antonescu remained a close friend of his widow, Veturia Goga.[26] By that time, revising his earlier stance, Antonescu had also built a close relationship with Codreanu, and was even said to have become his confidant.[27][28] On Carol's request, he had earlier asked the Guard's leader to consider an alliance with the king, which Codreanu promptly refused in favour of negotiations with Goga, coupled with claims that he was not interested in political battles, an attitude supposedly induced by Antonescu himself.[29]
Soon afterward, Călinescu, acting on indications from the monarch, arrested Codreanu and prosecuted him in two successive trials. Antonescu, whose mandate of Defense Minister had been prolonged under the premiership of
Carol's regime slowly dissolved into crisis, a dissolution accelerated after the start of
Rise to power
Romania's elite had been intensely Francophile ever since Romania had won its independence in the 19th century, indeed so Francophile that the defeat of France in June 1940 had the effect of discrediting the entire elite.[40] Antonescu's internment ended in August, during which interval, under Axis pressure, Romania had ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria (see Treaty of Craiova) and Northern Transylvania to Hungary (see Second Vienna Award). The latter grant caused consternation among large sections of Romania's population, causing Carol's popularity to fall to a record low and provoking large-scale protests in Bucharest, the capital. These movements were organized competitively by the pro-Allied PNȚ, headed by Iuliu Maniu, and the pro-Nazi Iron Guard.[6] The latter group had been revived under the leadership of Horia Sima, and was organizing a coup d'état.[41] In this troubled context, Antonescu simply left his assigned residence. He may have been secretly helped in this by German intercession,[42] but was more directly aided to escape by socialite Alice Sturdza, who was acting on Maniu's request.[43] Antonescu subsequently met with Maniu in Ploiești, where they discussed how best to manage the political situation.[6][43][44] While these negotiations were carried out, the monarch himself was being advised by his entourage to recover legitimacy by governing in tandem with the increasingly popular Antonescu, while creating a new political majority from the existing forces.[6][43] On 2 September 1940, Valer Pop, a courtier and an important member of the camarilla, first advised Carol to appoint Antonescu as Prime Minister as the solution to the crisis.[45] Pop's reasons for advising Carol to appoint Antonescu as Prime Minister were partly because Antonescu, who was known to be friendly with the Iron Guard and who had been imprisoned under Carol, was believed to have enough of an oppositional background to Carol's regime to appease the public and partly because Pop knew that Antonescu, for all his Legionary sympathies, was a member of the elite and believed he would never turn against it. When Carol proved reluctant to make Antonescu Prime Minister, Pop visited the German legation to meet with Fabricius on the night of 4 September 1940 to ask that the German minister phone Carol to tell him that the Reich wanted Antonescu as Prime Minister, and Fabricius promptly did just that.[46] Carol and Antonescu accepted the proposal, Antonescu being ordered to approach political party leaders Maniu of the PNȚ and Dinu Brătianu of the PNL.[6][43][47] They all called for Carol's abdication as a preliminary measure,[6][43][48] while Sima, another leader sought after for negotiations, could not be found in time to express his opinion.[43] Antonescu partly complied with the request but also asked Carol to bestow upon him the reserve powers for Romanian heads of state.[6][49] Carol yielded and, on 5 September 1940, the general became Prime Minister, and Carol transferred most of his dictatorial powers to him.[6][50] The latter's first measure was to curtail potential resistance within the Army by relieving Bucharest Garrison chief Gheorghe Argeșanu of his position and replacing him with Dumitru Coroamă.[51] Shortly afterward, Antonescu heard rumours that two of Carol's loyalist generals, Gheorghe Mihail and Paul Teodorescu, were planning to have him killed.[52] In reaction, he forced Carol to abdicate, while General Coroamă was refusing to carry out the royal order of shooting down Iron Guardist protesters.[53]
Michael ascended the throne for the second time, while Antonescu's dictatorial powers were confirmed and extended.
Antonescu-Sima partnership
The resulting regime, deemed the National Legionary State, was officially proclaimed on 14 September. On that date, the Iron Guard was remodelled into the only legally permitted party in Romania. Antonescu continued as Premier and Conducător, and was named as the Guard's honorary commander. Sima became Deputy Premier and leader of the Guard.[6][63][64][65] Antonescu subsequently ordered the Guardists imprisoned by Carol to be set free.[66] On 6 October, he presided over the Iron Guard's mass rally in Bucharest, one in a series of major celebratory and commemorative events organized by the movement during the late months of 1940.[67] However, he tolerated the PNȚ and PNL's informal existence, allowing them to preserve much of their political support.[68]
There followed a short-lived and always uneasy partnership between Antonescu and Sima. In late September, the new regime denounced all pacts, accords and diplomatic agreements signed under Carol, bringing the country into Germany's orbit while subverting its relationship with a former Balkan ally, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[69] Germans troops entered the country in stages, in order to defend the local oil industry[70] and help instruct their Romanian counterparts on Blitzkrieg tactics.[71] On 23 November, Antonescu was in Berlin, where his signature sealed Romania's commitment to the main Axis instrument, the Tripartite Pact.[6][72] Two days later, the country also adhered to the Nazi-led Anti-Comintern Pact.[73] Other than these generic commitments, Romania had no treaty binding it to Germany, and the Romanian-German alliance functioned informally.[74] Speaking in 1946, Antonescu claimed to have followed the pro-German path in continuation of earlier policies, and for fear of a Nazi protectorate in Romania.[75]
During the National Legionary State period, earlier antisemitic legislation was upheld and strengthened, while the "
Disorder peaked in the last days of November 1940, when, after uncovering the circumstances of Codreanu's death, the fascist movement ordered retaliations against political figures previously associated with Carol, carrying out the
Legionary Rebellion and Operation Barbarossa
Antonescu's plan to act against his coalition partners in the event of further disorder hinged on Hitler's approval,[6][64][94][95] a vague signal of which had been given during ceremonies confirming Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.[6][96] A decisive turn occurred when Hitler invited Antonescu and Sima both over for discussions: whereas Antonescu agreed, Sima stayed behind in Romania, probably plotting a coup d'état.[6][97] While Hitler did not produce a clear endorsement for clamping down on Sima's party, he made remarks interpreted by their recipient as oblique blessings.[98] On 14 January 1941 during a German-Romanian summit, Hitler informed Antonescu of his plans to invade the Soviet Union later that year and asked Romania to participate.[99] By this time, Hitler had come to the conclusion that while Sima was ideologically closer to him, Antonescu was the more competent leader capable of ensuring stability in Romania while being committed to aligning his country with the Axis.
The Antonescu-Sima dispute erupted into violence in January 1941, when the Iron Guard instigated a series of attacks on public institutions and a
After the purge of the Iron Guard, Hitler kept his options open by granting
Antonescu traveled to Germany and met Hitler on eight more occasions between June 1941 and August 1944.[111] Such close contacts helped cement an enduring relationship between the two dictators, and Hitler reportedly came to see Antonescu as the only trustworthy person in Romania,[6][112] and the only foreigner to consult on military matters.[113] The American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Hitler after first meeting Antonescu "...was greatly impressed by him; no other leader Hitler met other than Mussolini ever received such consistently favourable comments from the German dictator. Hitler even mustered the patience to listen to Antonescu's lengthy disquisitions on the glorious history of Romania and the perfidy of the Hungarians—a curious reversal for a man who was more accustomed to regaling visitors with tirades of his own."[114] In later statements, Hitler offered praise to Antonescu's "breadth of vision" and "real personality."[115] A remarkable aspect of the Hitler-Antonescu friendship was neither could speak other's language. Hitler only knew German, while the only foreign language Antonescu knew was French, in which he was completely fluent.[116] During their meetings, Antonescu spoke French, which was then translated into German by Hitler's interpreter Paul Schmidt and vice versa, since Schmidt did not speak Romanian either.
The German military presence increased significantly in early 1941, when, using Romania as a base, Hitler invaded the rebellious Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the
In June of that year, Romania joined the attack on the Soviet Union, led by Germany in coalition with Hungary,
After becoming the first Romanian to be granted the
The accord over Transnistria's administration, signed in
Reversal of fortunes
The Romanian Army's inferior arms, insufficient armour and lack of training had been major concerns for the German commanders since before the start of the operation.
As the Soviet Union recovered from the initial shock and slowed down the Axis offensive at the Battle of Moscow (October 1941 – January 1942), Romania was asked by its allies to contribute a larger number of troops.[148] A decisive factor in Antonescu's compliance with the request appears to have been a special visit to Bucharest by Wehrmacht chief of staff Wilhelm Keitel, who introduced the Conducător to Hitler's plan for attacking the Caucasus (see Battle of the Caucasus).[148] The Romanian force engaged in the war reportedly exceeded German demands.[148] It came to around 500,000 troops[148][149] and thirty actively involved divisions.[150] As a sign of his satisfaction, Hitler presented his Romanian counterpart with a luxury car.[148] On 7 December 1941, after reflecting on the possibility for Romania, Hungary and Finland to change their stance, the British government responded to repeated Soviet requests and declared war on all three countries.[151] Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and in compliance with its Axis commitment, Romania declared war on the United States within five days. These developments contrasted with Antonescu's own statement of 7 December: "I am an ally of the [German] Reich against [the Soviet Union], I am neutral in the conflict between Great Britain and Germany. I am for America against the Japanese."[152]
A crucial change in the war came with the Battle of Stalingrad in June 1942 – February 1943, a major defeat for the Axis. Romania's armies alone lost some 150,000 men (either dead, wounded or captured)[148] and more than half of the country's divisions were wiped out.[153]
The loss of two entire Romanian armies who all either killed or captured by the Soviets produced a major crisis in German-Romanian relations in the winter of 1943 with many people in the Romanian government for the first time questioning the wisdom of fighting on the side of the Axis.
Upon his return, Antonescu blamed the Romanian losses on German overseer Arthur Hauffe, whom Hitler agreed to replace.[157] In parallel with the military losses, Romania was confronted with large-scale economic problems. Romania's oil was the Reich's only source of natural oil after the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 to August 1944 (Germany also had synthetic oil plants operating from 1942 onwards), and as such for economic reasons, Romania was always treated as a major ally by Hitler.[146] While Germany monopolized Romania's exports,[158] it defaulted on most of its payments.[159] Like all countries whose exports to Germany, particularly in oil, exceeded imports from that country, Romania's economy suffered from Nazi control of the exchange rate (see Economy of Nazi Germany).[160] On the German side, those directly involved in harnessing Romania's economic output for German goals were economic planners Hermann Göring and Walther Funk, together with Hermann Neubacher, the Special Representative for Economic Problems.[161] A recurring problem for Antonescu was attempting to obtain payments for all of the oil he shipped to Germany while resisting German demands for increased oil production.[146] The situation was further aggravated in 1942, as USAAF and RAF were able to bomb the oil fields in Prahova County (see Bombing of Romania in World War II, Operation Tidal Wave).[162] Official sources from the following period amalgamate military and civilian losses of all kinds, which produces a total of 554,000 victims of the war.[163] To improve the Romanian army's effectiveness, the Mareșal tank destroyer was developed starting in late 1942. Marshal Antonescu, after whom the vehicle was named, was involved in the project himself.[164] The vehicle later influenced the development of the German Hetzer.[165][166]
In this context, the Romanian leader acknowledged that Germany was losing the war, and he therefore authorized his Deputy Premier and new Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu to set up contacts with the Allies.[148][167] In early 1943, Antonescu authorized his diplomats to contact British and American diplomats in Portugal and Switzerland to see if were possible for Romania to sign an armistice with the Western powers.[168] The Romanian diplomats were informed that no armistice was possible until an armistice was signed with the Soviet Union, a condition Antonescu rejected.[168] In parallel, he allowed the PNȚ and the PNL to engage in parallel talks with the Allies at various locations in neutral countries.[148][169] The discussions were strained by the Western Allies' call for an unconditional surrender, over which the Romanian envoys bargained with Allied diplomats in Sweden and Egypt (among them the Soviet representatives Nikolai Novikov and Alexandra Kollontai).[170] Antonescu was also alarmed by the possibility of war being carried on Romanian territory, as had happened in Italy after Operation Avalanche.[171] The events also prompted hostile negotiations aimed at toppling Antonescu, and involving the two political parties, the young monarch, diplomats and soldiers.[148][172] A major clash between Michael and Antonescu took place during the first days of 1943, when the 21-year-old monarch used his New Year's address on national radio to part with the Axis war effort.[173]
Ouster and arrest
In March 1944, the Soviet
However, Antonescu's non-compliance with the terms of Wilson's ultimatum also had drastic effects on Romania's ability to exit the war.
Large-scale
The new Romanian authorities declared peace with the Allies and advised the population to greet Soviet troops.
Placed in the custody of PCR militants, Ion Antonescu spent the interval at a house in Bucharest's
Trial and execution
In May 1946, Ion Antonescu was prosecuted at the first in a series of
Antonescu was represented by Constantin Paraschivescu-Bălăceanu and Titus Stoica, two public defenders whom he had first consulted with a day before the procedures were initiated.[202] The prosecution team, led by Vasile Stoican, and the panel of judges, presided over by Alexandru Voitinovici, were infiltrated by PCR supporters.[203] Both consistently failed to admit that Antonescu's foreign policies were overall dictated by Romania's positioning between Germany and the Soviet Union.[148][204] Nevertheless, and although references to the mass murders formed just 23% of the indictment and corpus of evidence (ranking below charges of anti-Soviet aggression),[205] the procedures also included Antonescu's admission of and self-exculpating take on war crimes, including the deportations to Transnistria.[148][206] They also evidence his awareness of the Odessa massacre, accompanied by his claim that few of the deaths were his direct responsibility.[207] One notable event at the trial was a testimony by PNȚ leader Iuliu Maniu. Reacting against the aggressive tone of other accusers, Maniu went on record saying: "We [Maniu and Antonescu] were political adversaries, not cannibals."[148] Upon leaving the bench, Maniu walked toward Antonescu and shook his hand.[148][208]
Ion Antonescu was found guilty of the charges. This verdict was followed by two sets of
Ideology
Ethnic nationalism and expansionism
Antonescu's policies were motivated, in large part, by
Conducător Antonescu thought Hitler willing to revise his stance on Northern Transylvania, and claimed to have obtained the German leader's agreement, using it to justify participation on the
It is also possible that, contrary to Antonescu's own will, Hitler viewed the transfer of
Romanian historian
Antisemitism and antiziganism
Part of a series on |
Antisemitism |
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Category |
A recurring element in Antonescu's doctrines is
Antonescu was a firm believer in the
Ion Antonescu's
Fascism and conservatism
There is a historiographic dispute about whether Ion Antonescu's regime was
Nevertheless, other historians theorize a synthesis of fascist and conservative elements, performed by Antonescu and other European leaders of his day. Routledge's 2002 Companion to Fascism and the Far Right uses the terms "para-fascist" to define Antonescu, adding: "generally regarded as an authoritarian conservative [Antonescu] incorporated fascism into his regime, in the shape of the Iron Guard, rather than embodying fascism himself."[64] "Para-fascist" is also used by Griffin, to denote both Antonescu and Carol II.[264] American historian of fascism Robert Paxton notes that, like Salazar, Romania's dictator crushed a competing fascist movement, "after copying some of [its] techniques of popular mobilization."[265] Political scientists John Gledhill and Charles King discuss the Iron Guard as Romania's "indigenous fascist movement", remark that Antonescu "adopted much of the ideology of the Guardists", and conclude that the regime he led was "openly fascist".[266] References to the fascist traits of Antonescu's dictatorship are also made by other researchers.[15][267]
The synthetic aspect of Antonescu's rule is discussed in detail by various authors. British historian Dennis Deletant, who notes that the fascist label relies on both Antonescu's adoption of some fascist "trappings" and the "dichotomy of wartime and postwar evaluation" of his regime, also notes that post-1960 interpretations "do more to explain his behaviour than the preceding orthodoxy."[268] Deletant contrasts the lack of "mass political party or ideology" with the type of rule associated with Nazism or Italian fascism.[26] British-born sociologist and political analyst Michael Mann writes: "The authoritarian regimes of Antonescu [...] and Franco [...] purported to be 'traditional', but actually their fascist-derived corporatism was a new immanent ideology of the right."[269] Another distinct view is held by Romanian-born historian of ideas Juliana Geran Pilon, who describes Romania's "military fascist regime" as a successor to Iron Guardist "mystical nationalism", while mentioning that Antonescu's "national ideology was rather more traditionally militaristic and conservative."[270]
Power base, administration and propaganda
In theory, Antonescu's policies had at least one revolutionary aspect. The leader himself claimed: "I want to introduce a
Although he assigned an unimportant role to King Michael, Antonescu took steps to increase the monarchy's prestige, personally inviting Carol's estranged wife,
The regime was characterized by the leader's attempts to regulate even remote aspects of public life, including relations between the sexes. He imposed drastic penalties for misdemeanors,[289] and the legal use of capital punishment was extended to an unprecedented level.[290] He personally set standards for nightclub programs, for the length of skirts and for women's use of bicycles,[6] while forcing all men to wear coats in public.[26] His wife Maria was a patron of state-approved charitable organizations, initially designed to compete with successful Iron Guardist ventures such as Ajutorul Legionar.[291] According to Romanian-born gender studies academic Maria Bucur, although the regime allowed women "to participate in the war effort on the front in a more regularized, if still marginal, fashion", the general tone was sexist.[292]
The administrative apparatus included official press and
Antonescu and The Holocaust
Iași pogrom
Three weeks after gaining power and inaugurating the National Legionary regime, Ion Antonescu declared to Italian interviewers at
Often discussed as a prelude to the
In the aftermath of the pogrom, thousands of survivors were loaded into the so-called "death trains". These overcrowded and sealed
Transnistria
Right upon setting up camp in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Romanian troops joined the Wehrmacht and the
Many deaths followed, as the direct results of starvation and exhaustion,
We decided to defend our Romanian rights because our all-too-tolerant past was taken advantage of by the Jews and facilitated the abuse of our rights by foreigners, particularly the Jews...We are determined to put an end to this situation. We cannot afford to put in jeopardy the existence of our nation because of several hundred thousand Jews, or in order to salvage some principle of humane democracy that has not been understood properly."[338]
The deportees' remaining property was
The question of the Yids is being discussed in Berlin. The Germans want to bring the Yids from Europe to Russia and settle them in certain areas, but there is still time before this plan is carried out. Meanwhile, what should we do? Shall we wait for a decision in Berlin? Shall we wait for a decision that concerns us? Shall we ensure their safety? Pack them into catacombs! Throw them into the Black Sea! As far I am concerned, 100 may die, 1,000 may die, all of them may die"[343]
Between 21–24 and 28–31 December 1941, Romanian gendarmes and Ukrainian auxiliaries killed about 70,000 Jews at the Bogdanovca camp; the massacre was Antonescu's way of dealing with a typhus epidemic that had broken out among the Jews of Transnistria owing to the poor living conditions that had been forced to endure.[344] The last wave of Jewish deportations, occurring in June 1942, came mainly from the Cernăuți area in Northern Bukovina.[93][345]
Also in the summer of 1942, Ion Antonescu became a perpetrator of the
Odessa massacre
The Odessa massacre, an act of collective punishment carried out by the Romanian Army and Gendarmes, took the lives of a minimum of between 15,000[356] and 25,000[357] to as many as 40,000[358] or even more than 50,000[148][359] Jewish people of all ages. The measure came as the enforcement of Antonescu's own orders, as retaliation for an explosion that killed 67 people at Romanian headquarters on that city. Antonescu believed that the original explosion was a terrorist act, rejecting the possibility of the building in question having been fitted with land mines by the retreating Soviets.[93][360] In addition, Antonescu blamed the Jews, specifically "Jewish commissars" in the Red Army, for the losses suffered by his 4th Army throughout the siege,[361] although both an inquiry he had ordered and German assessments pointed to the ill-preparedness of Romanian soldiers.[362] While the local command took the initiative for the first executions, Antonescu's personal intervention amplified the number of victims required, and included specific quotas (200 civilians for every dead officer, 100 for every dead soldier).[363] By the time of the explosion, the Jewish population was already rounded up into makeshift ghettos, being made subject to violence and selective murders.[364]
Purportedly the largest single massacre of Jews in the war's history,
Overall death toll and particularities
A common assessment ranks Antonescu's Romania as second only to Nazi Germany in its antisemitic extermination policies.
The Jewish population in the Old Kingdom, numbering between 300,000 and 400,000 people, survived the Holocaust almost intact.
Alongside the noticeable change in fortunes on the Eastern Front, a main motivator for all post-1943 changes, noted by various historians, was the manifold financial opportunity of Jewish survival.[387] Wealthier Jews were financially extorted in order to avoid community work and deportation, and the work of some professionals was harnessed by the public sector, and even by the Army.[388] From the beginning, the regime had excepted from deportations some Jews who were experts in fields such as forestry and chemistry, and some others were even allowed to return despite antisemitic protests in their home provinces.[389] Economic exploitation was institutionalized in late 1941-early 1942, with the creation of a Central Jewish Office. Supervised by Commissioner Radu Lecca and formally led by the Jewish intellectuals Nandor Gingold and Henric Streitman, it collected funds which were in part redirected toward Maria Antonescu's charities.[390] Small numbers of Romanian Jews left independently for the Palestine as early as 1941, but British opposition to Zionist plans made their transfer perilous (one notorious example of this being the MV Struma).[391] On a personal level, Antonescu's encouragement of crimes alternated with periods when he gave in to the pleas of Jewish community leader Wilhelm Filderman.[392] In one such instance, he reversed his own 1942 decision to impose the wearing of yellow badges,[393] which nevertheless remained in use everywhere outside the Old Kingdom and, in theory, to any Romanian Jews elsewhere in Axis-controlled Europe.[394] Assessing these contradictions, commentators also mention the effect of Allied promises to prosecute those responsible for genocide throughout Europe.[395] In the late stages of the war, Antonescu was attempting to shift all blame for crimes from his regime[396] while accusing Jews of "bring[ing] destruction upon themselves".[397]
The regime permitted non-deported Romanian Jews and American charities to send humanitarian aid into Transnistrian camps, a measure it took an interest in enforcing in late 1942.[93][398] Deportations of Jews ceased altogether in October of the same year. A common explanation historians propose for this reassessment of policies is the change in Germany's fortunes on the Eastern Front, with mention that Antonescu was considering using the Jewish population as an asset in his dealings with the Western Allies.[93][399] It nevertheless took the regime more than a year to allow more selective Jewish returns from Transnistria, including some 2,000 orphans.[93][400] After Transnistria's 1944 evacuation, Antonescu himself advocated the creation of new camps in Bessarabia.[401] In conversations with his cabinet, the Conducător angrily maintained that surviving Jews were better off than Romanian soldiers.[402]
The policies applied in respect to the Romani population were ambivalent: while ordering the deportation of those he considered criminals, Ion Antonescu was taking some interest in improving the lives of Romani laborers of the Bărăgan Plain.[403] According to Romanian historian Viorel Achim, although it had claimed the existence of a "Gypsy problem", the Antonescu regime "did not count it among its priorities."[404] By 1943, Antonescu was gradually allowing those deported to return home. Initially, Constantin Vasiliu allowed the families of soldiers to appeal their deportation on a selective basis.[405] Romanian authorities also appear to have been influenced by the objections of Nazi administrators in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, who feared that the newly arrived population would outnumber local Germans.[406] By January 1944, the central authorities ordered local ones not to send back apprehended fugitives,[407] instructed them to provide these with some food and clothing, and suggested corporal punishment for Romani people who did not adhere to a behavioural code.[408] As the Romanian administrators abandoned Transnistria, most survivors from the group returned on their own in summer 1944.[409]
Antonescu and the Final Solution projects
Ion Antonescu and his subordinates were for long divided on the issue of the
By summer 1942, German representatives in Romania obtained Antonescu's approval to deport the remaining Jewish population to extermination camps in occupied Poland.[93][415] Among those involved on the German side were mass murderer Adolf Eichmann and his aide Gustav Richter,[416] while the Romanian side was represented by Jewish Affairs Commissioner Lecca (reporting to Antonescu himself).[417] Richter directed Lecca in setting up the Central Jewish Office, which he assumed would function as a Judenrat to streamline extermination policies.[418] According to such plans, only some 17,000 Jews, labeled useful to Romania's economy, were to be exempt.[93][419] The transports had already been announced to the Romanian Railways by autumn 1942, but the government eventually decided to postpone these measures indefinitely as was done with most other deportations to Transnistria.[93][420] Antonescu's new orders on the matter were brought up in his conversations with Hitler at Schloss Klessheim, where both leaders show themselves aware of the fate awaiting Jewish deportees to Poland.[421] By then, German authorities charged with applying the Final Solution in Eastern Europe completely abandoned their plans with respect to Romania.[422] In August 1942, Antonescu had worked out plans with the SS for deporting all of the Jews of the Regat or the "Old Kingdom" to the German-run death camps in Poland, but then cancelled the deportation.[423] The principal reasons for his change of mind were signs of disapproval from court circles, a warning from the American government passed on by the Swiss ambassador that he would prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity after the Allies had won if the deportation went ahead, and most importantly because Hitler would not undo the Second Vienna Award and return northern Transylvania to Romania.[424] Antonescu saw the deportation of the Jews of the Regat as the pro quid quo for the return of Transylvania and unable to obtain satisfactory promises from the German Ambassador Baron Manfred von Killinger that Romania would be rewarded with the return of Transylvania in exchange for handing over its Jews, Antonescu cancelled the deportation until the Germans would make him a better offer.[424]
According to Oldson, by the final stage of the war Romania rejected "all extreme measures against Jews who could not be proven to be communists."
Opposition and political persecution
Political mainstream
The circumstances of wartime accounted for cautious and ambivalent approaches to Antonescu's rule from among the Romanian political mainstream, which grouped advocates of
Antonescu is known to have publicly admonished opposition leaders for their disobedience, which he equated with obstruction,[439] and to have monitored their activities through the Special Intelligence Service.[440] However, some early communiqués he addressed to Brătianu also feature offers of resignation, which their recipient reluctantly rejected.[441] The Germans objected to such ambiguities, and Hitler once advised Antonescu to have Maniu killed, an option which the Conducător rejected because of the PNȚ leader's popularity with the peasants.[440] While tolerating contacts between Maniu and the Allies, Antonescu arrested the clandestine British envoys to Romania, thus putting a stop to the 1943 Operation Autonomous.[442] In parallel, his relationship with Queen Mother Helen and Michael rapidly deteriorated after he began advising the royal family on how to conduct its affairs.[443] Dissent from Antonescu's policies sometimes came from inside his own camp. Both the officer corps and the General Staff were divided on the issue of war beyond the Dniester, although it is possible that the majority agreed it would bring Northern Transylvania back to Romania.[444] A prominent case was that of Iosif Iacobici, the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, whose objection to the massive transfer of Romanian troops to the Eastern Front resulted in his demotion and replacement with Ilie Șteflea (January 1942).[148][152] Șteflea issued similar calls, and Antonescu's eventually agreed to preserve a home army just before the Battle of Stalingrad.[445] Various other military men extended their protection to persecuted Jews.[446] Overall, Antonescu met significant challenges in exercising control over the politicized sectors in the armed forces.[447]
Antonescu's
Political underground
Organized
Although repressed, divided and weak, the PCR capitalized on the Soviet victories, being integrated into the mainstream opposition. At the same time, a "prison faction" emerged around Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, opposing both the formal leadership and the so-called "Muscovite" communists who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union before the war.[473] While maneuvering for control within the PCR during and after 1944, "prison" communists destroyed a third group, formed around the PCR's nominal leader Ștefan Foriș (whom they kidnapped and eventually killed).[474] The PCR leadership was still suffering from a crisis of legitimacy after beginning talks with the larger parties.[475] The Soviets and "Muscovite" communists campaigned among Romanian prisoners of war in order to have them switch sides in the war, and eventually managed to set up the Tudor Vladimirescu Division.[476]
Cultural circles
Measures enforced by the Ion Antonescu regime had contradictory effects on the
A special aspect of political repression and
Legacy
Consequences of the Antonescu trial
The period following Antonescu's fall returned Romania to a democratic regime and the
Nevertheless, Romanian-born Holocaust historian Radu Ioanid notes, few Romanians involved in organizing the Holocaust were prosecuted, and, of those, none were executed after the Antonescu trial. He attributes this to nationalist resistance within the administrative and judicial apparatus, to communist fears of alienating a too large number of people, to the emigration of Zionist survivors, and to the open hostility of some communists toward liberal Jewish community leaders.[494] Jews also faced conflict with the new authorities and with the majority population, as described by other researchers.[495] There were, nonetheless, sporadic trials for Holocaust-related crimes, including one of Maria Antonescu. Arrested in September 1944 and held 1945–1946 in Soviet custody, she was re-arrested at home in 1950, tried and ultimately found guilty of economic crimes for her collaboration with the Central Jewish Office.[496] Five years later, she was sent into internal exile, and died of heart problems in 1964.[497] After 1950, a large number of convicted war criminals, even some sentenced to life imprisonment, were deemed fit for "social cohabitation" (that is, fit to live amongst the general population) and released, while some suspects were never prosecuted.[498]
In communist historiography
Although the
The communist regime overemphasized the part played by the PCR in
Topics relating to the Holocaust in Romania were distorted during the communist era. Ceaușescu himself mentioned the number of survivors of the deportations (some 50,000 people) as a total number of victims, failed to mention the victims' ethnic background, and presented most of them as "communists and antifascists."
Earlier accounts of the massacres, which had already been placed under restricted use, were completely removed from public libraries.[518] While a special politicized literature dealt with the Holocaust in Hungary, the entire Ceaușescu period produced only one work entirely dedicated to Romania's participation.[519] Centred on the Iași pogrom, it shifted the blame from Romanian authorities and advanced a drastically reduced death toll.[520] In its preface, official historian Nicolae Minei claimed that Romania was not responsible for any deaths among Jews.[521] Other official texts made more radical claims, openly denying that Antonescu's regime was antisemitic, and that all those killed were victims of Germany or of circumstance.[522]
Debates of the 1990s
Romanians' image of Antonescu shifted several times after the
A particular case in this process was that of forces gathered around the
Various researchers argue that the overall tendency to exculpate Antonescu was endorsed by the ruling
To a certain degree, such pro-Antonescu sentiments were also present in post-1989 historiography. Reflecting back on this phenomenon in 2004,
Wiesel Commission and aftermath
In 2003, after a period in which his own equivocal stance on the matter had drawn controversy,
The same year, on 5 December, the Bucharest Court of Appeals overturned Antonescu's conviction for certain
Cultural legacy, portrayals and landmarks
Beyond their propaganda and censorship efforts, Antonescu and his regime had a sizable impact on
Marin Preda's 1975 novel Delirul displays the Ceaușescu regime's ambiguous relationship with Antonescu. Critics John Neubauer and Marcel Cornis-Pope remark that the novel is "admittedly not [Preda's] best work", and discuss his "complex representation" of Antonescu as "an essentially flawed but active leader who tried to negotiate some maneuvering room between the demands of Germany and the threats of the Soviet Union [and whose failure] led to the dismantling of Romania's fragile democratic system."[577] The book sought Antonescu's rehabilitation for his attitudes on the Bessarabia-Northern Bukovina issue, but did not include any mention of his antisemitic policies, of which Preda himself may have been ignorant.[578] An international scandal followed, once negative comments on the book were published by the Soviet magazine Literaturnaya Gazeta.[579] Although an outspoken nationalist, Eugen Barbu produced a satirical image of Antonescu in his own 1975 novel, Incognito, which was described by Deletant as "character assassination".[580]
During the 1990s, monuments to Antonescu were raised and streets were named after him in Bucharest and several other cities.
Awards and decorations
Antonescu received a number of awards and decorations throughout his military career, most notable being the
Award or decoration | Country | Date | Place | Note | Ref | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Medal of Military Virtue (1st Class in Gold) | Romania | 1913 | Southern Dobruja | Romania's highest military decoration at the time. Only received by one other officer in the army during the Second Balkan War. | [591] | |
Order of Michael the Brave (3rd, 2nd, and 1st Class received) | Romania | 1919 | Tisza River, Hungary
|
Romania's highest military decoration. Upon crossing the River Tisza, King Ferdinand took the Order of Michael the Brave from his own uniform and presented it to Antonescu, saying "Antonescu, no one in this country knows better than the King how much they owe you." | [590][592] | |
Pilot/Observer Badge in Gold with Diamonds | Germany | June 1941 | Bestowed to honor exceptional success, presented to Antonescu by Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. | [592] | ||
Iron Cross (2nd, and 1st Class received) | Germany | 6 August 1941 | Berdychiv | Awarded for bravery in battle as well as other military contributions in a battlefield environment. | [131] | |
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross | Germany | 6 August 1941 | Berdychiv | Nazi Germany's highest decoration for its military and paramilitary forces during World War II. First Romanian to receive the award. | [131] | |
Grand Cross of the White Rose of Finland with Swords | Finland | January 1942 | Bucharest | One of three highest state orders of Finland, established in 1919 by Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. | [593] | |
Crimea Shield in gold | Germany | 3 July 1942 | Bucharest | The first recipient of this award, bestowed upon Antonescu by Erich von Manstein on Hitler's behalf | [594][595][596][597][598] | |
Grand Cross of the Order of the Cross of Liberty with Swords | Finland | 10 November 1943 | The oldest of the Finnish state orders | [599] |
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Deletant, p. 37
- ^ Deletant, p. 37
- ^ Deletant, pp. 70, 257
- ^ a b c d e Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 465.
- ^ Penkower, pp. 152–153
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax Delia Radu, "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (1)", BBC, Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.
- ^ a b Veiga, p. 301
- ^ Deletant, pp. 37–38
- ^ Prit Buttar, Bloomsbury Publishing, 22 September 2016, Russia's Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916–17, p. 320
- ^ a b c Deletant, p. 38
- ^ Larry Watts, Eastern European Monographs, 1993, Romanian Cassandra, p. 43
- ^ Haynes, pp. 113, 115
- ^ Martin Thomas, "To arm an ally: French arms sales to Romania, 1926–1940." Journal of Strategic Studies 19.2 (1996): 231–259.
- ^ a b c d e f Deletant, p. 39.
- ^ ISBN 0-521-40418-5.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 301–302
- ^ Deletant, pp. 39, 45, 290
- ^ Veiga, p. 281
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 40
- ^ Deletant, pp. 34, 40–41; Veiga, p. 281
- ^ Deletant, pp. 40–41
- ^ Veiga, pp. 281, 296
- ^ Deletant, pp. 42–43
- ^ Deletant, p. 41
- ^ Final Report, p. 43; Deletant, pp. 34, 42; Veiga, pp. 246–247
- ^ a b c d e Deletant, p. 70.
- ^ Deletant, p. 42
- ^ a b (in Romanian) Ilarion Țiu, "Relațiile regimului autoritar al lui Carol al II-lea cu opoziția. Studiu de caz: arestarea conducerii Mișcării Legionare"[permanent dead link], in Revista Erasmus[permanent dead link], 14/2003-2005, at the University of Bucharest Faculty of History
- ^ Deletant, pp. 41–43
- ^ a b c Deletant, p. 44
- ^ Charles D. Pettibone, Trafford Publishing, 2012, The Organization and Order or Battle of Militaries in World War II: Volume VII: Germany's and Imperial Japan's Allies & Puppet States, pp. 10–11
- ^ Deletant, pp. 45, 293
- ^ Deletant, pp. 45, 58, 302
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 35, 50; Ornea, pp. 320–321; Veiga, p. 257
- ^ Deletant, pp. 3, 10–27, 45–47; Ornea, pp. 323–325; Veiga, pp. 256–257, 266–269
- ^ Deletant, pp. 45–46
- ^ Deletant, pp. 46–47. Deletant notes the determining factor for this decision was Antonescu's link to the Iron Guard.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 47, 293
- ^ Final Report, pp. 57, 60; Deletant, p. 47
- ^ Crampton, Richard Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, London: Routledge, 1997 p. 117.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 48–51, 66; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Ornea, pp. 325–327
- ^ Browning, p. 211
- ^ a b c d e f Deletant, p. 48
- ^ Ornea, pp. 325–326. According to Deletant, also present were Maniu's assistants Corneliu Coposu and Aurel Leucuția.
- ^ Haynes, Rebecca "Germany and the Establishment of the Romanian National Legionary State, September 1940" pp. 700–725 from The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 77, Issue # 4. October 1999 p. 711
- ^ Haynes, Rebecca " Germany and the Establishment of the Romanian National Legionary State, September 1940" pp. 700–725 from The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 77, Issue # 4. October 1999 p. 712.
- ^ Kelso, p. 96
- ^ Ornea, pp. 325–327; Roper, p. 8
- ^ Deletant, pp. 48–49; Ornea, pp. 326–327
- ^ Final Report, p. 320; Morgan, p. 85; Ornea, p. 326
- ^ Ornea, p. 327
- ^ Deletant, pp. 49–50, 52, 194
- ^ Deletant, pp. 49–50
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 52–55; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Kelso, p. 96; Roper, p. 8
- ^ Deletant, pp. 52–55
- ^ a b Crampton, Richard Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, London: Routledge, 1997 pp. 117–118.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 49–51; Veiga, pp. 279–280. Veiga mentions in particular Heinrich Himmler, head of the Schutzstaffel organization, who, although inclined to support Sima, advised the latter to let the general take hold of government.
- ^ Deletant, p. 49; Ornea, pp. 326–327, 339
- ^ Deletant, pp. 55–56; Ornea, p. 326
- ^ Deletant, pp. 52–68; Gella, p. 171; Geran Pilon, p. 59; Kelso, pp. 96–97; Kenney, pp. 92–93; Morgan, p. 85; Ornea, pp. 326–327; Veiga, pp. 281–282, 296, 327. According to Kelso and Ornea, Antonescu was turned down by all political forces except the Iron Guard. Deletant (pp. 55–56) notes that these refusals were motivated by Sima's requests, which Maniu perceived as excessive.
- ^ Deletant, p. 55
- ^ Crampton, Richard Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, London: Routledge, 1997 p. 118.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 43, 46, 54, 62, 109–112; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 1–2, 57–68; Gella, p. 171; Geran Pilon, p. 59; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Ioanid, pp. 231–232; Kelso, pp. 96–97; Nicholls, p. 6; Ornea, pp. 58, 215–216, 327–329; Veiga, pp. 281–283
- ^ ISBN 0-415-21494-7.
- ISBN 0203501322.
- ^ Ornea, p. 215
- ^ Deletant, p. 59; Ornea, p. 333
- ^ Deletant, pp. 74–75; Veiga, pp. 280–281, 304
- ^ Haynes, p. 102
- ^ Browning, p. 211; Deletant, p. 61
- ^ Final Report, p. 62; Deletant, p. 61; Veiga, pp. 295–296
- ^ Deletant, pp. 1, 2–3, 61–62, 280; Haynes, pp. 102, 107; Nicholls, p. 225; Veiga, p. 296
- ^ Nicholls, p. 225
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 62, 92, 275
- ^ Deletant, p. 51
- ^ Final Report, pp. 19–20, 31, 103, 109–113, 181–183, 185–190, 202–208, 382–385; Achim, pp. 163, 167; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 59, 62–63, 103–108, 251–252; Kelso, pp. 100–101; Ornea, pp. 331, 393–394; Veiga, pp. 289–290, 296, 301
- ^ Final Report, pp. 19–20, 31, 43, 87, 116–117, 183–199, 320, 384; Deletant, pp. 103–108, 131, 308–314; Ioanid, pp. 231–232; Ornea, p. 391; Weber, p. 160
- ^ Final Report, pp. 183–203, 320; Deletant, pp. 103–107, 131, 308–314
- ^ Final Report, pp. 206–207; Deletant, pp. 58, 104
- ^ Final Report, pp. 46, 109–113, 117–118, 181–182, 186; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 32–33, 317; Deletant, pp. 55–57, 58–68, 104–105; Gella, p. 171; Griffin (1993), pp. 126–127; Ornea, pp. 332–341; Roper, p. 8; Veiga, p. 282
- ^ Deletant, p. 60
- ^ Ornea, pp. 334–335
- ^ Ornea, pp. 338–339, 341–343; Veiga, pp. 291, 297
- ^ Deletant, pp. 21, 24, 26, 131, 139–140, 318; Veiga, pp. 282–283, 290–291, 300–301, 305
- ^ Final Report, pp. 46, 110–111; Deletant, pp. 60–61, 297–298, 302; Ornea, pp. 335–341, 347; Veiga, pp. 291–294, 311–312
- ^ Final Report, pp. 110–111; Veiga, pp. 293–295
- ^ Ornea, p. 341
- ^ Ornea, p. 341; Veiga, pp. 294–295
- ^ Deletant, pp. 63, 301
- ^ Final Report, pp. 62–63; Veiga, pp. 280, 296
- ^ Deletant, pp. 25–27, 47, 61, 287
- ^ Final Report, p. 63; Deletant, pp. 61–62, 76–78
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an Delia Radu, "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (2)", BBC, Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 62–63, 113; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 62–68; Griffin (1993), p. 127; Harvey, p. 497; Morgan, pp. 85–86, 188; Nicholls, p. 225; Ornea, pp. 338–339, 342, 345; Roper, p. 8; Veiga, pp. 295–297, 327
- ^ ISBN 0-7190-2355-6.
- ^ Veiga, p. 296
- ^ Deletant, pp. 63–65; Ornea, pp. 342–343; Veiga, pp. 296–297
- ^ Deletant, pp. 64, 299; Veiga, p. 297
- ^ a b c Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 466.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 43, 46, 62–63, 103, 112–115, 181, 208, 382; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 33, 402–403, 408; Browning, pp. 211–212; Deletant, pp. 64–68, 71–72; Ioanid, pp. 232, 236; Ornea, pp. 219, 250, 284, 343–348; Penkower, pp. 148–149; Veiga, pp. 297–304, 312–313
- ^ Deletant, pp. 64–65, 299; Ornea, p. 343
- ^ Final Report, p. 186; Deletant, pp. 64–65, 105–106; Ornea, p. 343; Veiga, pp. 297–298
- ^ Deletant, pp. 64–65; Ornea, p. 343; Veiga, p. 298
- ^ Final Report, pp. 43, 46, 103, 112–115, 208, 382; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 402–403; Browning, pp. 211–212; Deletant, pp. 66, 71–72, 299–300; Ioanid, p. 232; Veiga, pp. 298–299, 301
- ^ Final Report, pp. 62–63, 125; Harvey, p. 497; Veiga, pp. 301–302, 313
- ^ Final Report, p. 63; Harvey, pp. 497–498
- ^ Final Report, pp. 63, 382; Browning, pp. 211–212; Harvey, p. 498
- ^ Browning, p. 212; Deletant, p. 87; Harvey, p. 498; Morgan, p. 188; Veiga, pp. 301–302
- ^ Ornea, pp. 329–331, 346–348
- ^ Deletant, pp. 68, 301
- ^ Deletant, p. 280
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 62.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 65, 168; Deletant, pp. 1, 280; Harvey, p. 498
- ^ Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pp. 195–196.
- ^ a b c Harvey, p. 498.
- ^ Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011 p. 214
- ^ Final Report, pp. 63–64; Deletant, pp. 61–63, 75–76, 304
- ^ Deletant, pp. 26–27, 75
- ^ a b c Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 325–326
- ^ a b c d Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 325
- ^ Ancel, Jean, The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 326
- ^ Deletant, pp. 78–80, 83
- ^ Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 436.
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 437.
- ^ Final Report, p. 253; Deletant, pp. 80, 83
- ^ Deletant, p. 80
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120–126, 200, 204, 208–209, 243–244, 285–286, 315, 321, 323, 327–329; Ancel (2005 a), passim; Deletant, pp. 130–140, 316–317; Ioanid, p. 233; Trașcă, pp. 398–399; Weber, p. 167
- ^ Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 pp. 464, 467.
- ^ a b c d e Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 467.
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 438–439
- ^ a b c d Deletant, pp. 83, 86, 280, 305
- ^ Final Report, p. 320; Boia, pp. 270–271; Deletant, pp. 51, 84–87, 90–91, 254; King, pp. 93–94; Trașcă, pp. 377–380
- ^ Achim, pp. 171, 184; Browning, p. 277; Deletant, pp. 86–87; King, pp. 93–94; Trașcă, p. 380sqq
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 334–335.
- ^ Deletant, p. 166; Trașcă, p. 384
- ^ Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 334.
- ^ a b c d e Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 335.
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 459–460.
- ^ Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 304.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 77–78, 83, 94–96
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 385–389
- ^ Deletant, pp. 87–88; Trașcă, pp. 385–387
- ^ Final Report, pp. 150–157, 245, 321, 323; Ancel (2005 a), p. 291; Deletant, pp. 171–177, 248–253, 261, 276–277, 328–329; Trașcă, p. 389sqq
- ^ Deletant, pp. 167–168; Gella, p. 171
- ^ Nicholls, p. 6; White, p. 175
- ^ a b c d Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 521.
- ^ Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 73
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd Delia Radu, "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (3)", BBC, Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.
- ^ a b c Deletant, p. 2
- ^ Nicholls, p. 6
- ^ Deletant, pp. 90–92
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 92
- ^ Deletant, pp. 96–97, 99; Gella, p. 171; Penkower, p. 161
- ^ a b Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pp. 460–461.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 209–210, 335
- ISBN 85-00-01682-5
- ^ Deletant, pp. 98–99
- ^ Final Report, pp. 63, 117, 168; Deletant, pp. 26–27, 75; Harvey, p. 545
- ^ Harvey, p. 545
- ^ Deletant, p. 26; Harvey, pp. 544–545
- ^ Deletant, pp. 26–27
- ^ Chant, p. 75; Deletant, p. 27; Gella, p. 171
- ^ Gella, p. 173; Weber, p. 164
- ^ Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 228
- ^ Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 229
- ^ Steven J. Zaloga, Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941–45, p. 31
- ^ Final Report, p. 252; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 230–240, 341–344; Penkower, pp. 153, 161
- ^ a b Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 461.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 75, 231–240, 341–344; Roper, pp. 8, 14
- ^ Deletant, pp. 231, 233–234, 236–239, 342–345
- ^ Deletant, pp. 234–236
- ^ Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Roper, p. 14
- ^ Deletant, pp. 236, 337
- ^ Chant, p. 124; Deletant, pp. 234–235, 342
- ^ Deletant, p. 231; White, p. 158
- ^ Deletant, pp. 233–234, 238–239; Kelso, p. 129
- ^ Cioroianu, pp. 51–52; Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 8–9, 13–14
- ^ Deletant, pp. 238–240, 343–344
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 238–239, 344; Roper, p. 14; Weber, p. 156
- ^ Deletant, pp. 240, 344; Kelso, p. 129; Nicholls, p. 6
- ^ Chant, pp. 84, 303
- ^ Deletant, pp. 239–240
- ^ Chant, p. 124; Deletant, p. 237
- ^ Ancel (2005 a), p. 321; Bucur (2004), pp. 173–176; Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Cioroianu, pp. 50–55; Deletant, pp. 3–4, 241–246, 265–266, 343–346; Gella, p. 172; Guran & Ștefan, p. 112; Ioanid, pp. 235–236; Kelso, p. 129; Kenney, p. 93; Kent, p. 52; King, p. 94; Morgan, p. 188; Nicholls, pp. 6, 166–167; Roper, pp. 13–15; Weber, pp. 152–154, 158–159; White, p. 158
- ^ Deletant, pp. 241–242; Roper, p. 14
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 55; Deletant, pp. 242–243; Roper, p. 14
- ^ Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Gella, p. 172; Kelso, p. 129
- ^ Chant, p. 122
- ^ Final Report, p. 316; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 247–248; Kelso, p. 130; Nicholls, pp. 167, 225
- ^ Harvey, p. 498; Morgan, p. 188; Veiga, pp. 302–303, 313–314
- ^ Deletant, pp. 243–244, 345–346
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 244
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, pp. 244, 246
- ^ Deletant, pp. 246, 346
- ^ Deletant, p. 249
- ^ Final Report, pp. 317–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261, 346–350; Frankowski, pp. 218–219
- ^ Final Report, pp. 316, 319–320, 331; Deletant, pp. 247–248, 261
- ^ Final Report, pp. 316–317; Frankowski, p. 219; Ioanid, p. 235
- ^ Final Report, pp. 313–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261; Frankowski, pp. 218–219
- ^ a b Deletant, pp. 248, 255
- ^ Final Report, p. 314; Deletant, pp. 172, 248–249, 328
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 251
- ^ Final Report, pp. 313, 322; Deletant, pp. 250–251
- ^ Final Report, pp. 320–321; Deletant, p. 248
- ^ Final Report, p. 321
- ^ Final Report, pp. 240–241, 252, 321–322; Achim, p. 168; Deletant, pp. 73, 252–255, 261, 276–277; Kelso, p. 97
- ^ Final Report, p. 245; Deletant, pp. 173–174, 252–253, 261, 276–277, 329
- ^ Deletant, pp. 255–256, 348
- ^ Deletant, pp. 248, 261
- ^ Deletant, pp. 255–257, 349–350
- ^ Deletant, pp. 256–259, 349–350
- ^ Deletant, pp. 259, 350
- ^ Deletant, pp. 5, 259
- ^ Deletant, p. 259
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, p. 259
- ^ Deletant, p. 260
- ^ Final Report, pp. 171–172; Deletant, pp. 61–62, 75–76, 79, 167; Haynes, pp. 106–110, 120; Ioanid, p. 245; Trașcă, pp. 380–385
- ^ a b Kent, p. 224.
- ^ Deletant, p. 76; Haynes, pp. 99–100, 102–109.
- ^ Deletant, p. 76; Haynes, pp. 99–100, 108–110, 120.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 76, 326.
- ^ Haynes, p. 119.
- ISBN 1-85065-381-X.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 171–172, 253; Deletant, pp. 62, 85–87, 93; Trașcă, pp. 379–380.
- ^ Deletant, p. 85. Partly rendered in Trașcă, p. 378.
- ^ Achim, p. 184; Boia, p. 270; Deletant, pp. 167, 326; Trașcă, pp. 380–385; White, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 380–382.
- ^ King, p. 93.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 253–254.
- ^ Boia, pp. 270–271.
- ^ Final Report, p. 253; Gella, p. 171.
- ^ a b Trașcă, p. 383.
- ^ Deletant, p. 79.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 152–153; Trașcă, p. 383.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 325–326; Haynes, pp. 119–120; White, p. 175.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 116, 181.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 246–247, 248, 322–323.
- ^ a b Final Report, p. 243.
- ^ Boia, p. 260.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 116, 127–128, 181–182, 184, 202–203, 323, 325, 383, 385; Deletant, pp. 1, 128–129; Trașcă, pp. 388–389.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 101, 209–211, 243–247, 384; Deletant, pp. 15–20, 116–120, 128–129, 138, 140–141, 210–211, 259, 276–277, 318; Ioanid, pp. 232–233; Penkower, p. 182; Trașcă, pp. 387–389.
- Bessarabian Jews (Browning, pp. 275–276; Deletant, p. 18; King p. 93) or the retaliatory Dorohoi pogrom(Final Report, pp. 84–86).
- ^ Boia, pp. 258–259; Deletant, pp. 15–20; Ornea, p. 394.
- ^ Deletant, p. 85. Partly rendered in Final Report, p. 244 and Trașcă, p. 388.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120–122, 127–142, 169, 175–177, 321; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 15–19, 291, 402; Deletant, pp. 79, 116–118, 127–130, 142–150, 155–156, 319; Polonsky, p. 27. The term used by Mihai Antonescu in his recommendations to the Romanian administrators is "ethnic purification", as confinement to "labor camps, where Jews and other foreigners with doubtful attitudes will not be able to exercise their prejudicial influences." (Ioanid, p. 232); Achim, p. 167; Browning, p. 276; Trașcă, pp. 387–389.
- ^ Deletant, p. 129.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 133–134; Deletant, pp. 118, 206.
- ^ Ancel (2005 b), p. 234.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 225–228, 240–241; Achim, pp. 168–169; Deletant, pp. 189–190; Ioanid, p. 234; Kelso, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Final Report, p. 229; Achim, p. 169; Deletant, p. 192; Ioanid, p. 234; Kelso, pp. 101, 105, 124–127.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 225–226; Achim, pp. 166–167; Deletant, pp. 187–189.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 227, 240–241; Achim, pp. 168, 171; Deletant, pp. 188–189, 254.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 225–226; Achim, pp. 168, 171; Deletant, p. 188.
- ^ Kelso, p. 98.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 223–228; Achim, pp. 164–168.
- ^ Final Report, p. 227; Achim, p. 168; Deletant, pp. 187–188.
- ^ According to Achim (pp. 167–170, 179, 182–183, 185) and Deletant (pp. 189–190), the measures reflected Antonescu's views on "social problems" more than a racist perspective. However, Kelso (pp. 99–100) believes the report was a notable factor in the decision to deport the Romani people.
- ISBN 0-691-00629-6.
- ^ ISBN 0-631-20933-6.
- ISBN 1-57181-877-4. Griffin also draws direct comparisons between Antonescu's conflict with the Iron Guard on one hand and António de Oliveira Salazar's clash with the National Syndicalists(1993, pp. 151–152).
- ^ Laqueur, pp. 203, 205; Morgan, p. 86; Roper, pp. 8, 11.
- ^ Veiga, pp. 281–283, 290, 296, 305, 327; White, p. 158.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 115, 323.
- ^ a b Griffin (1993), p. 127.
- ISBN 1-57181-537-6.
- ^ ISBN 0-7425-4067-7.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 115–116, 237, 313, 316, 322–324, 384–385; Achim, pp. 167, 180; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 234, 245, 255; Boia, pp. 118–119; Gella, pp. 171, 172, 173; Ioanid, pp. 232, 235, 237–238, 244, 245; Kenney, pp. 92–93; Nicholls, p. 6.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 1–2.
- ISBN 0-521-85000-2.
- ^ Geran Pilon, p. 59.
- ^ Boia, pp. 316–317
- ^ a b c d e Adrian Majuru, "King Carol II and the Myth of Eternal Romania" Archived 15 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine, in the Romanian Cultural Institute's Plural Magazine Archived 21 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Nr. 29/2007
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 69
- ^ Deletant, p. 71
- ^ Deletant, pp. 70–71
- ISBN 1-58046-137-9; Achim, p. 167
- ^ Deletant, p. 1
- ^ Deletant, p. 53
- ^ Final Report, pp. 31, 43, 117, 384–385
- ^ Morgan, p. 85
- ^ Final Report, pp. 31–32, 43, 116, 253, 384
- ^ a b c Deletant, p. 72
- ^ Final Report, pp. 139, 141; Deletant, pp. 72, 87–88, 152–153, 166–171, 277, 321–327; Trașcă, pp. 384–385
- ^ Final Report, p. 139; Deletant, pp. 72, 83, 87–88, 153, 277, 305, 322, 324
- ^ Final Report, pp. 118–119, 385; Deletant, pp. 69–70, 72, 88–90, 169–170, 277, 327
- ^ Deletant, p. 59
- ^ ISBN 1-57181-738-7
- ^ Deletant, p. 168
- ^ Achim, p. 169; Deletant, pp. 70–71; Frankowski, p. 217
- ^ Deletant, pp. 71–72, 253; Frankowski, p. 217
- ^ Veiga, p. 305
- ^ Bucur (2006), p. 182
- ^ Final Report, pp. 92, 96; Bucur (2006), p. 191; Deletant, pp. 114, 231
- ^ Final Report, pp. 92, 96; Ornea, pp. 249–250
- ^ Final Report, pp. 92–102
- ^ Final Report, p. 97
- ^ Final Report, pp. 92–93; Ancel (2005 a), p. 403
- ^ Ornea, pp. 281–282, 284–285
- ^ Final Report, pp. 91–107, 117, 204, 284–285, 383, 385; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 406–408; (2005 b), pp. 231–232, 234–235; Bucur (2006), p. 186; Deletant, pp. 114, 138, 140; Neubauer et al., p. 150; Trașcă, pp. 387, 389
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 387, 389. Among these, Trașcă cites (p. 387): "The Romanian and German armies are fighting against communism and the kikes, not against the Russian soldier and people!" and "The war was provoked by the kikes of the entire world. Fight against the warmongers!"
- ^ Final Report, p. 94; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 403, 407; Deletant, pp. 81–82, 83, 92–93, 101, 304–305; Harvey, p. 498; Nicholls, p. 225
- ^ a b c Trașcă, p. 379
- ^ Deletant, p. 54
- ^ Ornea, pp. 320, 342–343
- ^ Ioanid, p. 232; Ornea, p. 393
- ^ Final Report, pp. 118–119, 197–199, 201, 206, 291–292; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 103, 108–113, 120, 123–124, 159, 201, 207, 211, 310–311, 381; Kelso, pp. 100–101
- ^ Final Report, pp. 118–119, 184, 199–201, 206, 292–293, 381; Deletant, pp. 115–116, 310
- ^ Final Report, pp. 63, 183–214, 220–221, 238, 290–291, 381; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 103–106, 198–199, 308–314; Ioanid, p. 232; Ornea, pp. 393–394
- ^ Final Report, pp. 19–20, 63, 92, 117, 168–169, 181–182, 185–195, 202–203, 238, 250, 384–385; Deletant, pp. 106–108, 123, 210–211; Kelso, pp. 100–101; Ornea, pp. 393–394
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120, 243; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 17–46, 100–108, 403; Deletant, pp. 130–132
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120–123, 200, 208–209, 244, 329; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 11–12, 40–46, 49–51, 57–58, 69–70, 73, 100–110, 130, 161–163, 169, 274, 325; Deletant, pp. 130–134, 138
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120–126, 200, 204, 208–209, 243–244, 285–286, 315, 323, 323, 327–329; Ancel (2005 a), passim; Browning, pp. 276–277; Deletant, pp. 133–140; Ioanid, pp. 233, 236; Laqueur, p. 206; Penkower, p. 149; Polonsky, p. 27; Veiga, pp. 300, 312; Weber, p. 167
- ^ Final Report, pp. 125–126, 209, 295; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 12, 130, 151–344; Deletant, pp. 134–137, 317
- ^ Final Report, p. 126; Deletant, pp. 130, 136–137; Polonsky, p. 27
- ^ Deletant, pp. 137, 316; Ioanid, p. 233; Penkower, p. 149; Polonsky, p. 27
- ^ Final Report, pp. 321, 329; Deletant, p. 137; Ioanid, pp. 233, 236
- ^ Final Report, pp. 126, 382; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 11, 15, 390–393; Deletant, p. 316; Weber, p. 167
- ^ Final Report, pp. 121–125, 208–209; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 11–12, 15–19, 22–23, 26–33, 40–46, 49–51, 57–58, 69–70, 73, 100–110, 130, 141–154, 158–169, 238–247, 274, 290–293, 325, 422–427; Deletant, pp. 137–140, 252, 276, 317; Ioanid, p. 233; Trașcă, pp. 398–399. According to Ioanid, German participation in the Romanian-coordinated operation resulted in, at most, 3,000 of the deaths of a total 10,000 to 12,000.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 121, 122; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 21–22, 26–30, 50–51, 149, 328, 391, 414, 416; Deletant, pp. 137, 317; Weber, p. 167
- ^ Final Report, p. 124; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 12, 158, 175–189, 317–328, 379–422; Deletant, pp. 138–139
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66, 125, 128–134, 141, 175–177; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 21, 361–365, 402; Browning, pp. 275–277; Deletant, pp. 127–128, 143–149, 275, 314, 319–321; Ioanid, p. 233; Penkower, p. 149
- ^ Browning, p. 276; Ioanid, p. 233
- ^ Deletant, pp. 127, 314
- ^ Browning, pp. 275, 276, 277. He also notes (p. 275): "Hungarian soldiers seem to have largely abstained from following the German example".
- ^ Final Report, pp. 65–66, 134–136, 176–177, 244–245, 383; Deletant, pp. 128, 142–152, 171, 321–322; Polonsky, pp. 27–28
- ^ Polonsky, pp. 27–28. Partly rendered in Final Report, pp. 127–128; Ancel (2005 a), p. 408; Deletant, pp. 142–143
- ^ Deletant, p. 155
- ^ Final Report, p. 175; Deletant, p. 120
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 468.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 135–136, 244–245
- ^ Final Report, pp. 65–66, 135–136; Deletant, pp. 151–152, 171
- ^ Final Report, pp. 65–66, 135–136, 383; Deletant, pp. 150–152
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66, 136–137, 200–201; Deletant, pp. 124, 146–149, 152–153, 184–187; Ioanid, p. 233
- ^ Final Report, p. 138sqq; Ancel (2005 b), passim; Deletant, pp. 116, 123–126, 141–142, 152–230, 275, 321–341; Ioanid, pp. 231, 233–234; Kelso, pp. 100–101; Ornea, pp. 394–395; Weber, passim
- ^ Final Report, p. 244; Deletant, pp. 153, 322–323
- ^ Final Report, pp. 26, 139–140, 210–211; Deletant, pp. 152–165, 171; Penkower, p. 149; Weber, p. 151
- ^ Final Report, p. 244; Deletant, pp. 152–153, 155
- ^ a b c Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 469.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 139–140, 185–186, 201, 244–246; Ancel (2005 b), p. 232; Deletant, pp. 107–108, 152–155, 207, 329
- ^ Final Report, pp. 144–146, 178–179, 382; Ancel (2005 b), p. 231; Deletant, pp. 127, 128, 170–171, 177–180, 314–315, 329–331; Ioanid, pp. 231, 233–235, 236
- ^ Final Report, pp. 143, 146, 179, 385–386; Deletant, pp. 177–184
- ^ Final Report, pp. 146–150, 293; Deletant, pp. 171, 177–184, 195, 323
- ^ Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 472.
- ^ Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 pp. 471–474.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 161, 165
- ^ Final Report, pp. 226–241, 250, 252; Achim, pp. 168–180; Deletant, pp. 187–196, 331–332; Ioanid, p. 234; Kelso, pp. 98, 100sqq; Weber, p. 151
- ^ Deletant, pp. 73, 187, 254
- ^ Final Report, pp. 225–226; Achim, p. 168; Deletant, pp. 73, 189–190, 254
- ^ Final Report, pp. 226–230; Achim, pp. 171–175; Deletant, pp. 190–192; Kelso, pp. 101, 103–104, 105, 108, 112, 124–127
- ^ Final Report, pp. 228–229; Achim, pp. 172–173; Deletant, pp. 191–192; Kelso, p. 112
- ^ Kelso, pp. 98, 100
- ^ Final Report, pp. 229, 240; Achim, p. 174; Deletant, p. 191; Kelso, pp. 101, 113
- ^ Achim, pp. 173–174; Deletant, p. 191; Ioanid, p. 234; Kelso, pp. 110–114. Ioanid mentions that 40 pounds was the accepted limit.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 231–236, 250; Achim, pp. 175–180; Deletant, pp. 192–196; Kelso, p. 113sqq
- ^ Final Report, pp. 230, 236; Achim, pp. 178, 180; Deletant, pp. 191, 195–197; Kelso, pp. 121–123, 127–128
- ^ Deletant, p. 127
- ^ Final Report, pp. 150, 152
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 393, 398
- ^ a b c Weinberg, p. 239
- ^ Final Report, p. 151; Trașcă, p. 391
- ^ Final Report, p. 247; Deletant, pp. 116–118; Trașcă, pp. 386–389
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 386–389
- ^ Final Report, pp. 151–153, 245; Deletant, pp. 171–172, 253; Trașcă, pp. 392–394. Antonescu's initial order defines the intended victims as "communists", but a later conversation with his ministers exclusively uses "Jews" for the same categories (Deletant, pp. 171–172; Trașcă, pp. 393–394).
- ^ Final Report, p. 150; Trașcă, pp. 389–391
- ^ Final Report, pp. 151–153, 323; Trașcă, pp. 391–394. The detonation was a method of execution ordered by Antonescu personally (Final Report, pp. 152–153; Trașcă, p. 393).
- ^ Deletant, pp. 175–177; Trașcă, pp. 395–397
- ^ Deletant, p. 176; Trașcă, p. 396. Partly rendered in Final Report, p. 246
- ^ Trașcă, p. 396
- ^ Final Report, pp. 150, 153–157, 323; Deletant, pp. 177, 329; Trașcă, pp. 397–398
- ^ Final Report, pp. 153–168, 246, 248; Deletant, pp. 182–184
- ^ Final Report, p. 382; Deletant, p. 127; Oldson, p. 3
- ^ Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, pp. 260–261
- ^ Oldson, pp. 2–5
- ^ Final Report, pp. 179, 381; Weber, pp. 150–151
- ^ a b c (in Romanian) "Moldova critică reabilitarea parțială a lui Antonescu", BBC Romanian edition, 23 February 2007
- ^ Final Report, p. 382; Deletant, p. 127; Ornea, p. 394; Weber, p. 151
- ^ Ancel (2005 b), p. 231
- ^ Final Report, p. 382; Deletant, pp. 127–128
- ^ Ramet, p. 173
- ^ Deletant, pp. 2, 127, 171, 314; Laqueur, p. 206; Polonsky, p. 28; Weber, pp. 150–151, 164
- ^ a b Polonsky, p. 28
- ^ Final Report, pp. 226, 230, 235–237, 241, 382; Achim, pp. 169, 174–175, 179, 182; Deletant, pp. 4, 6, 171, 195, 254; Ioanid, p. 234; Kelso, pp. 109, 130. The authorities themselves counted 24,686 deportees (Final Report, p. 230; Kelso, p. 109). Around 6,000 survivors were recorded alive by late 1944 (Achim, p. 179; Deletant, p. 195; Kelso, p. 130). However, the actual number of survivors may in theory be twice as high (Final Report, p. 236; Achim, p. 179; Deletant, pp. 4, 6, 195).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 68–69, 117–118, 168–172, 243, 249, 383, 385–386; Ancel, p. 231; Boia, pp. 260–261; Deletant, pp. 2, 4, 114–115, 205–229, 235, 334; Ioanid, pp. 232, 233, 235; Oldson, pp. 4–11, 161–163; Ornea, pp. 394–395; Penkower, p. 148sqq. In these definitions, the Romanian Old Kingdom also includes areas of Transylvania and Bukovina still under Romanian rule after 1940.
- ^ Boia, pp. 260–261
- ^ Oldson, p. 162
- ^ Deletant, pp. 275, 354; Oldson, pp. 4–11, 161–163
- ^ Final Report, pp. 68–69, 117–118, 120, 168, 171–172, 201, 210, 253–254, 385; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 231–232, 234–235; Deletant, pp. 100–101, 112–113, 121–124, 125, 206, 213–214, 311; Oldson, pp. 7–8, 10–11, 162; Ornea, pp. 394–395; Penkower, pp. 148, 153–155; Weinberg, p. 239
- ^ Final Report, pp. 117–118, 120, 201, 210–217, 385; Deletant, pp. 108–114, 123–124, 311
- ^ Ancel (2005 b), pp. 231–232, 234–235. Ancel places blame for the discontent provoked among locals on Antonescu's earlier propaganda themes.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 201, 212–217; Deletant, pp. 120–124, 213–214, 216, 312–313
- ^ Deletant, pp. 213–219, 337–338; Penkower, pp. 149–152, 154–157, 161–163
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120, 200, 207–210, 247; Deletant, pp. 71–72, 114, 120–122, 125, 216, 311, 317–318; Ioanid, p. 234; Penkower, pp. 152–153, 157, 161, 169–170
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120, 200, 209–210, 247; Deletant, pp. 114, 311; Ioanid, p. 234
- ^ Final Report, pp. 120, 200; Deletant, pp. 114–115, 124, 184
- ^ Deletant, pp. 118–119; Ioanid, p. 234
- ^ Final Report, pp. 251–252; Penkower, p. 161
- ^ Deletant, p. 119
- ^ Final Report, pp. 218, 383–384; Deletant, p. 100
- ^ Final Report, pp. 252–253; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 231–234; Deletant, pp. 100–101; Ornea, p. 394; Penkower, pp. 153, 161. The decision appears to have been taken by Mihai Antonescu at a time when the leader was incapacitated by his 1942 disease (Deletant, pp. 209–211).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 218–220, 251–252, 383–384; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 232–234; Deletant, pp. 118–119, 203–204, 215–225, 338–340
- ^ Deletant, pp. 116–117, 119
- ^ Deletant, pp. 118–120, 276
- ^ Final Report, pp. 237–238; Achim, pp. 169–170
- ^ Achim, p. 170
- ^ Final Report, p. 229; Kelso, pp. 124–127
- ^ Achim, pp. 184–185
- ^ Achim, p. 180; Kelso, pp. 128–129
- ^ Kelso, pp. 128–129
- ^ Final Report, pp. 236–237, 240–241; Achim, p. 180; Kelso, pp. 129–130
- ^ Final Report, pp. 63–65, 126–127
- ^ Final Report, pp. 133–134; Deletant, pp. 116, 118, 128, 151
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66, 133, 134, 383; Browning, pp. 276–277; Deletant, pp. 146, 150–151, 177; Ioanid, p. 235; Oldson, pp. 2, 10; Penkower, p. 149
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66, 136; Deletant, pp. 128, 151
- ^ Browning, p. 320. Partly rendered in Final Report, p. 140.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66–69, 167–172, 243, 249, 286, 383; Deletant, pp. 205–215, 334–336; Ioanid, p. 234; Weber, p. 150
- ^ Final Report, pp. 66–69, 172; Deletant, pp. 205, 209, 212, 334–335; Ioanid, pp. 234, 235; Penkower, p. 152
- ^ Final Report, pp. 67–69; Deletant, pp. 208–211; Penkower, pp. 152–153
- ^ Final Report, p. 67; Deletant, pp. 121–122, 124
- ^ Final Report, p. 171
- ^ Final Report, pp. 69, 171–172, 243, 249, 383; Deletant, pp. 127, 208–215, 334–336; Penkower, pp. 152–153
- ^ Deletant, pp. 1, 214–215
- ^ Final Report, pp. 69, 253; Weinberg, pp. 239–240
- ^ Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 pp. 475–476.
- ^ a b Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 476.
- ^ Oldson, p. 7
- Red Cross for similar transfer efforts, including the ill-fated ship Mefküre. (Penkower, pp. 148, 153–155, 157; Deletant, pp. 213–218).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 69, 171–172, 383; Deletant, pp. 121–122, 210; Oldson, pp. 4, 8–11, 161–163. According to Penkower (p. 153), Radu Lecca changed orders for the deportation into occupied Poland immediately after being "snubbed" by Joachim von Ribbentrop's employees.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 216, 218, 225–229, 340–341; Penkower, pp. 169–170; Weber, p. 150
- ^ Final Report, p. 237; Achim, pp. 170, 185
- ^ Achim, pp. 183–184; Deletant, pp. 228–229
- ^ Final Report, p. 201; Deletant, pp. 226–228, 253
- ^ Deletant, p. 228
- ^ Final Report, pp. 173–175; Deletant, p. 229; Ioanid, pp. 244–245; Penkower, p. 152
- ^ Final Report, pp. 173–175, 250–251; Deletant, pp. 229, 340; Ioanid, pp. 244–245
- ^ Final Report, pp. 284–285, 320, 324; Deletant, p. 319; Gella, p. 171; King, pp. 93–94; Trașcă, pp. 378–379; White, pp. 157–158
- ^ Haynes, pp. 111–113
- ^ Deletant, pp. 51, 84–85, 93–94, 98, 266–267; Kenney, p. 93; King, p. 94
- ^ King, p. 94
- ^ Deletant, pp. 93–94, 117–118, 206, 234; Kenney, p. 93
- ^ a b Deletant, p. 75
- ^ Deletant, pp. 74, 94, 307
- ^ Deletant, p. 343
- ^ Deletant, pp. 53, 99–100
- ^ Trașcă, pp. 378–380
- ^ Deletant, pp. 98, 264, 307
- ^ Final Report, pp. 292–296
- ^ Deletant, p. 52
- ^ Final Report, pp. 286, 288, 290, 300; Deletant, pp. 212, 337; Ioanid, p. 234; Weber, pp. 158–159
- ^ Final Report, pp. 177, 283, 289–290; Deletant, pp. 161–165, 177
- ^ Deletant, p. 177
- ^ Final Report, pp. 286, 301; Deletant, pp. 211–212, 337; Ioanid, pp. 234–235
- ^ Final Report, pp. 252, 286, 301, 383; Deletant, pp. 198–204, 333, 336
- ^ Deletant, pp. 159–160; Penkower, p. 149
- ^ Penkower, p. 149. According to Penkower, the plans were rejected by Department of State official Cavendish W. Cannon, who called attention to Arab Anti-Zionism.
- ^ Deletant, p. 117
- ^ Final Report, pp. 169–170, 190, 286, 290, 298–300; Deletant, pp. 206, 208; Weber, p. 154
- ^ Final Report, p. 322; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 409–411; Weber, pp. 153–156, 164
- ^ Final Report, p. 238; Achim, p. 174
- ^ a b Final Report, pp. 238–239
- Righteous among the Nationsis found in Final Report, pp. 303–312.
- ^ Penkower, pp. 153, 157, 169–170
- ^ Final Report, p. 298; Deletant, pp. 124, 313; Penkower, p. 161
- ^ Deletant, pp. 216–219, 225–229, 337–339; Oldson, pp. 7–8; Penkower, p. 148sqq
- ^ Final Report, p. 324; Cioroianu, pp. 44–45, 55, 126–132, 151–154; Deletant, pp. 238–239, 344; Gella, p. 172. In addition to the PCR, these included the Ploughmen's Front and the Socialist Peasants' Party (Cioroianu, pp. 55, 126–127, 132, 151–154).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 65, 243; Browning, p. 276
- ^ Final Report, pp. 104–105, 143; Cioroianu, pp. 42–52, 132–134; Deletant, pp. 116, 123, 196–198, 219, 225, 238–239, 254, 303, 311, 332–333, 335–336, 340, 343–344
- ^ Final Report, p. 143; Ioanid, p. 233
- ^ Deletant, pp. 72, 303, 332
- ^ Frankowski, p. 217. According to Deletant (p. 72), 72 communists believed to be Soviet agents or partisans were executed in 1940–1944, from a total of 313 PCR members sentenced to death. The rest had their sentences commuted.
- ^ Final Report, p. 105; Deletant, p. 225
- Jilava Massacre(Deletant, p. 302).
- ^ They included the Iron Guardist Haig Acterian (Ornea, p. 219) and, possibly, the communist Ion Gheorghe Maurer (Cioroianu, p. 134).
- ^ Cioroianu, pp. 43–46, 48–52; Deletant, pp. 332, 344; Roper, pp. 14–16
- ^ Cioroianu, pp. 46, 48–49, 62, 134
- ^ Deletant, pp. 343–344; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 13–16
- ^ Cioroianu, pp. 128, 134–135, 140, 171, 265; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 14–15
- ^ Guran & Ștefan, p. 113
- ^ Neubauer et al., pp. 148, 150
- ^ Neubauer et al., p. 148
- ^ Boia, p. 259
- ^ Final Report, pp. 290–292, 295
- ^ Final Report, pp. 300–301; Deletant, pp. 206–207
- ^ Deletant, p. 237
- ^ Bucur (2006), pp. 184–186
- ^ Deletant, pp. 58, 297, 302
- ISBN 0-8223-1241-7
- ^ "Jehovah's Witnesses in East Central, South Eastern and Southern Europe. The Fate of a Religious Minority (book reviews)" Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine, in LIT Verlag's Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft Archived 24 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine, 1/2007
- ^ Deletant, pp. 73, 254
- ^ Final Report, pp. 313–331; Cioroianu, pp. 130–131, 265–268, 295–297; Deletant, pp. 264, 347, 349; Gella, p. 173; Ioanid, pp. 235–237; Weber, pp. 158–159
- ^ Final Report, pp. 315–316, 324; Deletant, pp. 249–250, 349; Ioanid, p. 235
- ^ Cioroianu, pp. 266–267
- ^ Ancel (2005 b), pp. 235–236, 241; Gella, p. 173
- ^ Kent, pp. 109–110
- ^ Ioanid, pp. 235–236
- ^ Final Report, pp. 316, 339; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 235–256; Weber, pp. 152–159, 164–167. Ancel discusses in particular the influx of Zionists fleeing Soviet rule in the late 1940s, the renewed antisemitic violence of the period, as well as the various clashes between Romanian officials and Jewish community leaders both before and after the communist takeover.
- ^ Deletant, pp. 313, 350
- ^ Deletant, p. 350
- ^ Final Report, pp. 281, 315, 317–318
- ^ Final Report, pp. 337–338; Ioanid, pp. 233, 244; Weber, p. 161
- ^ Final Report, pp. 321–331, 335–339, 347, 385; Deletant, pp. 3–4, 262–263; Weber, pp. 157, 159, 166–167
- ^ Ioanid, p. 236; Weber, pp. 161–163
- ^ Ancel (2005 a), pp. 17–18, 427–428; Deletant, p. 273; Ioanid, p. 236; Weber, pp. 160–161
- ^ Final Report, pp. 240–241; Achim, pp. 170–171, 189
- ^ Boia, p. 119; Bucur (2004), pp. 173–176; Deletant, pp. 243, 265–266, 269, 344; Roper, pp. 13–14, 41–42
- ^ Deletant, pp. 243, 265–266, 343–344; Roper, pp. 13–15, 41–42
- ^ Final Report, pp. 280–281, 283–284, 335–339, 347, 385; Deletant, pp. 264–265; Ioanid, pp. 236–237; Weber, pp. 158–159, 166–167
- ^ Deletant, pp. 4, 264–265
- ^ Final Report, pp. 283–284, 340–348; Ancel (2005 a), p. 423; Boia, pp. 118–119, 336, 340; Deletant, pp. 4–5, 265–269; Geran Pilon, pp. 59–66; Ioanid, pp. 236–245; Oldson, pp. 3–4
- ^ Final Report, pp. 339–340; Boia, pp. 119, 340; Deletant, pp. 4–5, 266–269; Ioanid, pp. 239–240
- ^ Boia, p. 336; Cioroianu, pp. 416–420, 490–492
- ^ Ioanid, pp. 239–240, 245
- ^ Final Report, p. 348; Boia, pp. 160–161, 259, 340; Deletant, p. 269; Geran Pilon, pp. 67, 116; Ioanid, pp. 246, 251; Laqueur, p. 205; Shafir, p. 215
- ^ Boia, pp. 339–341
- ^ Boia, p. 339
- ^ Ioanid, p. 240
- ^ Final Report, pp. 283–284, 302, 345–346; Ancel (2005 a), p. 424; Bucur (2004), pp. 174–175; Ioanid, p. 240
- ISBN 0230502091. Retrieved 7 August 2019.
- ^ Ancel (2005 a), pp. 12–13, 17, 414; Ioanid, p. 236
- ^ Ioanid, pp. 240–241
- ^ Ancel (2005 a), pp. 428–425; Ioanid, pp. 240–241
- ^ Final Report, p. 345; Ioanid, p. 241
- ^ Final Report, pp. 284, 302, 340–348; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 414, 418; Deletant, pp. 264, 269; Ioanid, pp. 241–245; Oldson, p. 3; Weber, pp. 164–165
- ^ Boia, pp. 28–29, 340, 344; Shafir, p. 230
- ^ Boia, pp. 28–29
- ^ Final Report, pp. 319, 322, 330–331; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 270–271
- ^ Boia, p. 259; Deletant, pp. 270–271
- ISBN 0-521-00070-X
- ^ Deletant, p. 4
- ^ Final Report, pp. 349, 352–353, 360–361; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178sqq; Deletant, pp. 269–271, 312; Ioanid, p. 246sqq; Kenney, p. 93; Laqueur, pp. 205–206
- ^ Ramet, pp. 172–173
- ^ Laqueur, p. 205. Both factions have also been known to endorse integral denial (Final Report, pp. 365–367).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 349, 350, 351, 353–354, 359, 373–374; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 6, 269–271; Geran Pilon, pp. 67–71; Ioanid, pp. 246, 250–252; Laqueur, pp. 203–205; Shafir, pp. 214–215
- ^ Final Report, pp. 349, 350, 373; Boia, p. 340; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 6, 269, 281–282
- ^ Deletant, pp. 281–282; Shafir, p. 231
- ^ Boia, p. 340
- ^ Final Report, pp. 350, 353; Ioanid, pp. 246, 251; Laqueur, pp. 205–206
- ^ Final Report, pp. 350–352, 362–363; Ioanid, p. 246
- ^ Final Report, p. 350; Shafir, p. 215
- ^ Deletant, pp. 271, 352. Theodoru stands out for his complete form of Holocaust denial (Final Report, pp. 350–352, 354, 362, 373).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 356, 357–358, 372, 375–376, 378
- ^ Among those cited are Expres Magazin (Ioanid, pp. 129, 250) and Dosarele Historia (Deletant, p. 350) Evenimentul Zilei did the same in the early 1990s. (Weber, p. 150).
- ^ Final Report, pp. 349, 354, 356, 375
- ^ Ioanid, pp. 247, 248
- ^ Boia, pp. 340–341; Deletant, pp. 269–270; Ioanid, pp. 247–250, 251–252; Kenney, p. 93; Laqueur, p. 205
- ^ Boia, pp. 340–341; Deletant, pp. 269, 270; Kenney, p. 93
- ^ ISBN 978-0415564410.
- ^ Deletant, p. 270; Ioanid, p. 247
- ^ Final Report, pp. 360–362; Boia, p. 29; Ioanid, pp. 249–250, 252; Kenney, p. 93
- ^ Final Report, pp. 374–375; Deletant, pp. 271–272
- ^ Final Report, p. 349
- ^ Bucur (2004), p. 158
- ^ Deletant, pp. 2, 3, 5
- ISBN 2-87027-941-8; Bucur (2004), pp. 158, 178–179; Deletant, pp. 4–7, 262, 270–273
- ^ Bucur (2004), p. 178; Ioanid, p. 245. According to Ioanid, these Romanian-sourced interpretations affected historiographic accounts at an international level, when they were republished by the Yad Vashem.
- ^ Final Report, pp. 348, 350, 355–356, 357–359, 361, 367; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 7, 270–271, 352–353
- ^ Final Report, p. 348
- ^ Final Report, p. 353; Deletant, p. 273
- ^ Final Report, pp. 348, 362; Deletant, pp. 273–274
- ^ Final Report, pp. 179, 341, 379; Deletant, p. 272; Ioanid, p. 249
- ^ Final Report, p. 379; Deletant, pp. 281, 253, 352
- ^ Deletant, p. 272
- ^ Final Report, pp. 361, 374; Deletant, pp. 270–273
- ^ Final Report, pp. 9–13, 17–18, 361–362, 386–393; Deletant, pp. 6–7
- ^ a b c d e f (in Romanian) Daniela Șontică, "Biserica lui Antonescu" Archived 13 June 2009 at the Wayback Machine, in Jurnalul Național, 20 May 2006
- ^ a b c (in Romanian) Vasile Gârneț, "Mari Români. Concursul s-a terminat, discuțiile continuă" Archived 12 July 2007 at the Wayback Machine, in Contrafort, October 2006
- ^ a b c (in Romanian) "Reabilitarea numelui mareșalului Antonescu, respinsă" Archived 24 February 2009 at the Wayback Machine,Mediafax, 6 May 2008
- ^ a b (in Romanian) Claudia Ciobanu, "Pentru Chișinău, Antonescu ramîne criminal de război"[permanent dead link], in Cotidianul, 23 February 2007
- ^ (in Romanian) Claudia Ciobanu, "Rusia îl consideră pe Antonescu criminal de război"[permanent dead link], in Cotidianul, 23 February 2007
- ^ (in Romanian) Ionel Stoica, Dan Sebastian, "Bătălie în justiție pe vila de un milion de euro din Predeal a mareșalului Antonescu" Archived 26 May 2009 at the Wayback Machine, in Adevărul, 26 September 2008
- ^ Bucur (2004), p. 172
- ^ Bucur (2004), pp. 172–173
- ^ (in Romanian) Ion Longin Popescu, "Un sat istoric: Antonești" Archived 12 September 2009 at the Wayback Machine, in Formula As, Nr. 823, June 2008
- ^ Deletant, pp. 98, 118, 231
- ^ Deletant, p. 305
- ISBN 0-253-20949-8
- ISBN 0-415-03049-8
- ^ Neubauer et al., p. 174
- ^ Deletant, pp. 267–268; Ioanid, p. 239
- ^ Deletant, p. 268; Ioanid, p. 239
- ^ Deletant, p. 267
- ^ Final Report, pp. 359–361; Bucur (2004), pp. 158, 178; Ioanid, pp. 251–252; Kenney, p. 93; Ramet, p. 173
- ^ Final Report, p. 360; Ioanid, p. 251; Shafir, p. 215
- ^ Final Report, p. 360; Shafir, p. 215
- ^ Ioanid, p. 251
- ^ Bucur (2004), p. 178
- ^ Ioanid, p. 252
- ^ Final Report, pp. 359–361
- ^ Mihir Bose, "Johansson Worried by Romanian Racist Antics", in The Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2005
- ^ "In tara cu noua strazi care poarta numele lui Antonescu, Guvernul tace o saptamana in cazul distrugerii cimitirului evreiesc din Husi". Ziare.com.
- ^ a b Centrul de Istorie și Civilizație Europeană (Academia Română); Fundația Culturală Română (1995). Romanian civilization, Volume 4. Romanian Cultural Foundation; Original: Indiana University Press. p. 95.
- ^ Muzeul Literaturii Române (Romania) (1998). Manuscriptum, Volume 29 (in Romanian). Muzeul Literaturii Române; Original: University of Michigan Press. p. 119.
- ^ ISBN 1-85532-169-6.
- ISSN 1584-1855. Archived from the original(PDF) on 28 March 2012. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
- ISBN 9781780965703– via Google Books.
- ISBN 9781909384545– via Google Books.
- G. G. Harrap, 1970, p. 19
- ^ Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus, Speeches and proclamations, 1932-1945, Bolchazy-Carducci, 2004, p. 2799
- ^ Christopher Ailsby, Combat medals of the Third Reich, P. Stephens, 1987, p. 98
- ISBN 978-952-222-847-5.
References and further reading
- Final Report of the ISBN 973-681-989-2
- ISBN 963-9241-84-9
- Jean Ancel,
- Preludiu la asasinat. Pogromul de la Iași, 29 iunie 1941, ISBN 973-681-799-7
- " 'The New Jewish Invasion' – The Return of the Survivors in Transnistria", in David Bankier (ed.), The Jews are Coming Back: The Return of the Jews to Their Countries of Origin after WWII, Berghahn Books, Providence, 2005, pp. 231–256. ISBN 1-57181-527-9
- Preludiu la asasinat. Pogromul de la Iași, 29 iunie 1941,
- ISBN 973-50-0055-5
- ISBN 978-0-8032-5979-9
- Maria Bucur,
- "Edifices of the Past: War Memorials and Heroes in Twentieth-century Romania", in ISBN 1-85065-715-7
- "Women's Stories as Sites of Memory: Gender and Remembering Romania's World Wars", in Nancy M. Wingfield, Maria Bucur (eds.), Gender & War in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2006, pp. 171–192
- "Edifices of the Past: War Memorials and Heroes in Twentieth-century Romania", in
- Christopher Chant, The Encyclopedia of Codenames of World War II, ISBN 0-7102-0718-2
- ISBN 973-669-175-6
- ISBN 90-272-3452-3; see:
- Letiția Guran, Alexandru Ștefan, "Romanian Literature under Stalinism", pp. 112–124
- John Neubauer et al., "1945", pp. 143–177
- ISBN 1-4039-9341-6
- Deletant, Dennis. "Romania" in The Oxford Companion to World War II edited by I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot (2001) pp 954–959.
- Stanislaw Frankowski, "Post-Communist Europe", in Peter Hodgkinson, Andrew Rutherford (eds.), Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects, Waterside Press, Winchester, 1996, pp. 215–242. ISBN 1-872870-32-5
- Aleksander Gella, Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors, ISBN 0-88706-833-2
- ISBN 1-56000-620-X
- Giurescu, Dinu C. Romania in the Second World War: 1939–1945 (East European Monographs, 2000).
- ISBN 0-415-09661-8
- Arnold D. Harvey, Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793–1945, ISBN 1-85285-078-7
- Rebecca Ann Haynes, " 'A New Greater Romania'? Romanian Claims to the Serbian Banat in 1941", in Central Europe, Vol. 3, No. 2, November 2005, pp. 99–120; republished by University College London's Library Services
- ISBN 0-8018-4969-1
- Michelle Kelso, "Gypsy Deportations from Romania to Transnistria, 1942–44", in ISBN 0-900458-85-2
- ISBN 1-84277-663-0
- Peter C. Kent, The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943–1950, ISBN 0-7735-2326-X
- ISBN 0-8179-9792-X
- ISBN 0-19-511793-X
- Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945, Routledge, London, 2003. ISBN 0-415-16943-7
- David Nicholls, Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion, ISBN 0-87436-965-7
- ISBN 0-87169-193-0
- ISBN 973-9155-43-X
- Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust, ISBN 0-8143-1952-1
- ISBN 0-691-11306-8
- Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Way We Were—And Should Be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the 'Idyllic Past' ", in Timothy A. Byrnes, ISBN 0-521-85926-3
- Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, Routledge, London, 2000. ISBN 90-5823-027-9
- ISBN 0-271-01811-9
- Thomas, Martin. "To arm an ally: French arms sales to Romania, 1926–1940." Journal of Strategic Studies 19.2 (1996): 231–259.
- Ottmar Trașcă, "Ocuparea orașului Odessa de căre armata română și măsurile adoptate față de populația evreiască" Archived 15 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine, in the Romanian Academy George Bariț Institute of History's Historica Yearbook 2008, pp. 377–425
- ISBN 973-28-0392-4
- Watts, Larry L. Romanian Cassandra: Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, 1916–1941 (East European Monographs, 1993)
- Petru Weber, "Die Wahrnehmung des »Domestic Holocaust« im Rumänien der Nachkriegsjahre", in Regina Fritz, Carola Sachse, Edgar Wolfrum (eds.), Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 2008, pp. 150–167. ISBN 978-3-8353-0212-9
- ISBN 0-521-56626-6
Historiography and memory
- Chioveanu, Mihai. "A Deadlock Of Memory The Myth And Cult Of Ion Antonescu In Post-Communist Romania." Studia Hebraica 3 (2003): 102–123.
- Treptow, Kurt W. Romania and World War II ( Center for Romanian Studies, 1996).
- White, George W. Nationalism and Territory. Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe, ISBN 0-8476-9809-2